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Abstract 
This thesis explores the problem of time and the connected problem of history in 
the thought of two Russian thinkers, Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdiaev. After an 
introduction tracing the history of these problems in philosophical thought from the 
ancient Greeks to the twentieth century, the main body of the thesis is divided into 
two central chapters, the first on Bulgakov and the second on Berdiaev. Analysis of 
their two contrasting approaches to these questions reveals opposite formulations of 
the time-history relationship, in which Bulgakov suggested the primacy of history 
over time, whilst Berdiaev maintained the primacy of time over history. Subsequent 
exploration aims to account for these different organisations of the time-history 
relationship, and discusses how for Bulgakov a deterministic pattern of thought about 
time and history was central, and how for Berdiaev a paradoxical approach to these 
problems was dominant. Across this discussion, these thinkers’ various points of 
contact with classical, European and Russian intellectual traditions is highlighted, 
and in this way their thought on these questions is located within an intellectual 
context which extends beyond Russia. 
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Introduction: 
Time, History and the Russian Tradition 
 
What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know.   
If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.  
 
– St.  Augustine, Confessions.
1
 
1. Overview 
 
Thesis objective 
The central objective of this thesis is the exploration of the problem of time and 
the connected problem of history in the thought of two ‘Silver Age’ Russian thinkers, 
Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944) and Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948).2 Although time is 
the primary concern, it is difficult to separate thought about time from thought about 
history in the work of these two philosophers. History is therefore considered 
alongside time, providing a more accurate and fuller account of their thinking. 
Bulgakov and Berdiaev were chosen due to their significant but contrasting 
engagements with these themes, as they present opposite formulations of the time-
history relationship: Bulgakov suggested the primacy of history over time, whilst 
Berdiaev maintained the primacy of time over history. This thesis will aim to account 
for these different organisations of the time-history relationship, looking at their 
various points of contact with classical, European and Russian intellectual traditions. 
                                            
1
 Saint Augustine, Confessions, translated by Henry Chadwick (Oxford, 1992), p. 230. 
2
 Evtuhov’s definition of what constitutes the Russian ‘Silver Age’ will be used: ‘…I use it [the term 
Russian “Silver Age”] to refer more generally to the complex of ideas, literature, art, philosophy, and 
politics that together constituted the cultural explosion of those years [1890-1920].’ Catherine Evtuhov, 
The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious Philosophy (New York, 
1997), p. 3. 
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Time, history and the Russian tradition 
Time is amongst the most basic categories of human existence. In the Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, it is noted that: 
Time is the single most pervasive component of our experience and the most 
fundamental concept in our physical theories.
3
   
The desire to study the nature of time reflects an intellectual demand to understand 
exactly how we live in the world, how our lives are organised, and, ultimately, why 
we must one day die. Overviews of the philosophy of time usually begin with Plato 
(424/3-348/7 BC),4 and can be traced right through to the present day.5 Considering 
the almost continuous presence of the question of time in the history of philosophy, it 
is unsurprising that thinking about time can also be found within the Russian tradition. 
However, as is attested above, in the early twentieth century Russian context such 
thinking may be interwoven with thought about history, creating some specific 
problems.   
The nature of the relationship between time and history was being questioned 
in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe as well as in Russia. After the 
fall in popularity of the metaphysical systems of history put forward by philosophers 
such as Georg Hegel (1770-1831) in the early nineteenth century, many were 
beginning to question whether they should be searching for the ultimate meaning of 
life in history or in time. As Roberts notes:  
But by the end of the [nineteenth] century, the intrusiveness of time and history was 
                                            
3
 Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9 (London, 1998), p. 413. 
4
 See, for example, amongst many others: John F. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient 
Philosophy (Cambridge MA, 1948); Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in 
Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (New York, 1986). 
5
 The twentieth- and twenty-first century engagement with time is vast in terms of scope and is of 
immense complexity. For the most comprehensive overview of contemporary debate on time, see 
Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, 4 vols (Abingdon, 
2008). Also see Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), The Arguments of Time (Oxford, 2006); Robin Le Poidevin, 
Murray MacBeath (eds), The Philosophy of Time (Oxford, 1993). 
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forcing a more radical rethinking. Some sought a new means of access to the 
suprahistorical, while others moved in the opposite direction, taking change, time, 
novelty, and creativity as ultimately real.
6
 
Philosophers such as Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) offered different perspectives on this problem, and 
likewise in Russia both positions that Roberts outlines found support. Indeed, it is 
noticeable that Bulgakov looked for access to the ‘suprahistorical’ via the historical 
whilst Berdiaev, to use Roberts’ expression, ‘moved in the opposite direction’, taking 
the above problems – time, creativity, and change – as some of the most important. 
It should, however, also be noted that both viewpoints suggest a continued 
preoccupation with matters relating to the passage of time, to what time itself means 
and to what it may bring in the future. It is therefore an operating assumption of this 
thesis that whilst the questions they provoke may be different, a significant aspect of 
both discourses – those on time and those on history – relate to a very similar 
philosophical problem. 
The question of history in Russian thought has been studied far more broadly 
by scholars than the question of time. This is partly because Russian philosophy is 
more obviously engaged with the question of history than it is with time: it is easier to 
find reflection on the path of history – specifically Russian history – than it is on 
time. 7  Indeed, Wachtel has spoken of a Russian ‘obsession’ with the past, 8  
                                            
6
 David D. Roberts, Nothing but History: Reconstruction and Extremity after Metaphysics (Berkeley, 
1995), p. 40. 
7
 Notable Russian philosophers writing about history include Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856), particularly 
his Filosoficheskie pis’ma: see P. Ia. Chaadaev, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1989), pp. 15-138; Nikolai 
Danilevskii (1822-1885): see N. Ia. Danilevskii, Rossia i Evropa. Vzgliad na kul’turnye i politicheskie 
otnosheniia slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu (St Petersburg, 1995); Konstantin Leont’ev 
(1831-1891): see K. Leont’ev, Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo. Filosofskaia i politicheskaia publitsistika 
(Moscow, 1996). Vladimir Solov’ev (1853-1900) also wrote at length about history, but there is no text 
in particular in which he expounds his views on history in full. See instead Manon de Courten, History, 
Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment of Vladimir Solov’ev’s Views on History and his 
Social Commitment (Bern, 2004). A debate between Slavophiles and Westernisers, which began in 
the 1830s and involved key Russian thinkers such as Aleksei Khomiakov (1804-60), Ivan Kireevksii 
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Copleston identified the philosophy of history as a key element of Russian 
philosophy,9 and Malinov opened his recent work on eighteenth century Russian 
philosophy with the claim that the philosophy is history is a ‘special’ theme in the 
history of Russian thought. 10  Vasily Zen’kovskii (1881-1962) has also made the 
famous claim that Russian thought is in itself historiosophical: 
Русская мысль сплошь историософична, она постоянно обращена к вопросам о 
«смысле» истории, конце истории и т.п.
11 
However, this should not overshadow the importance of the question of time in the 
Russian mind. As shall be seen in the case of Bulgakov and Berdiaev, time was an 
independent problem, and, further, some of their thinking about history was built 
upon temporal concepts and presuppositions. It will therefore be seen how for both 
these thinkers ideas about time figured significantly in their contrasting philosophies. 
 
Location within Silver Age scholarship 
Scholarship around Russian Silver Age philosophy has had an interrupted 
history. This is partly due to the previously sidelined position of this element of 
Russian philosophy in the Soviet Union: the diversity of the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Russian tradition was hidden by a monotonous official narrative 
which focused on the development of Marxist thought and discredited those who had 
                                                                                                                                       
(1806-56), and Konstantin Aksakov (1817-60), is another a central argument in the history of Russian 
thought, which related primarily to Russia’s place in history. For a definitive account of this debate, 
see: Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-
Century Russian Thought, translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Oxford, 1975). 
8
 Andrew Baruch Wachtel, An Obsession with History: Russian Writers Confront the Past (Stanford, 
1994). 
9
 Frederick C. Copleston, Russian Religious Philosophy: Selected Aspects (Notre Dame, 1988), pp. 
37-57; Frederick C. Copleston, Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev (Notre 
Dame, 1986), pp. 168-200. 
10
 A. V. Malinov, Filosofiia istorii v Rossii XVIII veka (St Petersburg, 2003), p. 7.  
11
 V. V. Zen’kovskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1991), p. 18. 
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spoken out against it. 12  Many significant Silver Age Russian philosophers were 
banned in the Soviet Union and if they were discussed at all it was in the most 
derogatory of terms.13 This meant that until the fall of the USSR, the primary sources 
were scattered, with very few available in translation. It was only after the extensive 
republication of Russian philosophy from the late 1980s onward that work on 
Russian Silver Age philosophy really began in earnest.14  
In spite of this there were still overviews of Russian thought available before 
the 1990s, and some of these were quite brilliant. 15  Indeed, the histories of 
Zen’kovskii and Walicki, for example, remain seminal works. However, such 
accounts typically foreground individual thinkers and movements, rather than themes. 
In the Soviet period, accounts were also written by Western scholars who were 
interested in Russian philosophy, particularly in those philosophers who lived in 
European exile. Some of these works, however, show a variety of methodological, 
intellectual and, sometimes, even linguistic shortcomings. Despite the great increase 
                                            
12
 The classic Soviet description of the emergence of historical materialism is V. E. Evgrafov et al. 
(eds), Istoriia filosofii v SSSR, 5 vols (Moscow, 1968-1988). As Tihanov’s recent essay on the subject 
also notes, ‘Ignoring Marxism [in an overview of Soviet thought] and preferring instead to explore 
solely various non-Marxist discourses would have resulted in a failure to grasp the crucial place of 
Marxism in the often subterraneous dynamics of stability and change which sustained and shot 
through the public discourses of philosophy and the social sciences in the Soviet period.’ Galin 
Tihanov, ‘Continuities in the Soviet Period’, in William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord (eds), A 
History of Russian Thought (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 311-39 (p. 311). 
13
 For example, in G. S. Vasetskii et al. (eds) Ocherki po istorii filosofii v Rossii. Vtoraia polovina XIX i 
nachalo XX veka (Moscow, 1960), the central thinkers of the Silver Age period are mentioned only in 
a series of defamatory essays in which Lenin is cited more frequently than all of them put together. 
Their ideas are not explored, but they are rather just held as examples of ‘anti-revolutionary’, ‘anti-
democratic,’ and ‘bourgeois’ ideology. Within this text, see in particular the essays:  Z. G. Afanas’eva, 
‘Razvitie V. I. Leninym marksistskoi teorii klassovoi bor’by v kontse XIX veka i kritika “legal’nogo 
marksizma”’, pp. 177-200; N. I. Bochkarev, ‘Nekotorye voprosy kritiki V. I. Leninym ideologii 
burzhuaznogo liberalizma v Rossii (1907-1914 gg.)’, pp. 201-23; S. I. Popov, ‘Bor’ba V. I. Lenina 
protiv neokantianskoi revizii marksistskoi filosofii i znachenie etoi bor’boi dlia sovremennosti’, pp. 224-
49. For a similarly pejorative Soviet discussion of Berdiaev in particular, see V. A. Kuvakin, Kritika 
ekzistentsializma Berdiaeva (Moscow, 1976).  
14
 Motroshilova, for example, comments broadly concerning the changes taking place in research in 
the mid-1980s: ‘К тому времени [середине 1980-х гг.] в сфере исследований русской философии 
уже начались – но только начались – преобразования, благотворное влияние которых 
подтвердилось в последующие годы.' N. V. Motroshilova, Mysliteli Rossii i filosofiia zapada. V. 
Solov’ev, N. Berdiaev, S. Frank, L. Shestov (Moscow, 2006). 
15
 See, for example: N. O. Losskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii (Moscow, 1991); Zen’kovskii, Istoriia russkoi 
filosofii, 4 vols; Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism, 
translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford, 1979). 
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in scholarship in the last twenty or so years, the study of Russian philosophy is still 
very much a work in progress.16 Many themes central to the Russian Silver Age 
tradition remain underexposed to proper scholarly analysis. This is particularly true 
with reference to the problem of time, though less so for the question of history.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore novel in a number of respects. Firstly, it 
brings the question of time to the forefront, something which, save for a few isolated 
examples, has not been done with respect to either of these central figures or the 
Russian tradition. 17  Time is a major theme in the history of philosophy and it 
emerges frequently within Russian philosophical discourse in a number of different 
ways. Considering the long history of the problem of time, a discussion of the 
philosophy of time in the Russian context will develop further understanding of how 
Russian philosophy was connected to other bodies of thought. An attempt to connect 
these two Russian philosophers to the philosophical mainstream therefore takes 
precedence over connecting them to other Russian thinkers.  Secondly, this thesis 
represents a continuation of the more recent thematic approach to Russian thought. 
Finally, the comparative dimension of this work is also reasonably novel within the 
context of scholarship on Russian philosophy. Although there are newer examples 
where comparisons between larger numbers of philosophers are evident,18 such a 
                                            
16
 Newer studies have taken on a more thematic approach to the history of Russian thought, whilst 
maintaining a sense of chronology. See, for example: G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole, A History 
of Russian Philosophy (Cambridge, 2010); Edith W. Clowes, Fiction’s Overcoat: Russian Literary 
Culture and the Question of Philosophy (New York, 2004); P. A. Sapronov, Russkaia filosofiia. Opyt 
tipologicheskoi kharakteristiki (St Petersburg, 2000); and William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord 
(eds), A History of Russian Thought (Cambridge, 2010). 
17
 The major exception here is Howard A. Slaate, Time, Existence and Destiny: Nicholas Berdyaev’s 
Philosophy of Time (New York, 1988). Although identifying a number of key themes in Berdiaev’s 
philosophy of time and providing an interesting discussion of Berdiaev’s work in relation to certain 
modern theologians, this work unfortunately fails to bring much in the way of critical discussion of his 
ideas. Its exploration of Berdiaev’s work is essentially a descriptive rather than analytic enterprise, 
and it further suffers from an obvious intent to promote Berdiaev’s philosophy. 
18
 See, for example: Anna Lisa Crone, Eros and Creativity in the Russian Religious Renewal: The 
Philosophers and the Freudians (Leiden, 2010); Motroshilova, Mysliteli Rossii i filosofiia zapada; 
Mikhail Sergeev, Sophiology in Russian Orthodoxy: Solov’ev, Bulgakov, Losskii and Berdiaev (New 
York, 2006); Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox 
10 
 
direct comparison between Bulgakov and Berdiaev is a new undertaking, despite the 
significant confluence of their thought and lives. 
 In order to introduce the themes of this thesis more fully, a quite 
comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of time and the philosophy of history 
will follow, as will a discussion of the concept of ‘temporality’ which is used later on. 
Of necessity, this takes something of the form of a ‘potted history’, but this is 
important as it establishes key parameters and problems in philosophical thinking 
about time and history. In this overview, it should be noted that scholarly overviews 
will be drawn on as much as primary sources. There will also be a more detailed 
account of the Russian exploration of these themes in the nineteenth century, and 
further discussion of Bulgakov’s and Berdiaev’s respective philosophies. 
  
                                                                                                                                       
Theology in a New Key (Edinburgh, 2000); G. F. Garaeva, Sofiinyi idealizm kak istoriko-filosofskii 
fenomen. (Solov’ev V. S., Florenskii P. A., Bulgakov S. N.) (Moscow, 2000). 
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2. The philosophy of time 
Thought about time is, unsurprisingly, varied. However, many of the basic 
questions concerning time which have engaged the philosophising mind were 
defined long ago. Callahan notes: 
Solutions to the problem of time are still proposed to go back in their essentials to one 
of these four ancient views [Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Augustine], even though the 
modern philosopher may be unaware that his theory is not being offered for the first 
time.
19
 
Speculation on the nature of time has by no means been all strictly philosophical, 
although much of it refers back to philosophical concepts. This is evident in scientific 
study: although philosophy did not play a lead role, it still helped define the broader 
parameters and questions that scientists sought to answer. As Disalle notes: 
Indeed, the empirical success of physics itself was made possible, in some part, by the 
achievements of […] philosophical effort…
20
 
Time has played an important role in theology and philosophy, and a rich tradition of 
thought about time exists which bears little reference to developments in physics. 
Below is an outline of the major developments in the history of thought about time up 
to the late 1940s, where the scope of our project is limited by the death of Nikolai 
Berdiaev in 1948. Points of contact with the Russian tradition will be noted when they 
arise, but the central concern is an elaboration of the history of thought about time, 
so it can be better understood how Russian thinking fits into a broader philosophical 
tradition.  
 
                                            
19
 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, p. vii. 
20
 Robert Disalle, Understanding Space-Time: The Philosophical Development of Physics from 
Newton to Einstein (Cambridge, 2006), p. 1. 
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Time and Eternity in ancient philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Augustine 
 Speculation on the problem of time is already present in the philosophy of the 
ancient Greeks. A key theme that emerged from this discussion of time was the 
identification of two contrasting temporal dimensions of ‘time’, on the one hand, and 
‘eternity’, on the other, distinctions which recur throughout theological, mystical and 
idealist approaches to the question. Time, put simply, was taken as the immanent 
temporal dimension and eternity as the metaphysical temporal dimension, with 
varying modes of connection postulated between the two. In the first of the four 
classical approaches to time mentioned above, Plato (428/427-348/347 BC) 
expounded his ideas about time and eternity in the Timaeus dialogue (360 BC).21 His 
fundamental intuition was that time was a moving ‘image’ of eternity.22 Eternity was 
motionless and uncreated, whereas time was created and in motion: 
Time is created primarily by the maker of the universe in the very act of ordering the 
universe in accordance with the eternal model and producing the moving image of 
eternity. But time could not be created unless there were something to proceed 
according to number in the realm of becoming.
23
 
Time proceeds independently according to ‘number’, a regular, external measure.24 
Plato thereby set out two problems that would be of great consequence to the 
development of thought about time. First, he identified a position which would later 
be termed ‘platonism’, ‘substantivalism’ or ‘absolutism’.25 Absolutism is the belief that 
time is, quite simply, absolute: it is not defined by events, space, or change. Time 
flows independently and is contingent on nothing for its passage. This point of view 
found many advocates, including Isaac Barrow (1630-1677) and Isaac Newton 
                                            
21
 Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis, 2000). 
22
 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, p. 18. 
23
 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
24
 Ibid., p. 17. 
25
 In this thesis I will refer to this tradition of thought as ‘absolutism’. 
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(1643-1727), and the debate between absolutism and ‘relativism’ or ‘reductionism’ 
(the countervailing tendency, suggesting the dependence of time on a variety of 
other conditions) would become a defining aspect of the debate about time, 
specifically in natural philosophy and physics.  
 The second position which Plato established regarded the nature of the 
relationship between time and eternity. Unlike the absolute-relative debate, this was 
a question of interest to Russian thinkers, particularly Berdiaev. Plato, understanding 
the general harmony and rationality of the universe,26 asserted that time reflects this 
harmony and is thus an ‘image’ of the order which exists in eternity. Time is a form of 
eternity and bears much likeness to it. For many Christian philosophers, as well as 
for other mystical and idealist philosophers, this would become problematic on 
account of their negative perspective on the empirical world where time exists. A 
final point of note is that thinking about time and eternity, especially in theology, 
frequently led to the construction of historical frameworks which described how 
eternity was reached after a passage through time. This historicising tendency is 
also notably evident in the Russian tradition. 
 Following Plato, Aristotle (384-322 BC) developed a philosophy of time and 
eternity not altogether dissimilar to Plato’s, but one which reflected a greater concern 
with natural philosophy. 27  Perhaps on account of this interest, Aristotle did not 
influence Berdiaev and Bulgakov – or, perhaps, Russian thought more broadly – in 
the same way as Plato. Aristotle, mainly in the fourth book of his Physics,28 studied 
the relationship between motion and time. He concluded that time was the ‘number’ 
                                            
26
 Waterfield notes: ‘In short, Plato’s vision is of a rationally ordered, teleological universe, where 
everything has its place and its purpose.’ Robin Waterfield, ‘Introduction’, in Plato, Republic, 
translated by Robin Waterfield (Oxford, 1993), pp. xi-lxii (p. lv).  
27
 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, p. 40. 
28
 Aristotle, Aristotle's Physics: Books 3 and 4, translated by Edward Hussey (Oxford 1983). 
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of motion, or the measure of a given motion: 
Time defines motion by being the number of motion, but motion defines time as well, 
since we may call time much or little, measuring it by motion.
29
 
This time-motion relation introduced an element of relativity into the understanding of 
time, as it suggested the dependency of time upon motion. Such relativism would 
later be developed in different ways by philosophers including George Berkeley 
(1685-1753) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), and also by scientists such as 
Einstein. However, despite this relativism, for Aristotle time was still fundamentally 
absolute, as Hawking notes: 
 Both Aristotle and Newton believed in absolute time. That is, they believed that one 
could unambiguously measure the interval of time between two events, and that this 
time would be the same whoever measured it, provided they use a good clock. Time 
was completely separate from and independent of space.
30
   
Time is absolute because all motion, in Aristotle’s universe, is a reflection of the 
continuous, perfect motion ongoing in the heavens, started by the creator.31 This 
therefore still indicates time’s reliance on eternity, or something conceptually similar. 
Although suggesting the possibility of temporal relativity, Aristotle does not follow 
through and fully establish it. 
 The nature of the relationship between time and eternity was adjusted 
significantly by Plotinus, who offered his philosophy of time in the third of his 
Enneads.32 Plotinus, like Plato, held that time was created,33 but he could not agree 
with Aristotle that time was only limited to the measure of motion, despite 
                                            
29
 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, p. 67. 
30
 Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (London, 1988), p. 
18. 
31
 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, pp. 86-87. 
32
 Plotinus, Enneads, translated by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1966-88). 
33
 Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London, 1994), p. 117. 
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appreciating the argument: he believed this does not tell us what time is, only what it 
measures. 34  Plotinus argued more grandly that time is the ‘life of the soul’, a 
reflection of the soul’s process of becoming in the world of time.35 Plotinus’ argument 
was built upon his description of a narrative in which the One, the unified centre of 
the universe from which all emanates, expands out through various phases of 
development, stages which will be eventually returned through in a passage back to 
the One. In the realm of eternity, an activity in the ‘soul’, something akin to 
‘discontent’, led to the emanation of time from eternity. 36  Time, however, is 
evanescent. It will be transcended and all will return back to eternity, as Majumdar 
emphasises: 
Perhaps Plotinus’ deepest contribution to the philosophy of time is not so much his 
critically modified vision of Plato’s view as his inference that time is evanescent – an 
opaque iconostasis to be left behind in the soaring flight of the self.
37
 
Plotinus thus offered a development of the time-eternity question, suggesting a 
deeper sense of narrative to the whole process of time and also a sense of the end 
of time. This narrative structure would impact profoundly upon Christian thinking:  
…Plotinus’ treatment of the subject became paradigmatic not for later Neo-Platonists 
but rather for the Christian tradition. The strong distinction Plotinus makes between 
eternity and time, repeated almost word for word by Boethius, is a window between 
Christian and Plotinian creation metaphysics.38  
The narrative that emerges from Plotinus’ philosophy – i.e. a movement from One to 
eternity, from eternity to time, then a movement back to eternity and eventually back 
to One – would complicate in particular Nikolai Berdiaev’s attempt to engage with the 
                                            
34
 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, pp. 105-06. 
35
 Pauliina Remes, Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the ‘We’ (Cambridge, 2007), p. 42. 
36
 Gerson, Plotinus, p. 123. 
37
 Deepa Majumdar, Plotinus on the Appearance of Time and the World of Sense: A Pantomime 
(Aldershot, 2007), p. 5. 
38
 Gerson, Plotinus, p. 116. 
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problem of time, and also played a role in Bulgakov’s thought. 
 The last of the great classical views on time was offered by Saint Augustine of 
Hippo (354-430). Philosophically speaking, he was the most influential theologian of 
the Patristic period, as McGrath comments: 
…[Augustine was] probably the greatest and most influential mind of the Christian 
church throughout its long history.
39
 
Augustine was also the most expansive Christian voice on the problem of time, 
something which is particularly important for the Russian tradition in view of its deep 
connections to Christianity. Indeed, the Bible itself is rather silent on the 
philosophical question of time and eternity, as Barr notes: 
[There is a] very serious shortage within the Bible of the kind of actual statement about 
“time” or “eternity” which could form a sufficient basis for a Christian philosophical-
theological view of time. It is the lack of actual statements about what time is like, more 
than anything else, that has forced exegetes into trying to get a view of time out of the 
words themselves.
40
 
In view of this, Augustine’s views on time, given his influence, become even more 
relevant.  
In terms of his description of time and eternity, Augustine offered little that was 
particularly new. Similarly to Plato, he argued that in (God’s) eternity there is no 
change, whilst in the realm of time change takes place. 41  He also agreed with 
Aristotle regarding the relationship between time and motion.42 In contrast to Plotinus, 
he did not assert that time was any sort of ‘emanation’ from eternity: he held rather 
that God directly created time, and that it was continuously dependent on God’s 
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providential activity for its existence.43 The uniqueness of Augustine’s thought about 
time, however, was not so much in his discussion of time and eternity, but, rather, its 
‘psychological’ aspect, as Knuutila emphasises: 
Augustine is mainly interested in a psychological account of time, but he also takes 
some basic ideas formulated in ancient natural philosophy for granted.
44
 
This psychological element consisted in a description of how the individual 
constructs time. Emphasising the role of memory and anticipation, Augustine 
highlighted how time is a ‘distension of the soul’ – he argued that whilst the past and 
future do not seem to exist, the activity of the soul (i.e. the individual) makes them 
real.45 This is because the past exists in memory and the future exists in anticipation: 
time is therefore made whole by man, in the soul. By placing an emphasis on the 
human relationship to time, Augustine reordered the formulation of time and eternity 
in which eternity simply sat above, or around, time. Instead, he suggested that there 
was something within man, rather than within a more loosely defined eternity, which 
played an ordering role over time. This element of Augustine’s thought will reappear 
in particular in Berdiaev’s philosophy of memory and time, as we will see later. 
 
Medieval philosophies of time: classical philosophy and mysticism 
In the medieval period there were few notable developments made in thought 
about time, although the question continued to be addressed. Augustine remained 
influential over medieval Christian thought,46 as did Plato and Aristotle, who similarly 
figured prominently in some non-Christian philosophy. For example, the Persian 
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philosopher and polymath Avicenna (980-1037)47 wrote significantly on the problem 
of time, but he was still in dialogue with Plato’s Timeaus.48 For the Russian tradition, 
a relevant offshoot of medieval Christian thinking about time was developed by the 
German mystic Meister Eckhart (1260-1327). 
Eckhart described how the metaphysical and divine were absent from the 
created, material world of nature. He suggested that the divine should be sought in 
the spirit, not in the corporeal: 
There are three things that prevent us from hearing the eternal Word. The first is 
corporeality, the second is multiplicity, the third is temporality. If a man had passed 
beyond these three things, he would dwell in eternity, and dwell in the spirit, and dwell 
in unity, and in the desert, and there he would hear the eternal Word.
49
 
He thereby separated time and eternity on the basis of his intuition of a division 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ domains: as time is closely connected to the 
corporeal and material, he suggested that the divine, and by implication the eternal, 
was wholly absent from this time. Indeed, as Clark emphasises: 
God does not exist in the sphere of time but in that of eternity.
50
 
Eckhart was still deeply influenced by Augustine, as Clark also mentions, 51  and 
similarly believed in the fact that time was engendered by God, was a measure of 
motion, and flowed dependent on God’s providence. However, Eckhart’s introduction 
of an impassable divide between corporeal time and divine eternity was significant. 
For Plotinus – arguably the greatest early influence over Christian ideas about time – 
notions of time ‘emanating’ from eternity suggested a close link between the two. 
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Eckhart conversely suggested no such close connection. This would become a 
central distinction in Russian thinking about time.  
 
The modern period: absolutism, relativism and Kantian idealism 
 From the late seventeenth century onwards debate about time began to 
flourish more widely. The most important aspects of this discussion included a 
reinvigorated debate between temporal absolutists and relativists – which as noted 
was of less consequence to the Russian discussion – and Kant’s exposition of 
idealism, which was much more significant for Russian thought.  The absolutism-
relativism debate was developed in arguments between Isaac Newton (1643-1727) 
and a variety of other philosophers, including Berkeley and Leibniz. Although Pierre 
Gassendi (1592-1655) was the first of the early moderns to propose the platonic 
notion of the absolute nature of time and space,52 Newton is perhaps the most famed 
advocate of this position. He states this unequivocally in Principia (1687): 
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably 
without relation to anything external...
53
 
Disalle encourages us to look at Newton’s contributions to the debate over the 
nature of time not in terms of a continuation of philosophical supposition about time, 
but in terms of a fledgling scientific project. 54  However, looking at its broader 
continuities with the philosophical tradition, it is still evident that the philosophical 
groundwork laid down by figures such as Plato and Aristotle figured prominently in 
Newton’s understanding of an absolute time. 
 Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) took the opposite stance to Newton. Already 
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embroiled in debate with him over who should take responsibility for the advent of 
calculus,55 there was a distinct personal dimension to their argument. Leibniz came 
from a philosophical background, and, on the basis of a ‘monadology’ in which the 
substance of all things can be reduced down to the level of ‘monads’, argued that 
time was not independent from substance but was instead a measure of these 
substances: 
Leibniz [...] rejects the philosophical cogency of absolute space and time, arguing 
instead that they are orders or systems of relations.
56
 
Leibniz therefore came to the relativistic conclusion that time was dependent on 
relations within space, prefaced by his notion of the universal ‘monad’ basis of all 
things. 
 George Berkeley (1685-1753), the English idealist philosopher, came to a 
similar conclusion to Leibniz, but by different philosophical means. Also motivated to 
refute Newton,57 Berkeley argued that time was dependent entirely on the mind. 
Time, he held, is nothing more than the succession of ideas:   
A succession of ideas I take to constitute Time, and not to be only the sensible 
measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think.
58
 
This completely subjectivises time: time becomes located within the subject, it is the 
product of consciousness. This would lead Berkeley into trouble as he refused to 
posit any sort of ‘universal’ or ‘meta-’ time outside the time of the individual subject. 
Berkeley postulated that each individual lived in their own ‘private’ time,59 making it 
difficult to understand by what principle two different individuals could agree on a 
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common time. A similar problem, as will be seen later, could be raised with 
Berdiaev’s philosophy of time, but, as an existentialist, for him this was not such an 
immediate concern. As Pitcher concludes: 
Berkeley’s view of time is what we might call a solipsistic one: there is no common time 
for everyone, but a separate, unique time for each mind. There are no temporal 
relationships among the different time series […] because there is no common time in 
which alone such relationships could exist.
60
 
Although Berkeley’s ideas therefore somewhat fall apart on the question of time, they 
demonstrate how an early-modern idealist dealt with the problem.  
 Although the absolute-relative debate was not central to Russian thinking 
about time, the same cannot be said for Kant’s (1724-1804) philosophy. His Critique 
of Pure Reason61 revolutionised thought about time. His principal argument was that 
the human mind, when attempting to deal with the phenomena of the world, or 
things-in-themselves, deploys a priori notions of time and space to organise these 
phenomena: 
Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. With 
regard to appearances in general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent 
them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent 
to ourselves time void of appearances. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is the 
reality of appearances possible.
62
  
Kant is therefore cognisant of the continuing question of the relationship between 
time and space, and of how time relates to objects, but reaches the radical 
conclusion that time is a function of human intellect. While demonstrating a 
sensitivity to the Berkelian thesis that time is held within the mind, Kant’s far more 
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sophisticated solution looks at the role the mind plays in constructing time, not just at 
the extent to which the mind’s activity itself constitutes time. However, on the basis 
of the ideal nature of time, Kant also suggested that time was infinite.63 This worked 
against the original Plotinian intuition concerning the evanescence of time, an idea 
which, as already noted, took on great importance in Christian and, later, in Russian 
thinking about time. Kant, therefore, will be a point of some ambivalence for Russian 
philosophers, in particular Bulgakov, who held Kant in great esteem but did not fully 
agree with him. Berdiaev also held Kant in high regard. 
 Of the subsequent German idealist thinkers – Johann Fichte (1762-1814), 
Georg Hegel (1770-1831), Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854), and Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) – Hegel is of greatest import, but his thinking is of more 
relevance to the historical concerns of this thesis, as are his connections with Karl 
Marx (1818-1883). They will therefore be discussed later. 
 
Discussions of time contemporary to Bulgakov and Berdiaev 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century thought about time diversified 
significantly. Philosophers began to engage with it in new ways, and as a 
consequence of their efforts the philosophy of time is now recognised as a central 
philosophical problem. Many Russian Silver Age thinkers, including Bulgakov and 
Berdiaev, had only an incomplete understanding of what was going on around them, 
a fact which is perhaps not surprising but is also revealing about the development of 
Russian philosophy.  
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Science: Einstein 
 Albert Einstein established the basis of the modern scientific understanding of 
time, outlined in his Special Theory of Relativity (1905) and General Theory of 
Relativity (1916). Although the French mathematician Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) 
was developing similar theses to Einstein, it is the latter who has received credit for 
the theory of relativity. For most, Einstein’s theory of relativity put an end to the 
absolutism-relativism debate which had dogged discussions of time for thousands of 
years. Einstein, as is known, postulated the relativity of time, space and motion. His 
relativity works on the principle of the constancy of the speed of light: whatever 
speed an object is travelling at, light will always travel exactly 300,000 kilometres a 
second faster.64 This would seem to suggest that for two different objects travelling 
at different speeds, light travels at different speeds, as it is exactly 300,000 km/s 
faster than both. However, Einstein refused to accept such a contradiction: 
In a move of breathtaking audacity, Einstein reasoned that, since there were no real 
contradictions, and therefore a light beam cannot have two speeds in the same respect 
and at the same time, the two [objects] must have different times. That is, the [objects] 
each measure the same relative speed for the light beam because time flows differently 
for each [object].
65
 
Einstein therefore concludes that time itself is relative to the motion of an object. The 
faster an object travels, the slower the experience of time.66 Time and space become 
totally interdependent, conceived of as ‘space-time’. The implications of relativity 
would imprint themselves profoundly on future discourse about time. However, at the 
same time, Einstein – at least for us – concludes the narrative of the relationship 
between science and philosophy on time, as from here on physics, becoming more 
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and more complex, bears less and less relation to philosophical concepts and 
debate. It is notable that neither Berdiaev nor Bulgakov make any reference to 
Einstein’s work on time, nor demonstrate any serious understanding of or interest in 
developments in contemporary physics. 
 
Philosophy: concern with the nature of time 
 Two key early twentieth century European thinkers, the British philosopher 
John McTaggart (1866-1925) and the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-
1941), demonstrated a concern with the nature of the ‘flow’ of time itself – that is, 
with the passage of past, present and future. This interest was shared in particular 
by Berdiaev, although he indicated no awareness of McTaggart and an incomplete 
understanding of Bergson.  
In his article ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1908), McTaggart offered a breakthrough 
for the stricter philosophy of time comparable in significance to Einstein’s for the 
physics of time. As a ‘critical’ idealist, McTaggart considered the interior qualities of 
time and boldly asserted his conclusion: 
I believe that time is unreal.
67
   
This positing of the unreality of time was based upon his discussion of what he 
believed to be the two ways in which time was experienced,68 the ‘A’ and the ‘B’ 
series.  In the ‘A’ series, event M is experienced in terms of past, present, and future. 
At time T, M can theoretically be equally future to, present with, or past to time T, 
depending on T’s position with relation to M. In the ‘B’ series, the distinctions earlier 
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and later are used. Event M, for example, will always be earlier than event N 
because M happened first. M is earlier than N, N is later than M and this will always 
be so.69 McTaggart held that both of these forms of time fall into contradiction and 
are thus unreal. In his account of McTaggart’s thinking, Kennedy concisely outlines 
how both series are contradictory. The ‘B’ series, he notes, is contradictory because 
the time distinctions ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ are static. However, time is change: the two 
are incommensurable. Time cannot be the ‘B’ series. 70  The ‘A’ series is also 
contradictory, for two reasons. The first is because an event can potentially be past 
(P), present (N) and future (F), but these are contrary properties. 71  This is 
contradictory. In an attempt to overcome this contradiction, it could be suggested 
that an event is P, N, and F at different times: however, this would demand the 
supposition of another time, a ‘meta-time’, in which an event could be P, N, and F.72 
Likewise, when this ‘meta-time’ is distinguished in terms of P, N, and F, in order to 
escape the original contradiction of the ‘A’ series, a further time, a ‘meta-meta-time’ 
will be required. This will carry on ad infinitum, and so too leads to contradiction.73 
McTaggart thereby finds both series unreal and concludes that time is likewise 
unreal. Although Berdiaev did not reference McTaggart, it is certainly striking that 
Berdiaev, as will be seen later, similarly arrived at the notion of the ‘paradox’, or 
contradiction, of time. 
 Bergson likewise demonstrated a concern with the passage of time, but 
offered a philosophy of time that resonated with many Russian thinkers:74 it was anti-
positivist but was not of the sort of ‘critical’ idealism which frequently proved too 
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laborious for many Russians. Contrary to positivist approaches to the question of 
time, Bergson was concerned with the apprehension of the ‘duration’ (la durée), the 
time of existence which was unified, rather than divided up. This duration is a part of 
the subject: 
…for our past follows us, it swells incessantly with the present that it picks up on its way; 
and consciousness means memory.
75
 
The above recalls Augustine’s thesis on time as a ‘distension of the soul’, as both 
place impetus on the activity of the subject in unifying time. For Bergson, the 
problem relating to time was to establish the inner unity that he felt over-analytic 
approaches to it had destroyed. Therefore, as Pearson recounts, Bergson’s ideas 
about duration are non-mathematical and non-logical: 
Let us begin with the point we wish to get to and arrive at: duration cannot be made the 
subject of a logical or mathematical treatment.
76
 
Bergson set an anti-positivistic paradigm for a treatment of time which would be 
influential in Russia. More broadly he reflected a growing protest against the terms of 
positivism, scientific thought, and perhaps also of the sort of McTaggartian ‘critical’ 
idealism which then were monopolising discourses on time. The intentions behind 
this project resonated deeply with Silver Age thinkers.   
 
Heidegger 
 Martin Heidegger (1889-1971) is the last of the philosophers we want to look 
at here. This is because he developed if not the first, then perhaps one of the most 
influential existentialist readings in the philosophy of time. His philosophy of time is 
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detailed best in Being and Time (1927).77 In a broadly idealist manner, Heidegger 
examined the way in which time depends upon being. Blattner categorises 
Heidegger’s thinking as follows: 
Being and Time intends to develop an account of the sense of “being” by linking being 
with time; time is to be the “horizon” of “any understanding of being at all.” That is, 
being is to be interpreted or understood in terms of time.
78
 
Heidegger identifies various types of time that relate to being: ‘ordinary time’, ‘world 
time’, and ‘orginary temporality’.79 ‘Originary temporality’ is the most primary of these 
forms of time, and the others are built on top of it. In this discussion, Heidegger 
espouses the dependence of time upon being: without being or ‘Dasein’, he argues, 
there would be no time. As Blattner explains: 
…I shall characterise Heidegger as a “temporal idealist.” He believes that without 
Dasein there would be no time. This temporal idealism places him in a venerable, 
philosophical tradition that includes Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant and Bergson.
80
 
Heidegger, then, despite the novelty of his engagement with the problem of time still 
demonstrates some continuity with a broader philosophical trend. He reflects well 
some of the modes that have been identified throughout the history of thought on this 
problem. 
 
 The later twentieth century and beyond 
 The twentieth century has seen a radical development of thought about time 
and also a significant complication of the ideas and terms used. Quantum theory, 
time-travel, space-time, the tropics of time and the direction of time have come to 
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dominate much of the discourse. However, these discussions lie well beyond the 
intellectual context of this project and there is not space to discuss them. For the 
most up-to-date and comprehensive account of the problems related to time which 
engage contemporary philosophers, see The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts 
in Philosophy.81 
 
Summary 
 This overview of the problem of time has sought to describe the broad 
tradition in which we want to locate Russian thought about time. Although it has 
extended into areas of thinking which many Russians were not familiar with – or 
perhaps did not want to be familiar with – it serves to highlight the larger context to 
the themes which preoccupied Russian thinkers in general, and Bulgakov and 
Berdiaev in particular. It will emerge that both Bulgakov and Berdiaev show points of 
contact with a great variety of these thinkers. The temporal theme perhaps most 
central to the Russian tradition is that of the relationship between ‘time’ and ‘eternity’: 
we will see how this is a formative concept not only for Berdiaev, but also for 
Bulgakov. This theme also gives rise to the question of narrative, which introduces 
the problem of the relation between time and history. Next we need to look in greater 
depth at the philosophy of history. 
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3. Philosophy of history 
The primary focus of this thesis is the question of time. However, the Russian 
tradition, in its dealings with the question of time, also demonstrates a degree of 
reliance upon the historical imagination. Thinking about time is therefore frequently 
confused with and complicated by thought about history. As was mentioned at the 
outset, Bulgakov and Berdiaev came to opposite configurations of the time-history 
relationship. Bulgakov conceptualises time as history – for him time is history. 
Berdiaev takes the opposing stance: for him history is time, not the other way round.  
An inclination to connect time and history stems from three philosophical 
assumptions. The first of these relates to a theme in the broader philosophy of time, 
the use of the related concepts of ‘time’ and ‘eternity’. Plotinus arranged these 
concepts into an historical narrative in which time would eventually come to an end, 
and the Christian tradition, following in his footsteps, put them to a similar use. 
Russians emulated this example. As a result eschatology, an orientation towards the 
end, 82  became particularly significant to their discussions of time. Secondly, a 
Russian tendency towards thinking about an ultimate truth or meaning manifested 
itself in the assumption that the ‘meaning’ of time could and would somehow be 
revealed. It was understood that this revelation would take place across time, which 
potentially implied a narrative or history. Both these assumptions or predispositions 
can be allied to the anti-positivist trend in much Silver Age philosophy so that – 
whether they read them or not – many Russians would perhaps not have engaged 
with the overly ‘critical’ successes of McTaggart.  
 This historical thinking did not take place in a vacuum, however, and it bore 
relation to a number of existing historical concepts and trends that need to be 
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outlined. The influence of these historical concepts in Russia constitutes the third 
contributing factor to the Russian predisposition towards historicised treatments of 
time. Philosophers such as Georg Hegel (1770-1831) and Karl Marx (1818-1883), 
offering models in which time was relegated to being something akin to the ‘bearer’ 
of history, rose to great prominence in Russian intellectual circles. As Courten notes:  
…[Hegel’s] contribution was decisive in providing history with an immanent meaning. In 
Russia his views on history were enthusiastically welcomed, and he enjoyed there a 
much more enduring influence than in Western Europe, which makes him a highly 
relevant author to address with respect to philosophy of history in Russia.
83
 
It is apparent, however, that within these sorts of historical systems there is still a 
number of concepts at work suggesting an interest in temporal problems. They 
surround assumptions about the way history moves and flows. A dialogue with the 
problem of time therefore continues, albeit under the umbrella of historical discussion.  
From the above it is evident, then, that we are interested in the ‘speculative’ 
philosophy of history rather than the ‘critical’ philosophy of history, as the latter 
concerns the more ‘prosaic’ writing of history, whereas the former looks at history in 
a more grandiose, potentially metaphysical aspect. The broad developments of 
thought about history need to be outlined so the Russian stance can be better 
understood.  
 
The emergence of historical thinking  
 Whilst there is a long-standing and quite continuous concern with time which 
can be traced across the history of philosophy, the modern historical ‘consciousness’, 
evident in sophisticated discourse on history as an independent intellectual problem, 
emerged relatively recently. The ancient Greeks, for example, believed in the 
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general perfection of the universe and tended to treat the historical process as 
secondary, at least from a philosophical point of view. Similarly, in the Roman period 
and on into Christianity, history as a discipline was not held in high philosophical 
esteem, as Burns notes: 
Nevertheless, throughout the later Hellenistic and Roman period the philosophical 
discounting of history as a scientific discipline continued. One might have expected that 
with the advent of Christianity […] concern to affirm the scientific status of history would 
emerge, but this did not happen.
84
 
Although Christianity laid out a model of history, given specific formulation by 
Augustine,85 this did not trigger philosophical debate about the nature of history. 
Christian thinkers laid down important historical concepts but did not establish history 
as an independent philosophical problem. 
There is a general consensus that thinking about history in its own right began 
some time towards the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the 
Enlightenment. Roberts contends: 
Gradually, and relatively recently, then, it became possible in the Western tradition to 
conceive the world as fundamentally historical in some sense. This new historical 
consciousness achieved articulation as a sequence of thinkers reacted against the 
intellectual mainstream, reformulated with the twin Galiliean and Cartesian 
revolutions.
86
 
The Enlightenment idea that mankind could comprehend the entire world solely by 
use of reason was instrumental to the development of such thought. Giambattista 
Vico (1668-1744) is frequently identified as one of the earliest significant thinkers 
                                            
84
 Robert M. Burns, ‘On Philosophizing about History’, in Robert M. Burns, Hugh Rayment-Pickard 
(eds), Philosophies of History: From Enlightenment to Postmodernity (Oxford, 2000), pp. 1-29 (p. 5). 
85
 Courten, History, Sophia and the Russian Nation, p. 52. 
86
 Roberts, Nothing but History, p. 23. 
32 
 
about history,87 and he demonstrated this Enlightenment optimism that man could 
understand history through only human means. Vico looked at human history as a 
whole, from the emergence of cognitive human life, and thereby placed emphasis on 
history’s immanent aspect, rather than relying on transcendental assumptions 
handed down by theology.88 The study of the development of reason within this 
process was seen as vital to the study of humanity. 
David Hume (1711-1776) then expanded the Enlightenment ambition to 
understand the nature of history. He introduced the problem of determinism in history, 
something which would become a major theme in the philosophy of history, 
particularly in Russian formulations. Determinism is the belief that if one properly 
understands a given system, then one can by analysis of the forces in play 
accurately predict results:  
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of 
nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant 
and universal principles of human nature […] and become acquainted with the regular 
springs of human action and behaviour.
89
 
Hume’s determinism, as the above demonstrates, is non-teleological, and 
demonstrates a weak sense of a historical process leading anywhere. However, it 
enshrines the principle that the results of events can be predicted through rigorous 
analysis of their conditions. Later, teleology would be blended with this determinism 
in potent formulation.  
The broader impact of the Enlightenment assumption of the boundless 
potential of reason was significant: Hamilton has suggested that the result of this 
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optimism led to the beginnings of a search for ‘universal’ history, a key feature of 
later German thought.90 This search consisted in an attempt to map out the complete 
course of history according to a set of rational rules, and it became a common theme 
in nineteenth-century philosophy more broadly. 
 
Nineteenth-century developments: Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche 
 The nineteenth century saw a flowering of historical thought, both of the 
speculative and critical varieties. The latter of these developments, which to a 
significant extent were set in motion by the historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), 
is not of primary interest to us. However, in the figures of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche 
we see three more speculative philosophies of history which asserted great influence 
over the Russian tradition. There are of course many other philosophers from this 
period who introduced important philosophical concepts about history, but they will 
be noted as they arise later. For the time being only these three, pre-eminent figures 
will be covered. 
 The shadow of Georg Hegel (1770-1831) stretches across much nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Russian thought. Hegel’s philosophy of history aspires to 
the sort of ‘universal’ history identified by Hamilton in the previous section. The 
Hegelian understanding of history describes how Spirit, the metaphysical essence, 
takes on a material form and engages in the process of ‘becoming’. This becoming 
forms a teleology within history, as the end of history will be the conclusion of 
becoming. Within this process, every stage is meaningful, and, furthermore, every 
stage is driven by rational necessity. Hegel thus offers a deeply determined, 
teleological vision of history, as Roberts notes: 
But it is equally crucial that for Hegel, the individualities of history form a totality; history 
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is a single, unified, and all-encompassing process. Moreover, that process is 
meaningful, significant. For Hegel, the fact that there is history, with its variability and 
difference, is not a mundane imperfection but is essential to what the world is and 
necessary for its purpose to be achieved.
91
 
Hegel demonstrated what would later be termed ‘historicism’ – a belief in the all-
consuming importance of the historical process, and in the idea that history could be 
fully understood according to rational principles. A century later, the term ‘historicism’ 
would be used by Karl Popper (1902-1994) in the pejorative aspect. He believed that 
such historicism reflected a naïve attempt to understand the inner mechanics of 
history, with the aim to predict the future accurately.92 This allowed, Popper held, the 
totalitarian interpretations of history which provided intellectual justification for 
monstrosities such as Stalinism and Nazism. We will return to Hegel later when we 
come to the thought of Sergei Bulgakov, as Hegel asserted a particular influence 
over his thought about history. 
 The importance of Karl Marx (1818-1883) in the context of Russian history 
needs no introduction. Marx, a student of Hegel’s, is commonly perceived to have 
‘turned Hegel on his head’. What is meant by this is that where Hegel identified a 
metaphysical teleology in history, defined by the becoming of Spirit, Marx identified a 
materialist teleological determinism, working towards the ‘becoming’ of the proletariat 
and the final arrival of communism across the world. The metaphysical was thus 
turned over and replaced by the material. As Hook notes in his study From Hegel to 
Marx: 
[Marx] shares with Hegel the belief that the order of historical events is more than a 
confused record of chance occurrences. He does not claim that anything could have 
happened in the past. Nor that there are unlimited degrees of freedom in the present 
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and the future. But he differs from Hegel in refusing to believe that what did happen has 
any more meaning than what individual men can find in it.
93
 
Marx’s interpretation of history was based upon his ostensibly empirical studies into 
human history around the world. According to the terms of his pseudo-scientific 
theories, the progression of human society through a number of stages, inevitably 
reaching that final stage of communism, was guaranteed by the logic of an internal 
dialectic in which a series of crises produced new world orders. This process was 
both highly determined and driven by a clear teleology. As with Hegel, Marx will also 
be discussed in greater depth later. 
 In contrast to Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche did not offer a ‘universal’ philosophy 
of history in the way they did. Indeed he was contemptuous of the nineteenth-century 
preoccupation with the past: 
Not only is Nietzsche’s contribution to the assault on metaphysics widely recognised, it 
is taken for granted that, as one aspect of that assault, he denigrated “history,” helping 
to undermine the premium on historical modes of understanding characteristic of the 
nineteenth century.
94
  
Nietzsche impacted on Russian historical thinking in that he helped give momentum 
to the intellectual forces moving against the metaphysical, ‘universal’ histories of 
philosophers such as Hegel, forces that were maturing in the late nineteenth century. 
However, Nietzsche still offered a radical call to human potential and freedom in 
history. Putting emphasis on human will, Nietzsche prophesied that man could reach 
beyond his present circumstances and radically alter the future. For example, in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1885), Zarathustra proclaims: 
Yes, a sacred Yes is needed, my brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills 
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its own will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world.
95
 
Nietzsche therefore wanted to detach man from the abstract strictures of 
metaphysical systems and allow him to fulfil his ability to become great. Man in 
Nietzsche’s reckoning was unfettered from the past and free to realise what he 
wanted in history. This great power that Nietzsche invested in man, free from any 
sort of historical coercion, was a powerful idea and many Russians felt compelled to 
either contend or agree with it.  
 
 The discipline and study of history has of course moved on further in the 
twentieth century, including the development of the Annales School and the move 
into modernity and then on to post-modernity.96 However, the Russian thinkers we 
are dealing with demonstrated no awareness of the sorts of developments going on 
in the discipline of history, as they were still very much grounded in nineteenth-
century patterns of thought. 
 
The Christian philosophy of history and the idea of Kairos 
 The final intellectual context which needs to be outlined relates to ideas about 
history in the Christian tradition, as this played a major role in Russian thinking. The 
basic Christian notion of history, laid out in the Bible, is well known: after man fell 
from Eden into the world, human history began. The eventual resolution of this 
history will be the second coming of God and the salvation of all mankind. As has 
already been suggested, this bears significant similarity to the Plotinian historical 
narrative in which activity in the Soul engenders time from eternity (akin to the Fall), 
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but that at some later point this time will disappear and all will return back to eternity 
(the point of salvation). However, looked at in more depth, there are also some 
further, distinctive aspects of the Christian interpretation of history. 
One of these features is the focus on the historical significance of specific 
events, many of which concern Christ. These include his life, death and resurrection. 
McGrath notes: 
The New Testament is saturated with the belief that something new has happened in 
the history of humanity, in and through the life and death of Jesus Christ, and above all 
through his resurrection from the dead. The theme of hope predominates, even in the 
face of death.
97
 
Christianity therefore places great emphasis on what it interprets to be seminal 
events in the passage of history. This identifies specific moments in the course of 
history as taking on particular value, as Ricouer explains: 
…Christian Revelation scandalized the Greeks though the narration of those “sacred” 
events: creation, fall, covenant, prophetic utterances, and, more fundamentally, 
“Christian” events such as incarnation, cross, empty tomb, and the birth of the Church 
at Pentecost.
98
  
Single, critical events therefore mark out providential developments in the Christian 
understanding of history. Many Russian thinkers continued to look for the religious 
importance of critical moments in their own time. 
As noted by McGrath in the quotation above, the importance of the events 
surrounding Christ also engenders hope, which constitutes the foundations of the 
Christian perspective on future history. This hope allows the Christian to believe that 
the future course of history is guaranteed by the providence of God: history will come 
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to an end with the second coming of Christ, with the establishment of the kingdom of 
Heaven and the end of suffering: 
For the Christian, faith in the Lordship of God dominates his entire vision of history. If 
God is the Lord of individual lives he is also Lord of history: God directs this uncertain, 
noble, and guilty history toward Himself.
99
   
This ending to history is eschatological, as has already been explained. In 
eschatology it is expected that the world will change permanently, that a new order 
will come about: 
A characteristic Christian belief, of decisive importance in this context, is that time is 
linear, not cyclical. History had a beginning; it will one day come to an end. 
“Eschatology” deals with a network of beliefs relating to the end of life and history, 
whether of an individual or of the world in general.
100
 
In Christian eschatology there are three central interpretations. The first is futurist, 
believing that the kingdom of God lies in the future and will one day suddenly 
intervene into human life; the second is inaugurated, expressing the belief that the 
kingdom of God has begun to be established in the world, but that it is not yet 
completed; the third is realised, which states that the kingdom of God has already 
been realised in the coming of Christ.101 We shall see how Berdiaev tends towards 
the first of these eschatological interpretations whereas Bulgakov’s thought is closer 
to the second. 
 
The Christian Idea of Kairos 
 The notion of ‘Kairos’, an appointed time of reckoning in which the flow of time 
or ‘Chronos’ is broken down, is also an influential idea in much Christian thought, but 
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it takes on particular significance when eschatological thinking is taken into account. 
The notion of Kairos was originally developed from the Greek tradition of rhetoric: the 
moment of Kairos was considered a particularly opportune moment for an action. In 
Christian thinking, however, it took on a much grander, historical scope. Paul Tillich, 
the twentieth-century theologian, wrote in particular detail about the notion of Kairos. 
He writes: 
We call this fulfilled moment, the moment of time approaching us as fate and decision, 
Kairos. In doing this we take up a word that was, to be sure, created by the Greek 
linguistic sense, but attained the deeper meaning of fullness of time, of decisive time, 
only in the thinking of early Christianity and its historical consciousness.
102
 
If we turn to the Bible, Kairos, although often appearing either in translation or in 
indirect reference, is a pertinent, widespread notion which is often recalled when 
discussing the idea of temporal or historical ‘fulfilment’. In Mark 1:15, for example, it 
is written: 
And saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and 
believe the gospel. 
Similarly, in II Corinthians 6:2: 
For he saith, I have heard thee in a time accepted, and in the day of salvation have I 
succoured thee: behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation. 
Both of these quotations propagate the sense that ‘the time has come’ or that ‘time is 
at hand’, and both also imply an apocalyptic context which is particularly influential in 
Russian thinking. The idea of Kairos, then, will elucidate some of the theological 
background to Berdiaev’s and Bulgakov’s – particularly Berdiaev’s – thought about 
time. It not only describes an apocalyptic context in which a notion of temporal and 
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historical fruition is perceived in particularly clear form, but also describes how the 
flow of history and time is perceived to empty out into a particular moment or 
decision. This is a key notion in any eschatological schema, and figures prominently 
in both thinkers. Kairos also adds an urgency to conceptualisations of time and 
history, something that will be particularly notable when we come to look at Berdiaev 
and Bulgakov in more depth.  
 
Summary 
 A number of key themes emerge from this brief overview of the historical 
concepts that were influential for Russian conceptualisations of history. The first of 
these is the point raised at the outset, namely, as identified by Roberts, that around 
the fin de siècle period, thinkers frequently looked for either a ‘suprahistorical’ or a 
temporal meaning to the world. We will see how the two thinkers who form the 
subject of this thesis tend towards opposite sides – Bulgakov the former, Berdiaev 
the latter. However, at the same time each offers profound speculation on both the 
‘suprahistorical’ and the temporal, so the distinction is not entirely clear-cut. Next, in 
their thought about history the theme of determinism will be particularly contentious. 
The historical determinism which was given shape by philosophers such as Hegel 
and Marx was particularly influential in the Russian context, whether this was 
manifested in a continuation of deterministic thinking or a radical reaction against it. 
Finally, there is the context of the Christian interpretation of history, which offered a 
broad model of history around which other concepts could be implemented. Christian 
ideas featured prominently in both philosophers’ understandings of history. 
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4. The concept of temporality 
 A final concept used in this thesis needs to be highlighted here. An 
investigation into the intellectual concerns of time and history has two aspects. For 
our purposes, the main aspect concerns philosophical conceptualisations of time and 
history. The background to these has been explored. However, a second aspect 
concerns the way in which this time or time-as-history is actually experienced. These 
two aspects – experience and conceptualisation – work to inform one another, and 
therefore exploration of the understanding of temporal and historical experience will 
enrich and deepen analysis of the more complex conceptualisations which are at 
least in part built upon this experience. McKeon, for example, notes how questions 
arising from an experience of time influence a commentator in the way he then thinks 
about time (and, likewise, history): 
 “Time and temporality” is a formula to designate time in its circumstances, substantive 
and cognitive, and it may be used as a device by which to develop and examine the 
variety of circumstances in which “time” acquires its variety of meanings in the context 
of a variety of problems...
103
 
‘Temporality’, then, will better orientate an understanding of a conceptualisation of 
time, as it provides a context in which it can make more sense. Similarly, Koselleck, 
a distinguished contemporary thinker on the question of time and history, has 
proposed that in the historical realm ‘experience’ (i.e. the experience of the present) 
and ‘expectation’ (comparable to a conceptualisation of time or imagination of the 
passage into the future) are intimately linked. He suggests:  
…[they are] indicative of a general human condition; one could say that they indicate an 
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anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor conceivable.
104
  
A close relationship between these two dimensions of thought about time – time and 
temporality – has therefore been posited relatively recently.105 
In the two main chapters of the thesis, there will thus be some space given to 
an account of Bulgakov’s and Berdiaev’s temporal experience. Experience, in this 
reckoning, should not refer to their direct analysis of time or history: it is instead 
concerned with commentary and thought specifically about the present, with how the 
contemporaneous situation is understood and related to. This is what is meant by 
temporality. This means that, when discussing temporality, we will be looking at time, 
history and their related problems, extending forwards and backwards, through the 
prism of the present. It is intended that in this way the two philosophers’ thinking 
about time and history will be better understood as it will be contextualised within a 
more immediate historical timeframe. Analysis in each case will therefore proceed 
via the following model: temporality, as it is a broader, more simple concept will be 
explored first, and then conceptualisations of time and history will be discussed 
afterwards. These conceptualisations will thus be located within a better defined 
intellectual and historical context.  
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5. The Russian Tradition  
 One of the aims of this thesis is an attempt to locate Russian thought about a 
philosophical problem within a broader intellectual context, as it often happens that 
much scholarship focuses on the purely Russian dimensions of a philosophical 
problem. Having said this, there is clearly a significant Russian context that needs to 
be explored, as Russian ideas grew in the context of not only a European, but also a 
Russian background. 
 
Historical thought in Russia  
In the Russian context, historical themes figure more prominently and have 
been analysed in more depth than those relating to time. However, this merely 
reflects the fact that many of the better known Russian thinkers engaged with this 
sort of problem were active in the nineteenth century, when historical thought was, 
as has already been mentioned, in vogue. Bulgakov and Berdiaev were writing when 
such thinking had lost some of its popularity, and it will be quite noticeable how little, 
beyond some broader conceptual and structural similarities, they have in common 
with many of the ideas about time and history that are characteristic of nineteenth-
century Russian thought. The following overview is not intended to outline 
exhaustively the Russian engagement with the problem of history, but rather to 
present the tradition into which Bulgakov and Berdiaev were entering.  
 
Chaadaev, the Slavophiles and Westernisers 
 Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856) is a deeply significant thinker in the history of 
Russian philosophy, and, as Zen’kovskii has noted, he has always attracted the 
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attention of historians of Russian thought.106 In terms of the themes that are being 
examined here, Chaadaev played a particular role in the development of the Russian 
philosophy of history, and also suggested a certain orientation with respect to time. 
Although in many ways different to Bulgakov and Berdiaev, he nonetheless played a 
part in the creation of a Russian mode of thinking in which contemplation of history 
and the end of history became well entrenched.  
As Losskii notes, Chaadaev’s philosophical worldview had a strikingly 
religious character,107 and his ideas about history, which frequently exhibit a French, 
Catholic influence, demonstrate this. Walicki writes: 
At the root of Chaadaev’s philosophy of history were his beliefs in a “universal mind” – 
a collective consciousness evolving within the historical process – and in the 
importance of the social and organizational functions of the Church.
108
 
Within this understanding of history Providence dominated and the role of individual 
will was diminished. Waliciki continues to explain: 
Man can be called truly great and free when he realizes the creator’s design and 
indentifies his own will with the superior will animating history. Unlike the traditional 
Providentialists, Chaadaev thus attempted to reconcile the notion of a transcendent 
Providence with an immanentist philosophy of history.
109
 
This attempt at identifying the transcendent ‘superior will’ immanently within history 
recalls the Hegelian notion of a transcendent spirit subjecting itself to the teleological 
process of becoming within history. Chaadaev’s philosophy of history thereby 
reflected the broad notions about history existing elsewhere in Europe at this point, 
which held that there was a single, universal meaning to history. However, 
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Chaadaev also charged this with a potent sense of religiosity. 
 The second notable aspect of Chaadaev’s philosophy of history, possibly 
more important than the first, was how he linked his ideas about history to a value-
laden, at first deeply negative discussion of Russia’s historical fate. These ideas 
were laid down in 1829-30 in the first of his Philosophical Letters. Here he wrote:  
Дело в том, что мы никогда не шли вместе с другими народами, мы не 
принадлежим ни к одному из известных семейств человеческого рода, ни к 
Западу, ни к Востоку, и не имеем традиций ни того, ни другого. Мы стоим как бы 
вне времени, всемирное воспитание человеческого рода на нас не 
распространилось. Дивная связь человеческих идей в преемстве поколений и 
история человеческого духа, приведшие его во всем остальном мире к его 
теперешнему состоянию, на нас не оказали никакого действия.
110
 
Chaadaev thereby developed a sense of the non-historicity of Russia, and similarly 
the sense that it lay ‘outside time’ – there is a feeling that Russia somehow sits 
outside the providential processes of history. The powerful notion of Russia’s 
historical backwardness, the cure to which Chaadaev believed lay in an emulation of 
the West, would spark one of the defining Russian philosophical debates of the 
nineteenth century. This argument was fought between the Westernisers on the one 
side, who believed that the West held the key to Russia’s future, and the Slavophiles 
on the other, who believed that Russia was unique historically, geographically and 
spiritually, and that these special characteristics marked Russia out as superior to 
the West. They accordingly constructed philosophies of history in which a Russian 
historical ‘mission’ took on universal eschatological significance.111 Chaadaev thus 
postulated a number of ideas which helped to define the tradition in which Bulgakov 
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and Berdiaev later operated. 
 
Danilevskii  
 Nikolai Danilevskii (1822-1885) is another Russian philosopher of the 
nineteenth century who is well-known for the development of an elaborate 
philosophy of history. His philosophy demonstrated Slavophile tendencies and was 
concerned with the historical fate of Russia, but also went beyond this. Danilevskii 
was thus not a conventional Slavophile. As MacMaster puts it: 
[Danilevskii] was no orthodox Slavophil gone astray. He never wholly believed in the 
doctrine.
112
 
Like many other Russian thinkers, his interests were broad, in this case including 
botany, zoology, economics, ethnography, statistics and history. 113  Much of this 
found its way into his philosophy of history. However, his most notable success 
concerns the elaboration of the idea of ‘cultural-historical types’. Bazhov notes: 
Соответственно Н. Я. Данилевский – создатель теории культурно-исторических 
типов, является родоначальником одного из влиятельных направлений в 
философско-историческом мышлении ХХ века.
114
 
After describing the various ‘types’ of cultural-historical civilisations, Danilevskii 
outlined a set of laws according to which these types would develop across history. 
He sets this out in Rossiia i Evropa (1869): 
Начну прямо с изложения некоторых общих выводов или законов исторического 
развития, вытекающих из группировки его явлений по культурно-историческим 
типам.
115
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The broader purpose behind defining these cultural-historical types was to highlight 
the absence of a unified humanity, since Danilevskii held that it is the existence of 
the many different types which characterises human civilisation. History is therefore 
seen as the competing interaction of these types, as Losskii describes: 
Смысл культурно-исторических типов состоит в том, что каждый из них по-своему 
выражает идею человека, и совокупность этих идей есть нечто всечеловеческое. 
Всемирное владычество одного культурно-исторического типа было бы 
оскудением жизни.
116
 
Danilevskii also adds a latent teleological framework to this interpretation of 
competing historical types, by suggesting that the Slavic type will be the first to be 
grounded in all four categories (religious, scientific-artistic-technical, political, social-
economic) of civilisation, and that an all-Slavic federation will rise after the fall of 
European history and the Austro-Hungarian empire.117 
Danilevskii thus developed a philosophy of history which, whilst not 
influencing Bulgakov or Berdiaev in any particularly notable way, demonstrated 
many common Russian themes such as panslavism and eschatology. 
 
Leon’tev 
 The philosophy of Konstantin Leont’ev (1831-1891) resonated with Berdiaev 
in particular, although this was perhaps more due to the former’s anti-equality stance 
and his assertion of the aristocratic nature of truth rather than his philosophy of 
history. Leont’ev’s understanding of history centred on analogy to the growth, 
flourishing, and final decay of an organism. It is outlined in Vizantizm i Slavianstvo 
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(1875).118 Walicki summarises: 
All development, Leontiev argues, passes through three fundamental stages that are 
common not only to biological evolution but also to the evolution of artistic styles or 
whole social organisms. The starting point is a period of simplicity in which a primitive 
homogeneity prevails […] The transition to the second stage is a process of growing 
complexity in which both the whole and its parts become individualized […] this second 
stage culminates in “flourishing complexity,” i.e. maximum differentiation […] From this 
moment evolution passes into [the third stage of] disintegration…
119
 
Leont’ev’s estimation of the historical process was therefore quite negative. He was 
familiar with Danliveskii’s idea of cultural-historical types and willingly adopted it in 
order to demonstrate how the European ‘type’ followed his model of diversification 
and decay.120 He saw such decay chiefly in Western pluralism and liberalism, and 
was deeply concerned that Russia was being forced to follow the European path: 
Но неужели мы, русские (и все славяне, с нами вместе), в самом деле раз 
навсегда уже прикованы к развитой колеснице Запада?.. Неужели нет никакого 
поворота с этого общего пути, на котором уже нет спасения (это, кажется, 
ясно)?
121
 
His solution to the problem of encroaching European liberalism in Russia was bold, 
and is put forwards in his famed thesis of ‘freezing Russia’: 
Нельзя же действовать теперь противу привилегий, которых нет; а надо, 
напротив того, действовать в наше время противу равенства и либерализма... То 
есть надо подморозить хоть немного Россию, чтобы она не «гнила»...
122
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Leont’ev’s response to the movements he perceived in history was one of deep 
reaction: he seemed to suggest that it was possible to arrest a little the movement of 
the historical process outlined in his theory of development by somehow ‘freezing’ 
Russia and stopping the onset of inevitable decay.  
 Leont’ev again highlights the diversity of the Russian nineteenth century 
engagement with the problem of history, and posits one of the more unorthodox 
theories on the nature of history. Continuing the debate begun by Chaadaev, he was 
still eager to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the European developmental paradigm. 
Leon’tev’s suggestion of turning time and history around or ‘backwards’ also 
reappeared in the work of another equally unusual philosopher, Nikolai Fedorov 
(1829-1903), with his task for redirecting human effort from forward-looking progress 
to resurrection of all past generations of forefathers.  
 
Solov’ev 
 The work of Vladimir Solov’ev (1853-1900) had great significance for the 
course of Silver Age philosophy in Russia. He is the most influential of the Russian 
religious philosophers, and emphasised the importance of religion over philosophy, 
rather than the other way round. As Shestov commented in 1927:  
[Соловьев] не от философии пришел к религии, а от религии к философии.
123
 
Both Bulgakov and Berdiaev, but particularly Bulgakov, were influenced by him. 
Solev’ev’s deepest intuition, as Berdiaev notes, concerned the themes of all-unity 
and Sophia: 
У Вл. Солевьева, как и всякого значительного мыслителя, была своя первичная 
целостная интуитция, из которой объясняется все его миросозерцание. То была 
                                            
123
 Lev Shestov, ‘Umozrenie i Apokalipsis’, 1927. In D. K. Burlak (ed.), Vl. Solov’ev: pro et contra. 
Lichnost’ i tvorchestva Vladimira Solov’eva v otsenke russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei, vol. 2 (St 
Petersburg, 2002), pp. 467-530 (p. 486). 
50 
 
интуиция конкретного всеединтсва, связанная со встречей с Софией Вечной 
Женственностью Божией.
124
 
This theme of a search for unity through philosophy, started by Ivan Kireevskii (1806-
1856) and propagated through the Slavophile movement, found an influential 
formulation in the work of Solov’ev. The notion of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, was 
an important concept here and it figured very prominently in Bulgakov’s thought.  
 Solov’ev’s philosophy of history was also influential for a number of Russian 
thinkers, although his thinking on this theme is spread across his work rather than 
being elaborated in a single text.125 A search for unity, manifested in the idea of the 
eschatological, final re-unification of the churches, constituted a core aspect of his 
idea of history, which may be at odds with some more Russo-centric worldviews. 
Within this schema Sophia, a bridge between metaphysical and material, played a 
critical role. These ideas will be discussed in greater depth later when we turn to 
Bulgakov, as they had particular significance for him. 
 
Russian Marxists and Revolutionaries 
 The Russian Marxist and otherwise revolutionary ‘philosophical’ engagement 
with the questions of time and history is understandably quite limited, in view of the 
fact that many of them were social and political activists rather than philosophers. 
Indeed, many would have balked at the suggestion that they were philosophers, as it 
was against such bourgeois pursuits as endless philosophical debate that they 
protested. There are many excellent accounts of the social and political dimensions 
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of such movements.126  However, there is certainly a case to be made that Russian 
Marxists and revolutionaries, in their often pathological focus on the coming 
revolution, espoused a quite distinct philosophy of history. The Marxist dimensions of 
the philosophy of history have already been outlined and need not be repeated. 
What is peculiar to the Russian aspect of this, however, is the frequently 
eschatological, or, more specifically, millenarian tones that the Russian Marxist 
perspective on history took. This locates them within the arena of more traditional 
Russian philosophy, as eschatology was an already well-established intellectual 
commonplace in Russia. Sergei Nechaev (1847-1882), Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) 
and Leon Trotskii (1879-1940) all demonstrate different interpretations of a similar 
predisposition towards such millenarian thought.127 
 
Time in Russian Philosophy 
As has been mentioned above, the scholarly discussion of the theme of 
history in Russian philosophy has been considerably more extensive than the 
discussion of time. Indeed, the specific problem of time as such has attracted 
relatively little attention. However, this should not be taken as an indication that 
Russian philosophers and writers did not engage with the problem of time. To the 
contrary, a Russian concern with time can be traced which exhibits some clearly 
identifiable characteristics. Although it is not my contention that the problem of time 
was an overt theme in the Russian tradition, it is nonetheless possible to 
demonstrate how it has been broached by a range of Russian thinkers. 
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This concern with time comes into particular focus when viewed through the 
prism of an idea discussed by Berdiaev. He postulated an existential time, an interior, 
non-uniform, concentrated form of time. This idea bears similarities to a number of 
other Russian thinkers, who likewise alluded to a special time of almost extra-
temporal experience, where the perceptible, commonplace rhythm of regular time 
breaks down. This form of time is often juxtaposed against a more formulaic, 
external time which is regular, tangible and more commensurate, in certain respects, 
to history. The axiomatic value attached to these forms of time also varies: some see 
the extra-temporal space as problematic, whilst others, like Berdiaev, see it as the 
realm of prophecy and truth. To demonstrate this theme in Russian thought we will 
take four prominent intellectual figures – Chaadaev, Gertsen, Dostoevksii, and 
Tolstoi – who all demonstrate an engagement with these ideas in different ways. 
Chaadaev, as has already been mentioned, developed a philosophy of history 
which was deeply influential in the development of Russian thinking. However, his 
ideas relating to the historical position of Russia suggested a striking philosophical 
assumption concerning the relationship that Russia and the Russian people had with 
time. He suggested that Russia stood beyond the normal flow of time, in a kind of 
“outer” time where the regularities of the normal temporal course are not perceptible: 
Мы стоим как бы вне времени, всемирное воспитание человеческого рода на нас 
не распространилось. Дивная связь человеческих идей в преемстве поколений и 
история человеческого духа, приведшие его во всем остальном мире к его 
теперешнему состоянию, на нас не оказали  никакого действия.
128
 
Chaadaev thus suggests that Russia somehow lay ‘outside time’ and that it was 
untouched by the ‘history of the human spirit’. Although not attributing any positive 
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value to such an extra-temporal position, as Berdiaev later would, Chaadaev is 
nonetheless identifying a special temporal domain in which departure from the 
common rhythms of time and history – where human ideas, generations and spirit 
are all connected – is possible. 
Gertsen, albeit to a lesser extent, at times expresses himself in ways which 
resonate with this idea of temporal deracination. Although a thinker more engaged in 
the empirical world of politics, history, and society, a similar sense of an extra-
temporality or non-historicity emerges in parts of S togo berega (1850), originally 
published in German. In a more romantic mode, we read in the opening dialogue of 
the text: 
 Стало быть, наша мысль привела нас к несбыточным надеждам, к нелепым 
ожиданиям; с ними, как с последним плодом наших трудов, мы захвачены 
волнами на корабле, который тонет. Будущее не наше, в настоящем нам нет дела; 
спасться некуда, мы с этим кораблем связаны на живот и на смерть остается, 
сложа руки, ждать, пока вода зальет, а кому скучно, кто поотважнее, тот может 
броситься в воду.
129
 
Although this is evidently a less overt rendition of the theme that has been detected 
in Chaadaev’s thought, there is a similar suggestion of the possibility of a domain 
lying outside the usual flow of time. It is more grounded in events, as is suggested by 
the physical metaphor of the ship, but the possibility of a step beyond the standard 
experience of time, which relates to the flow of the present into the future, is still 
posited. Later in his life, Gertsen made separate claims which also resonate with the 
Berdiaevian theme of the importance of the present, the experience of the now, 
albeit in a different way. In his essay on Robert Owen, the British socialist, Gertsen 
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discussed how mankind had been liberated from old ideas about history: freed from 
religious ideas and determinism, he wrote, history was ‘going nowhere’, and could 
therefore go ‘wherever possible’. A sense of great historical culmination is thereby 
evinced in the essay, focused on the idea that in the present, in the all-important now, 
man had be liberated from predestination and that anything was possible. 130 
Similarly, then, there is the suggestion of a special, deeper time, connected to the 
present moment, which is opposed to linear models of time and history which 
suggest determination. 
 Although often dealing with the uniform, historical time that we see in texts 
such as Voina i mir, in certain texts Tolstoi also demonstrates a sense of another 
time, a time outside the regular flow of existence. Smert’ Ivana Il’icha provides an 
example of how Tolstoi dealt with this other form of time. In this text, although there 
is a strong sense of the regular time which the living characters experience – Tolstoi 
makes a number of references to the years, months, weeks and days that they live 
by – these temporal markers have less importance for Ivan Il’ich as he moves closer 
to death. Indeed, there is a sense of an eschatological present in this text, the living 
experience of the final moments of death. We see this when, by the end of the tale, 
Ivan Il’ich fully grasps that his death is imminent. He becomes almost fully detached 
from regular time: 
– У! Уу! У! – кричал он на разные интонации. Он начал кричать: «Не хочу!» – и так 
продолжал кричать на букву «у».  
Все три дня, в продолжение которых для него не было времени, он бaрахтался в 
том черном мешке, в который просовывала его невидимая непреодолимая 
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сила.
131
  
There is a sense across this text, particularly evident in the latter stages of Ivan 
Il’ich’s illness, that he experiences time in a different way as he moves closer to the 
end. Tolstoi thus similarly makes use of this ‘other’ time often touched upon by 
Russian thinkers and philosophers, in this case exploring how the dying have access 
to a different temporal space, which symbolises a path to the end. This time 
orientated toward death, this eschatological present, is contrasted to the regular time 
of the living world. 
Throughout much of his work, Dostoevskii makes a similar use of time which 
at moments suggests that two types of time – a normal, regular time and a special, 
concentrated time where such regularity breaks down – exist. In this latter form of 
time there is frequently a pervasive sense of crisis, a theme which will also be 
explored in Bulgakov’s and Berdiaev’s thought as a shared feature. Such a time is 
particularly evident in Idiot, most notably at the points prior to when Prince Myshkin 
experiences epileptic seizures. At these moments, it is almost as if Myshkin slips out 
of the normal flow of time into a moment of understanding and clarity, which in itself 
takes on a prophetic, mystical character: 
Гром, крик, драгоценные осколки, рассыпавшиеся по ковру, испуг, изумление – о, 
что было с князем, то трудно, да почти не надо изображать! Но не можем не 
упомянуть об одном странном ощущении, поразившем его именно в это самое 
мгновение и вдруг ему выяснившемся из толпы всех других смутных и странных 
ощущений: не стыд, не скандал, не страх, не внезапность поразили его больше 
всего, а сбывшееся пророчество! [....] Еще мгновение, и как будто все пред ним 
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расширилось, вместо ужаса – свет и радость, восторг; стало срипать дыхание и... 
но мгновение прошло.
132
 
Dostoevskii uses time as something pliable, and in this instance we see how the 
‘moment’, a single, concentrated temporal point, rises out of the regular flow of time. 
Everything expands, becomes clearer and more acute: indeed the feeling of 
immediacy becomes less important to Myshkin than the clarity and the ‘prophecy’ 
that is revealed in an isolated temporal moment. Bakhtin,133 in his discussion of 
Dostoevskii’s poetics, similarly asserts that this special, concentrated time that 
Dostoevskii uses is a notable feature of his work: 
Только то, что можеть быть осмысленно дано одновременно, что может быть 
осмысленно связано между собою в одно времени, - только то существенно и 
входит в мире достоевского; оно может быть перенесено в вечность, ибо в 
вечность, по Достоевскому, все сосуществует. То же, что имеет смысл как 
«раньше» или как «позже», что довлеет своему моменту, что оправдано лишь как 
прошлое, или как будущее, или как настоящее в отношении к прошлому и 
будущему, то для него не существенно и не входит в его мир.
134
 
In Dostoevskii’s work, this concentrated, simultaneous time, where things intersect 
with eternity and where the distinctions of past and future break down, is a notable 
theme. Again, then, we see a sense of an extra-temporal space where the regular 
flow of time is no longer important. Instead, a more acute, concentrated experience 
of time opens up.  
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5. Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdiaev 
 In this concluding section of the Introduction, we will turn now to the two 
thinkers who are the focus of this thesis. Bulgakov and Berdiaev were two central 
philosophical figures of the Silver Age period in Russia. They were active in the 
major philosophical and religious communities before the revolution and both were 
exiled in 1922 by the Bolshevik regime. 135  In exile they independently took on 
leading roles in the Russian emigration. Bulgakov, when in Paris, helped found the 
St Sergius Orthodox Theological Institute in 1925, and Berdiaev rose to fame as one 
of the most published and translated Russian philosophers in Europe – he was even 
given an honorary doctorate by the University of Cambridge in 1947. 136  As 
philosophers, then, they were both well respected and well-known. 
 Born only three years apart, Bulgakov and Berdiaev lived through the same 
intellectual and social movements developing in Russia and Europe, and occupied 
broadly similar philosophical positions, that is, as religious philosophers. Both moved 
from an initial position of ‘Legal Marxism’, a type of non-violent, gradualist socialism, 
on to a vaguely defined idealism concerned with the philosophical development of 
religious ideas. As young men, they were in some contact with one another and even 
co-edited a journal, Novyi put’, for a short time around 1904-05. 137  In his 
autobiography Berdiaev wrote favourably of his early dialogue with Bulgakov: 
Большую близость я чувствовал с С. Булгаковым, с которым переплетались наши 
пути во внешних проявлениях. У С. Булгакова тогда уже был решительный 
поворот к христианству и православию. Я же стоял еще на почве свободной 
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духовности. Разговоры с С. Булгаковым в Киеве на религиозные темы имели для 
меня значение.
138
 
Both also wrote in the three path-breaking Russian collections Problemy idealizma 
(1902), Vekhi (1909) and Iz glubiny (1918). Given the intellectual and historical 
confluence of their lives, then, a comparison between the two has clear attractions.  
However, when looked at more deeply there are distinct differences in their 
thinking, which makes the contrast between them all the more interesting. Bulgakov 
allowed theology to penetrate into his philosophical worldview much more deeply 
than Berdiaev, and in 1918 he was ordained into the priesthood. His philosophical 
work – the work that this thesis is concerned with – was written before 1918, but still 
demonstrates his greater dependence on religious ideas. Berdiaev, on the contrary, 
was driven to solutions that were perhaps more philosophical than they were 
religious: although still maintaining a strong sense of faith throughout his work, the 
central concepts that Berdiaev dealt with, including existentialism, creativity and 
objectification, were more overtly philosophical than they were theological. Berdiaev 
and Bulgakov eventually therefore became quite distinct from one another in their 
thinking, and the intellectual processes through which this happened are the source 
of significant interest. 
 Most importantly for this project, both had a lot to say on the theme of time 
and history, and both came to very different resolutions of the time-history 
relationship, as has already been mentioned. However, there has been little recent 
work exploring the theme of history in either of these philosophers, and next to 
nothing concerning their philosophies of time. The scholarly background to both 
thinkers will be laid out in greater depth below.  
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Scholarship on Bulgakov and Berdiaev 
There has been a substantial amount of scholarship dedicated to both 
philosophers from the 1950s onwards, but since the 1990s the quality and scope of 
this work has increased. Bulgakov has been lately more popular than Berdiaev, but 
there is still a reasonably consistent stream of scholarship concerned with the latter. 
 
Bulgakov 
 Generally speaking, due to the nature of his thinking as a whole, Bulgakov 
has been written about more in theological journals and books than in philosophical 
publications. However, he was initially also less well known than Berdiaev in broader 
philosophical and intellectual circles. Although Bulgakov appears in overviews of 
Russian thought such as those written by Losskii and Zen’kovskii,139 there is not 
much of significance written about him from the 1950s to the early 1980s. A number 
of reasons could be suggested for this, but most likely Berdiaev’s more outspoken, 
radical style, along with his more flamboyant personality and appearance made him 
more popular on a broader stage. Copleston wrote about Bulgakov in some depth in 
his 1988 work on Russian religious philosophy, 140  and from the 1990s onwards 
Bulgakov began to attract more attention. Catherine Evtukhov is the leading authority 
on Bulgakov outside Russia, and she has written the key intellectual biography of 
him available in English, published in 1997.141 She has also published widely in 
Russian and English on Bulgakov elsewhere.142 Work on Bulgakov gained further 
momentum towards the end of the 1990s and on beyond 2000. A number of essays 
on Bulgakov appear in Kornblatt and Gustafson’s book on Russian religious 
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philosophy,143 and he was the subject of an international conference held in Moscow, 
the papers of which were published in 1998.144 Bulgakov then appears in a spate of 
works in the last decade concerned with various elements of Russian philosophy,145 
and also in the esteemed Russkii put’ ‘pro et contra’ series. 146  As has been 
suggested, much of the focus on Bulgakov has concerned his theological work, 
specifically his ideas about Sophia. Vaganova’s recent study provides an extensive 
discussion of this theme in Bulgakov’s work,147 but there is a wealth of material 
which deals with this and the other aspects of his theology. These are frequently 
discussed in journals, both philosophical and theological, and over the last ten years 
there has been a reasonably consistent stream of scholarship dedicated to his work 
on Orthodoxy.148 Philosophical themes have not been entirely relegated, to which 
Krasicki’s recent article is witness. 149  However, as this overview demonstrates, 
Bulgakov’s thought has been much more the object of theological rather than 
philosophical research. A focus on the themes of history and time in Bulgakov’s 
thought is attractive in that it contributes to the somewhat under-represented body of 
scholarship on Bulgakov’s philosophy, as opposed to his theology. 
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Berdiaev 
 Scholarship on Berdiaev has gone through two distinct phases. The first of 
these was a great flowering of interest in Berdiaev and his work around the end of 
his life and after his death. In Europe and America, scholars, intellectuals, 
theologians and people who felt themselves to be inspired, one way or another, by 
Berdiaev’s writing and thought published a large amount from the late 1940s to the 
end of the 1960s. 150  Unfortunately, much of this work, while not lacking in 
enthusiasm, suffered from a lack of scholarly rigour and objective analysis. There 
was some émigré Russian work on Berdiaev in the 1950s and 1960s,151 and also an 
intriguing analysis from a Soviet intellectual in the 1970s.152 This Russian material 
possessed a greater analytical acumen and clarity, as the calibre of commentator – 
notably figures such as Zen’kovskii and Losskii – was very high. With the passing of 
this generation, however, people became less interested in Berdiaev, and it was only 
in the 1990s and 2000s, with the broader resurgence of interest in Russian Silver 
Age philosophy, that interest began to grow again, in Europe and the USA as well as 
in Russia. In scholarship written in English, there has not been as much recent work 
dedicated to Berdiaev as there has been to Bulgakov.153 However, especially in 
Russia, there has been a reasonably regular flow of articles published about 
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Berdiaev from the 1990s onwards, particularly in the journal Voprosy filosofii.154 Two 
biographies have been published over the last 20 years, both in Russian.155 Again, 
however, some of this modern material has suffered from a lack of critical insight, 
and some work is marked by its shortcomings.156 The scholarly landscape around 
Berdiaev, then, is mixed: it contains some excellent work, but there is also much 
within it that is somewhat lacking in quality.   
 
 As has already been discussed, the problem of time, and time related to 
history, has had next to no exclusive discussion with relation to these thinkers. The 
works that have been dedicated to relevant topics – namely Poltoratskii’s Berdiaev i 
Rossiia,157 and Slaate’s somewhat obscure work on Berdiaev’s philosophy of time158 
– are discussed where they are directly relevant. 
 
Structure and methodology 
 This thesis is separated into two large chapters. The first investigates 
Bulgakov’s philosophy of ‘history and time’, in which he presents history as having 
primacy over time. The second discusses Berdiaev’s philosophy of ‘time and history’, 
where he presents the alternative argument of time having primacy over history. Due 
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to differences in their philosophical exposition and output, a different approach will 
be taken to each philosopher. With Bulgakov, due to his movement into the realm of 
theology in 1918, a shorter chronological period of work is examined (1900-18), so 
the investigative method taken will be diachronic. This means that his philosophy of 
history and time will be discussed as it unfolds, as there are clear, logical steps in the 
development of his philosophy. Berdiaev, however, is a more nebulous philosopher, 
and it has been elected to discuss his thought in a synchronic fashion, as his 
relevant work extends across most of his active life as a philosopher (1900-48). 
Synchronic analysis places greater emphasis on the construction of Berdiaev’s 
thought, as he is rather vague when trying to present his ideas about a subject in full. 
As has been outlined already, the analytic concepts applied to both will be the 
same: first there will be a discussion of their intuition of ‘temporality’, their 
perceptions of the time in which they live. This is intended to contextualise their 
conceptual thought about time and history, which will be discussed afterwards. In 
this way it is hoped that discussion and comparison of Bulgakov and Berdiaev will be 
firmly grounded in their historical and intellectual contexts. The comparative 
dimension will be examined more closely in the second chapter on Berdiaev, as it 
will be more clear when we come to discuss his thought how it contrasts to 
Bulgakov’s philosophy. 
 All quotation will be indented in the style that has been established. For the 
sake of consistency, this will also include quotations shorter than one sentence in 
length. The central subdivisions within chapters will be numbered and underlined, 
the minor headings will be presented in italics. 
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Primary Sources 
 The central primary materials used in this thesis, the works of Bulgakov and 
Berdiaev, are readily available in print. These texts were all originally published 
between the 1930s and 1950s, many of them in France by the YMCA. Since then, 
the majority have then been re-published – some more than once – between the 
1980s and 2000s. All are therefore available in reliable, scholarly editions. No 
complete collected works, however, have been published for either thinker. 
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Chapter 1: Sergei Nikolaevich Bulgakov   
History and Time  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sergei Bulgakov  
Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944) is an exemplary representative of the 
intellectual and philosophical generation in Russia which developed its thought 
across the Silver Age period. Born into a clergyman’s family, Bulgakov renounced 
his faith at an early age and established himself as a recognised Marxist, only to 
then abandon this new belief in 1900 and return over a number of years to 
Orthodoxy. He described this path in the title to his first major publication, Ot 
Marksizma k idealizmu (1903), which recounts an intellectual journey broadly shared 
by a number of his contemporaries. Bulgakov’s writing, in which currents of Neo-
Kantianism, Orthodoxy and Marxism converge, demonstrates a rich and varied 
intellectual heritage. Considering the breadth of his work and the extent of his activity 
in intellectual and political groups in the early twentieth century, Bulgakov can be 
identified as a Russian thinker of particular importance. 
 
Bulgakov’s thought 
Bulgakov’s non-Marxist philosophical work began in 1901 with the lecture 
‘Karl Marks kak filosofskii tip’, and ended around 1917 with Svet nevechernii.159 He 
                                            
159
There exists a broad consensus that Bulgakov’s philosophical work terminated with Svet 
nevechernii. See, for example: V. V. Zen’kovskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii, vol. 2, part 2 (Leningrad, 
1991), pp. 205-06; I. I. Evlampiev, ‘Religioznyi idealizm S. N. Bulgakova: “za” i “protiv”’, in Evlampiev 
(ed.), S. N. Bulgakov: pro et contra, pp. 7-59 (pp. 45-49); Elena Monakhinia, ‘Professor protoierei 
66 
 
then took orders and became a priest in 1918, moving to theological problems and 
beyond the concerns of this project. As Krasicki notes:  
Theological dogma may lead philosophical thought beyond the barriers philosophy 
imposes on itself, to which Bulgakov’s thought is a perfect witness. It can reveal the 
depth inaccessible to philosophical speculation.
160
 
Desire to access this theological ‘depth’ led Bulgakov on to the discussion of 
problems which were not strictly philosophical. Indeed, the suggestion of a superior 
value being attached to the notion of ‘depth’ in itself testifies to the sorts of problems 
one encounters when subjecting more overtly theological material to philosophical 
investigation, and helps explain why we will not trace Bulgakov’s thought beyond 
1917. 
In his philosophy, Bulgakov’s central aim was to construct a religiously 
orientated idealism. This was, however, originally developed out of an attempt to 
refute the Marxism and Positivism that he had once esteemed. Quite differently to 
Berdiaev, who identified his defining philosophical problems in his first works, 
Bulgakov’s philosophy took a number of years to develop, and we see over his 
seventeen-year philosophical period the process through which he came to 
formulate it. Bulgakov’s idealism demonstrated the rule of the metaphysical or God 
over the material world,161 although it still asserted the meaningful existence of the 
material dimension. He maintained that reality is both ‘real’ and ‘ideal’: 
Вся жизненная действительность идеально-реальна во всех своих изгибах, она 
алогично-логична.
162
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Bulgakov searched for a deeper spiritual or religious meaning to govern the broad 
logic of human nature, the world and history. He looked for evidence of this meaning 
in specific material problems: he wrote extensively on the question of economy and 
developed a system whereby economic development took on metaphysical 
significance. However, when discussing the metaphysical, a key element of his 
thinking was the suggestion of a relationship between metaphysical and material 
coloured by deterministic assumptions, in which the metaphysical, through a variety 
of channels, controls what goes on within the material.  
Although looking for a way in which the material and metaphysical could 
coexist harmoniously and in connection – thereby avoiding dualism – Bulgakov still 
maintained a divide between them. In Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) he looked instead 
to connect them through a different intellectual apparatus, and did this by taking on 
the Solovʹevan concept of Sophia.163 Recalling the cosmology of the nineteenth-
century German idealist Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) and ideas from biblical 
scripture about Divine Wisdom,164 Sophiology in Bulgakov’s thought describes how 
everything in the material world possesses a potential metaphysical, divine (or 
Sophiological) value, which is given to them by Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, who 
exists in both material and metaphysical dimensions. Sophia, therefore, acts as 
nexus between the ideal and material realms, making possible simultaneous 
transcendence and immanence and a broader sense of unity. Sophia became a 
central feature of Bulgakov’s developed religious-philosophical worldview. 
 Broadly, then, Bulgakov’s thought is religious-idealist. However, the structure 
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of this thinking, as will be shown, demonstrates a determinist bent much more 
characteristic of Marxist-Hegelian thought, and reflects the influence of a range of 
philosophers outside strictly Orthodox circles. In view of the way in which Bulgakov’s 
thinking developed over time, a diachronic investigation of Bulgakov’s philosophy will 
be favourable. This means that a longer introduction to his thinking is not necessary: 
as we trace the development of his philosophy, its terms will become clear. 
 
The problem of history in Bulgakov’s thought 
In respect of the relationship between time and history in Russian Silver Age 
thinking, Bulgakov demonstrates a continued engagement with the question of 
history, rather than time, and also a historicised approach to a range of different 
philosophical, social and religious problems. For him, the problem of time is viewed 
through the prism of history – his principal thesis on time suggests that time is history: 
…во времени, т.е. в истории.
165
   
It is only later in Bulgakov’s philosophical development, specifically in Svet 
nevechernii (1917), that he gives space specifically to the question of time, and even 
here his grasp of time is still fundamentally historicised:  
«Трансцендентальное» время Канта, или отвлеченная форма времени, 
неизбежно мыслится как потенциальная бесконечность, не знающая ни начала ни 
конца; поэтому его идея и приводит разум к антиномии, обнаруженной самим же 
Кантом. Напротив, конкретное время, которым и является история, имеет и 
начало, и конец...
166
 
Time is therefore conceptualised as history: Bulgakov needs to attach a historical 
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meaning to time and the sense of a beginning and end which he clearly believes is 
implicit in the idea of history. From the above it is also evident that this time 
conceptualised as history has a teleological dimension.  
The nature of Bulgakov’s conceptual engagement with the problem of history 
reveals a number of the trends identified in the introduction to this thesis. An interest 
in history issues both from the influence of Orthodox Christian thinking, which places 
a strong emphasis upon eschatology and historical destiny, and also from the 
influence of Hegelian and Marxist thought, in which historicism and a preoccupation 
with historical process are central to the development of an intellectual worldview.167 
Furthermore, as will be explored when looking at Bulgakov’s sense of temporality, 
the cataclysmic background of early twentieth century Russia and Europe will also 
have provoked thought concerned with the direction and meaning of history. In a 
characteristic reflection upon the greater meaning of history, Bulgakov writes in 1903:  
Является ли человек, а затем человечество, а затем его история только фактом, 
непредвиденным результатом причинных рядов, не имеющим никакой 
внутренней необходимости, а лишь необходимость внешнюю, или же человек и 
историческое человечество несет в себе абсолютную идею, выполняет 
абсолютную задачу, существует не вследствие случайной комбинации причин, а 
во имя нравственной цели?
168
 
As the above suggests, it will be revealed how history provides Bulgakov with a 
means to perceive a system of governing forces which are based not on empirical, 
scientific laws, but rather on religious, metaphysical and divine laws. They direct the 
movement of history, and therefore mankind and the world, towards the coming of 
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the Kingdom of God.  
 
‘Historicised’ problems in Bulgakov’s thought 
Bulgakov’s thinking about history extends into a number of other problems 
which at first glance do not appear to be innately historical. However, due to their 
treatment these questions take on historical significance and can thus be described 
as ‘historicised problems’. They include the questions of evil, freedom, and creativity, 
and it is a point of particular note that these same questions will also take on great 
importance for Berdiaev’s construction of a philosophy of time. Bulgakov’s work on 
these historicised problems reveals with greater clarity a determinist pattern of 
thinking, and, significantly, they will also put the paradoxical nature of Berdiaev’s 
dualistic apprehension of time into starker relief. They are thus a noteworthy set of 
problems in both philosophers’ work, but it remains to be seen how the two 
philosophers will attach different relative importance to them.  
 
Influences on Bulgakov’s historical thought 
 There needs to be some preliminary reference made to the intellectual 
influences that directed Bulgakov’s thought in his work on history, as this allows his 
philosophy to be better understood later. This will be a little different than with 
Berdiaev, as fewer philosophers are immediately obvious as directly influential upon 
him. With Bulgakov, though, the situation is more clear. It should be noted, however, 
that the latter’s level of erudition is intimidating, and that there is not space in this 
study assiduously to trace every intellectual influence which acted upon him. Not 
only in terms of theology, but also in philosophy he was immensely well read and 
moved through a number of different phases of thought. For our purposes we need 
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only outline the principal influences and intellectual contexts which acted upon 
Bulgakov’s thought concerned with history. Although these philosophers have all 
been introduced in the introduction to this thesis, it is still necessary to outline more 
exactly the ways in which they influenced Bulgakov’s thought.  
 Concerning Bulgakov’s relationship to these other thinkers, Zen’kovskii has 
commented, perhaps somewhat unfairly, that: 
…только Соловьев и Флоренский вошли в его внутренний мир властно и 
настойчиво. В мужественном и даже боевом складе ума у Булгакова – как ни 
странно – жила всегда женственная потребность «быть в плену» у кого-либо...
169
  
The idea that Bulgakov needed to be in ‘womanly’ bondage to a particular thinker is 
misleading. Although in terms of historical thinking certain bodies of thought 
demonstrated tenacious influence over Bulgakov’s mind, this does not constitute any 
sort of bondage; a variety of different philosophies placed influence on him 
simultaneously, making bondage to a single one difficult. A conception of reliance 
upon one particular thinker overshadows the influence of another.  
 
Marx 
 Marx’s influence over Bulgakov was most extensive specifically in his work on 
history. Although he abandoned Marxism in 1900 after writing his Magister thesis, 
some of the basic notions in Marx’s thought continued to influence Bulgakov, albeit 
in unexpected ways. Gonzalez, however, encourages appreciation of the fact that in 
the Russian context there was a variety of syntheses of Marxist thought, and that it is 
therefore misguided to look here only for ‘orthodox’ interpretations of Marx:  
In fact, it would be incorrect to assume that ‘‘an orthodox Marxism’’ or ‘‘a Marxist 
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doctrine’’ existed in Russia at the turn of the [twentieth] century. Similarly, it would be 
just as foolish to believe that the brand of Marxism that subsequently developed in 
Russia was anything other than a unique synthesis of eclectic thought.
170
 
Although it would be very wrong to see Bulgakov as a Marxist, he still demonstrates 
how certain elements of Marxist thinking were synthesised into other philosophies, 
even those which were overtly opposed to Marxism.  
In terms of the theme of history, a preoccupation with history was both 
typically Russian and typically Marxist. Marxism is steeped in historical consideration, 
and a central feature of Marxist thought lies in its clear identification of an historical 
schema: 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
171
 
Bulgakov without question inherited this legacy of historicism from his Marxist past, 
and similarly looked to identify a clear historical framework existing in the world. 
Marxist influence is perhaps expressed most clearly in his willingness to describe 
history in terms coloured by determinism: he was happy to limit the scope of a 
number of ‘historicised problems’ – including freedom, creativity, evil, and the nature 
of life itself – to make them correspond to a determined and teleological structure 
which would guarantee the end point of history: 
Это работа Софии над восстановлением мироздания, которую ведет она чрез 
посредство исторического человечества, и ею же устанавливается 
сверхсубъективная телеология исторического процесса.
172
 
Determinism, the determination of activity by given conditions, and teleology, a deep 
historical goal-orientation, thus worked hand in hand with one another in Bulgakov’s 
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thought as they did in Marx’s. 
Although the deterministic elements of Bulgakov’s thought are metaphysical 
whilst Marx’s determinism is material, their arrangement and the way in which they 
work remain similar. The influence of Marx on Bulgakov has been traced in recent 
scholarship. Rodnianskaia, for example, speculates: 
Стоит задуматься над тем, с какой инстинктивной уверенностью молодой 
Булгаков нащупал в марксизме самое для себя главное – исторический 
материализм с его притязанием на предвидение будущего, на гарантированное 
будущее.
173
   
Similarly Garaeva, who on the whole has drawn much more sympathetic conclusions 
on Bulgakov’s relationship with Marxism, still admits that: 
Естественно, у него [Булгакова] тяготение к такой философской системе, которая 
бы дополняла марксизм.
174
 
Marx, then, was a key figure in the formulation of both Bulgakov’s broader 
philosophy and his conceptualisation of history. 
 
Hegel 
 The question of Marx and Bulgakov leads naturally on to the question of 
Hegel and Bulgakov. There are certain aspects of specifically Hegelian thought 
manifested in Bulgakov’s work on history which go beyond Marxian formulations. As 
was outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the first of these is the suggestion of a 
highly determined metaphysical teleology unravelling across history, in which the key 
notion is the historicised concept of becoming. This idea suggests that something 
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complete or perfect is already contained within the relative, but is in a condition of 
self-revelation. If we contrast, for example, statements from Hegel and later remarks 
from Bulgakov the closeness becomes apparent: 
 But the other side of its Becoming, History, is a conscious, self-mediating process – 
Spirit emptied out into Time; but this externalisation, this kenosis, is equally an 
externalisation of itself; the negative is the negative of itself. This Becoming presents a 
slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all 
the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly because the Self has to penetrate and digest this 
entire wealth of its substance […] its fulfilment consists in perfectly knowing what it 
is…
175
 
The above reveals a construction of the history-time relation analogous to Bulgakov’s: 
it suggests, if not the primacy of history over time, then at least a degree of identity 
between the two.  
Considered alongside the quotation from Bulgakov below, we see a similar 
conceptualisation, albeit phrased according to slightly different principles:  
 Божественные энергии, действующие в мире, принадлежат вечности 
Абсолютного, а то, что принадлежит самому миру в его процессе, существует 
лишь в относительном: мир покоится в лоне Божием, как дитя в утробе матери. 
Оно живет собственной жизнью [...] но вместе с тем оно существует в матери и 
только матерью [...] Абсолютное, не теряя абсолютности своей, полагает в себе 
относительное как самостоятельное бытие – реальное, живое начало […] 
Творческое да будет […] делает его началом мирообразующим, с своим особым 
центром, «становящееся абсолютное»...
176
 
These two statements similarly suggest that the process of history is some gradual 
procession of the Absolute or God (with varying definitions of what this constitutes) 
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through a process of becoming in the relative. There is also a similar level of 
abstraction to their description of history: where Marx identifies clear stages in 
historical development, Hegel and similarly Bulgakov demonstrate a willingness to 
talk about history in abstract terms.177  
 
Solovʹev 
Solovʹev’s influence over Bulgakov’s thinking is particularly deep. Along with 
Florenskii, Solovʹev was key in informing much of Bulgakov’s developing religious-
idealist worldview. He recognised this directly: 
 Целостное и последовательно развитое христианское миросозерцание – вот что 
дает современному сознанию философия Соловьева.
178
 
In terms of historical thinking, Solovʹev was integral to the formation of Bulgakov’s 
ideas on a range of problems which would contribute to his philosophy of history. The 
most obvious of these is Sophia, but they also include subjects such as evil, theodicy, 
freedom, and all-unity. Bulgakov’s and Solovʹev’s styles and concerns were also 
quite similar, as is evident in the way in which they approach the problem of history. 
As Courten notes in her recent work on Solovʹev’s philosophy of history: 
…Vladimir Solovʹev never elaborated his conception of history in a systematic manner. 
His numerous views are scattered over many texts, but he neither produced one single 
book devoted exclusively to his views of history, nor addressed the possibility and 
methods of knowing history.
179
 
This could almost be repeated word for word about Bulgakov: despite evincing a 
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consistent concern with history he never addressed it head-on in a way that would 
make analysis more straightforward. 
The basic goals of Solovʹev’s philosophy of history were also quite similar to 
Bulgakov’s. A theme in Solovʹev is the unification of old theological principles and 
modern secular ideas: 
…Vladimir Solovʹev sought to combine the traditional model of history (theology of 
history) with the modern conception of universal process (philosophy of history) into a 
synthesis (Sophiology of history), which, however, remained unachieved.
180
 
We see the same concerns in Bulgakov’s work on history, and in his philosophy 
more broadly. Just like Solovʹev he wanted to combine modern, secular ideas with 
religious ideas about history, as Stöckl notes:  
As a theologian, he [Bulgakov] certainly understood himself as rooted in patristic 
theology, but in his own works he sought to advance from this basis, and to develop a 
theology of engagement with and involvement in the secular world.
181
 
Bulgakov, like Solovʹev, also sought to establish the connection of the old and the 
new through a Sophiological thesis on unity. Solovʹev is thus an example of a 
Russian thinker whose thinking resonated very deeply with Bulgakov. However, it 
should be noted that Bulgakov was not in any sort of thrall to Solovʹev: he made his 
own way to the conclusions he did according to the influence of some quite different 
interests and ideas.  
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Kant 
 Although Kant did not directly influence Bulgakov in terms of his thinking about 
history, he nevertheless exerted a continual influence upon Bulgakov, and would be 
significant when he came to write about time. Kant’s authority in Russian intellectual 
circles was rarely subject to doubt, and, as Kamenskii notes, most Russian thinkers 
of this period felt the need to orientate themselves philosophically in one way or 
another towards him: 
Европейская духовная жизнь конца XIX – начала  XX в. и специфические 
национальные задачи русской философии заставляли всех ведущих авторов 
журнала так или иначе определить свое отношение к учению Канта, испытать 
остроту ума, глубину и силу собственных принципов и убеждений в осмыслении 
системы, в высшей степени сложной и «лукавой».
182
 
Bulgakov was similarly driven to emphasise his connection with the Kantian tradition. 
For example, he writes in 1903: 
 Должен сознаться, что Кант всегда был для меня несомненнее Маркса, и я 
считал необходимым проверять Маркса Кантом, а не наоборот.
183
 
He continues to write at length about Kant throughout his work. There exist 
references to Kant throughout Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912), and Svet nevechernii 
(1917) opens with the Kantian question, ‘How is religion possible'.184 Later, when 
Bulgakov came to write about the problem of time more specifically in Svet 
nevechernii, Kant would become important due to the fact that he presented a 
philosophy of time with which Bulgakov could not agree, but one which he felt he had 
to discuss due to the nature of Kant’s significance to the broader construction of his 
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personal philosophy. 
 
Florenskii 
 Father Pavel Florenskii (1882-1937) deserves special mention when looking at 
Bulgakov’s intellectual background. Florenskii, in the words of Pyman, was a ‘quiet 
genius’.185 Of astonishing intellect, Florenskii distinguished himself in mathematics, 
philosophy, theology, applied physics and linguistics. Like Kant, however, whilst 
Florenskii perhaps did not directly influence Bulgakov’s thought about history or time, 
he was still instrumental in Bulgakov’s broader philosophical, theological and 
personal development. 186  Florenskii’s thought was based on a strong distinction 
between two worlds, the ‘Edenic’ and the ‘non-Edenic’ domains, as Khoruzhii 
explains: 
Иными словами, различие между бытием эдемским и не-эдемским 
воспринимается как различие онтологическое; «детское осуждение онтологично», 
замечает Флоренский. […] На языке «взрослой» метафизики Флоренского, эти 
два рода бытия различаются как бытие, соответственно, заключающее и не 
заключающее в себе определенное ноуменальное (духовное, онтологическое) 
содержание, смысл, идею.
187
 
Although this created a stronger sense of a material-spiritual divide than Bulgakov 
maintained, what is particularly noticeable how Florenskii tied them together. As 
Khoruzhii also notes: 
«Родство» некоторых элементов есть факт онтологический и означает общность 
или тождественность их метафизической сущности, ноуменального содержания. 
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В терминах этого нового онтологического понятия, истинное, совершенное бытие, 
или «Эдем», можеть быть определено тем свойством, что там все – родное всему; 
все сущее в его пределах – будь то люди, природа, формы, запахи, звуки – 
оказывается всюду и полностью соединенным родством, «уроднившимся» друг 
другу, «родимым, родным до сжимания сердца».
188
 
This sense of a deeper metaphysical base to everything that exists in the world is a 
notion we find well expressed in Bulgakov’s work, particularly in his Filosofiia 
khoziaistva (1912). Florenskii also developed important ideas about antinomy 189 
which, again although slightly different to Bulgakov’s apprehension of antinomy in 
Svet nevechernii (1917), further demonstrate how Florenskii influenced Bulgakov’s 
engagement with a variety of themes. Finally, Florenskii was also a major exponent 
of Sophiology, a theological idea which, as has already been discussed, was of great 
significance to Bulgakov for his discussion of the relationship between material and 
metaphysical. As Fudel’ notes, Florenskii similarly interpreted the universal 
Sophiological nature of the world, and this helped provide him with a broader sense 
of unity: 
Идея Богоматери-Церкви-Софии полностью удовлетворяет всечеловеческому 
стремлению ощутить софийное единство мира, и в этой части письма большая 
заслуга о. Павла.
190
 
Sophia figured in a similar way in Bulgakov’s philosophy, and satisfied Bulgakov’s 
similar ‘all-human’ striving to uncover a broader unity in the world.  
 Florenskii therefore influenced Bulgakov at a deeply conceptual level, and 
provided him with some profound intuitions about the nature of the world and the 
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structure of the relationship between metaphysical and material. Further, he 
encouraged Bulgakov to engage with themes such as antinomy, Sophia, and unity, 
thereby reinforcing concerns which Bulgakov, after reading Solov’ev, had identified 
as central.   
  
The Russian tradition 
 Finally, the general influence of the Russian intellectual milieu is evident in 
Bulgakov’s thinking. It is apparent in the nature of the problems he looks at, the way 
he tries to synthesise such a wide range of philosophical ideas, his lack of strict 
analytical discipline and the way he moves through themes and different, often 
unrelated problems so quickly. Indeed, many commentators have termed Bulgakov’s 
thought particularly ‘Russian’: 
 По всей видимости, не может быть философского воззрения более «русского», 
чем теория [философии хозяйства]...
191
 
This ‘Russian’ thinking extends deeply into his engagement with the theme of history. 
It is particularly manifest in Bulgakov’s preoccupation with eschatology: 
eschatological thinking, a focus on the eschaton, the end of history or time, 
permeated Russian thought. It is evident in Russian religious, philosophical, positivist 
and Marxist thinking: we see it in thinkers such as Chaadaev, Fedorov, Solovʹev, 
Berdiaev and many other thinkers of many different creeds. Indeed, as was 
discussed earlier, it could be asserted that ever since Chaadaev the question of 
Russia’s historical destiny and the theme of history have been particularly significant 
to Russian thought. Bulgakov was very much a product of this national tradition. 
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Methodological considerations 
 The treatment of Bulgakov’s thought is divided into two sections. The first 
deals with Bulgakov’s sense of temporality. This exploration is intended to lay the 
ground for and orientate the detailed exploration of Bulgakov’s conceptualisation of 
history, in the subsequent, main section. Further, in the course of the main section, 
when questions relating to Bulgakov’s more limited philosophy of time emerge, these 
will also be discussed. They will not be addressed in a separate section as this would 
break the narrative of his thought. Throughout frequent and quite lengthy quotation 
from Bulgakov is used. This reflects both Bulgakov’s rather expansive style and the 
need for textual support for the argument. 
 Finally, the approach is diachronic, rather than the synchronic approach that 
will later be applied to Berdiaev. This is due to the fact that Bulgakov gradually 
unfolds his philosophy in quite a logical fashion across his philosophical works. After 
his essay-based period of writing between 1900-1911, the two central texts of the 
1910s (Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) and Svet nevechernii (1917)) demonstrate clear 
steps in the elaboration of a philosophy. As we trace this development of his 
philosophy, the gradual development or discovery of a conceptualisation of history 
will unfold. This will not be possible with Berdiaev, who demonstrates no such 
development of ideas. 
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2. Temporality 
Разве мы не являемся свидетелями всеобщей катастрофы, 
крущения всей «новой истории»? 
Iz glubiny, 1918.
192
 
  Investigation will begin by looking at Bulgakov’s sense of temporality, at how 
he understood the nature of the present in which he lived. This will help provide an 
intellectual context in which to orientate his thought concerned with conceptualising 
history later. While Bulgakov purportedly looks at time historically, in terms of history, 
he still demonstrated a keen sense of the present. Indeed, he typically interprets 
present, living experience in an historical context: 
Ибо история не есть лишь хронология, отсчитывающая чередование событий, 
она есть жизненный опыт...
193 
Bulgakov’s sense of temporality thus maintains an historical character.  
 
Temporality as Crisis 
 Looking over the sweep of Bulgakov’s post-Marxist philosophical work, from 
‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ (1901) to Svet nevechernii (1917), a significant 
proportion of his commentary on the present relates to a theme of crisis. This at times 
becomes cataclysmic or apocalyptic. As he remarks in 1909 in his Vekhi essay: 
Русская революция развила огромную разрушительную энергию, уподобилась 
гигантскому землетрясению, но ее созидательные силы оказались далеко слабее 
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разрушительных. У многих в душе отложилось это горькое сознание как самый 
общий итог пережитого.
194
 
If we look at the historical period across which Bulgakov was philosophically active, 
crisis – specifically Russian, but also international – is a pervasive theme. In Russia, 
following the turn of the century, catastrophic failure in the 1904 Russo-Japanese war, 
the 1905 revolution, the failed political projects of the Duma in 1906 and 1907 (in 
which Bulgakov participated), world war from 1914, revolution and then further civil 
war from 1917 testified to continuous social, political and national tumult. A religious 
dimension, connected to the notion of ‘Kairos’ discussed in the introduction to this 
thesis, can also be explored here: the identification of single, defining motions in time 
and history has a distinct Christian appeal. In eschatological, Christian philosophies 
such as Bulgakov’s, it is anticipated that there will therefore be a certain propensity 
towards identifying crisis moments in the passage of history.  
Highly sensitive to these historical developments, Bulgakov also experienced 
other forms of crisis. A personal philosophical crisis began in 1900, when, after the 
conclusion of his Magister thesis, he denounced Marxism. As a result of this, he 
began to see in society around him an encroaching intellectual crisis, most obviously 
manifested in the popular embrace of Marxism and Positivism: 
Между тем при всем богатстве знаний и развития науки современная мысль 
представляет картину внутреннeго распада и бессилия.
195
 
This had deep moral and religious implications, and in the following cataclysmic 
historical events of the early twentieth century Bulgakov also saw refractions of this 
maturing intellectual crisis.  
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 Temporality as crisis therefore underpins Bulgakov’s experience of the present, 
and, consequently, of time. Moreover, it adds a sense of immediacy and purpose to 
much of his writing, and offers some bearing on the direction of his thought regarding 
the problem of history. It serves to crystallise his sense of moral and intellectual 
responsibility, something which is reflected in his assertion that philosophy is 
demanded more than ever in the contemporary world:  
А философия необходима для жизни теперь более, чем когда-либо, благодаря 
некоторым особенностям переживаемого нами исторического момента.
196
  
It should be noted that this sense of crisis would not then lead directly to the 
formulation of a philosophy of history, but rather created a mood in which the 
development of a philosophy of history, or at least the engagement with historical 
themes, seemed a sharper, more immediate problem.  
The theme of crisis will be identified across Bulgakov’s philosophical work. 
However, this will not follow any particular diachronic logic, as what is being 
highlighted is the synchronic pervasiveness of this mood – emphasis is not being 
placed upon its development. Having said this, particular attention will be paid to 
‘Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo’ (Bulgakov’s 1909 Vekhi contribution) and ‘Na piru 
bogov’ (his 1917 Iz glubiny contribution), as these two texts, which are not featured in 
particular depth in later analysis, demonstrate particularly vibrant engagements with 
the theme of crisis. 
 
Historicised crisis 
 An important characteristic of the prevailing sense of crisis is that it is deeply 
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historicised – meaning that Bulgakov is acutely aware of the historical proportions of 
the present. For example, he writes in the introduction to Dva grada (written in 
October 1910): 
 Настоящая эпоха представляет собой в некоторых отношениях критический и 
поворотный период в русской истории [...] настоящее знаменует собой 
критическую эпоху в нашем культурном самосознании.
197
  
The present is, therefore, described as a critical epoch – meaning that Bulgakov, as 
well as identifying the prolonged nature of this present crisis, is also imbuing it with 
an innately historical dimension. This will be similar to Berdiaev, who in more overt 
ways identifies an ‘epoch of crises’. It is important to note, however, that this sense of 
historicised crisis predates obvious national or historical events, including both the 
1904 war and 1905 revolution, although it no doubt draws on the fin-de-siècle mood 
of the times. He writes in 1903: 
Ради необыкновенной, можно даже сказать – торжественной, важности 
переживаемого исторического момента и ради его необыкновенной трудности 
нам нужно рождающее силу единение, чтобы дружно сомкнутыми рядами идти 
навстречу багровеющему востоку, где уже занимается новый день русской 
истории.
198
 
A feature of this sense of historical crisis, as is described above, is also that 
there is something fundamentally unusual (neobyknovennoi) going on in the present. 
The difficulties of the present moment are – even before any of the great national 
historical upheavals – portrayed as unusually stark. This sense of the strangeness of 
the present, of things being out of equilibrium, is maintained elsewhere in Bulgakov’s 
work: 
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 Те элементы, которые нормально должны находиться в гармонии, теперь 
враждуют между собою или находятся в состоянии взаимного отчуждения…
199     
There exists, then, the idea that the current historical moment is deeply 
significant, that the channels of the past and future lead to and from this decisive 
historical point. Bulgakov, again in 1910, refers to this moment as an historical 
‘conjuncture’: 
Как бы ни было велико фактическое влияние этой силы [черносотенства] в 
настоящий момент благодаря исторической конъюнктуре, все-таки это есть сила 
прошлого...
200
 
Conjuncture is here a revealing concept, as it reinforces the sense that Bulgakov 
perceives himself to be standing at some sort of great crossroads on the paths of 
history, where historical fate hangs in the balance. 
  A sense of historicised crisis is evinced particularly clearly in Bulgakov’s Vekhi 
(1909) and Iz glubiny (1918) contributions. Here we find a particularly vivid 
demonstration of Bulgakov’s sense of history leading up to a critical point. For 
example, in ‘Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo’, he writes: 
Вдумываясь в пережитое нами за последние годы, нельзя видеть во всем этом  
историческую случайность или одну лишь игру стихийных сил. Здесь произнесен 
был исторический суд, была сделана оценка различным участникам исторической 
драмы, подведен итог целой исторической эпохи.
201
 
Epochal and almost biblical significance is attached to the present situation through 
the supposition of some sort of ‘historical judgement’ (istoricheskii sud) being made in 
the present. 
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This reaches a zenith in ‘Na piru bogov’ (1918). This piece, recalling of 
Solovʹev’s poem ‘Tri razgovora’, is composed of six – rather than of three in ‘Tri 
razgovora’ – dialogues between characters representing different aspects of Russian 
society. The apocalyptic tone of this text is captured well in a peroration made, in the 
first dialogue, by the ‘public figure’: 
 Общественный деятель: Погибло, все погибло! Умерло все, и мы умерли, 
бродим, как живые трупы и мертвые души. До сих пор ничего я не понимаю, мой 
ум отказывается вместить. Была могучая держава, нужная друзьям, страшная 
недругам, а теперь – это гниющая падаль, от которой отваливается кусок за 
куском на радость всему слетевшемуся воронью. На месте шестой части света 
оказалась зловонная, зиряющая дыра.
202
 
This sort of fearful, apocalyptic outcry is repeated across ‘Na piru bogov’. Again, we 
see the apprehension of the contemporary crisis in the broadest terms:  
 Беженец: В действительности этот кризис идет гораздо глубже. Его терпит вся 
европейская культура, и русская интеллигентция есть лишь здесь наиболее 
чуткий барометр. И он происходит не от войны, но от общих духовных причин. 
Можно сказать, что и сама война скорее явилась следствием, а вместе и 
симптомом этого кризиса.
203
 
 Also, in the translation of a sense of temporality as crisis into a perception of 
history as crisis (amply manifested in historical events), it is not difficult to see, at 
least in part, the influence of Marx alongside that of religious eschatology. 
 
Intellectual crisis 
 A central aspect of the current or impending calamity, in Bulgakov’s reckoning, 
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consists in the intellectual degeneration of his contemporaries. The intelligentsia, in 
his perception, is racked by Marxism, Positivism and other similar philosophies which 
proclaim the atheistic dominance of the objective, material world over the spiritual, 
religious world – or even the nonexistence of the latter. This is expressed in the 
religiously indifferent or atheist character of the Russian intelligentsia: 
Известная образованность, просвещенность есть в глазах нашей интеллигенции 
синоним религиозного индифферентизма и отрицания [...] Этим пропитана 
насквозь, до дна, скудная интеллигентская культура, с ее газетами, журналами, 
направлениями, программами, правами, предрассудками, подобно тому как 
дыханием окисляется кровь, распространяющаяся потом по всему организму.
204
 
This sort of worldview is expressed in doctrines, such as those of Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1804-1872) and of Marx, which are perceived to suggest the advent of the man-god, 
who becomes a god purely according to his immanent, material capacities, rather 
than of the God-man, the man who, through his spiritual make-up, contains within 
himself the image of God, and is thus a likeness to God.205  
Intellectual crisis is thus an integral element of contemporary crisis because it 
brings with it significant religious consequences: 
Нетрудно нам, детям XIX в., понять сущность этой проблемы. XIX в. в умах 
многих разрушил или по крайней мере расшатал старое верование и старые 
представления об этой, земной, жизни как приготовлении к будущей, небесной.
206
 
Therefore, what this intellectual crisis seems to amount to is, rather, a spiritual crisis, 
and it pervades Bulgakov’s experience of his present context in the same way that 
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his awareness of social and national cataclysm disturb him to proclaim historical 
crisis. Kornblatt has recently noted how a common aspect of a broader spiritual crisis 
pervading Silver Age philosophy consisted in a perceived tension between similar 
problems, in this case concerning the relationship between faith and the modern 
world: 
…[there was in Silver Age Russia an] uneasy coexistence of faith in salvation and a 
pervading fear of the dramatic ending toward which the modern world seemed to be 
hurtling.
207
 
What is significant here is how uneasiness relating to the relationship between faith 
and modern life brought the future into question. 
 For Bulgakov, this sense of intellectual or spiritual crisis is a gathering 
historical process. For example, in ‘Religiia chelovekobozhiia L. Feierbakha’ (1905), 
he writes: 
Ибо ведь в течение всего XIX века до наших дней – и чем дальше, тем быстрее, – 
растет количество людей, обходящихся без потусторонних идеалов и целиком 
перенесших их сюда, в «царство мира сего», и фактически для этих людей 
политика стала религией.
208
 
The suggestion of acceleration – ‘the further [along], the faster’ – will be dealt with 
below, when analysis turns towards Bulgakov’s interpretation of crisis in the light of 
more widely held notions of modernity. What this statement suggests more broadly is 
again a certain historical narrative that has led up to the present critical situation of 
intellectual degeneration. The religious aspects of this crisis are the most worrying 
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aspects of the problem, and characterise most distinctly Bulgakov’s perception of the 
nature of the present condition, as the below quotation eloquently demonstrates: 
В этом смысле наша историческая эпоха не имеет себе подобной в истории, ибо 
всегда встречались отдельные антирелигиозные течения, но не было такого 
сознательного и убежденного, такого фанатического и непримиримого 
стремления свести человека на землю и опустошить небо. Если бы нужно было 
выразить духовную сущность нашей эпохи в художественном образе, в картине 
или в трагической мистерии, то эту картину или мистерию следовало бы назвать 
«Похороны Бога, или Самоубийство человечества».
209
 
Again the dramatic rhetoric of Bulgakov’s writing captures the fact that he is deeply 
troubled by the intellectual and spiritual condition of the society around him, and that 
the tendencies exhibited by his contemporaries demonstrate to him a growing crisis 
which prevails in the current world. He worries about where these growing, 
accelerating forces are leading. This leads us on to the question of modernity.  
 
Modern crisis 
 The final aspect of Bulgakov’s sense of temporality consists in his experience 
of the present as modern. This sense of modernity further creates the impression that 
the world is pregnant with, or in a state of, crisis. Thus far the word ‘modern’ has 
been avoided as it has some specific connotations which need to be explored further. 
Recent scholarship concerned with late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Russia has identified a common disquiet regarding the pace, direction, and 
consequences of modern – frequently scientific – progress. Beer, for example, 
comments: 
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Inherent in the notion of progress as espoused by the apostles and practitioners of 
science was a nagging doubt that Russia might be forging ahead in the wrong 
direction...
210
 
A concern with the direction of modern development is not, however, something 
unique to Russian fears surrounding the modern world. Indeed, Berman has 
identified a broader ‘paradox of modernity’, in which there exists the ‘promise of 
growth’ alongside the ‘terror of destruction’.211 This suggests that whilst in many 
interpretations of modernity there is celebration of the successes of progress, there 
also exists a parallel and pervasive fear that these modern successes have been 
bought at the cost of inevitable demise. Traces of this same mix of trepidation and a 
sense of possibility are identifiable in Bulgakov’s work, and contribute to the 
development of his experience of time: the question of modernity thus adds another 
aspect to his sense of the crisis of the present, or temporality as crisis. 
 In accordance with Berman’s thesis, the experience of modernity is 
fundamentally ambivalent. This is vindicated in Bulgakov’s work: whilst he evinces a 
deep concern about modern life, Bulgakov also wants to find something positive in it. 
This is most clearly demonstrated in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912). Given the choice 
of subject matter – economy – this text demonstrates particularly clearly Bulgakov’s 
sense that the modern world needs to be better understood: 
 Своеобразную остроту проблема философии хозяйства получает и для 
современного религиозного сознания. В эпоху упадка догматического 
самосознания, когда религия всего чаще сводится к этике, лишь окрашенной 
пиэтистическими «переживаниями», особенно важно выдвигнуть онтологическую 
и космологическую сторону христианства, которая отчасти раскрывается и в 
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философии хозяйства.
212
 
Despite the obvious notes of caution regarding the negative elements of the modern 
epoch, then, the sense of a need to engage with the modern problem of economy 
exists. We will not find such a positive engagement with the modern world in 
Berdiaev: he will castigate the rise of the machine and declare that mankind needs to 
return to the ‘new middle ages’.213  
In his reflection on modernity, Bulgakov also tries to establish the religious, 
Sophiological basis of modern economy and development. This again is directed 
towards finding positive value in modernity: 
 Итак, хозяйство софийно в своем метафизическом основании. Оно возможно 
только благодаря причастности человека к обоим мирам, к Софии и к 
эмпирии...
214
 
A sense of dialogue with the modern world is a particularly useful notion. Valliere has 
put forward the idea that the notion of Sophia itself provides a means for dialogue 
with the modern world: 
 My thesis is that Sophia, in the works of modern Russian sophiologists, is best seen as 
a conceptual representation of the dialogue between the Orthodox theological tradition 
and modern civilization…
215
 
The idea of elements of Bulgakov’s thought being in dialogue with the modern 
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condition of the world can be extended here to include his work specifically 
concerned with the present. This provides some orientation when we come to look at 
his conceptualisation of history. 
 This having been said, across Bulgakov’s work a large amount of material 
shows his much deeper engagement with the second half of Berman’s modern 
paradox, demonstrating the ‘terror of destruction’ that exists in the modern world. Due 
to the objectifying, mechanical character of much economic development, Bulgakov 
fears the human cost of modern development and its ultimate consequences: 
 Несомненно, что эта [современная] цивилизация, в своих высших проявлениях, 
бесспорно, достигшая небывалых успехов, создает страшный для всего 
индивидуального механизм, захватывающий своими шестернями, зубцами, 
маховиками индивидуальную жизнь и практически провозглашающий принцип: не 
суббота для человека, а человек для субботы.
216
 
The vivid, industrial and altogether menacing imagery of this statement demonstrates 
the visceral fear Bulgakov feels when faced by modern scientific development. It 
appears that it is specifically the material aspects of modern development that he 
perceives to be threatening, and that he sees in the rapid development of science a 
struggle being waged between the material and the spiritual worlds: 
Антагонизм между материальной и духовной цивилизацией неискореним, и 
мещанин всегда будет удерживать свободный полет человеческого духа [...] 
Нельзя не признать вместе с Герценом, что головокружительный материальный 
прогресс XIX в. до известной степени нарушил равновесие не в пользу духовного 
человека, а европейско-американская цивилизация обнаруживает некоторый 
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наклон в сторону мещанства.
217
 
There is a fear, then, that the extent of modern development has unbalanced the 
equilibrium existing between material and spiritual forces, meaning that the present 
epoch is felt to be unstable and in a condition of tumult. 
 Bulgakov’s understanding of the crisis of specifically modern development 
therefore focuses on the objective, divisive qualities that science is perceived to 
promote. This is manifested in the broken, divided and unhappy modern 
consciousness: 
Совремменое сознание, разорванное, превращенное в обрывок самого себя в 
системе разделения труда, не перестает болеть этой своей разорванностью и 
ищет целостного мировоззрения, которое связывало бы глубины бытия с 
посведневной работой, осмысливало бы личную жизнь...
218
 
Modern life and modern people are understood to be in a particularly difficult, critical 
condition due to the overwhelming impetus modern progress puts upon material, 
economic and objective scientific values, which do nothing to satisfy mankind’s 
spiritual and religious needs. This crisis is perceived to be accelerating, along with 
the steadily intensifying pace of scientific thought. In this way, modern crisis blends 
into Bulgakov’s understanding of intellectual and spiritual crisis which pervades the 
present historical epoch: 
 Но мы слышим уже, как против нас выдвигается главный логический идол нашего 
времени – «научность», перед которым пасуют, склоняют свои колени многие 
даже смелые умы, слышим хриплый, скрипучий, мертвенный голос ее оракулов, 
говорящий: как можно говорить о воскресении, о чудесах, вообще о таких вещах, 
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которые давно упразднены наукой и отнесены к числу отживших суеверий!
219
 
 
Conclusions 
 Looking at Bulgakov’s experience of time or experience of the present has 
revealed a number of important themes. The first of these is clearly that Bulgakov 
demonstrates a well-defined experience of the present condition, of temporality, and 
that the key characteristic of this experience is crisis. There is a prevailing sense that 
Bulgakov lives with a continual feeling of impending or unfolding catastrophe, that he 
fears for the future path of mankind. Furthermore, this understanding comes with a 
significant historical dimension. His historical understanding of the present – that is, 
of it representing a distinct, critical historical epoch – demonstrates a historicising 
tendency which will be informative for analysing the rest of his work. Beyond this, he 
finds that the prevailing condition of the modern crisis is manifested in the intellectual 
or spiritual orientation of modern society. People are overwhelmingly focused on the 
material aspects of life, rather than on its spiritual or religious aspects. He finds this 
atheistic, materialist tendency reflected in the catastrophic changes that are 
overtaking Russian and European society. 
 Understanding this aspect of Bulgakov’s thinking is valuable, because, as has 
already been stated, it provides a context in which we can better understand his 
thinking about history. Given his estimation of the historical significance of the 
present, and of the great crises overtaking society, we can better understand his 
proclivity to think in grand, historicised terms. We will see how in his philosophy of 
history he will eventually formulate a conceptualisation of history which rationalises 
                                            
219
 S. Bulgakov, ‘Voskresenie Khrista i sovremennoe soznanie’, Narod, 1906. Published in Bulgakov, 
Dva grada, pp. 269-74 (p. 272). 
96 
 
the great crises of the present and restores the spiritual basis of the modern world. 
This allows him to proclaim the eventual and inevitable victory of the good and divine. 
In this way he is able to assuage somewhat the sense of despair which arises from 
the cataclysms taking place in the present. 
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3. Conceptualisations of history 
 
Что же значит найти смысл истории? 
Problemy idealizma, 1902.
220
 
 The exploration of Bulgakov’s thought about history, which occupies the rest 
of the chapter, considers the entire corpus of Bulgakov’s philosophical work (1901-
17). We will see how his engagement with the problem of history began with a 
number of separate, historicised concerns and how these gradually came together to 
form a more comprehensive philosophy of history, which is first presented in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912). Bulgakov’s final and most significant strictly 
philosophical work, Svet nevechernii (1917) will then be analysed in depth, taking the 
preceding years of development into account. 
 
Ot marksizma k idealizmu (1897-1903) 
 Bulgakov lost faith in Marxism whilst finishing his Magister thesis, Kapitalizm i 
zemledelie, in 1900. As Meerson recounts:  
The discovery, made by Bulgakov the economist, that Marx’s philosophical 
antipersonalism is the weakest point of his economic theory, is a departing point for 
Bulgakov’s philosophical research.
221  
Bulgakov’s internal revolution, which was both philosophical and religious, and quite 
all-encompassing in terms of a shift in worldview, reoriented his thought first towards 
a refutation of his previous faith. This refutation of Marxism, which was initiated in Ot 
marksizma k idealizmu,222 took on many aspects that dealt with the question of 
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history. As his thought eventually moved on beyond this negative goal of refutation, 
these aspects dealing with history would then become significant elements in his 
fuller worldview. However, despite Bulgakov’s intensions, we will see how elements 
of Marxist thought, specifically relating to determinism, were still at work within his 
mind.  
It should be noted that rather than presenting a well formulated 
conceptualisation or philosophy of history, Ot marksizma k idealizmu instead 
demonstrates the development of the philosophical elements or concerns needed to 
construct a fuller philosophy of history. Together, these various elements first 
evidence Bulgakov’s historicising incline of thought. Later they are assembled 
together in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) and Svet nevechernii (1917). Voronov, a 
contemporary of Bulgakov, accordingly describes the ‘idealism’ of this collection in 
1904 as follows:  
…это направление [идеализм] является перед читателем еще 
несовершеннолетним, и, может быть, не вышедшим из горнила сомнения.
223
 
This collection thus demonstrates the seeds of Bulgakov’s historical thinking, but is 
also strongly coloured by his ongoing intellectual transition.   
 
‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ (1901) 
 Bulgakov’s first essay written after his departure from Marxism, ‘Ivan 
Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ (given as a speech in Kiev, in 1901, and then published 
in Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii in 1902) enjoyed great popularity. It was a significant 
essay as it laid out some of his new concerns and the new, more emotive way he 
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wanted to broach intellectual problems. In terms of the theme of history, we see in 
this essay an engagement with the first and perhaps most significant of his 
‘historicised’ problems, the problem of evil, which is dealt with through the idea of 
theodicy. As Bulgakov would comment two years later in 1903, theodicy inevitably 
led to thought about eschatology:  
Всякая теодицея переходит необходимо в открытую или прикровенную 
эсхатологию, и в этом сходятся все философские и религиозные учения...
224
  
Bulgakov’s work more broadly offers discussion on the meaning of evil and its 
relation to God. However, as the above hints at, theodicy may be linked to history, as 
eschatology can take on a historical dimension.  
In ‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ (1901) Bulgakov explains how theodicy 
is linked to the greater rationality of the ‘world order’:  
Вопрос, который с такой трагической силой и безумной отвагой ставит здесь Иван, 
вопрос о происхождении и значении зла в мире и разумности мирового порядка, 
есть вековечный вопрос метафизики, старый как мир, вопрос, который со 
времени Лейбница, стал называться проблемой теодицеи.
225
  
This indicates that Bulgakov’s principal grasp of the concept of theodicy relates to 
the genesis and meaning of evil. Through the assertion of its connection to the 
‘rationality’ of the world order, it can be understood how later this ‘rationality’ is 
translated into the ‘meaning’ of history and the world: it provides a reason for why 
and perhaps how everything is taking place. Engagement with the theme of theodicy 
is developed in ‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ through an attempt at negating 
what Bulgakov holds to be an incorrect history-theodicy, which consists in ‘the theory 
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of progress’ or the positivistic-socialist conceptualisation of history. According to this 
schema, future harmony is bought at the expense of present suffering: 
Примером такого [атеистического] мировоззрения может служить современное 
материалистическое понимание истории и основанное на нем учение социализма: 
будущая гармония социализма покупается здесь неизбежно жертвой страданий 
капитализма; «муки родов» нового общества, по известному сравнению Маркса, 
неустранимы.
226
  
Present evil is therefore justified by future good. This conceptualisation of history 
greatly troubles Bulgakov, as it would likewise trouble Berdiaev. It is apparent 
through the rest of the essay that Bulgakov believes that contemporary Russian 
acceptance of this unsatisfactory and sacrilegious theodicy posits a spiritual malaise 
analogous to the one which racked Ivan Karamazov. In such a way criticism of Ivan 
opens out into a broader attack on modern values.  
Bulgakov carries on to argue in ‘Ivan Karamzov kak filosofskii tip’ that the 
question of theodicy in the contemporary mindset is resolved through a reliance on 
Eudemonism, that is, on the idea that the goal of history is dictated by the 
achievement of the greatest level of material happiness for the greatest number of 
people. This resolution, he finds, is inadequate: 
Мы лично думаем, что проблема теодицеи, как она поставлена Иваном, 
неразрешима с точки зрения эвдемонистического понимания прогресса, видящего 
в последнем увеличение счастия наибольшего числа людей. Проблема эта 
разрешима или устранима только путем метафизического и религиозного 
синтеза.
227
  
This atheistic materialism, furthermore, engenders a belief in constant progress 
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forwards, progress which is justified only by itself, rather than from elsewhere – i.e. 
from the metaphysical or from God. It emerges that Bulgakov finds this idea 
problematic, because he demands a higher, metaphysical sanction to history:  
Основная вера этого века – вера в бесконечный прогресс человечества; в этой 
вере сходятся все теории прогресса, как бы различны они ни были. Прогресс этот 
является сам себе целью, нет какого-либо внешнего императива, который бы эту 
цель оправдывал или превращал в средство для иной высшей цели.
228
 
If it is to be meaningful, progress, or the historical development of humanity, 
therefore demands a ‘higher aim’. Otherwise it just reduces to an infinite movement.  
Thus we see the beginnings of Bulgakov’s engagement with the problem of 
history. Primarily, he discusses the contemporary conception of history, which he 
finds spiritually unsatisfactory and philosophically flawed. This is therefore a part of 
his attempt to negate positivism and socialism: through his use of Ivan Karamazov 
as a philosophical ‘type’, Bulgakov intends to demonstrate the inadequacies of such 
contemporary beliefs. More broadly, however, we see the identification of a number 
of historicised concerns: firstly, we see that the problem of evil is connected with the 
problem of history; secondly, that present evil cannot be justified by future good; and 
lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there is the suggestion that historical 
movement – progress – should not be justified by itself, but rather that it requires 
external sanction. This immediately places Berdiaev squarely within the Russian 
‘historiosophic’ tradition, looking for theurgic meaning within history. As Malinov 
comments: 
Кроме того, историософский подход проявляется в теургизме, т.е. поиске в 
истории тайны, подлинного смысла, сокрытого за эмпирическим покровом 
событий. Историософия предполагает в истории своеобразную “глубину”, 
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“смысловое измерение”, в котором и определяется ее подлинный ход.
229   
The sorts of questions that Bulgakov identifies as being significant to the theme of 
history mark him out as a thinker who wanted to identify a greater, metaphysical 
meaning to history, rather than a purely immanent, empirical meaning. Berdiaev, like 
many other Russian thinkers, was also interested in these sorts of historiosophic 
problems.  
 
‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’ (1902)  
Following the success of ‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’, Bulgakov 
continued with the essay ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’, which was published 
as the opening article to the ground-breaking collection Problemy idealizma in 
1902.230 This essay is essential to our appreciation of Bulgakov’s understanding of 
history, and it also demonstrates the extent to which at this point his own thought 
regarding history relied on negative thinking concerning the Marxist or positivist 
position on the same topic, showing how Marxist categories of historical thought are 
still deeply engrained in his mind. ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’ also 
introduces the problem of ‘mechanical causality’ (mechanicheskaia prichinnost’) 
relating to Bulgakov’s understanding of the historical process.231 This essay is a 
thorough attack on what Bulgakov believes to be the positivist or Marxist 
understanding of history identified in the previous essay – the ‘theory of progress’ – 
and the consequent theodicy this worldview entails. The popular belief in this theory 
relates to Bulgakov’s aforementioned sense of intellectual crisis. Read has noted:  
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[Problemy idealizma] was attacking Marxist positivism in areas which had been ignored 
because Marxism was mainly a social and political movement and, like the intelligentsia 
as a whole, largely ignored philosophical issues…
232
  
Bulgakov’s essay, by taking such philosophical concerns as the nature of history and 
theodicy, was a key part of this attack.  
In ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’, we see Bulgakov’s thorough-going 
attempt to describe what he believes does not constitute the true nature of the 
historical process. It is closely related to his interpretation of the conceptualisation of 
history presented by positivism and Marxism: 
В мире царит, по этому [современному] воззрению, механическая причинность. 
Начавшись неведомо когда и как, а может быть, существуя извечно, мир наш 
развивается по закону причинности, охватывающему как мертвую, так и живую 
материю, как физическую, так и психическую жизнь. В этом мертвом, лишенном 
всякого творческого смысла движении нет живого начала, а есть лишь известное 
состояние материи; нет истины и заблуждения – и та и другая суть равно 
необходимые следствия равно необходимых причин, нет добра и зла, а есть 
только соответственные им состояния материи.
233
 
As the above quotation indicates, modern faith in ‘mechanical causality’ presents to 
Bulgakov a world in which there is no living source or principle guiding life and 
history – historical movement thus conceived is nothing but the lifeless sequence of 
causes and effects. There is no great reason existing behind human existence and 
there is no goal directing human activity. History, according to this reckoning, would 
be nothing more than a systematic, regular movement of events, and within this the 
terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ have no meaning.  
                                            
232
 Christopher Read, Religion, Revolution and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900-1912 (London, 1979), 
p. 41. 
233
 Bulgakov, ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’, in Ot marksizma, p. 497. 
104 
 
Although Bulgakov was perhaps somewhat vulgarising Marxist and positivist 
thinking here, it is of little importance at this moment: it is clearly evident that 
whatever its relation to the ‘real’ Marxist philosophy, he clearly held his interpretation 
of Marx to be accurate. 234  In attempting to refute this understanding of history, 
Bulgakov would need to establish the existence of what he held to be greater, more 
meaningful influences than the pure mechanical causality he interpreted in Marxism. 
As Evtuhov comments: 
 …Bulgakov’s thought contains an implicit philosophy of history that refutes positivism’s 
linear conception of the historical process.
235
  
Bulgakov will therefore later argue that metaphysical forces exist, free from regular 
causal relations, and that their action is key to the broader movement of the historical 
process. In this way, the imposition of the spiritual – or metaphysical – is a means of 
refuting the rule of the purely material.  
A further interesting aspect of this essay is the way in which Bulgakov’s 
approach to the ‘theory of progress’ focuses upon its historical dimension. He 
understands that the question of progress is bound to the broader question of history:  
Первая и основная задача, которую ставит себе теория прогресса, состоит в том, 
чтобы показать, что история имеет смысл, и исторический процесс есть не только 
эволюция, но и прогресс. Она доказывает, следовательно, конечное тождество 
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причинной закономерности и разумной целесообразности, является в этом 
смысле, как мы уже сказали, теодицеей.
236
 
Bulgakov thus continues to attack the conceptualisation of history offered by the 
‘theory of progress’. In this way a critique of the Marxist understanding of history 
constitutes a key element in the development of Bulgakov’s understanding of history, 
as Iakovets similarly argues: 
Возражения С.Н. Булгакова против социального детерминизма, строго 
определнных законов исторического прогресса, являются реакцией 
разуверившегося марксиста на преувеличение экономическим материализмом 
роли объективных факторов, законов развития производительных сил и их 
определяющей роли в динамике экономических и социальных отношений, 
духовной жизни общества, на игнорирование роли личности и ее свободного 
выбора в прогрессе общества.
237
 
Bulgakov’s understanding of history is therefore being formed in opposition to the 
positivist reading; where it suggests the rule of mechanical causality, Bulgakov wants 
to find spiritual impetus.  
Although arguing that it is not within the capacity of positivist thinking to reach 
its goal, Bulgakov also notes that the straining of positivist thought towards 
establishing the meaning of history demonstrates an inevitable disposition of the 
‘philosophising mind’:  
Но самая задача поставлена совершенно правильно, и она неизбежно является 
философствующему уму, ищущему постоянного бытия в потоке преходящих 
событий и не согласному видеть в истории лишь мертвую причинную связь.
238
  
Bulgakov himself – possessing a ‘philosophising mind’ – is also looking for this 
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constant presence within the flow of transient events, and he will, clearly, not agree 
to see only dead, causal connection in the passage of history. This testifies to an 
innate historicism rooted deep within Bulgakov’s consciousness which highlights 
again how he arrives at the idea that time must be history in order for it to make 
sense: there needs, he feels, to be some sort of constant being within the flow of 
events. We will also see later how this idea, suggesting a certain need to understand 
history, is built into an assertion of humanity’s universal religious or spiritual thirst.  
Towards the end of ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’ Bulgakov, led on by 
the above considerations, begins to discuss the metaphysics of history. The 
identification of this problem is significant, as is the description of his present 
configuration of the metaphysics of history: 
 Метафизика истории является раскрытием абсолютного в относительном; она 
стремится увидать, как вечное сияние абсолюта отражается в ограниченной 
рамке пространства и времени.
239
  
History, thus conceived, is a process in which the absolute or eternal imprints itself 
upon and reveals itself through the relative. Indeed, Losskii notes that Bulgakov 
believes in the ‘providential importance’ of the historical process,240 and Bulgakov’s 
assertion indeed implies that history, as a whole, is invested with absolute meaning, 
meaning which is reflected and revealed within the limits of time and space (i.e. in 
history). The presence of Hegelian teleology is thus obvious: the idea of an Absolute 
revealing itself through the course of history is deeply Hegelian. Furthermore, it 
constitutes a structure for thinking about history which suits Bulgakov’s mind. He 
reasserts this conceptualisation of history, arguing,  
Что же значит найти смысл истории? Это значит, прежде всего, признать, что 
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история есть раскрытие и выполнение одного творческого и разумного плана, что 
в историческом процессе выражена мировая, провиденциальная мысль.
241
 
Considered in these terms, then, the historical process is never fully divided from the 
eternal and absolute, and is a process which possesses real, providential value, and 
it is the development of a ‘creative’ – i.e. not immanent – plan which is leading 
towards the final arrival of the metaphysical and eternal.  We will see that this idea of 
the ‘creative plan’ is developed at much greater length in later work, particularly in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912), but also that, specifically regarding the question of 
creativity, it becomes increasingly deterministic. Here, however, is the kernel of 
Bulgakov’s historically determinist and teleological thought: history is viewed as the 
unfolding of some great metahistorical, metaphysical plan, which plays out across 
the relative but is orientated towards a metaphysical end.  
‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’ thus presents us with a number of 
important developments in terms of Bulgakov’s understanding of history. It builds 
upon ‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ by continuing to assert the importance of 
theodicy as an historical mode of thinking. This is achieved by arguing that positivism 
and Marxism, in presenting a vision of historical progress and its conclusion, also 
construct an implicit theodicy. Furthermore, this essay testifies to the significance of 
the historical aspects within Bulgakov’s thinking. It introduces the theme of 
mechanical causality – something he will later try to refute according to the principle 
of ‘freedom’ – as a fallacious mode for understanding the historical process. By 
asserting that history is the unfolding of the eternal and absolute – something which 
bears strong resemblance to Hegelian thinking about history – Bulgakov also attests 
to the possibility of the determined nature of the historical process: as Losskii (above) 
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notes, Bulgakov sees the ‘providential’ in every event, and therefore throughout 
history.  
There are the makings here of unitary, almost monist thinking, as Bulgakov is 
beginning to tend toward a description of how the metaphysical or absolute ties 
together both the physical and the metaphysical realms, giving history a determined 
endpoint and process. This type of thinking will later become troublesome for the 
broader goals of Bulgakov’s philosophical thinking, as it elaborates in greater detail a 
pattern of determinist thinking in which the idea of freedom is challenged. Such 
problems become more pronounced in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) and Svet 
nevechernii (1917). 
 
‘Chto daet filosofiia Vladimira Solovʹeva sovremennomu soznaniiu?’ (1903)   
Bulgakov’s essay ‘Chto daet sovremennomu soznaniiu filosofiia Vladimira 
Solovʹeva?’, first published in Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii in 1903, but also given 
as a public lecture in Kiev, Poltava and Kishinev, deserves mention. A meditation 
upon the importance of Solovʹev’s thought, it sets the stage for the growing influence 
of his thinking over Bulgakov more generally. There is extensive discussion of the 
theme of all-unity and universalism, making clearer the attraction of these ideas to 
Bulgakov. This essay offers, however, important engagement with the themes of evil 
and eschatology, which, as we have already noted, are both connected to 
Bulgakov’s understanding of history. It therefore elucidates how Solovʹev offers 
subtle direction to his historical thinking. 
 An important moment in this essay comes when Bulgakov offers his first 
attempt at an explicit definition of evil. Evil, he attests, paraphrasing but also 
concurring with Solovʹev, is ‘egoism’:  
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Источником его [зла] является эгоизм, стремление к исключительному 
самоутверждению...
242
  
This assertion is significant, as it will become a definition of evil that understands any 
turning away from man’s communion with the metaphysical as fundamentally evil. 
Bulgakov also makes an interesting point regarding eschatology in this essay, 
demonstrating the centrality it plays in his thinking regarding history:  
...подобно тому, как каждый сознательный человек имеет свою философию 
(какова бы она ни была) и свою религию, так же точно каждый человек имеет и 
свою эсхатологию, живет не настоящим только, а будущим и для будущего, от 
которого он ждет осуществления своих лучших надежд. Самое ужасное для 
человека – потерять веру в будущее.
243
  
By asserting that thinking about eschatology – an idea which often carries a 
historical dimension – is rudimentary to every 'conscious' person, Bulgakov again 
hints at the innate historicism in his thinking.  
Eschatology, Bulgakov argues further, is also connected to the problem of evil 
and of theodicy. He therefore becomes more explicit in describing what he believes 
the historical process is destined to reveal, and therefore how exactly evil and history 
are tied together: 
Мы сказали уже, что в эсхатологию гонит нас проблема теодицеи, потребность 
найти в этом лежащем во зле мире, а следовательно, - что для нас здесь всего 
важнее, - в нашей собственной жизни разумный смысл, оправдать добро, 
которому мы служим.
244
  
What becomes obvious more broadly, evident both in the above quotation and the  
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essays which have been discussed so far, is that Bulgakov is fundamentally 
searching for some greater meaning (razumnyi smysl'), which justifies and possibly 
even orders that which is taking place across history and the historical process itself. 
Again, then, we see the operation of a mode of thinking also present in Marxism – by 
looking for evidence of the ‘providential’ (broadly understood) in the relative, 
Bulgakov continues to see evidence of a greater plan that is unfolding within history. 
This demonstrates his continuing susceptibility towards historical determinism and 
teleological thinking, a tendency which will be expressed more fully in his later work. 
 
Other essays from 1903   
In 1903 Bulgakov wrote two further essays also containing important elements 
relating to the question of history – ‘Ob ekonomicheskom ideale’ and ‘O sotsial’nom 
ideale’. The central thesis of ‘Ob ekonomicheskom ideale’, which was first given as a 
lecture and then published in Nauchnoe slovo, is that as a discipline political 
economy is not able to provide itself with meaning or direction. Bulgakov thereby 
argues that scientific endeavour must look higher than itself in order to understand 
itself. Meanwhile, this essay also continues to refer to some of Bulgakov’s 
historicised concerns. Most importantly we see the reassertion that human life, and 
thereby history, has meaning and direction given to it not by itself, but from above 
itself:  
Человеческая жизнь имеет абсолютной смысл и ценность не в себе самой, а вне 
себя и выше себя, получает ее не в качестве эмпирического или биологического 
факта, а как служение высшему, идеальному началу, сущему добру.
245
 
Thus, as was mentioned in ‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’, the historical process 
                                            
245
 Bulgakov, 'Ob ekonomicheskom ideale', in Ot marksizma, p. 649. 
111 
 
does not possess meaning in and for itself, but rather is meaningful in terms of its 
higher aspiration and metaphysical importance.  
‘O sotsial’nom ideale’, published in Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii in 1903, 
presents us with another important development in Bulgakov’s historical thinking. It 
introduces the question of freedom, a problem which will develop increasing 
importance within Bulgakov’s historical thought over his philosophical work, and 
which will be discussed on a number of occasions throughout this chapter as it is 
relevant to our claim that he demonstrates a deterministic pattern of thinking. Since 
identifying the problem of ‘mechanical causality’ in ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii 
progressa’ as a mode of historical development in which there was no freedom, it 
has been anticipated that he would identify a contrasting mode of causality. 
Bulgakov begins this essay by claiming:  
Человек сознает себя свободным. Настоящее и будущее представляется для 
него не как ряд причин и следствий, при данных условиях единственно 
возможный, а как ряд различных возможностей, причем осуществление той или 
другой возможности зависит от его воли, от его поступков.
246
 
Freedom is of special importance to Bulgakov with regards to the question of history, 
as it allows him to refute the sort of iron-clad material determinism that is proposed 
by Marxist and positivist systems. Otherwise, history would be fully predetermined:  
Все будущее, с точки зрения последовательного детерминизма, равно 
необходимо. Необходимы, следовательно, все гадости и мерзости, которые еще 
имеют быть совершены в истории, наряду с подвигами любви и правды.
247 
However, Bulgakov goes on in this essay to make a series of assertions 
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which appear limit man’s freedom of choice in a different way. He begins by 
suggesting: 
 Способность оценки, различие добра и зла, в большей или меньшей степени 
свойственна всем, по крайней мере взрослым и здоровым людям.
248
 
He establishes the metaphysical root of this capacity of choice: man is given, 
through his divine likeness, a set of values which constitute the criteria by which he 
makes his choices. These principles are the ideal basis which serves to motivate 
man’s strivings, as Bulgakov highlights with respect to the principle of equality:  
Люди не равны в порядке натуральном, как эмпирические существа, но равны в 
порядке идеальном, как умопостигаемые сущности, как духовные субстанции. Но 
при этом порядок идеальный дает норму, естественное право, для порядка 
натурального.
249
  
Freedom, therefore, is inherently circumscribed: metaphysical principles function to 
inform man’s decision making and endeavour. These exist on the ideal, rather than 
material, plane. Man is therefore ‘free’, as it were, to be influenced by these 
metaphysical principles. The metaphysical nature of man’s various aspirations is 
reasserted in this essay: 
Отсюда следует, что учение о равенстве людей и абсолютном достоинстве 
человеческой личности, составляющее нравственный фундамент новейшей 
демократической цивилизации, необходимо подразумевает transcensus за 
пределы опытно данной действительности, в область сверхопытную, доступную 
лишь метафизическому мышлению и религиозной вере...
250
  
It thus becomes possible that history and the future no longer depend solely on 
meaningless mechanical causality, but are rather driven by man’s need to pursue 
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certain metaphysical precepts. This suggestion of man’s innate metaphysical or 
religious qualities, driving his action within history, is made much more obvious in 
later work, and constitutes a central element of the determinist pattern evident in 
Bulagkov’s thought. In this essay, we see a groundwork laid down according to 
which metaphysical impulses, rather than material impulses, inform human activity. 
 
Conclusions 
How might we describe the engagement, presented across the collection Ot 
marksizma k idealizmu, with the question of history? Thus far we have encountered 
a number of ‘historicised’ problems that all relate to it – theodicy, eschatology, 
meaning, freedom, causality – although there is no single conceptualisation or 
philosophy of history offered. At present there is therefore no obvious label to bring 
these together, although we can see evidence of Christian, Hegelian, Marxist and 
eschatological thought. This is all phrased in the context of Solovʹevan and at times 
Kantian considerations. Together, it demonstrates the importance of the historicising 
proclivity within Bulgakov’s mind, as he perceives in a range of different problems a 
historical dimension. Time is not (yet) a concern, as he perceives the world in terms 
of developmental patterns and historical forces, rather than in the more individual 
concerns of time and experience.    
Initially, we can suggest that Bulgakov’s thinking has, over 1901 to 1903, 
taken on two basic aspects: the first concerned with the historical process – the 
actual movement of history and events – and the second with the destination and 
meaning, or sanction, of this process. The central elements of Bulgakov’s thought 
about the historical process concern the fact that he is keen to demonstrate, in a 
variety of ways, that mechanical causality – or material, immanent necessity – does 
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not constitute the basis of historical movement. This is partly a product of his attack 
on Marxism and positivism, and partly comes from the religious elements of his 
thinking, which aspire to see the ‘providential’ in every event. The rule of mechanical 
causality would extinguish the possibility of freedom, a profoundly important 
Christian precept, and would make the historical development and movement of 
humanity meaningless, as it would be encompassed by nothing more than lifeless, 
purely immanent, material causality. By extension, Bulgakov’s second concern, 
engaged with the problem of historical meaning and history’s destination, demands 
that history is something that is guided by a higher, metaphysical and providential 
force. Through this guidance, suffering and evil can be understood as part of a 
broader and, moreover, morally good process. Theodicy is therefore deeply tied to 
Bulgakov’s fuller thinking about history.  
Notwithstanding his turn against Marxism, an intellectual heritage including 
Marxism and Hegelianism may be considered to continue in the development of 
Bulgakov’s thought about history in this period. We see this particularly in ‘Osnovnye 
problemy teorii progressa’ (1902) where it is suggested that in the historical process 
a providential, world meaning is expressed.251 This Hegelian idea, imbued with a 
Christian ethical drive, will be central to Bulgakov’s developing thought about history. 
A Hegelian-Marxist legacy is also further evident in Bulgakov’s continual concern 
with the nature of historical process. Keen to assert that not just history as a whole 
but also history as a process possesses meaning, Bulgakov is driven to refute the 
positivist thesis which, in his mind, wishes to see in history only dead, causal 
connection.252 Such Marxian-Hegelian continuity is also expressed in a susceptibility 
to determinist thinking built upon man’s relation to certain metaphysical principles or 
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forces. Over his following works, the scope of this deterministic bent of thought will 
expand. 
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Dva grada (1911) 
 
 Dva grada covers essays written by Bulgakov over a longer period, from 1904 
to 1910. The focus of the collection is vaguer than that of Ot marksizma k idealizmu, 
and we see him explore a variety of religious, intellectual and social themes. Broadly 
speaking, the desire to refute Marxism and positivism is still obvious, but the nature 
of Bulgakov’s attack has changed. Although implicitly suggested across a number of 
the essays in Ot marksizma k idealizmu – including ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii 
progressa’ (1902), ‘Ob ekonomicheskom ideale’ (1903) and ‘O sotsial’nom ideale’ 
(1903) – in Dva grada Bulgakov’s identification of the religious character of Marxism 
and positivism, a key element in his critique, is much more direct. Through this 
argument it will emerge how he aims to establish mankind’s metaphysical 
characteristics or eternal strivings, the elements of man which are independent from 
the material conditions of a particular society. This demonstrates a continued 
development towards metaphysically determinist thinking, as he describes how 
these strivings inform man’s activities. Dva grada also demonstrates the deepening 
of Bulgakov’s specifically Christian consciousness and the first steps of a movement 
towards theology.   
In terms of engagement with the problem of history, we do not see quite as 
much useful material across these years, although we do see a continuation and 
some development of the historicised elements presented in Ot marksizma k 
idealizmu. The essay ‘Apokaliptika i sotsializm’ (1909-10) is particularly relevant for 
our concerns. Christian eschatological thinking will play a greater role in this 
collection, and we will continue to see an engagement with the question of historical 
destination and meaning, as well with the question of causality within the historical 
process. Rather than looking at this collection on an essay-by-essay basis, it will be 
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more constructive to take a thematic approach and focus on those essays which 
best demonstrate these themes. 
 
Christian framework 
A key aspect of the essays offered in Dva grada is that they are written in a 
more decidedly Orthodox Christian key, which assimilates the other characteristics of 
Bulgakov’s thinking which have been discussed up to this point. It is expressed 
clearly in respect of his discussion of the theme of history, as demonstrated by the 
first essay of the collection, ‘Religiia chelovekobozhiia u L. Feierbakha’, written in 
1905.  
 
‘Religiia chelovekobozhiia u l. Feierbakha’ (1905) 
‘Religiia chelovekobozhiia u L. Feierbakha’ demonstrates both Bulgakov’s 
increased engagement with Christian themes and his prevailing interest in history. 
The increased Christianisation of his worldview is evident in the way he chooses to 
describe the historical process:  
Рост человечества от темной тварной стихии до светлого богообщения и 
богопознания, от зверечеловечества к богочеловечеству и наполняет собой 
исторический процесс. Для этого процесса одинаково необходима и свободная 
человеческая стихия, активно усвоящая открывающееся божественное 
содержание, и необходимо это откровение Божества, многочастное и 
многообразное.
253
  
These Christian elements are presented with absolute, determinist language – the 
word ‘necessary’ (neobxodimo) is notably repeated – but are accompanied by the 
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word ‘free’, perhaps indicating Bulgakov’s recognition of the growing tension existing 
between freedom and necessity in his thought. Further, there is also a Hegelian twist: 
Bulgakov discusses a ‘self-revealing divine content’ (otkryvaiushcheesia 
bozhestvennoe soderzhanie) using a present active reflexive participle, putting 
emphasis on the Hegelian idea of an active, presently self-revealing absolute. This is 
though juxtaposed against the separate activity of man, which is ‘mastering’ this 
content. Divine, absolute activity and free, human agency are thus placed together; 
both, however, are still discussed in terms of ‘necessity’, and a flavour of 
determinism remains. 
In this essay Bulgakov continues to discuss other Christian elements which 
also tend towards a pattern of metaphysically determinist thinking, built upon 
ontology. He mentions how the revelation of the absolute ‘presupposes’ certain 
characteristics which emancipate man from the rule of the material and demonstrate 
his communion with the metaphysical:  
Очевидно, что возможность откровения абсолютного, возможность 
богочеловеческого процесса предполагает в человеке известные способности, 
известное духовное сродство, «образ и подобие» абсолютного.
254
  
Bulgakov also returns to the problem of freedom, which has both Christian and 
historical dimensions. He argues that man’s potential for free choice explains why 
history is at present divided, why there still exists evil in the world:  
Источник этого дуализма – свобода, в которой наше высшее достоинство – образ 
Божий. Где есть свобода, там есть и выбор и разделение, там есть борьба, и не 
для ленивого прозябания, но для борьбы непримиримой и безостановочной 
посланы мы в этот мир, для создания царствия Божия путем свободной 
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борьбы.
255
  
Freedom is again understood in a somewhat determined sense, and is cited in the 
context of it being driven towards a specific goal – the creation of the Kingdom of 
God. We are sent into the world, and our freedom is then placed in the context of a 
struggle for something: it is not simply posited. With ‘Religiia chelovekobozhiia u L. 
Feierbakha’, the stage is thus set in Dva grada for a similar engagement with the 
various problems connected with history identified in Ot marksizma k idealizmu, but 
in the context of a clearer Christian framework. 
 
‘Voskresenie Khrista i sovremennoe soznanie’ (1906) 
A Christianised vision of history is evident in other essays from Dva grada, for 
example ‘Voskresenie Khrista i sovremennoe soznanie’ of 1906:  
В воскресении Христа решался вопрос о смысле жизни, истории, о правде мира. 
В нем все бы умерло, и с Ним все воскресает, исполняется разумом, становится 
светоносным, и даже та теория эволюции и прогресса, которою теперь 
человечество отгораживается от религии, получает высший смысл и значение.
256
  
This Christian framework to the problem of history continues to inform the other 
historicised themes we have discussed. These specifically relate to the question of 
causality that operates within history: 
И вот на основании того же самого понятия естественной необходимости, с каким 
оперирует научная мысль и в дарвинизме, и в марксизме, и вообще в 
эволюционизме, мы постулируем, утверждаем необходимость чуда – 
Воскресения Христова, а за ним и всеобщего воскресения и преображения как 
высшего и заключительного звена космической эволюции. Центр вопроса состоит 
именно в том, где же искать мирового демиурга, творящего эту «естественную 
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необходимость»? Видеть ли его в полуфантастическом, полумифологическом, 
совершенно чуждом нашему внутреннему, непосредственному опыту 
представлении о косной материи или же видеть ее в светлой силе человеческого 
и мирового духа?
257
 
In the context of Christian concepts such as miracle, resurrection and transfiguration, 
this quotation demonstrates Bulgakov’s inclination to understand both his and others’ 
conception of the historical process by means of necessity. Identifying a 
distinguishing feature of his contemporaries’ understanding of necessity to be its 
‘natural’, and thereby material character, Bulgakov then reveals a temptation to 
replace one deterministic system – the determinism of Marxist historical materialism 
– with the trappings of a determinism of another sort, a kind of religious or 
metaphysically styled determinism, expressed here in the notion of the ‘necessity of 
the miracle’ that is ‘Christ’s resurrection’.  
 
Ongoing patterns of determinist thinking 
As we have already noted, a pattern of metaphysically determinist thinking 
occasionally appeared in Ot marksizma k idealizmu. Although it should not be 
overplayed at this point and should be understood alongside the other, non-
determinist elements in his thought, it can be noted that these determinist trends also 
emerge in Dva grada and continue shape Bulgakov’s thinking on history. In Ot 
Marksizma k idealizmu, this pattern of thought was exposed in the assertion that the 
possibility of the revelation of the absolute supposes certain special characteristics in 
man’s ontological make-up, and that these characteristics, which inform his activity, 
lead man to make history in a certain way. This idea is most obviously suggested in 
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‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’ (1902):  
Итак, человек не может удовлетвориться одной точной наукой, какой думал 
ограничить его позитивизм; потребности метафизики и религии неустранимы и 
никогда не устранялись из жизни человека.
258
 
This means that man, in his historical activity, tries to satisfy these ‘needs’ or 
‘demands’ (potrebnosti), allowing history to be directed by whatever source lies 
behind these needs.  
In Dva grada, the scope of the ontological dynamic existing between mankind 
and the metaphysical or divine is defined to a greater extent. For example, in ‘Karl 
Marks kak religioznyi tip’ (1906), we read:  
По моему убеждению, определяющей силой в духовной жизни человека является 
его религия – не только в узком, но и в широком смысле слова, т.е. те высшие и 
последние ценности, которые признает человек над собою и выше себя, и то 
практическое отношение, в которое он становится к этим ценностям.
259
  
This theme of innate metaphysical qualities, compelling men to reach beyond the 
material, beyond the present, is a common theme, and particular attention needs to 
be drawn to it.  
In 'Religiia chelovekobozhiia u russkoi intelligentsii', written in 1908, the theme 
is phrased differently: 
Человек рожден для вечности и слышит в себе голос вечности, он слышит его 
тонким ухом своих величайших мыслителей, ученых и поэтов, своим чистым 
сердцем праведников, творческим гением своих художников. Жить во времени 
для вечности, переживать в относительном абсолютное и стремиться дальше 
всякой данности... к этому призван человек, и это стремление [...] есть живое 
                                            
258
 Bulgakov, ‘Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa’, in Ot marksizma, p. 497. 
259
 S. Bulgakov, ‘Karl Marks kak religioznyi tip’, Moskovskii ezhenedel’nik, 1906. Published in 
Bulgakov, Dva grada, pp. 51-70 (p. 51). 
122 
 
богооткровение в нас.
260
 
An interesting formulation of time and eternity – which since Plato has been central 
to discussion of time and is prominent in Berdiaev – is thus also found here. In the 
above arrangement – ‘to live in time, for eternity’ – it relates to the sort of formulation 
that, after Plotinus, was taken on by Patristic fathers such as Augustine of Hippo, 
who suggested that whilst we live in time the goal of history is the end of time and 
the passage into eternity.  
In the above quotation and other essays included in Dva Grada tensions may 
be observed around the problem of man’s relationship to the metaphysical, and his 
relation to freedom and necessity within this, which continue to suggest a pattern of 
deterministic thinking that is slightly at odds with other aspects of Bulgakov’s thought. 
Elements of Hegelian-Marxist (and also Christian) thought that have a determinist 
colouring – evident in the discourse of necessity and of ‘calling’ – are juxtaposed with 
Christian ideas about the metaphysics of freedom that Bulgakov also assimilates. 
Bulgakov is at this point still cognisant of a conflict between metaphysical freedom 
and the constraints the material world presents to this freedom, admitting in 
‘Khristianstvo i sotsial’nyi vopros’ (1906): 
 …человек призван одновременно жить в двух мирах: в царстве неодходимости и 
в царстве свободы, нося в душе постоянную загадку, противоречие, антиномию, 
обусловливающую постоянную борьбу, призываюшую к постоянному подвигу. 
Пред человеком всегда два пути, хорошо или дурно отличаемые, путь 
освобождения от мира силой его отрицания и путь порабощения его пустым и 
мертвым стихиям.
261
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Nonetheless, despite describing these ‘two paths’, in actuality Bulgakov does not 
provide conditions in which man could end upon the wrong path: as he describes it, 
through his metaphysical freedom man is called to a divine path. He therefore does 
not doubt the final, religious end to history: 
…истории, которая все же представляет собой необходимый, хотя и трагический 
путь к высшей стадии бытия…
262
 
History is frequently understood as the necessary path to a definite goal – whatever 
this path may be, the endpoint is inevitable. Freedom exists along the way, however 
a determined, ‘necessary’ framework structures the path of the journey. 
The elements of Bulgakov’s thought suggesting a type of metaphysically-
styled determinism in Dva grada do not, however, lead him to undermine the reality 
of the material world or the material aspects of the historical process. Man is, 
Bulgakov understands, compelled to live within the material realm, despite the fact 
that he possesses metaphysical qualities. Therefore, he argues in ‘Khristianstvo i 
sotsial’nyi vopros’:  
Возделывание «земли», т.е. сил природы (которое включает, конечно, не одно 
только земледелие, но все виды промышленного труда), составляет 
естественную задачу человечества, и было бы странно предположить – 
одинаково и с религиозной, и с человеческой точки зрения, – чтобы эту задачу 
разрешал человек изолированно.
263
  
Bulgakov therefore asserts that, whilst living in the material world, man should not 
become blinded by the material aspect of his life: he should remain aware of the fact 
that he does not lead his material life in isolation – he remains in contact with the 
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divine. 
At a number of points in Dva grada, then, we see the problem of determinist 
traits in Bulgakov’s thinking. These are more fully expressed in Filosofiia khoziaistva 
(1912), where he discusses the themes of creativity and history, and creativity and 
freedom.   
 
‘Apokaliptika i sotsializm’ (1909-10) 
For our purposes the essay ‘Apokaliptika i sotsializm’, written across 1909-10, 
is the most significant essay in Dva grada. In this piece Bulgakov extensively 
explores the themes of history and eschatology, and it is the first instance in which 
he offers some more explicit formulations on a philosophy of history. Coming as it 
does at the end of the period in which the essays of Dva grada were written (1904-
1910), it demonstrates how he is, in 1910, finally beginning to arrive at a fuller 
conceptualisation of history. In this essay, Bulgakov discusses in depth the problem 
of apocalyptic thought – specifically Jewish apocalyptic thinking – and reveals how 
notions of apocalypse and by extension crisis are prevalent elements in his own 
conceptualisation of history. This substantiates the observation made earlier which 
suggested that a sense of temporality as crisis orientates a broader conceptual 
approach to history.  
‘Apokaliptika i sotsializm’ also continues to demonstrate Bulgakov’s more 
nuanced approach to his refutation and exploration of Marxism, and in this refutation 
he continues to develop his own thought by offering an ontological commentary on 
the universal religiosity of mankind which is coloured by determinism. This thinking 
significantly depends on his treatment of history. Where in his 1909 contribution to 
Vekhi (‘Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo’) Bulgakov had identified the underlying 
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religiosity of the intelligentsia,264 in ‘Apokaliptika i sotsializm’ he similarly describes 
the religious basis of the Marxist and socialist philosophy of history:  
В основе социализма как мировоззрения лежит старая хилиастическая вера в 
наступление земного рая (как это нередко и прямо выражается в 
социалистической литературе) и в земное преодоление исторической 
трагедии.
265
  
 ‘Apokaliptika i sotsializm’ begins with the statement that two interpretations 
exist concerning how history unfolds. Both, significantly, relate to theology and the 
religious world. The first is chiliasm:266 
Возможна вообще двоякая ориентировка в истории. В одном случае история 
рассматривается как процесс, ведущий к достижению некоторой запредельной, 
однако истории еще имманентной и ее силами достигаемой цели – условно 
назовем это рассмотрение хилиастическим [...] Хилиастична в этом смысле 
всякая теория прогресса, как религиозная, так и нерелигиозная...
267
  
Chiliastic interpretations therefore consider history to be a process that unfolds 
according to the influence of the forces that exist inside it – there is no room for 
metahistorical forces (i.e. forces which exist outside the realm of history) to channel 
the historical process. Socialism, based upon the above, understands history in a 
purely chiliastic sense:  
В социализме хилиазм, естественно, заполнил собой весь исторический план и 
окончательно заслонил всякий эсхатологический горизонт.
268
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This vision of history, trapped within the immanent world, to Bulgakov seems 
fundamentally limited. Such an understanding of history focuses only on ‘horizontal’ 
movement,269 further demonstrating its limitation:  
Но он [хилиазм] есть средство ориентирования лишь в горизонтальной плоскости, 
лишь в историческом разрезе, в области дискурсивного, имманентного 
содержания истории, и об этом значении и его ограниченности никогда не 
следует забывать.
270
  
This chiliastic understanding of history is thus fundamentally impoverished in 
Bulgakov’s descriptions, as it offers no room for the metaphysical.  
 In Bulgakov’s reckoning a need for something higher than chiliasm will thus 
always exist. This again determines mankind’s aspirations: in history, man demands 
the metaphysical. He thereby introduces the second historical orientation, which is 
eschatological:  
Человек не может, даже если бы хотел, остаться исключительно в области 
имманентного и временного и совершенно устранить всякую мысль о возможном 
перерыве – не времени, но самой временности – о переходе за ее предел, хотя 
бы неведома куда.
271
  
(The brief mention of vremia and vremennost’, not explored here, will become a 
problem later for Bulgakov in Svet nevechernii). History, understood in this 
eschatological sense, is thus a movement of transcending history, moving beyond 
the boundaries of the time that operates within it, into the eternal. He therefore 
argues:  
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Если в хилиазме человечество видит впереди себя историческую цель, то в 
эсхатологии оно усматривает над собою и за пределами этого мира с его 
историей сверхприродную цель.
272
 
A proper historical orientation therefore inevitably takes on this metaphysical 
perspective. 
 This is not to say, however, that Bulgakov wants to focus purely on the 
metaphysical aspect of history. Indeed, he asserts that history is about the proper 
simultaneous experience of both the immanent and the metaphysical dimensions of 
history. A proper orientation in history requires that one works immanently in history 
whilst at the same time feeling the presence of the divine and metaphysical within 
and beyond it. This is a crucial distinction for Bulgakov’s breed of eschatology: he 
still maintains a degree of focus on the immanent, whereas as we will see for 
Berdiaev eschatology is orientated towards total transcendence. Bulgakov elucidates 
this argument when discussing the differing role of the prophet and the apocalyptic: 
И пророк и апокалиптик глядят в будущее и ищут в нем ответа на «проклятые 
вопросы современности». Но пророк живет и действует в настоящем в гораздо 
большей степени, чем апокалиптик.
273
  
We see then immediately that the prophet has a greater grounding in reality – he 
works and acts in the present. The prophet, existing in this way, understands history 
in the proper, eschatological sense:  
Черта первого настроения [настроение пророка] – мужественная активность, 
чувство Бога в истории – побуждает служить Ему историческими деяниями, 
творить историю; это – субъективное, творческое, антидетерминистическое, или, 
выражаясь по-современному, «прагматическое» отношение к истории. Недаром 
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пророки являются вместе с тем и крупнейшими общественными, а иногда и 
государственными деятелями и патриотами; с величайшим подъемом 
религиозного чувства они соединяют трезвый реализм, я готов сказать – 
практичность [...] их взор остается не затуманенным открывающейся пред ними 
всемирно-исторической и эсхатологической перспективой, они сохраняют и 
гармонию душевных сил, и душевное здоровье.
274
 
Both antideterministic, creative, subjective, possessing the feeling of God within 
history – but at the same time practical, real, and working within history to create 
history: the prophet thus seems to represent Bulgakov’s first explicit assertion of how 
history works, and how one should relate to it. This understanding suggests that 
history is driven from within and guided from without by the metaphysical and the 
divine, which is consequently both within and outside history. All is providential to the 
prophet: every immanent event possesses metaphysical value.  However, the above 
should also be treated cautiously: the assertion of the antideterministic element of 
the prophet’s orientation within history is disingenuous, as there are still clearly 
deterministic ideas at work. It is best to understand ‘antideterminism’ in the context of 
his definition of positivism, which prescribes a material determinism. The prophet, 
understanding history in the eschatological sense, looks to overcome and transcend 
the material rather than work only within the material and be determined by it. So it is 
that Bulgakov’s rather narrow description of determinism is linked only to the material 
– he seems not to have understood, despite his reading of Hegel, how it could 
operate at a metaphysical level. 
 Contrary to the antideterministic line, we see further suggestions of a 
deterministic pattern, operating at a metaphysical level, emerge in ‘Apokaliptika i 
sotsializm’. These are most evident in a description of ‘obligation’ before history: 
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Обязанность перед этой общечеловеческой и космической жизнью, а 
следовательно, и перед историей, вместе с «талантами», вверенными в наше 
распоряжение, налагаются на нас одновременно с рождением. История для 
религиозного есть также священное тайнодействие, притом имеющее смысл, 
ценность и значение во всех своих частях, как это глубоко было почувствовано в 
германском классическом идеализме, особенно у Гегеля.
275
 
A clear reference to Hegel testifies to Bulgakov’s constant awareness of Hegelian 
thought. This sense of calling and responsibility towards history recalls our 
interpretation, presented earlier, that in Bulgakov’s mind man is called by his 
metaphysical or divine nature to act a certain way and follow a certain path within 
history.  
 
Conclusions 
We can see, then, that in Dva grada a number of the same elements continue 
to be dealt with regarding the question of history, alongside the development of a 
much stronger Christian focus. A concern with emancipating the process of history 
from the inert rigidity of purely immanent processes is pronounced, and we see an 
ongoing attraction to a metaphysically styled determinism. This latter pattern of 
thought has been identified by other scholars, most notably Rodnianskaia, who 
argues that it demonstrates the lasting influence of Marx’s thought over Bulgakov:  
…обратимся к булгаковской теории исторического прогресса, которая строилась в 
сознательном и воинственном отталкивании от марксизма и вместе с тем, с 
определенной поры, в бессознательном притяжении к нему.
276
 
An attraction towards determinist solutions is particularly significant in terms of 
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the further development of Bulgakov’s thought. As will be seen, he continued to deal 
with the material in its concrete form in later work, a preoccupation which led to 
criticism from contemporaries. Berdiaev, in particular, damningly suggested that 
Bulgakov was a materialist through and through: 
 Он [Булгаков] остался экономическим материалистом и перенес свой 
экономический материализм на небо...
277
 
Whether or not the criticism is justified, the need to deal with the material world 
demonstrates the influence Marxism continued to assert on Bulgakov’s thought 
regarding history. This desire to find the providential within the material, along the 
lines of an idealism, also demonstrates the beginnings of a cosmology – i.e. the idea 
that all that occurs within the physical world is infused with the energy and power of 
the metaphysical or Logos. Indeed, Zen’kovskii goes as far as to assert:  
…основы философских построений Бугакова лежат в его космологии. 
Религиозный перелом не оторвал его от мира, а сам  определялся (во всяком 
случае в значительной степени) потребностью глубже понять мир и проникнуть в 
его сокровенную жизнь, сокровенный смысл.
278
  
In this sort of historical worldview the themes of eschatology and theodicy are also 
both still very influential. Cosmological thinking will appear most clearly in Filosofiia 
khoziaistva, where it is argued that history-as-economy is the process whereby man 
vivifies the natural, material world: he imbues it with divine wisdom through 
Sophiological economy – through his deliverance of Sophia to the natural realm.  
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Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) 
 
 Filosofiia khoziaistva, published in 1912, is the product of Bulgakov’s 
movement through a number of philosophical and religious ideas, and is his first 
attempt at expounding a comprehensive worldview. As is made clear in the preface, 
a desire to deal with positivist and Marxist thought still figures prominently in 
Bulgakov’s mind:  
Для автора настоящая работа имеет еще и совершенно особое значение, ибо в 
ней подводится внутренний итог целой полосы жизни, окрашенной 
экономическим материализмом, и она есть долг философской совести автора по 
отношению к своему собственному прошлому.
279
  
Presenting a fuller development of many of the ideas which had been prominent 
across his earlier work, Filosofiia khoziaistva also introduces the religious-
philosophical concept of Sophia. This idea provides a greater unity to Bulgakov’s 
thinking, which was perhaps lacking in his earlier work. As Garaeva asserts:  
Сознание С.Н. Булгакова было настроено на потребность синтетической 
философии, философии всеединства, а потому он без труда приемлет Софию 
как идеальную основу тварного мира…
280
  
This text is thus deeply significant in a variety of respects – although introducing new 
concepts, it is the result of long philosophical meditation. Indeed, Evtuhov suggests 
that it was the fruit of the previous decade (if not more) of philosophical searching.281 
 The central problem of Filosofiia khoziaistva, the problem of economy, is 
taken in a broad sense. In the tradition of Kant, Hegel, and other nineteenth-century 
philosophers, and along with many of his European and Russian contemporaries, 
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Bulgakov was interested in the broad dynamic of the relationship between man and 
the material world, and thereby also the revived Neo-Kantian problem of the subject-
object relation. Indeed, as Kołakowski, cited here by Styczński, notes, the general 
renewed movement of Kantian thinking aimed at wresting the broader concerns of 
philosophy away from dominant positivist consensuses:  
Kantianism was more than a philosophical trend. Above all it was an effort to vindicate 
philosophy as it was directed against the scientistic orientation of the positivists. […] 
They [the positivists] assumed that methods used in natural sciences were the only 
means of achieving reliable knowledge […] [yet] Kantianism delivered a method of 
thinking according to which philosophy was not only a legitimate, but indispensable 
form of intellectual existence…
282
 
In view of this, economy for Bulgakov represented the way in which mankind 
interacted with and shaped the material world – it was not just a prosaic concern with 
the scientific study of economics. Drawing together his background of teaching 
political economy and his active opposition to Marxist economic thought, Bulgakov 
thus aimed to ascribe metaphysical and religious meaning to the notion of economic 
activity.   
Friedrich Schelling’s (1775-1854) Naturphilosophie was also particularly 
influential in the formulation of the thesis presented in Filosofiia khoziaistva, which, 
looking at the relationship between man and nature, identified a mutual identity 
existing between the inert matter of the material world and the active, enlightening 
matter of divine humanity. Pustarnakov has argued that the influence of Schelling in 
Russian philosophy after Solov’ev tends to be overlooked, 283  and Bulgakov’s 
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Filosofiia khoziaistva demonstrates how Schelling’s influence was still very much 
present in early twentieth-century Russian thinking. Indeed, Vaganova in her 
comprehensive overview of Bulgakov’s Sophiology asserted a broad similarity in 
Schelling’s and Bulgakov’s intellectual development: 
Если для аналогии (а аналогия, вернее, типология развития мысли, несомненно, 
прослеживается) взять творческую эволюцию Шеллинга, от натурфилософии к 
теософии (философии откровения), то булгаковская амплитуда куда круче: она 
начинается политэкономией земледелия, а заканчивается догматическим 
богословием.
284
 
The closeness between Schelling and Bulgakov is thus quite significant, and 
perhaps extends beyond their mutual espousal of the notion of a man-nature identity. 
Regarding the specific problem of history within Bulgakov’s work, Filosofiia 
khoziaistva offers some crucial advances in terms of the exposition and development 
of his thinking. Most importantly, we see in this text a more sustained treatment of 
the problem of history. Indeed it could be argued that history is amongst its most 
significant elements. In Filosofiia khoziaistva Bulgakov presents a full 
conceptualisation of history, describing how it plays out at both a cosmic and an 
anthropological level. The ideas behind it, being centred upon the question of the 
meaning of economy, perhaps inevitably unfold across the framework of history. For 
Bulgakov, as we will see, engagement with the question of economy unavoidably 
results in thought about history; indeed, the two become almost coterminous:  
Хотя эмпирически, непосредственно она [деятельность хозяйства] и выражается 
в мириадах разрозненных актов, но динамически она есть единая и связная 
деятельность, которая субъектом имеет не индивид, но род, и развертывается во 
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времени, т.е. в истории.
285
  
Economy and history thus exist in very close connection, the former ‘unfolding’ in the 
latter. We will continue to see the historicised themes of theodicy, causality and 
freedom in Filosofiia khoziaistva, as well as the introduction of the question of 
creativity. This is all done alongside an integration of Christian ideas into a 
philosophical context. The specific problem of metaphysical determinism, evident at 
both cosmic and anthropological levels, becomes yet more obvious in Filosofiia 
khoziaistva, and a fuller discussion of this determinism will be an important element 
in our understanding of the evolution of Bulgakov’s historical thought to this point. I 
begin with an attempt at capturing the central tenets of his conceptualisation of 
history presented in this work. 
 
Cosmic philosophy of history 
 The first thing we notice about Filosofiia khoziaistva is the great expansion in 
the scale of Bulgakov’s historical thinking. According to its wider scope and the 
broader terms arising from his engagement with economy as a philosophical 
problem, Bulgakov’s thought now aspires to a – literally – more universal level:  
Всякий живой организм, как тело, как организованная материя, находится в 
неразрывной связи со всей вселенной в качестве ее части, ибо вселенная есть 
система сил, взаимно проникаюших одна другую, и нельзя сдвинуть песчинку, 
уничтожить хотя один атом без того, чтобы не подвиглась – в той или иной форме 
и степени – вся вселенная.
286
  
This cosmic scope is reflected in a similarly epic impression of history. Filosofiia 
khoziaistva describes how the two great cosmic forces of ‘life’ and ‘death’ are locked 
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in conflict. The resolution of this conflict, which occurs through economy, takes on 
the shape of history. There is a distinct religious character to this process:  
Мир мертвой и косной материи разрешается в мир энергий, за которыми 
скрываются живые силы. Пелены постепенно спадают с трехдневного и 
смердящего уже Лазаря, который ждет повелительного слова: Лазаре, иди вон!
287
 
The cosmic principles of life and death are associated with multiple meanings. Life is 
associated with good, creativity, the subject, the natura naturans (nature in its ideal 
condition) and ultimately with Sophia and the divine, whereas death is characterised 
in terms of mechanism, evil, inertness, lifelessness and is associated with the natura 
naturata (nature in its present condition), the object and the terrestrial. This means 
that through the expansion of this life-death opposition Bulgakov is able to explore 
many of the problems with which he had dealt previously, and also to talk more 
broadly about the basic subject-object divide.  
In the cosmic antagonism between life and death, these principles are not 
antinomiously opposed to one another, but are, rather, only opposing ‘conditions’ or 
‘states’ of life: 
 В теперешнюю мировую эпоху устойчивость не достигнута ни в ту, ни в другую 
форму – ни в сторону Хаоса, Пустоты и Механизма, ни в сторону Организма, 
бессмертной Жизни, Полноты. Между Жизнью и Смертью идет поединок [...] 
Точнее следует сказать, что это борьба не двух начал, но двух состояний одной и 
той же Вселенной, причем самая эта борьба есть лишь симптом болезненного 
состояния бытия, хотя и болезни роста...
288
 
As they are not antimoniously opposed, Bulgakov, following Schelling’s lead in his 
Naturphilosophie, suggests the inevitable resolution of the life-death contradiction by 
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identifying their mutual identity:  
Возможность борьбы между одущевленным и неодущевленным обусловливается 
их существенным тожеством при различии их как состояний.
289
 
This identity makes possible the transformation of the inert, deathly world into a 
divine, vivified organism – it makes possible the victory of the principle of life over the 
principle of death. This is very close to Schelling’s thesis in Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature (1803), where he writes:  
Man is not born to waste his mental power in conflict against the fantasy of an 
imaginary world, but to exert all his powers upon a world which has influence upon him, 
lets him feel its forces, and upon which he can react. Between him and the world, 
therefore, no rift must be established; contact and reciprocal action must be possible 
between the two, for only so does man become man.
290
 
Bulgakov understands that there is no such rift between man and the world, between 
life and death, and therefore along with Schelling follows a thesis of identity. 
The process whereby this conflict between the two principles or conditions of 
life and death is resolved constitutes the basis of history. Problematically, due to the 
emphasis that is placed not just on identity but also on the primacy of life, it will 
emerge that, despite the new terminology, this historical process is, at a cosmic level, 
deterministic. This primacy of life is formulated explicitly below: 
Этот монизм жизни, панзоизм, в противоположность монизму смерти, или 
пантанатизму, материалистов, вслед за древними мыслителями (Платоном и 
особенно Плотином), Бёме и Баадером, Шеллингом и Вл. Соловьевым, мы 
считаем метафизической гипотезой, единственно способной вывести из 
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затруднения...
291
  
An opposition between life and death thus forms the basis of the world and history, 
but in this opposition life is primary and death secondary. In his interpretation of 
Plato and Plotinus, along with mystics such as Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) and 
Franz von Baader (1765-1841), he clearly detects the sort of mystical predisposition 
towards a negation of the ‘deathly’ or inert, material principle in the same way that, 
as we shall see later, Berdiaev would. In Bulgakov’s thinking, then, the ultimate 
imbalance between the two principles of life and death will drive the economic 
process taking place across history and create a teleology to the historical process. 
 
The historical narrative of Filosofiia khoziaistva 
 The historical narrative of Filosofiia khoziaistva is a description of the steady 
vivification of the inert natural world by the divine force of life – the process of 
economy. This narrative, therefore, accounts for the victory of life over death:  
Задача космического и исторического процесса в том и состоит, чтобы этот 
[божественный] огонь  проник, согрел, осветил всю тварь, всю природу.
292
  
History, then, is immediately given a much clearer structure and goal than it had 
been previously, with teleology therefore much more evident. This historical process 
is possible, Bulgakov argues, due to economy, as economy is the means by which 
man interacts with the world: 
Хозяйство есть деятельность человека над природой; обладая силами природы, 
он творит из них, что  хочет.
293
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In this economic-historical process, humanity takes its content, its life, and fills inert 
nature – the object world – with it. This narrative states that nature, in its present 
state (natura naturata) is in a death-like, mechanical condition, but that this is not a 
permanent state. The subject (humanity) in the historical process overcomes the 
object (nature), and fills it with life. The type of eschatological thinking evident in this 
text thus recalls the ‘inaugurated’ eschatology discussed in the Introduction to this 
thesis: the bringing about of the end is presented as in process and already in 
motion.294 
Returning to the Schellingian identity, Bulgakov argues that the economic-
historical process is possible because everything, both nature (the object) and 
humanity (the subject), possesses the same metaphysical basis:  
И там [хозяйство] и здесь [познание] по-своему преодолевается 
противопоставление субъекта и объекта, в обоих процессах обнаруживается 
одна и та же метафизическая основа, именно тожество субъекта и объекта, и 
жизнь раскрывается как постоянное выявление, углубление и обнаружение этого 
тожества вместе с преодолением этой полярности.
295
 
The economic aspect of history is thus the agency by which inert nature is vivified, or 
by which history happens. The subject, or agent, in this process is humanity as a 
whole which thus becomes responsible for the process of history:  
Истинным и притом единственным трансцендентальным субъектом хозяйства, 
олицетворением чистого хозяйства, или самой функции хозяйствования, 
является не человек, но человечество.
296
  
Since, in this conceptualisation of history, it is humanity that drives the process of 
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history, the various ontological limitations to which man is subject will be of great 
significance. This ontological element in the conceptualisation of history will be 
discussed below. 
 Thus far, then, Bulgakov’s conceptualisation of history in Filosofiia khoziaistva 
offers both a cosmic scope and a clear narrative through which the historical process 
will take place. History, in this text, is the process in which mankind transforms 
deathly, object nature into a world full of life and divinity. However, this description 
has revealed two moments where determinism may emerge: the first concerns the 
fact that the metaphysical force of life is portrayed as primary, and the objective force 
of death secondary; the second concerns the fact that man, who is invested with 
responsibility for the passage of history, may be subject to limitations or conditions in 
this historical activity. These problems arise from a number of older concerns. 
 
Causality and theodicy 
As has been suggested, the older ‘historicised’ problems in Bulgakov’s 
thinking come together in Filosofiia khoziaistva to help formulate a fuller philosophy 
of history. Similarly, the question of causality is also still significant in the historical 
narrative of Filosofiia khoziaistva, as it describes how history moves. Bulgakov’s 
thought on causality has developed further: whilst now admitting the existence of 
mechanical causality as a process occurring within history, he asserts that this form 
of causality represents only anticipation of another. This ties the theme of 
mechanical causality to the broader terms of the life-death opposition. The 
mechanical (objective) form of causality thus is described as only awaiting the 
organic (subjective) form:  
140 
 
Поэтому природа извне есть механизм сил, в недрах же своих, потенциально, она 
есть живой организм.
297
  
The causal process at the roots of the world thus runs deeper than the principle of 
mechanism, recalling the fact that earlier, in Dva grada (1911), Bulgakov had 
suggested a metaphysical necessity in the place of immanent historical necessity. 
He is, indeed, still driven to underline again exactly why such a ‘mechanistic’ 
interpretation of the world is mistaken, explaining that mechanical causality offers no 
greater meaning to history: 
 Оно [чисто материалистическое воззрение] ставит в качестве объяснения ряд 
новых загадок, и в основу всего полагает абсолютный и всемогущий Случай, т.е. 
начало, которое ничего не объясняет, а только закрывает отсутствие объяснения. 
Каким образом мог сам собою из мертвого механизма природы возникнуть 
человек, каким образом косная и слепая материя может отдаваться его 
творческим замыслам, выдавать ему свои тайны и секреты и каким образом 
далее он может перерастать себя – все это вопросы, на которые нет и не может 
быть ответа.
298
  
It is evident that the problem of historical causality still preoccupies Bulgakov in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912), as it did in Ot marksizma k idealizmu (1903) and Dva 
grada (1911), and the primacy in history of metaphysical processes over 
mechanically causal processes continues to be asserted. 
Similarly, the historical narrative of Filosofiia khoziaistva is also built upon the 
demand for a theodicy, an apprehension of evil. This is because it demonstrates how 
the ‘evil’ forces of the world – those of death, inertness, mechanism and chaos – are 
overcome by the divine force of life, thereby reducing evil to something transient and 
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non-substantial. The historical dimension of theodicy is thus still prominent. However, 
in the broader cosmic balance of the relationship between good and evil, the 
quandary of the primacy of good over evil re-emerges. Above, it was revealed how 
Bulgakov, when trying to overcome the problem of evil, was led to describe a 
schema in which the divine and metaphysical offer the ultimate grounding and basis 
for everything that takes place in the world. As both subject and object, good and evil 
all share a metaphysical basis in good, the relationship between life and death is 
fundamentally skewed: it can only be assumed that the historical process will result 
in the revelation of this self-evident truth that life, good, is universal and primary. 
Therefore, as Gavrilyuk contends, Bulgakov’s thought becomes a kind of ‘ontological 
universalism’, in which everything is determined by this basic ontological quality of 
goodness running through the universe:  
For Bulgakov, in contrast, creaturely freedom, no matter how radical and far-reaching 
its revolt against God, could not possibly become a permanent barrier to the power and 
goodness of God. Because of its emphasis upon God as the source and power of being 
and its methodological shift from juridical to ontological categories, Bulgakov’s 
eschatology may be termed ontological universalism.
299
 
The primacy of life (or the metaphysical-divine) over death (or the object-material) 
thus expresses the cosmic dimensions of the type of metaphysically determinist 
thinking that exists in Bulgakov’s thought. This problem will re-emerge in Svet 
nevechernii (1917). Meanwhile, the sense of theodicy offering a dialogue with the 
contemporaneous world, with the crisis of modern times, is also still very apparent in 
this text: it is clear how the problems of the present relate to an improper balance 
between good and evil at a cosmic level, but that, due to the essential metaphysical 
basis of all, these crises will be eventually resolved for the victory of good. 
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Historical humanity  
Having looked at the cosmic aspects of Bulgakov’s treatment of history, we 
can now move on to the ontological aspects. A key development of Filosofiia 
khoziaistva is Bulgakov’s identification of mankind as a universal, historical whole. 
This whole, humanity, which is variously described as the transcendental subject of 
economy (transtsendental’nyi sub”ekt khoziaistva), the Demiurge (Demiurg), and 
also the World Soul (Mirovaia Dusha), carries out economic activity. Through this 
unified activity mankind is thus responsible for the fate of economy and history:  
Единство их [людей] выражается в объективном единстве истории и хозяйства, в 
общности их дела.
300
  
Humanity acquires an historical aspect, and its activity acquires transcendental 
importance in the movement of economy and history forwards. The question, 
however, arises – how free is this transcendental subject of economy in the direction 
of its activity? Why does humanity engage in the spreading of the ‘flame of life’ and 
not in creating a mechanism to bring death to the world and end history with the 
victory of death? A return to the question concerning the capacities by which 
mankind acts, and thereby creates history, is thus necessary. It is in this problem, as 
has been contended above by Gavrilyuk, that we find the elements in Bulgakov’s 
thought which exhibit an historical determinism. 
As has been suggested throughout Bulgakov’s earlier works, a key aspect of 
humanity is its possession of certain metaphysical and transcendental qualities that 
allow man to exist free from mechanical causality, to be transcendent to the object 
world. Bulgakov demonstrates this whilst discussing the theme of freedom:  
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Свобода есть не беспричинность, но самопричинность, способность действовать 
от себя [...] из себя начинать причинность, по-своему преломлять причинную 
связь и тем нарушать принцип всеобщего механизма.
301
  
Freedom is thus ability to be independent from the material world and to make one’s 
own causality. This freedom constitutes a powerful force within the historical dynamic, 
and its genesis – originating in the metaphysical, coming from God – again 
demonstrates the primacy of the metaphysical over the material. In Filosofiia 
khoziaistva, this ontological-historical problem of man’s freedom to create history is 
advanced in Bulgakov’s formulation of the question of creativity.  
 
The historical problem of creativity 
The historical ramifications of the determined nature of man’s ontological 
make-up are demonstrated when Bulgakov addresses the problem of creativity, a 
question which possesses a significant historical dimension. It is a new ‘historicised’ 
problem arising in Filosofiia khoziaistva. Creativity will also be integral to Berdiaev’s 
philosophy of time – more important than it is for Bulgakov’s philosophy of history – 
but his thought on this problem will differ from Bulgakov’s. Reemphasising the almost 
coterminous nature of history and economy, Bulgakov begins his exploration of 
creativity by detailing his perception of the dynamic whereby history moves:  
Человеческое хозяйство развивается не только экстенсивно, но и интенсивно, так 
что в каждом данном звене исторической цепи интегрируется если не весь 
предыдущий процесс, то некоторая его часть; настоящее вырастает из прошлого, 
его в себя поглощая, органически его усвояя…
302
  
In this discussion of the way in which history moves, Bulgakov evinces the Hegelian-
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Marxist idea that any historical progress contains within itself at least some elements 
of the past. However, he continues then to make a very important assertion: 
...но вместе с тем новый вид, этот интеграл предыдущего исторического ряда, 
содержит в себе и нечто качественно новое в сравнении со всем 
предшествующим, и в этом состоит историческое развитие в природе и в 
человеческой истории.
303
  
This identification of newness as a key component of historical development allows 
the way in for metaphysical, rather than immanent, processes to guide the 
movement of history. This recalls the idea that where the ‘chiliastic’ reduces to 
immanent processes, proper ‘eschatological’ interpretations focus on the 
transcendental in history. Bulgakov concludes that:  
Возможность истории, исторических процессов, а в том числе хозяйства (и 
знания), основана на этой способности к новому творчеству, идущему дальше 
простого воспроизведения или повторения старого...
304
  
Asserting that creativity, through the advent of newness, makes history possible is a 
significant step in the development of Bulgakov’s thinking about history, as he is 
offering a thesis on how history works. 305  As well as discussing history and a 
historical narrative at a cosmic level, he is also thus demonstrating how history 
moves at a more particular level.  
If the path of history (and economy) is based on creativity, then how, and 
according to what impetus, does humanity create? The solutions Bulgakov arrives at 
                                            
303
 Ibid., p. 93. 
304
 Ibid., p. 93. 
305
 It should also be noted that Bulgakov perceives the same creativity in economic activity as he does 
in artistic creativity, meaning that ‘creativity’ is used in a broad sense. For example, in reference to the 
Dostoevskian idea that ‘beauty will save the world’, Bulgakov writes: ‘Демиург в хозяйственном 
процессе организует природу, превращая ее механизм снова в организм [...] и тем превращает 
мир в художественное произведение [...] Поэтому победа хозяйства выражается в космической 
победе красоты. Отсюда пророчественное значение искусства как прообраза: «Красота спасет 
мир».’ Ibid., pp. 101-12. 
145 
 
offer the most comprehensive evidence available thus far of how a determinist 
pattern of thinking in his philosophy establishes a teleology in the historical process. 
Man’s capacity to create, Bulgakov argues, invests in him the responsibility for 
directing history, but this creative ability is circumscribed and directed by certain 
metaphysical criteria. He writes:  
Творчество требует, для своего существования, двух условий: наличности, во-
первых, замысла, свободы изволения, и, во-вторых, мощи, свободы 
исполнения.
306
  
Human creativity, therefore, requires a free ‘will’ (izvolenie) to create, and also the 
freedom of ability to effect creation.   
However, this brings into contention questions surrounding the source of this 
ability – where does it come from? Bulgakov claims:  
Если он [человек] может творить, то не из ничего, а из созданного уже […] мира. В 
нем он может отпечатлевать свои идеи, воплощать свои образы [...] [Но] откуда 
же рождаются в человеке эти образы, эти идеи-модели?
307
  
Human creativity is thus set a first limitation – it cannot create from nothing, which is 
the very opposite, as we shall see, of what Berdiaev believes. This statement is 
further qualified by the fact that the capacity of human creativity is also limited by the 
determination of its source: 
 Оно [человеческое творчество] есть выявление того, что метафизически дано, 
оно в этом смысле не есть творчество из ничего, но лишь воссоздание, 
воспроизведение данного, сделавшегося заданным, и это воссоздание 
становится творчеством постольку, поскольку оно есть свободное и трудовое 
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воспроизведение.
308
  
Indeed, he goes further, asserting that,  
Человеческое творчество не содержит поэтому в себе ничего метафизически 
нового, оно лишь воспроизводит и воссоздает из имеющихся, созданных уже 
элементов и по вновь находимым, воссоздаваемым, но также наперед данным 
образцам.
309
  
Creativity is therefore nothing but a capacity freely to re-create that which is already 
given to mankind by God. Thus far, then, if history is possible due to creativity, and 
creativity is only the recreation of ideas provided to man by God with material 
already given to him, it is not difficult to see how a certain metaphysically determinist 
pattern of thought is established inasmuch as man creates history according to plans 
and impulses rendered unto him by God. 
These considerations lead Bulgakov on to the question of man’s creative 
freedom. Here he makes the most remarkable statement, revealing his deepest 
intuition concerning life and history: 
 Человек свободен – а постольку и оригинален – лишь в направлении своих сил, в 
способе использования своей природы, но самую эту природу, основу своего я, 
он имеет как данную, как сотворенную.
310
  
We see then that man appears not to be free to choose his nature, that it is rather 
determined for him. Thus man is given a metaphysical nature and is endowed with a 
set of spiritual capacities which allow him to re-create that which is given to him. 
Furthermore, mankind is provided with a model of history that through his creativity 
he is called to recreate:  
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Человеческое творчество создает не «образ», который дан, но «подобие», 
которое задано воспроизводить в свободном, трудовом, историческом процессе 
то, что предвечно есть, как идеальный первообраз.
311
  
In this way mechanical causality, even the object world itself has no real sway over 
man, but he is instead forced to work through them in order to spread the flame of 
life – the life he has been endowed with – throughout creation.  
This conceptualisation of history affords mankind, in its creation of history 
through economy, neither the choice nor the potential to envision its own form of 
history. Indeed man, whether he wants to or not, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, works to realise aspirations which aim to manifest the ‘likeness’ 
(podobie) of what is given, rather than to create something fundamentally original or 
metaphysically new. The extent to which this thesis on creativity rests on a 
deterministic teleology is demonstrated in a concluding statement:  
Защита и расширение жизни, а постольку и частичное ее воскрешение и 
составляет содержание хозяйственной деятельности человека. Это активная 
реакция жизнетворного принципа против смертоносного. Это работа Софии над 
восстановлением мироздания, которую ведет она чрез посредство исторического 
человечества, и ею же устанавливается сверхсубъективная телеология 
исторического процесса.
312
 
A ‘meta-subjective’ or ‘supra-subjective’ teleology – carried out through the work of 
Sophia – that reigns over the historical process is conspicuously identified. Leskov, 
amongst others, also sees this conceptualisation of history as intrinsically 
deterministic and even goes so far as to speak of a ‘mechanistic type of rationalism’ 
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and a ‘harsh, one-dimensional and linear determinism’.313    
The historical dimensions of Bulgakov’s Sophiology now demand exploration, 
as Sophia is the basic device that allows this transmission of divine knowledge from 
God to man and then from man to the world.  
 
Bulgakov’s Sophiology 
 Up to now we have avoided engaging with the nature of the Sophiology and 
theological thinking that is evident across Filosofiia khoziaistva. The intention was 
first to demonstrate the historical structure and the various ‘historicised’ elements 
that Bulgakov describes in this text, as without this it would be harder to determine 
the more exact role of Sophia. Developing from his previous works, we have seen 
how Bulgakov has been keen to detect within the process of history a greater 
providential meaning as well as evidence of the fact that empirical reality does not in 
its own inert, mechanical processes hold the key to history. Alongside this Bulgakov 
has also demonstrated that he is still keen to find in a conceptualisation of history a 
solution to the problem of evil, which he now also understands to exist in mechanism, 
inertness and death. As we have also seen, in Bulgakov’s reckoning man, in his 
creation of history according to his metaphysical abilities and capacities, is able (only) 
to re-create that which is given to him as an ideal model. Bulgakov has further 
asserted that history is driven by a teleology rooted in Sophia. Sophia thus 
completes the determined teleology of Bulgakov’s historical thought offered in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva. What this actually means demands further elaboration. 
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 First a short description is needed. Sophia is Divine Wisdom. She issues from 
God at the moment of creation but is present within all creation: she is the 
intermediate force which functions to imbue creation – specifically humanity – with 
divine capacity and aspiration, despite the fact she too exists in the immanent world. 
As Garaeva asserts:  
София – это посредник, связывающее начало разных сфер – тварного мира и 
мира Божественного.
314
  
Indeed, as Louth summarises: 
The fundamental intuition of Sophiology is relatively easy to enunciate; it is that the gulf 
between the uncreated God and creation, brought into being out of nothing, does not 
put creation in opposition to God, rather Wisdom […] [sits] between God and 
us/creation, for Wisdom is that through which God created the universe, and it is 
equally through Wisdom that the human quest for God finds fulfilment.
315
 
This intermediary concept of Sophia thus offers a means of allowing the divine and 
metaphysical to exist within the empirical realm as well as outside it. Sophiology 
therefore facilitates, as discussed earlier, a degree of dialogue between the 
metaphysical and the present (unpleasant) condition of the world.316 Sophiological 
thinking helps find metaphysical value in calamity, and can be linked back to the idea 
of temporality as crisis: it allows for an appraisal of current crises in the light of divine 
value. Sophia therefore provides greater unity to Bulgakov’s philosophical project, as 
she describes a religious or metaphysical force which is the same in the 
metaphysical dimension as it is in the material dimension, bringing about a degree of 
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harmony. The search for this unifying principle has been a continuous element of 
Bulgakov’s thinking. Indeed, regarding the theme of all-unity issuing from 
Sophiological thinking, Evtuhov comments:  
Творчество Булгакова этой эпохи [эпохи Философии хозяйства] с удивительной 
легкостью причисляет к «философии единства» и к квази-мистическим полетам 
мысли, присущим Серебряному веку русской культуры.
317
 
Sophia, as the Divine Wisdom, is the divine basis behind the cosmic ‘vivifying 
principle’ existent in man and the world, and thus is the energy which drives man in 
his quest to realise the kingdom of God. It demonstrates the deep influence of 
Solovʹev over Bulgakov’s developing thinking, as was discussed earlier.318   
Sophia acts as a channel or mechanism whereby man receives, and is then in 
part defined by, the metaphysical aspects of his character. Man is driven to create 
and strive in a certain way, because man partakes of Sophia, of the Divine Wisdom, 
and is thereby unwittingly driven by it. Economy therefore becomes a Sophiological 
process – it is the process whereby man delivers the Sophiological energy of his 
subject to the object of the world. The Sophiological nature of economy is its most 
important feature in the historical dynamic, as economy is, just as history is, a 
Sophiological process:  
Поэтому окончательная цель хозяйства – за пределами его, оно есть только путь 
мира к Софии осуществленной, переход от неистинного состояния мира к 
истинному, трудовое восстановление мира.
319
 
Sophia, lying at the base of everything, also completes the cosmic aspect of 
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Bulgakov’s assertion, a key element in the deterministic pattern in his thought, which 
relates to the identity of subject and object in Filosofiia khoziaistva. This is because 
Sophia is the energy, or potential which equally illuminates object (or nature) as it 
does the subject, providing for their same metaphysical basis:  
В софийности природы обосновывается и объективно-логическая связь вещей, ее 
закономерность, которая установляется в науках.
320
  
Sophia therefore allows for the ontological aspects of Bulgakov’s thought, because it 
represents the channel through which divine capacity is transferred to mankind, and 
similarly provides for the cosmic aspects of his vision for the transformation of the 
material world, because it represents the metaphysical basis of nature. Therefore, 
Bulgakov is able to assert: 
София правит историей, как Провидение, как объективная ее закономерность, как 
закон прогресса... Только в софийности истории лежит гарантия, что из нее что-
нибудь выйдет и она даст какой-нибудь общий результат, что возможен интеграл 
этих бесконечно дифференцирующихся рядов. То, что история не есть вечное 
круговращение или однообразный механизм или, наконец, абсолютный хаос, не 
поддающийся никакой координации, – то, что история вообще есть как единый 
процесс, преследующий разрешение единой творческой задачи, в этом нас может 
утвердить только метафизическая идея об ее софийности, со всеми связанными с 
нею метафизическими предположениями.
321
 
Bulgakov’s use of words such as ‘zakonomernost’’, ‘garantiia’ and so forth is 
characteristic of a more Sophiological style of determinist thinking, which thereby 
becomes a part of the broader metaphysical pattern of determinism which has 
already been identified in Bulgakov’s thought.  
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In this Sophiological-metaphysical dimension of historical thinking we can still 
see the lasting presence of Hegelian-Marxist thinking about history, in which human 
activity becomes nothing but a necessary substratum of a greater historical process, 
where everything corresponds to the grand providential movement of events. 
Commenting on the passage just quoted, Zen’kovskii instructively makes a similar 
assertion, arguing that: 
У Булгакова не исчез тот исторический детерминизм, который у Маркса (от Гегеля) 
гарантирует, что в «конце истории» наступит «царство свободы», – только теперь 
У Булгакова «София правит историей, как объективная ее закономерность; только 
в софийности истории лежит гарантия, что из нее что-нибудь выйдет». Но как же 
тогда, при этом софийном плане истории, при этом внутреннем ее детерминизме, 
осмыслить начало свободы в человечестве? Эта тема занимала всегда 
Булгакова...
322
 
Sophia, then, for Bulgakov provides history with an ultimate plan and also 
justification: it brings divine, historical meaning to the vicissitudes and crises of life. 
This plan, constructed at a cosmic level, is carried out through mankind, who as the 
bearer of the Sophiological light will bring about the end of the historical process, 
transforming the object world, transcending mechanical necessity and causality, 
infusing all with the divine and metaphysical. 
Sophiologically determinist thought about history raises certain fundamental 
problems. As we have mentioned, Bulgakov’s historical thinking in part answers to a 
need to establish a proper theodicy. The thesis of Sophia responds to this, as it 
argues for the good that is existent in everything – that the whole world is pregnant 
with the divine, and that current evil and calamity is nothing but an improper 
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condition awaiting correction and revelation. However, regarding the Sophiological, 
universal value of all, Copleston has raised doubts over the possibility of evil in a 
world in which such all-unity is the dominant principle:  
The difficulty is to see how, if God is the Absolute, the total-unity, disunity and disorder 
can have arisen in the first place.
323
   
This will become a very real problem for Bulgakov. He tries to explain that the root of 
evil lies in the metaphysical events of the Fall, lying outside history. This does not, 
however, really address the difficulty raised by Copleston:  
Для философии хозяйства «метафизическое грехопадение» есть гипотеза, 
принятие которой проливает свет на основные ее проблемы, поскольку 
объясняет мировой и в нем исторический процесс. Конечно, это «событие» 
совершилось не во времени, и тщетно стали бы мы искать его следов в анналах 
истории или палеонтологических раскопках, где теперь ищут следов 
доисторического человека.
324
  
This is all well and good, but it does not explain – in the terms of Bulgakov’s broader, 
universal philosophy – why this evil occurred, nor why evil has proved to be so 
tenacious. If ‘all is providential’, if everything – be it the impetus behind Marxism or a 
political revolution – is urged on by a deep religiosity which is good and 
Sophiological by nature, and if life and the Divine are absolute, then why has this 
Sophiological impulse become perverted, or at least non-absolute – why has it not 
already triumphed? Bulgakov does not give a convincing answer as to why this is so 
– as to why the historical process itself must take place over such a protracted 
period. This problem will be better dealt with in Svet nevechernii (1917) as it deals in 
more depth with cosmogonic problems and the origin of evil.  
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Conclusions 
Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) is thus the most significant text that has been 
discussed yet regarding Bulgakov’s philosophy of history. First, it continues to 
demonstrate his inclination to look at philosophical problems from a historical 
perspective, as his discussion of economy as a historical problem plays out across a 
clear narrative. Furthermore, this historicising bent of thought, as has been 
suggested earlier, contains within itself a further proclivity towards determinist 
thinking. The historicised problems in Bulgakov’s work clarify in turn this determinist 
bent of thought: the need to deal with evil and an exploration of creativity made much 
clearer how determinist patterns emerge and function in Bulgakov’s thinking.  
This determinist thinking is built on a metaphysical rather than material 
imperative. This operates at two levels: cosmic and ontological. In the cosmic 
dimension, the determinist line of thinking is not as obvious in Filosofiia khoziaistva 
as it will be in Svet nevechernii (1917). Depicting a cosmic battle between good and 
evil, waged across history, Bulgakov offers the inevitability of the victory of good by 
establishing the metaphysical, Sophiological basis of everything (both good and evil, 
object and subject, mechanism and organism). This means the basic cosmic 
relationship between good and evil is imbalanced to such an extent that it is not 
possible for good to fail. This idea is rendered with much more exactitude in Svet 
nevechernii. At the ontological level, Bulgakov introduces the problem of creativity, 
another widespread theme in Silver Age thought. He describes how the kernel of 
economic activity, which creates history, consists in the emergence of newness, 
which itself is the product of creativity. However, he then immediately goes on to 
explain that this creativity is not genuine Divine creativity, but is rather only a re-
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creation of something already given to man by God, which exists within man by merit 
of his participation in Sophia. Thus man creates, and then drives history according to 
a metaphysical impetus and according to a plan that is delivered to him from the 
metaphysical – he does not freely create these plans, nor is he able to disregard 
them, as he is not free to choose his own nature, which is divine. A metaphysical 
teleology is thereby established through these twin cosmic and ontological 
dimensions. 
Berdiaev, in the journal Russkaia mysl’ (1916), commented witheringly on the 
way in which Bulgakov engaged with the question of creativity and with the 
implications this had for his ontology. He commented: 
Булгаков – богослов в экономике и экономист в богословии [...] [По Булгакову] 
Человек не имеет своей собственности. И он может лишь управлять, 
возделывать, хозяйничать на господской, хозяйнской земле, но не может быть 
творцом, не может быть оригинальным художником жизни.
325
 
It was clear to Berdiaev, as it is to us, how Bulgakov’s restricted understanding of 
human creativity fundamentally restricts man’s broader relationship with the world. 
The question of creativity therefore polarises Berdiaev in his relationship to 
Bulgakov’s thought, as he sees in Bulgakov’s work the same determinism and 
limitation that he finds in Marxist thought. Whilst this a is no doubt a simplification 
and possible misrepresentation of Bulgakov’s thought, Berdiaev’s own presentation 
of the creativity-history dynamic, by placing an emphasis on the primacy of the 
subject’s internal life, will provide a contrasting interpretation of the relationship 
between creativity and history (or, moreover, the relationship between creativity and 
time).   
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Svet Nevechernii (1917) 
 Svet nevechernii demonstrates a significant change in Bulgakov’s thinking. It 
expands beyond the boundaries of Filosofiia khoziaistva and his earlier work, and 
demonstrates his continuing movement towards theology. Written between 1911-16, 
it is a complicated text, whose guiding focus is also not as clear as in Filosofiia 
khoziaistva. Bulgakov notes in the introduction:  
Книга эта писалась медленно и с большими перерывами (в течение 1911-1916 
годов), а заканчивалась она уже под громы мировой войны.
326
  
The cataclysmic context in which he was writing therefore still figured overtly in his 
consciousness whilst he was writing it. Opening in a Kantian style, he identifies ‘how 
is religion possible?’ as the central problem for investigation. 327  Indeed, Svet 
nevechernii might be best described as his philosophical exploration of religion, 
along with an attempt to express a proper Orthodox weltanschauung. It is thus a 
synthesis of the various phases of thinking Bulgakov has moved through. Notably, 
both ancient Greek philosophy and early Christian apophatic theology take a more 
prominent place in this work.328  
The ideas presented in this text are complex, and they reflect a long and 
difficult genesis: 
Лично для автора эта книга представляет собой род духовной автобиографии или 
исповеди. Она является обобщающим постижением, как бы итогом всего мною 
пройденного, столь ломаного и сложного – слишком сложного! – духовного пути, я 
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в ней благодарно его озираю.
329
  
Inasmuch as it is a ‘confession’ for Bulgakov, this text, similarly to Filosofiia 
khoziaistva, will still look to overcome ‘guilt’ relating to his Marxist past. The ideas 
presented in Svet nevechernii are also no longer simply philosophical, they are also 
in many ways theological: this book sits somewhere between theology and 
philosophy. After it, as is widely accepted, Bulgakov moves into the field of pure 
theology. As the last of his philosophical works it is therefore an immensely important 
text: 
Книга «Свет Невечерний», вне всяких сомнений, является главным философским 
трудом Булгакова.
330
 
Perhaps, as he looked at this work as a kind of spiritual autobiography, after 
completing it Bulgakov felt happier to leave philosophical concerns behind and move 
fully into the Church. 
 The central philosophical-religious focus of Svet nevechernii is the concept of 
antinomy:  
…антиномия религиозного сознания должна быть раскрыта и осознана до конца в 
своих последствиях.
331
  
Blank has contended that it was Florenskii who first developed the Russian interest 
in antinomy, 332  and, given the closeness between Florenskii and Bulgakov it is 
certainly possible that this influenced Bulgakov’s interest in this theme in Svet 
nevechernii. For Bulgakov, antinomy consists in the notion of simultaneous 
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transcendence and immanence. This issues from the contradictions which arise 
through religious experience: 
Основное содержание религиозного переживания, как касания миру 
трансцендентному, запредельному, божественному, явным образом содержит в 
себе противоречие для рассудочного мышления. Объект религии, Бог, есть нечто, 
с одной стороны, совершенно трансцендентное, иноприродное, внешнее миру и 
человеку, но, с другой, он открывается религиозному сознанию, его касается, 
внутрь его входит, становится его имманентным содержанием. Оба момента 
религиозного сознания даны одновременно…
333
 
This concept of simultaneous transcendence and immanence is an important feature 
of Bulgakov’s thinking. As discussion of his earlier thought has demonstrated, 
specifically regarding the identity of subject and object, he had already been 
entertaining the idea of a metaphysical or Sophiological force operating both 
transcendentally and immanently within history. However, in Svet nevechernii identity 
gives way to antinomy, and Bulgakov tries to apply this antinomic principle to a 
number of philosophical concerns, including creation, time, space, Sophia, humanity 
and history. This focus on antimony makes his thinking more complex and makes the 
conclusions he draws in this text more difficult to apprehend. This is because 
antinomy, which then often becomes ‘mystery’, tends to rely on faith more than 
philosophical reason. 
 The nature of Bulgakov’s engagement with history in this work is expansive 
but requires some effort to be understood. Despite engaging with the problem of 
history overtly, namely in the fifty-page section entitled ‘Human history’ 
(‘Chelovecheskaia istoriia’), Bulgakov’s thinking about history is at times a little 
opaque. Whereas in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) history was a central organising 
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theme of the text, historical thinking in Svet nevechernii is more subsidiary, and other 
concepts occupy centre stage. Nonetheless it is still a very important intellectual 
concern; indeed, we see in this text the most consistent demonstration of historically 
determinist thought, and continued engagement with ‘historicised’ themes, including 
theodicy, freedom and necessity, and creativity. Svet nevechernii also develops 
upon Filosofiia khoziaistva by providing fuller cosmic and anthropological accounts of 
history.  
Significantly, in Svet nevechernii Bulgakov also introduces the philosophical 
problem of time. Time constitutes a frequent concern in this work, although this is not 
to say that within the internal hierarchy of Bulgakov’s thought time has become more 
important. He still understands time to be approximate to history, meaning that 
history is for him still dominant. He therefore still writes:  
…во власти временности, т.е. истории.
334
  
Instead, it will become evident how Bulgakov’s conceptualisation and understanding 
of time is itself historicised, and that despite his attempts to differentiate between 
time and history he nonetheless inexorably inclines towards a description of time 
which is innately historical.  
 Finally, Svet nevechernii also offers the most extensive dealing with the 
manifold ‘historicised’ problems that we have identified across Bulgakov’s work. This 
means we can, in view of our analysis of Bulgakov’s thought up to this point, discuss 
these various themes in full. 
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Bulgakov’s Conceptualisation of History in Svet nevechernii 
 
Overview 
 Up to this point we have described Bulgakov’s conceptualisation of history as 
an account of how mankind goes about establishing the rule of the metaphysical and 
divine through a number of processes, primarily economy. Man does this according 
to the impetus of divine characteristics existing within his nature, characteristics 
which demonstrate his transcendence to the world despite the fact that he is 
immanent to it. Critical to this schema is the fact that man and the world participate in 
Sophia, the Divine Wisdom. Sophia works as a nexus between man and God, and 
through her a divine teleology is transferred to the world, informing and stimulating 
human activity, and thereby shaping the historical process. History thus becomes the 
process of the divine enlightenment of the world by man through Sophia. As has 
been asserted, this discussion of history takes on a deterministic colouring in a 
number of instances. 
 Most obviously, Bulgakov in Svet nevechernii has moved on from focusing on 
history as economy, however broadly undersood. History is now described according 
to the nature of its transcendental subject, historical humanity: 
История есть, прежде всего, рождение человечества, объективное время, 
наполненное рождениями, а потому и смертями, и внутренно связанное их 
последование.
335
  
Humanity is placed squarely at the centre of the historical drama. Bulgakov goes on 
to suggest that through this cycle of human generations, which, as is asserted above, 
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connect ‘objective’ time, history arises as ‘concrete time’:  
…но именно в чередовании поколений возникает история как конкретное 
время.
336
  
Such ‘concrete time’ allows him to establish an order (or zakonomernost’) in history, 
according to which the flow of history proceeds in a regular way: 
Подобно тому как в Америку нельзя проехать из Европы, минуя океан, так и в 19 
век дорога лежит только чрез 18-й, и именно конкретная наполненность времени 
и создает «историческую закономерность» в том условном смысле, в каком 
можно о ней говорить. Время есть вполне соотносительно пространству...
337
  
Bulgakov is thus increasingly interested by the role of time in history, whereas earlier 
he had chiefly been engaged with the broader dynamic of history and of the forces 
which governed its movement. The historical process is also ‘regular’: history is, in 
this reckoning, some sort of inviolable, linear process. This is important as it 
continues to testify to the sort of regular developmental patterns described in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva. Berdiaev, however, will in contrast suggest a highly non-linear 
conceptualisation of the historical process. History in Svet nevechernii is still 
eschatological, as we shall see, but there is less focus on the process of what goes 
on within history – i.e. economy – and instead Bulgakov considers the metaphysical 
in greater detail. 
 Bulgakov also continues to describe the teleology he identified in Filosofiia 
khoziaistva. He writes:  
Если история вообще есть рождение человечества, то оно осуществляется с 
внутренно определенным планом и последовательностью. История связана 
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«временами и сроками», имеющими основание в духовной организации 
человечества. Поэтому она не есть «дурная бесконечность», естественно 
присущая формальному времени, но имеет грани, а, в частности, необходимо 
предполагает и начало, и конец, которых совершенно не знает абстрактное 
время.
338
 
History is thus still discussed in terms of being a ‘plan’. Bulgakov also overtly 
distinguishes between ‘formal’ or ‘abstract’ time and history or the time which he 
perceives to have its root in the spiritual organisation of humanity. Time of the latter 
type is much more closely related to history, whereas the former – at least for 
Bulgakov – appears to possess much less meaning or content.  
Bulgakov also still posits a meta-historical schema, transcending the beginning 
and end of history. The importance of this sense of meta-history is implied by his 
greater focus on the finite nature of history:  
Напротив, конкретное время, которым и является история, имеет и начало, и 
конец; иначе говоря, оно представляет собой эон, некую завершенность, 
последовательно раскрывающуюся во времени. Полнейшую аналогию 
историческому эону имеем и в своей собственной жизни, также представляющей 
собой конкретное время.
339
  
In this way, then, history is conceptualised as a discrete process, with the implication 
that forces are at work beyond these boundaries. A degree of antimony will be 
introduced later when he asserts that these forces are also at work within history. 
Furthermore, there is also a significant development regarding the connection that 
exists between a historical eon and a single human life: whereas in Filosofiia 
khoziaistva he had focused upon the collective body of humanity, here he opens up a 
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connection between individual life and history.  
 What has become evident in Svet nevechernii, then, is that greater focus is 
placed upon the nature of the connection between man’s life cycle and history. New 
themes are discussed in the context of history, and older notions are either 
assimilated into the newer interpretations or left behind. 
 
The Beginning and the End  
 A focus on the end and the beginning of history is a prevalent characteristic of 
Bulgakov’s historical thought in Svet nevechernii, and represents an extension of the 
sort of cosmic historical thinking which appeared in Filosofiia khoziaistva. This bears 
similarity to Berdiaev, who had much to say on these questions.  As Zen’kovskii has 
mentioned, the concept of antinomy is a philosophical focus for Bulgakov at this 
point:  
...принцип антиномизма имел коренное значение длы Булгакова...
340
  
We see this reflected specifically in his thinking regarding the end and beginning of 
history, where immanence and transcendence coincide. First of all, it is evident in 
Bulgakov’s concern with the goals or aims that he perceives to be governing the 
historical process: 
Цель истории ведет за историю, к «жизни будущего века», а цель мира ведет за 
мир, к «новой земле и новому небу». Лишь в царстве славы, когда окончится 
время, осуществится цель мироздания, а все теперешнее есть только муки 
рождения.
341
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This consequently puts less emphasis on the ‘middle’ of history: all Bulgakov 
appears interested in – at least from the above – is the end. It could be argued that 
Filosofiia khoziaistva was conversely much more interested in the middle process of 
history – economy – rather than just its beginning and end. There is the same 
Christian substance to these assertions, but the focus is different. In this new 
orientation eschatology is more evident, and has moved from the ‘inaugurated’ type 
of Filsofiia khoziaistva onto a more ‘futurist’ type. 342  An increased reliance on 
apophatic thought also becomes more manifest: the here and now appears of 
diminished consequence, as the end, the transcendence is more significant. 
 
The End 
The antinomy of the end arises over the fact that whilst the meta-historical 
aims of history lead beyond, they nonetheless must also exist within the historical-
temporal process, despite the fact that they do not belong to history. This problem is 
highlighted through Bulgakov’s exploration below. He asserts:  
И хотя историческое время, как конкретное, должно иметь не только начало, но и 
конец, однако, если держаться исторической поверхности, оно как будто не имеет 
своего конца и, не достигая свершения, обречено на дурную бесконечность.
343
  
This negative concept of a ‘bad infinity’ – the infinity of directionless, meaningless, 
non-teleological movement – is an idea lifted directly from Hegel. Bulgakov aims to 
establish a sense of direction by moving from the historical ‘surface’ to its depths, 
and looks to the ‘ontological’ aspect of history:  
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Однако так кажется, лишь если оставаться в области исторической 
феноменальности, но под нею лежит глубокая почва исторической онтологии. 
Если там, на поверхности, история как будто не умеет закончиться, то здесь она 
идет путем свершений, близясь к своей зрелости и концу.
344
 
‘Historical ontology’ most likely relates to Bulgakov’s intuition that history belongs to 
man’s internal life rather than existing purely as a phenomenon imposed upon him. 
He thus argues that the end of history can only be understood by looking at the 
‘deeper’, and by implication metaphysical or divine process which is at work beneath 
the tangible surface of historical developments.  
 This solution focuses upon the religious aspects of Bulgakov’s worldview and 
therefore draws back to his understanding of the primary religious antinomy in which 
God and the metaphysical are both immanent and transcendent to the world. 
Bulgakov looks for an antinomic and determinist principle to guide history, and tries 
to establish the metaphysical grounding of material, outward historical developments. 
In this way he perceives that beneath material progress lies a developing spiritual, 
metaphysical or divine process. He thus continues to investigate the aim, meaning or 
destiny which guides history, leading him on to a revealing assertion: 
 Но наступление исторической зрелости измеряется, конечно, не достижениями 
прогресса, это есть лишь симптом, преломленное отражение того, что 
совершается на глубине […] Созревает же она [история] в богочеловеческих 
актах богооткровения и боговоплощения: судьбы истории прямо или косвенно 
определяются судьбами Церкви. Церковь есть душа мира и душа истории. 
Онтология истории и есть церковная история […] [судьбы церкви] сплетены с 
общим ходом истории, но эта связь лежит так глубоко, что недоступна 
природному, непросветленному благодатию Божией человеку; она раскрывается 
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в откровении, но и она остается запечатленной тайной.
345
 
History, then, as the reflection of the spirit of the world, is ecclesiastical, or of the 
church (tserkovnaia), and therefore is subject to all the antinomies that exist within 
religious experience.346 Revelation in this reckoning is as important as human activity 
in the historical process, implying that God’s role in history is more direct. This 
statement that the church is the spirit of history further establishes the sense that the 
divine and metaphysical constitute the driving force in the historical process. 
A final theme that arises regarding the end is Bulgakov’s repeated use of the 
notion of ‘maturity’ and of ‘ripening’ with regard to the end. In the above quotation he 
had discussed ‘historical maturity’ (istoricheskoi zrelosti), and below this is repeated 
in the image of a ‘budding fig tree’ (raspuskaiushcheisia smokovnitse) and also in the 
repetition of ‘maturation’ or ‘ripening’ (sozrevat’): 
Близок ли конец? Только Отец ведает времена и сроки, Ему принадлежит 
свершение, но по распускающейся смоковнице судим о близости лета, и в нас 
самих должна созревать жертвенная готовность к концу и жажда конца. Из 
человеческого сердца должна исторгнуться молитва конца: ей, гряди, Господи 
Иисусе!
347
 
This concept of maturation or ripening could be read as being a reflection of the 
historical process, but it also adds to the deeper sense of eschatological expectation 
in Svet nevechernii, providing an enhanced anticipation of divine revelation (‘come, 
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Lord Jesus!’). There is thus a stronger eschatological ‘mood’ in Svet nevechernii that 
was not as prevalent in Filosofiia khoziaistva, which had been more focused on the 
nature of the process whereby the eschatological horizon would be reached. This 
may testify to a stronger sense of temporality as crisis: given the current upheavals in 
Russia and the world whilst this book was being written, it is to be expected that this 
catastrophic context would manifest itself in a heightened eschatological tone.  
 
Beginnings 
 Bulgakov’s focus on beginnings in Svet nevechernii represents newer subject 
matter for him. Centrally, it offers a number of answers regarding the problem of the 
‘why’ of history: why, if the divine and metaphysical is universal, both immanent and 
transcendent, must the historical process take place at all. It also completes the 
determinist aspect of his understanding of the historical process by providing a 
structure which embraces history from beginning to end. In his work on beginnings, 
Bulgakov deals with two different problems – the first being the beginning of human 
history, and the second concerning the cosmogonic problem of the beginning of the 
world – specifically discussing God’s act of creation. This is similar to Berdiaev, who 
also identified two such cosmogonic moments or events. Through discussion of these 
problems Bulgakov concludes that there is a meaning and direction which pervades 
both material creation and history right from its inception; that history and the world 
are together processes which are fully pre-conceived and ultimately directed – 
determined – from beginning to end. Bulgakov’s work on cosmogony is much richer 
than his writing about the beginning of human history. The latter relies heavily on 
standard Christian tenets dealing with Adam and Eve and the Fall:  
168 
 
Иначе сказать, человеческая история, как рождение и вместе творческое 
саморождение человечества, как некий завершенный эон, протекала бы и в раю, 
и в жизни прародителей до грехопадания мы имеем уже это райское начало 
истории.
348
  
Consequently here only Bulgakov’s cosmogonic thinking needs to be explored, as we 
can make more extensive reference to his ideas surrounding the Fall when we look at 
the problem of evil. 
 Bulgakov affirms the ultimate purpose and meaning of the world (and thereby 
of history) by asserting first and foremost the religious principle that both the world 
and man are created: 
 Перед лицом мировых неисследимостей, в беспредельности мировых 
пространств и безбрежности мировых времен, в неизмеримости мировых глубин 
и необъятности мировых громад, – звучит он, этот чудесный голос, властно 
шепчущий: миру, во всей его безмерности, не принадлежит его бытие, – оно ему 
дано. И в сердце человека слышится тот же неумолчный шепот: ты не в себе 
имеешь корень своего бытия, – ты сотворен.
349
 
He then continues by asserting the miraculous nature of creation, arguing that this 
process cannot be understood in a purely empirical manner or by using purely 
immanent cognitive means: 
Идея творения мира Богом поэтому не притязает объяснить возникновение мира 
в смысле эмпирической причинности, она оставляет его в этом смысле 
необъясненным и непонятным; вот почему она совершенно не вмещается в 
научное мышление, основывающееся на имманентной непрерывности опыта и 
универсальности причинной связи, она остается для него бесполезна и ему чужда, 
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– есть в этом смысле заведомо ненаучная идея.
350
 
This serves to establish the transcendental nature of the process through which the 
creation of the world took place.  
Bulgakov’s descriptions of process by which the relative is generated focus on 
how the ‘Absolute’ (God) divides itself to give space to and create the relative, non-
Absolute:  
Абсолютное, не теряя абсолютности своей, полагает в себе относительное как 
самостоятельное бытие – реальное, живое начало. Тем самым вносится 
двойственность в единстве неразличимости...
351
  
This explanation of how it is activity within the Absolute that leads to the creation of 
the relative therefore establishes how everything is, at its most fundamental level, 
dependent on the Absolute, God, for existence.352 
Bulgakov also understands the process of cosmogony as being antinomic, as 
is to be expected:  
Это самораздвоение Абсолютного как абсолютно-относительного образует 
предельную антиномическую грань для мысли (Grenzbegriff).
353
  
The antinomic character that Bulgakov ascribes to God’s act of creation – i.e. its 
simultaneous absoluteness and relativity – then imprints itself upon creation, 
specifically upon mankind:  
В недрах своего духа сознает человек метафизические последствия этого (если 
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можно выразиться) события в Абсолютном, сотворения мира Богом, в 
двойственности своей природы, в своей абсолютно-относительности. Ибо 
человек ощущает себя относительным бытием, […] Но в себе же находит он 
столь упругое сознание своей абсолютности, вечности, божественности….
354
 
This statement is central to Bulgakov’s mature philosophical thought, in that it 
establishes how humanity, in the deepest roots of its createdness, is subject to the 
same tension that has been identified to exist within the antinomy of creation. It is 
possible to see why it is that human being is simultaneously transcendent and 
immanent to the world, as this nature is established at the very beginning of the 
cosmogonic process, at the genesis of the world. As has already been argued, 
human nature is a key element through which Bulgakov is able to describe a 
historical schema, coloured by determinism, in which humanity is called to carry out 
the divine plan by merit of its own divine-metaphysical nature. We can see here, then, 
in Bulgakov’s cosmogony, that this human nature is created through the nature of the 
creative act itself by means of which God called the world into existence. 
 We also see in Bulgakov’s cosmogony a description of why the world process 
must occur – why it is that history must take place. This aspect of his thinking 
specifically recalls Hegel. Explaining that God, in creating the world from nothing, 
created the relative alongside the absolute, Bulgakov further argues that this creates 
something which is becoming alongside something which is already complete:  
Творением из ничего Абсолютное установляет как бы два центра: вечный и 
тварный, в недрах самодовлеющей вечности появляется «становящееся 
абсолютное» - второй центр.
355
  
This depiction of the world as becoming absolute is of course both deeply 
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deterministic and deeply Hegelian, as was discussed earlier: it suggests that the 
world is pre-determined, predestined for one purpose and for one goal – for 
becoming absolute. Although describing this process in religious terms, the Hegelian 
overtones to this understanding of the broad world-historical process are obvious:  
Рядом со сверхбытийно сущим Абсолютным появляется бытие, в котором 
Абсолютное обнаруживает себя как Творец, открывается в нем, осуществляется в 
нем, само приобщается к бытию, и в этом смысле мир есть становящийся Бог.
356
  
Bulgakov, in Svet nevechernii, therefore accounts more fully for some of the deeper 
questions surrounding his philosophy of history – namely why it is history began in 
the first place, and why it must continue – that were until this point unanswered, or at 
least not answered in sufficiently clear terms. 
 
Conclusions 
Thus far we can see, then, that the world, and by extension the history that will 
occur on this world, begins in antimony and will exist in an antinomic condition until 
the end. While it is only between these two antinomic poles of beginning and end that 
we see a form of historical progress which is empirically cognisant for the human 
mind (causal progress), man is instead called to look to the depths of his being, to his 
soul, to understand the true, almost ineffable nature of the process which is at work in 
‘the depths’. This excludes the possibility that any teleological force could arise within 
the limits of the historical process, other than by human-divine creation, as anything 
else would be limited by its necessary immanence. This human-divine work, we 
understand from Bulgakov’s earlier works and Svet nevechernii, will be influenced by 
humanity’s inherently divine character, and will therefore conform to the historical 
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plan that is held by God or in the metaphysical. The teleological force acting on 
history, which, as will be discussed, is variously described – God, Sophia, the 
Absolute – must therefore stand above the historical process, embracing it at both its 
beginning and end, whilst at the same time being antinomiously present within it, 
allowing it to reach is eschatological conclusion through its simultaneously 
transcendent and immanent capacity.  
Having examined, then, the development of Bulgakov’s conceptualisation of 
history, we can move on to discuss the question of determinism in Bulgakov’s 
historical thinking in more detail, specifically with regards to the ‘historicised’ 
problems identified across Bulgakov’s earlier works – those of theodicy, freedom, and 
creativity. 
 
Determinism in the historicised themes of Svet nevechernii 
In Svet nevechernii Bulgakov formulates the determinist aspects of his thought 
in simple terms: 
Закономерность существует лишь для твари и в конце концов только одна – воля 
Божия.
357
  
Bulgakov expresses the by now familiar teleology of religious-historical experience as 
theurgy: 
Христианская теургия
358
 есть незримая, но действительная основа всякого 
духовного движения в мире на пути к его совершению. Без ее освящающего и 
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животровящего воздействия человечество не могло бы близиться к разрешению 
тех творческих задач, которые правомерно ставятся перед ним на этом пути, и в 
этом смысле теургия есть божественная основа всякой софиургий.
359
   
Mankind’s unified activity determines the passage of history, which thereby becomes 
the gradual revelation of God or the Absolute. However, in Svet Nevechernii 
Bulgakov demonstrates that he is aware of the possible accusation of determinism, 
and attempts to counter such a claim: 
Единственная абсолютная закономерность мира есть Божия воля, т.е. чудо; мир 
не закономерен в каком бы то ни было детерминистическом смысле: 
механическом ли, оккультном или метафизическом, – но  чудесен.
360
  
He therefore asserts that idea the world should not be understood in any 
deterministic sense: neither mechanical, ‘occult’ (i.e. defamatory to God), nor 
metaphysical determinism operates in the world. Rather, the world order is 
‘miraculous’ – it transcends the boundaries which determinism proscribes. However, 
what is noticeable here, and what continues to suggest an underlying pattern of 
deterministic thinking, is the language and the concepts Bulgakov uses to highlight 
this. He still reaches towards the word zakonomernost’, which underlines a more 
restricted, ordered and regulated understanding of the world. Although attempting to 
transcend determinism as a category of thought, the broader pattern of his 
expression still implies gravitation towards it.  
Scholars have identified the deterministic aspects of Bulgakov’s thought, 
although some have treated it in a more even-handed way than others. 361  The 
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argument we have sought to develop thus far is that whilst it would be going too far to 
call Bulgakov an outright determinist – his thought is too subtle for such a simple 
description – he nevertheless demonstrates a pattern of thinking which is frequently 
coloured by deterministic language and concepts. Evtukhov is accurate when she 
looks at this historicising tendency in Bulgakov in a broad fashion:  
Понимание соблазна абсолютной закономерности имело глубокие корни в 
интеллектуальном развитии Булгакова; в попытке найти альтернативное решение 
он стремился ответить не только «кетлетистам» или «марксистам», но и самому 
себе.
362
  
Caution should therefore be exercised when describing the deterministic elements in 
Bulgakov’s thought. It perhaps demonstrates quite simply Bulgakov’s continued 
attraction towards absolute solutions to world problems: ‘determinism’ need not be 
understood as a dominant or exclusively Marxist theme. 
This type of thought reveals itself particularly clearly in Bulgakov’s discussion 
of a number of different philosophical problems. These ‘historicised’ problems directly 
or indirectly contribute to a conceptualisation of how the historical process unfolds, 
and demonstrate how the intellectual problem of history is reflected or refracted in the 
broader scope of Bulgakov’s philosophy.  
 
Theodicy and evil 
The question of evil in history, and its apprehension through theodicy, is 
amongst the deepest historical problems that Bulgakov encounters: it directs much 
of his thought and is the most significant of his ‘historicised’ problems. His 
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engagement with this problem has been marked since his first essay following 
conversion from Marxism, ‘Ivan Karamazov kak filosofskii tip’ (1901), and evil 
continues to be a significant theme in Bulgakov’s historical worldview whilst he was 
writing Svet nevechernii (1911-16). The frequently historicised way in which he 
writes about evil continues to demonstrate a deeply deterministic incline of thought, 
as the resolution of the problem of evil is described in frameworks that speak of 
necessity and inevitability:  
Мир не может вовсе не удаться…
363
  
Bulgakov’s earlier works demonstrate that he perceives the conflict between good 
and evil to constitute a key element of the historical drama. There is the further 
implication that the resolution of this conflict represents a, if not the, central aspect of 
the historical process, by means of which the Absolute, God, reveals itself. This is 
most evident in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912), in which history is presented as 
enlightenment of the ‘evil’ condition of the world by the ‘good’ force of man’s 
Sophiological-economic activity. This historical overcoming of evil is also apparent, 
to a certain extent, in Svet nevechernii:  
И Слово Божие дает надежду, ибо противопоставление добра и зла, рая и ада, не 
есть еще предельная цель мироздания.
364
  
The deterministic tone of Bulgakov's choice of words – predel’naia tsel’ – should be 
noted, although this is juxtaposed to the word ‘hope’, which does not have the same 
deterministic connotation. However, deterministic thinking arises over the way in 
which he conceives of the balance between good and evil, as the greater 
precedence he gives to good removes any sort of equilibrium between the two.  
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Bulgakov’s meditations upon evil in Svet nevechernii focus on attempting to 
prove the metaphysical impotence of evil whilst accepting the troubling 
pervasiveness of evil in history and in the material condition of the world. This bears 
similarities to the thesis propounded in Filosofiia khoziaistva, which described evil as 
a condition rather than a reality or principle. 365  However, in Svet nevechernii 
Bulgakov advances the new idea that evil is a product of the freedom man is given 
as a result of his being made in part from the cosmic ‘nothing’ (nichto), and in so 
doing he marks the relevance of both ancient Greek philosophers (specifically Plato 
and Aristotle, both of whom are discussed extensively in the opening chapters of the 
work) and the seventeenth century German Christian mystic theologian, Jakob 
Boehme (1575-1624), to his thinking.366 Bulgakov’s central assertion regarding evil in 
Svet nevechernii is that it is not metaphysically substantial and that it consequently 
can triumph neither in history nor in the world. History is presented as a resolution of 
evil – or the revelation of evil’s groundlessness. A determinist pattern of thought is 
evidenced in Bulgakov’s description of the apparent inevitability of the process by 
which evil is overcome, in his claims that ‘the world cannot fail’ (above), and it is 
therefore instructive to examine more closely Bulgakov’s thesis on evil in Svet 
nevechernii. 
 
The concept of evil in Svet nevechernii 
 First of all we need to look at Bulgakov’s understanding of evil, as it has taken 
on new aspects in this text. Bulgakov first argues – in a conventionally Christian 
manner – that evil and thereby sin did not exist before the Fall of man. This 
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establishes the historical character of evil:  
Мир до грехопадения и представлял собою такую безгрешную потенциальность 
софийности, метафизическую «землю», на которой мог произрасти Эдем.
367
 
However, the original possibility of sin and evil exists due to the fact that God created 
the world and man from nothing. The curious phenomenon of nothing in Svet 
nevechernii requires some exploration, as it is a complex idea, bringing us back to 
the problem of cosmogony.368 Bulgakov argues:  
Мир создан из ничего, – учит христианское откровение. – Между Богом и трарью, 
Абсолютным и относительным, легло ничто. Ничтожество – вот основа твари, 
край бытия, предел, за которым лежит глухое, бездонное небытие, «кромешняя 
тьма», чуждая всякого света.
369
 
This appears to demonstrate a degree of equality between nothing and creation: it 
seems that creation and nothingness sit side by side before God. As the above 
suggests, nothing and nonbeing (nebytie) exist in close, albeit ambiguous connection. 
We will take the two as approximately coterminous, as Bulgakov does not offer much 
in the way of further distinction.370 Bulgakov suggests that nothingness exists (or just 
‘is’) contingent upon the existence of being. Referring to Plato’s Parmenides 
dialogue, he explains:  
Творением Бог полагает бытие, но в небытии, иначе говоря, тем же самым актом, 
которым полагает бытие, Он сополагает небытие, как его границу, среду или тень 
[...] Поэтому, хотя и прав остается Парменид, что в Абсолютном, как 
пребывающем выше бытия, не существует и небытия, но Бог, полагая 
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относительное, т.е. бытие, косвенно дает бытие и небытию. Бог есть виновник 
не только бытия, но и небытия...
371
  
Nonbeing was therefore posited itself, and is dependent on being for its existence: 
God’s intention was to create being but by this act of creation he also posited 
nonbeing. Being is thus above nonbeing in this formulation, as nonbeing is 
contingent upon being for its existence. 
 Returning to the problem of evil, this positing of nothing creates the possibility 
of evil:  
Ничто не ощущалось в мире как актуальный принцип мироздания, но пребывало 
как его темная, немая основа [...] Но эта основа мироздания в себе таила 
возможность актуализации и вмешательства в судьбы мира, т.е. греха и зла.
372
  
The possibility of evil thus consists in the actualisation or interference of nothing in 
the world. However, despite describing this possibility of evil actualising itself, 
Bulgakov also fundamentally limits its scope for activity: he describes evil as 
secondary to the primary foundation of being. This means it lies, in the cosmic 
hierarchy, beneath good:  
Что же такое зло? Очевидно, что оно не может быть понято как второе начало 
бытия, существующее рядом с добром: такое манихейство, помимо религиозной 
абсурдности своей, представлял бы собой и метафизический non-sens.
373
 
Evil, as far as Bulgakov is concerned, is not substantial in the way that good is. We 
can assume that this is due to evil’s dependence on nothing and nothing’s inherent 
non-substantiality, although Bulgakov does not make this connection directly:  
Вообще онтологически не существует ни зла, ни ада, он есть своего рода 
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галлюцинация, закономерно возникающая в больных душах.
374
  
If we connect Bulgakov’s thesis on nonbeing and nothingness with his thought about 
the connection between evil and nonbeing, this offers a cogent explanation for why 
evil is not a second ‘source’ of being, why it is not ontologically substantial in the way 
being and good are. In this reckoning good will therefore overcome evil due to the 
fact that good and evil are unequal forces: by the logic of their metaphysical 
imbalance good will necessarily triumph. 
 Such, then, is the formulation of a theodicy in Svet nevechernii. Evil, 
fundamentally, issues from nothing or nonbeing, and thus does not possess the true 
ontological being as good, as evil is not metaphysically grounded in creation – it 
appears as only a necessary by-product of God’s creative act, a mere shadow of 
being. History, as was discussed above, is still discussed in Svet nevechernii in 
terms of its ‘aim’ and its ‘plan’, in which the divine and good will come to reign.375 We 
thus return to the determinist thesis made in this text which claims that the world 
cannot but succeed.376 History, then, as the propagation of the divine good, cannot 
but succeed, because of the cosmic correlation of the metaphysical force of good 
and the impotent force of evil. This is the opposite formulation to Berdiaev: he 
posited the fundamental power of evil: man, in Berdiaev’s reckoning, was truly free to 
evil, meaning evil was not fettered in the way it was for Bulgakov. This is another 
fundamental point at which the two diverge, and it relates to their very different 
conceptualisations of the historical process. 
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 Freedom and freedom to evil 
  Freedom is a crucial question within any deterministic framework, as James 
commented in The Dilemma of Determinism (1884):  
In other words, our first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be 
to affirm that we are free.
377
  
Freedom, although probably comprising the most opaque of Bulgakov’s ‘historicised’ 
problems, nonetheless poses important questions for the construction of a 
philosophy of history. Freedom can be either a chaotic or deterministic force in 
history, depending on its intellectual apprehension: in Bulgakov’s philosophy it is 
limited, in Berdiaev’s it is unbridled. The question of freedom in Svet nevechernii, 
whilst being a contentious one, will thus be connected to his understanding of the 
way in which history unfolds: 
...мы должны еще считаться с различными возможностями при наполнении 
объективного времени, связанными с существованием человеческой свободы. 
Последняя вплетается в ткань времени в качестве одной из образующих ее сил, 
причем, однако, и при наличности вносимых ею вариантов сохраняет свою силу 
общий закон исторического ряда.
378
 
Bulgakov revealingly posits its influence within the historical process, but does not 
permit it to affect the ‘general law’ of the historical order: he wants to assert the 
importance of freedom, but not fully liberate it. Freedom as a religious concept also 
necessarily possesses significant axiological value, as, in a Christian-Orthodox 
worldview, it is crucial that man is free, not only in his choice to love or serve God, 
but also in his capacity to profane against God, in his freedom to choose evil. 
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Bulgakov’s description of human freedom, however, is as the above implies deeply 
problematic, and the problem arises in both his broad description of freedom and 
more specifically in his discussion of man’s freedom to do evil. Both of these aspects 
relate to history.  
Regarding the question of freedom more broadly, it has already been 
established that from Bulgakov’s historicised perspective, unified mankind’s (or 
historical humanity’s) ‘divine-human’ activity is the central means through which 
history reveals its absolute meaning. It follows that the suggestion of man’s relative 
(non-absolute) freedom vis-à-vis the ‘general law’ of history is deeply significant, as, 
in the above reckoning, how man chooses to direct his activity determines the path of 
history. Therefore, any suggestion of the curtailment, limitation, or ‘directedness’ of 
this freedom of activity will lead to the eventual determination of the historical process 
according to these limitations or restrictions. A non-determinist historical worldview 
would seek to demonstrate to the greatest possible extent genuine, unbounded 
freedom – as, for instance, Berdiaev does – whereas a determinist viewpoint would 
construct laws to which freedom must subject itself. For example, Marx constructed 
his historical materialism on the principle that man’s freedom is, at its most 
rudimentary level, subject to the demands of material existence and consequent 
modes of economic production which ensure survival in the material world:  
The nature of individuals […] depends on the material conditions determining their 
production.
379
  
Lenin suggested a simplistic vision of freedom in his 1908 Materializm i 
empiriokrititsizm, directly quoting from Engels in his infamous Anti-Dühring. He 
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maintained that the greatest ‘freedom’ is achieved through understanding the nature 
of natural ‘necessity’:  
Свобода воли означает, следовательно, не что иное, как способность принимать 
решения со знанием дела. Таким образом, чем свободнее суждение человека по 
отношению к определенному вопросу, с тем большей необходимостью будет 
определяться содержание этого суждения.
380
 
Whilst by no means being as crude as the examples above, Bulgakov’s descriptions 
also place a number of limitations upon the scope of human freedom, which suggest 
some of the trappings of a deterministic schema. 
First, in Svet nevechernii Bulgakov describes freedom as a fundamentally 
relative concept: 
Самое противопоставление свободы и необходимости связано с 
ограниченностью и относительностью, свойственной твари. Свобода есть вообще 
понятие относительное, абсолютная свобода есть столь же противоворечивое 
понятие, как и абсолютное бытие.
381
 
As was demonstrated by the discussion of the non-absoluteness of evil, freedom 
(and similarly necessity), then, in its relativity, will be subject to the same limitations 
that evil encounters. Furthermore, by relegating freedom to the level of relativity, 
Bulgakov is implying that there is a greater framework – an absolute framework – in 
which freedom fits in the manner of a lesser force. This consequently suggests the 
subjection of freedom to absolute forces, and the possibility of an absolute teleology 
working above it. This is reaffirmed by Bulgakov’s suggestion that freedom is 
encompassed and defined according to God’s original cosmogonic act of creation:  
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…эта свобода [твари] онтологически, в своем источнике, вовсе не свободна, не 
есть causa sui, не субстанциальна, ибо всецело определяется из творческого да 
будет; космологически же, как основа мирового бытия, она есть именно то, в чем 
тварь чувствует себя собою.
382
  
Freedom, therefore, in its deepest ontological basis is not free: it is entirely defined 
by God’s initial creative act. Also, in view of this profound curtailment of freedom, 
Bulgakov has gone even further to suggest that man feels himself to be himself 
namely in this curtailed freedom, freedom which he has just described as not 
properly free. And yet, in an antinomy, this freedom, which ontologically is a lack of 
freedom, is simultaneously the basis of worldly being, cosmologically. It is, however, 
the restriction of freedom that Bulgakov reiterates: 
Тварная свобода необходимо ограничена...
383
  
Freedom is therefore still formulated in such a way that a thinker of Berdiaev’s 
disposition, who placed ultimate emphasis upon true freedom, would have found 
unsatisfactory: it is not free from limitation.  
Whilst admitting the presence of human freedom, Bulgakov indicates that 
freedom is itself subject to the greater laws of historical teleology and determinism – 
whilst he admits that freedom is ‘interwoven into the fabric of time’, this is later 
qualified by the assertion:  
Поэтому-то для Божества остается прозрачна и человеческая свобода, открыто 
будущее, нет в нем разных возможностей, а есть только действительность, 
реальные судьбы твари.
384
  
Metaphysically freedom is transparent, it is guided or rather defined and possibly 
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orientated by the original da budet, and is furthermore restricted by its relativity. Man 
cannot wield this freedom in a way God would not expect, as to God it is open, see-
through. Freedom, in its metaphysical transparency and relativity will never be able to 
rule over the historical process, as the historical process is the unfolding of the 
absolute, through the relative but not of the relative. In this way, freedom is 
encompassed by the greater meaning which is revealed through history, and 
becomes only a human condition which is pre-directed to contribute to this process. 
Moving on to the problem of mankind’s freedom to do evil, we are confronted 
with a similar problem concerning man’s ability to decide affirmatively whether or not 
he wants to pursue evil, and thereby direct the historical process towards an evil end. 
If human freedom was beyond metaphysical coercion, mankind’s freedom to evil 
would be as profound as his freedom to do good. However, we read:  
Свобода же в зле совсем не имеет той устойчивости, как свобода в добре, она 
лишена онтологической скрепы, свойственной последней: нельзя забросить якорь 
и утвердиться на нем в пустоте небытия. Поэтому свобода в зле предполагает 
судорожное волевое усилие непрерывного бунта, почему с нее и можно 
сорваться.
385
 
Furthermore, Bulgakov asserts that only good (dobro) resides above freedom and 
above the freedom-necessity distinction, implying that good is the only force that can 
ultimately triumph:  
Несомненно одно: только добру и неразрывно с ним блаженству принадлежит 
онтологическая сущность, только оно пребывает выше различения свободы и 
необходимости.
386
  
This therefore again serves to demonstrate a pattern of religiously-styled historical 
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determinism, worked out upon philosophical grounds: the freedom to evil is 
fundamentally deprived of any real ontological potency, as both freedom and evil are 
relative concepts lying below the absolute force of good, which presides above the 
distinction of freedom and necessity. Only good can thus provide an absolute 
teleology for history. 
 
Creativity 
 Creativity (tvorchestvo), as was noted in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912), 
becomes an increasingly important aspect of Bulgakov’s historical thinking. In Svet 
nevechernii, he explicitly states the identity of history and creativity:  
Жизнь есть творчество, а поэтому и история есть творчество.
387
  
While the highlighting of creativity, as already noted, begs comparison with Berdiaev, 
its interpretation in Bulgakov can be expected to reflect (albeit somewhat 
problematically or even paradoxically) a much more deterministic style of thinking. 
Although the history-creativity-determinism connection has been identified in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva, it has become more pronounced and explicit in Svet 
nevechernii.  
 The pattern of creative-historical determinism evident in Bulgakov’s thinking 
centres upon both the limitation of mankind’s creative ability and the directedness of 
this creativity. By establishing that human creativity is not creativity from nothing but 
creativity from a divine basis, Bulgakov limits human creativity. For him it cannot be 
considered the same as the true, free creativity with which God created the world:  
Тварное творчество, которое является актуальным выражением тварной свободы, 
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есть не творчество из ничего, но творчество в ничто из божественного 
что.
388
  
Although he allows creativity ‘into’ nothing (which, however, we already know is 
secondary to being), creativity is still dependent on the divine ‘something’, and this 
will provide for an ultimate direction towards God. This immediately presents a 
different thesis to Berdiaev, who argues that human creativity is creativity from 
nothing. In Bulgakov’s thought, however, creativity is only possible for mankind due 
to its engagement with the divine, the metaphysically substantial (the bozhestvennoe 
chto). 
 Human creativity, in its historical aspect, is however more deeply determined 
by the fact that it is fundamentally directed. This recalls the thesis presented in 
Filosofiia khoziaistva, where it was argued that creativity is indeed only recreation, 
but in Svet nevechernii Bulgakov further develops this idea, suggesting that the ‘task’ 
of creativity is fundamentally predetermined and pre-directed:  
То, чтó тварь сознает в себе как задачу творчества, вложено в нее Богом, 
другими словами, задача эта предвечно разрешена, но она должна быть 
разрешена во времени.
389
  
The divine is therefore presented as providing both the basis and goal of everything 
that emerges in the process of becoming, and is further described as providing the 
exact formula for the definition of worldly freedom:   
В этой свободе твари, опирающейся на тварное ничто, божественные начала 
бытия не в силе и славе своей, не в лике вечности, в которой они не  ведают 
развития и восполнения, ибо не нуждаются в них, но во временном становлении, 
как тема и вместе задача мирового процесса, его данность-заданность, чтó дает 
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наиболее точную формулу для определения и тварной свободы, и тварного 
творчества.
390
 
It is apparent, then, that the divine principles (nachala) of being serve to define not 
only the application of human freedom, but also the conditions which make human 
creativity possible, by requiring the use of the ‘divine something’ (bozhestvennoe 
chto) in the creative process and by setting the ‘task’ and ‘providing a most accurate 
formula for the definition of both human freedom and creativity’. The meaning of 
creativity as history thus becomes clear. 
In this formulation, then, Bulgakov does posit freedom – indeed, he also 
emphasises its importance – but goes on to limit it through the structure of his 
thought. Mankind appears to be directed and defined not only by God’s initial plan for 
the world but also by the nature of the cosmogonic act whereby the balance between 
the transcendent and immanent was established and creativity made possible. In this 
way, the nature of the world and of the historical forces within it permits only one 
historical path. Like the Hegelian and then Marxist systems before him, but also in 
concurrence with the Christian thesis which sees the will of God as singularly potent 
in history, and despite his efforts to describe freedom (both to evil and to creativity) 
within history, we are left with the impression that the only tenable solution to history 
as Bulgakov sees it is the triumph of God, of the divine and the Absolute. Anything 
else it is not philosophically conceivable based on the ideas he is propounding in 
Svet nevechernii. Berdiaev would, no doubt, also believe in the ultimate victory of 
God, but the structure and emphasis are quite different in his thinking. 
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Sophia and history 
 As was discussed in Filosofiia khoziaistva the idea of Sophia functions in 
Bulgakov’s thought as a medium which allows for the active engagement of God or 
mankind-directed-by-God in history. Humanity, through its participation in Sophia 
(Divine Wisdom), is imbued with the divine light of God. Sophia, while leading 
towards the simultaneous and antinomic expression of both immanent and 
metaphysical categories, is also transcendent to them altogether: 
Итак, метафизическая природа Софии совершенно не покрывается обычными 
философскими категориями: абсолютного и относительного, вечного и 
временного, божественного и тварного.
391
  
Beyond a description of Sophia’s intermediary role in the passage of history, Svet 
nevechernii does not offer anything significantly new to Filosofiia khoziaistva 
regarding the problem of Sophia and history. This is not true, however, with regards 
to the question of Sophia and time. 
 
Conclusions  
 Svet nevechernii presents a rich and complex engagement with the question 
of history. The multifaceted apprehension of this problem has taken on a number of 
new features which all demonstrate Bulgakov’s accelerating movement from 
philosophy to theology. The determinist colour to his thinking continues to be clearly 
expressed in this text, although he seems at times to be obdurately unaware of this 
element of his philosophy. This has been demonstrated at a number of different 
levels in Svet nevechernii: in the historical conflict between good and evil, where it is 
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argued that good cannot fail; in relation to freedom where he admits that absolute 
freedom is absurd; and in creativity when he argues that whilst ‘history is creativity’, 
the task of creativity is established and directed by God. When considered alongside 
the corpus of his work, Svet nevechernii thus helps complete the discussion of the 
determinist patterns and tendencies that have been identified in Bulgakov’s thought. 
Although back in 1901 he had vehemently rejected the immanent, material 
determinism of Marxism he had, by 1917, returned to a style of thinking about history 
– and about connected historical problems – that, whilst not necessarily Marxist, still 
clearly demonstrated determinist features. 
Bulgakov’s Philosophy of Time in Svet nevechernii 
 As this chapter on Bulgakov’s philosophy approaches its conclusion, it is a 
fortunate turn that the principal focus of the next chapter on Berdiaev, namely time, 
comes to the fore in Bulgakov. Indeed, the introduction of the theme of time in Svet 
nevechernii is noticeable. Although the word ‘time’ has been mentioned with some 
frequency in earlier works, in this text it has become a substantial intellectual 
concern. Time is taken up as a problem both related to other philosophical questions 
– specifically history and Sophiology – and also as an independent problem in its 
own right. Bulgakov’s wider thinking about time in Svet nevechernii is an attempt to 
subject it to the broader logic of his philosophy: time, which is immanent, is 
determined by eternity, which is metaphysical. This work on the time-eternity 
relationship brings him close to Berdiaev, for whom the time-eternity divide was also 
central. Previously Bulgakov seems to have satisfied himself with the time-history 
correlation expressed in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912) – ‘in time, i.e. in history’,392 and 
as we have seen he makes a similar assertion in Svet nevechernii (1917) – 
                                            
392
 ‘…времени, т.е. в истории…’ Bulgakov, Filosofiia khoziaistva, pp. 90-91. 
190 
 
‘temporality, i.e. history’.393  However, in Svet nevechernii he devotes more space to 
the question of time and appears to be aware of a distinction between time and 
history, even if the exact terms of the distinction remain elusive.  All of Bulgakov’s 
discussion related to time demonstrates a degree of uncertainty or discomfort, 
something that is quite revealing as to his deeper intuitions about the nature of time. 
Indeed, the first thing that strikes the reader about the question of time is 
Bulgakov’s remarkably confusing – or perhaps confused – approach. This is first and 
foremost reflected in the number of different ways in which he refers, without any 
explanation, to different categories or types of time. There are no less than ten 
categories of time mentioned in Svet nevechernii: ‘объективное время’; 394 
‘конкретное время’; 395  'формальное время'; 396  'абстрактное время'; 397 
‘отвлеченное время'; 398  'историческое время'; 399  ‘онтологическое время'; 400 
‘софийное время'; 401  'вечное время'; 402  and even ‘злое время'; 403  and only 
‘concrete’ and ‘Sophiological’ time receive any further elaboration. This is very 
different to Berdiaev’s work, which pays considerable attention to the accurate 
distinction between different categories of time (namely cosmic, historical and 
existential time).404 
This problem is compounded further by a number of other opaque comments 
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Bulgakov makes about time. There is mention of the ‘density or saturation’ of time,405 
but there is no further explanation offered as to what these somewhat cryptic terms 
mean, despite the fact that these concepts could potentially have significant 
repercussions for the broader formulation of thought about time. Similarly, and 
possibly most problematically, when dealing with the philosophical problem of time 
specifically, in a section subheaded ‘Time and eternity’ (Section 2.4 of Svet 
nevechernii, ‘Vremia i vechnost’’, pp. 175-79), ambiguity is compounded by 
Bulgakov’s willingness to move between the terms vremia and vremennost’, two 
words which clearly express different meanings, but for which he again does not 
account. Compared to time, vremia, vremennost’ is akin to time-ness, or possibly 
temporality or even temporariness. Vremennost’ perhaps relates to a broader 
experience of time or to the general conditions engendered by time. Bulgakov does 
not offer any guidance for what he means by these contrasting terms. For instance:  
Тайна тварности проявляется в противоречивом самосознании твари о вечности 
и временности своего бытия. Время есть актуальный синтез бытия и 
небытия...
406
  
He therefore seamlessly jumps between the two with nothing in the way of 
qualification. 
These noticeable ambiguities in Bulgakov’s thought concerning time 
complicate an attempt to explore his conception of the broader relation of time to 
other problems, specifically to history. The ambiguity itself also inevitably leads to 
speculation. Is Bulgakov’s lack of clarity in his temporal nomenclature representative 
of a lacuna in his thinking – is he perhaps unsure as to how time fits into the broader 
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patterns of his philosophy? Does it demonstrate that Bulgakov has not really thought 
beyond the rudimentary formula suggesting that time is roughly approximate to 
history? Although we see him attempt to subject time to the broader antinomic 
categories of his thinking in the ‘Vremia i vechnost’’ section, this does not remove 
these broader questions. We can best explore these by exploring the relationships 
Bulgakov establishes between time and other problems – namely history and Sophia 
– and also by looking at his descriptions of time itself. 
 
Time and History  
The relationship between time and history presented in Svet nevechernii is 
troublesome. This is particularly evident in Bulgakov’s discussion of the categories of 
‘objective’ and ‘concrete’ time. The problem arises over the fact that although he 
distinguishes between time and history at a lexical level, it appears that at a 
philosophical or intellectual level there is little to distinguish them, in that time still 
appears to be history. This means that the contemplation of time always takes on an 
historical dimension. We can refer back to a quotation cited previously:  
История есть, прежде всего, рождение человечества, объективное время, 
наполненное рождениями, а потому и смертями, и внутренно связанное их 
последованием.
407
  
In this statement, objective time appears to be the ‘temporal material’, as it were, of 
history: history is the way in which objective time, history’s material, is connected 
together by the cycle of human lives. Time, then, could be an ontological category, 
as mankind’s cycle of life and death connects and fills it. However, history too is 
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depicted as arising through man, as history is also ‘the birth of humanity’. Therefore 
neither time nor history appears to have any independence from humanity: time, 
man, and history all appear to be inextricably linked.  
A similar idea is reiterated on the following page: 
Объективное время содержит достаточное основание для порядка поколений и 
смены исторических народов, чем и определяется скелет истории […] История 
связана «временами и сроками», имеющими основание в духовной организации 
человечества…
408
 
Here we see the same assertion that objective time provides a sort of temporal 
material for the passage of history, although the emphasis is slightly different: it is 
suggested here that history is connected together by times, rather than time being 
connected together by human life which then creates history. There is possibly a 
degree of tautology at work here, but the same central idea is conveyed: namely, 
time and history are both organised and connected by the cycle of human lives, and 
by means of this a time-history identity is reinforced. However we look at the above 
quotations, both history and time appear to be temporal matter that requires 
humanity to link them together, and the cycle of human lives will provide an ultimate 
teleology for both. In such a reckoning neither time nor history would arise without 
humanity, as both are grounded in man,409 meaning that the basis of both is identical. 
Despite the formal distinction, then, the thesis of ‘time, that is, history’ still holds in 
this text. 
 Time is therefore addressed as linked to the human life cycle, but is also not 
disconnected from history:  
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…но именно в чередовании поколений возникает история как конкретное 
время,
410
 
This is important, as it testifies to the fact that Bulgakov still continues to look at time 
in a historicised manner: that is, he looks at time and temporal problems through the 
prism of historical thinking. However, there is more to the theme of time than just this. 
 
Time and Eternity 
 Bulgakov’s main exploration of the theme of time is, as mentioned, carried out 
in the ‘Vremia i vechnost’’ section of Svet nevechernii. This discussion is intriguing 
not only in its continuities with Bulgakov’s broader thinking, according to which time 
appears determined by eternity, but also in the fact that Bulgakov betrays his 
uneasiness in relation to time. Although it could be deduced that if time is history, 
and if history is ‘good’, time, by extension, must also be good, it appears that when 
disengaged from historical discussion, time acquires an ambivalence to match its 
ambiguity:  
Завистливый Хронос ревниво жирает детей своих, все умерщвляя, обесценивая, 
низвергая; жизнь есть какое-то торжество всеобщего умирания.
411
  
It becomes apparent, then, that as with the broader problem of evil in Bulgakov’s 
work, there is a similar demand for a ‘theodicy of time’, as it were, offering some sort 
of reason for the ineluctable, deathly process of time. Indeed, time seems to be 
portrayed as the root of evil; time becomes the means or process through which 
nothingness (which can be ‘actualised’ as evil) rears its head:  
Злое время, «распаленный круг бытия», есть огненное колесо, схваченное 
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тисками жадного ничто.
412
  
Here then time is described as ‘evil’, a quality which, as this quotation implies, is 
most likely the product of its connection with nothingness. This tension between 
describing, on the one hand, time as almost terrifying and, on the other, as 
something that can be neutralised according to a grander logic is a key aspect of 
Bulgakov’s thinking about time. 
 Moving to an analysis of some of the specific aspects of Bulgakov’s 
descriptions of time, his opening statements in ‘Vremia i vechnost’’ demonstrate his 
closeness to the contemporaneous European tradition and also Berdiaev. He begins 
by arguing that: 
Время есть актуальный синтез бытия и небытия, бывание, Werden. Настоящее, 
которое всегда поглощается прошлым и устремляется в будущее, есть как бы не 
имеющая измерения точка, движущаяся в океане меонального бытия: полубытия 
прошедшего и будущего, - уже-не-бытия и еще-не-бытия.
413
  
Bulgakov presents here a formulation of time in relation to being and non-being, and 
the procession from past to present to future. The solution he offers, which focuses 
on finding cognisable but also organic, human (rather than empirical) coherence in 
seemingly constant change, demonstrates some similarity to a European 
contemporary, Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Bergson looked at establishing ‘la durée’, 
the meta-temporal duration existing despite the broken flow of time.414 As Pearson 
suggests:  
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 Duration is experience (it is something lived if not adequately intuited), but equally it is 
experience enlarged and gone beyond. To think this duration is to think “beyond the 
human condition”, that is, beyond our dominant habits of representation in which time is 
conceived in terms of space.
415
 
Similarly, Bulgakov’s intuition that the present is continuously being ‘swallowed up’ 
by the past and future demonstrates a similarity to Berdiaev, who held that the 
problem of immanent, ‘objectified’ time consisted in the destruction of the present by 
the past and the future. Although Bulgakov did not voice any deep awareness of 
these philosophers, a similarity clearly exists: all evince a concern with the seeming 
unrelenting process of change inherent in the movement of time. 
Bulgakov places his initial formulation of time, of past, present and future, in a 
religious framework. He claims that time is fundamentally related to the conditions of 
the created world – and therefore is similarly subjected to the great antinomy which 
pervades being:  
В интуиции временности ощущается антиномия тварности, – божественного 
начала, погруженного в ничто и его собой оплодотворившего. Ибо время есть 
преходящесть и ничтожество всего сущего, но вместе и возможность всего 
бывающего...
416
 
Time, then, by bringing (or at least demonstrating) the confluence or ‘synthesis’ of 
being and nonbeing – life and death – therefore allows for the interaction of the 
divine basis and nichto (nothing) to happen simultaneously. This, however, will not 
take place on an even basis. 
While showing concern about the nature of time and how it relates to being, 
Bulgakov still subjects time to eternity, which is deeper and more substantial. He 
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argues that consciousness of the basic conditions of time or temporality is only 
possible due to the fact that such consciousness sits in eternity and looks down at 
time: 
Самое сознание временности, с его жгучестью и остротой, порождено чувством 
сверхвременности, не-временности жизни, оно родится лишь при взгляде во 
время из вечности.
417
  
This implies that an understanding of time can only be achieved if one is situated first 
in eternity: time cannot be perceived without eternity. This establishes a similar 
pattern in Bulgakov’s thinking: immanent reality (in this case time) is certainly real, 
but is fundamentally dependent on the metaphysical or divine for its reality. This 
paves the way, as we have already seen, for the immanent reality to be determined 
by the metaphysical plane, as immanent reality is guided from the metaphysical. 
Therefore Bulgakov argues:  
Время и вечность соотносительны: время не ощущалось бы в течении своем, не 
суммировалось бы из отдельных разорванных моментов, если бы этого не 
совершал сверхвремменый субъект времени.
418
  
This thesis is very similar to his ideas concerning history, which suggest that history 
is only possibly due to the existence of the transcendental subject of history, 
mankind: in the same way that man unifies history, man as the supra-temporal 
subject (sverkhvremmenyi sub”ekt) is similarly perceived to unify time, to allow it to 
flow. This testifies to the continuing idea that time is in man, not man in time, which 
suggests a Kantian dimension to Bulgakov’s thought which will be discussed below. 
Berdiaev similarly wanted to suggest that time was in man;419 however, due to the 
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conditions he ascribed to the material world in which time ruled, Berdiaev runs the 
risk of setting time outside man and freeing it from human control. 
With Bulgakov, however, there is a familiar pattern. Man, who is both temporal 
(immanent) and eternal (transcendent), establishes the determined relation between 
eternity and time: whilst being mutually related, eternity fundamentally projects into 
and substantiates time. Time can therefore not overcome eternity by any means:  
В любом миге бытия, в каждом его моменте просвечивает вечность, целостная и 
неделимая, в которой нет настоящего, прошлого и будущего, но все, что бывает, 
вневременно есть. Вертикальные сечения времени проникают в вечность, 
поэтому-то ничто из того, что только однажды мелькнуло во времени, не может 
уже исчезнуть, обратиться в небытие, ибо имеет какую-то проекцию в 
вечность...
420
 
This eternal dimension, which exists throughout the temporal dimension, 
encompasses and holds everything that occurs within time. As with Bulgakov’s ideas 
about theodicy, then, the supposed ‘evil’ of time, which brings with it death and 
perpetual change, is neutralised by the fact that nothing disappears in eternity – 
everything is. Eternity is therefore primary and time and the temporal conditions 
created by time (vremennost’, perhaps) are secondary to and dependent on eternity. 
Time, then, must be proved to be surmountable and secondary, in the same way that 
in Bulgakov’s theodicy evil is necessarily overcome: 
Временность должна погаснуть и обессилеть, линия времени слиться в точку, 
когда «времени больше не будет», как клянется ангел в Апокалипсисе, только так 
может разрешиться антиномия времени.
421
 
A theodicy of time is therefore presented through the similar argument that, just as 
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economy is, according to the thesis in Filosofiia khoziaistva (1912), the anticipation 
of the vivifying principle, so too is time just the anticipation of the eternal, meta-
temporal principle:  
И однако временность как образ тварности содержит в себе неистребимые 
временем побеги вечности.
422
 
 The question of time, therefore, exhibits some significant continuities within 
Bulgakov’s thought, but these bring with them new problems. What is broadly 
evident is the similar pattern of metaphysical determinism, in this case being 
demonstrated in the temporal realm. That which occurs in the realm of time is 
substantiated and grounded within the metaphysical, divine realm of the eternal and 
therefore receives its primary being from it. This, as well as allowing for determinist 
patterns to arise, functions to create a type of theodicy for time: time as continual 
change, as death, is neutralised by the fact that every moment of time is held and 
kept within eternity. This fits closely with broader patterns of Bulgakov’s thinking. It is 
interesting, however, to note Bulgakov’s description of the ‘envious Khronos’ 
(zavistlivyi Khronos) and other fearful references to time. These occasional 
comments about the threatening, all-consuming nature of time highlight the fact that 
time, taken out of a historical context, presents something that is alien to Bulgakov’s 
thinking. As a philosopher who thinks in such Solovʹevan terms as ‘all-unity’, time in 
a ‘formal’ or ‘abstract’ form presents something cold in which there is no 
Sophiological light, there is no unity or teleology other than continual change and 
inevitable death. Temporality or time is, in Bulgakov’s mind, therefore only rendered 
safe when it is returned to an ‘eternal basis’, when the changes and vicissitudes 
which emerge within time are returned to the all-encompassing embrace of eternity:  
                                            
422
 Ibid., p. 179. 
200 
 
Вечность лежит не за временем или после времени, но наряду с ним, над 
временем, как для него идеал, и под временем, как его основа, которая 
ощушается временем лишь чрез призму ничто, небытия.
423
  
Time is thus experienced due to the interaction of nothing or nonbeing with being, 
but this is accompanied by the fact that time is from every angle embraced by 
eternity. All temporal immanence is thus only real because time is held within eternity 
which, whilst allowing the movement of time, ultimately substantiates it. In the same 
way that Bulgakov’s broader historical thesis about time removes any of the real 
potency from time, so too does Bulgakov’s thinking about eternity, which relegates 
time to a secondary position.  
 
Discomfort with Kant and the reality of time 
 As has been mentioned earlier, Bulgakov has suggested that time is ‘within’ 
man. This idea, which recalls Kant, is also problematic for Bulgakov. The formative 
influence Kant asserted upon Bulgakov’s mind has been important throughout his 
philosophical and religious development, and Kant continued to influence Bulgakov’s 
thinking across 1911-16, when he was writing Svet nevechernii. However, as noted, 
Kant’s ideas about time sit awkwardly in Bulgakov’s mind, and the application of 
these ideas to Bulgakov’s thinking about time engenders some paradoxes for 
exploration. Bulgakov himself highlighted his ambivalence and pre-empted this 
passage of enquiry:  
Что же есть время? Только ли субъективная форма сознания, как провозглашено 
Кантом? И да, и нет.
424
 
Bulgakov’s trouble with Kant fundamentally issues from a question regarding 
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the reality of time. Kant suggested that time is not something innate to objects; it is, 
rather, an a priori mode of human cognition which the mind employs to organize and 
order the world around it. Thus: 
 Time is not an empirical concept. For neither co-existence nor succession would be 
perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation a priori […] 
Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions […] In it 
[time] alone is all reality of appearances possible. These may be all annihilated in 
thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so 
annulled.
425
 
Therefore, according to Kant, time is not something exterior to human cognition but 
rather exists and works within it, it is a mode of thinking which allows us to make 
sense of our intuitions of the world. This idea clearly holds some sway over Bulgakov, 
who similarly suggests that:  
Временность
426
 выражает собой состояние тварности в разных ее модальностях 
и принадлежит нашему «трансцендентальному субъекту», выражающему тварное 
восприятие мира.
427
  
Time in the above is a condition of created things through which we perceive the 
world. However, by reducing time to a purely cognitive level, Kant removes some of 
the empirical reality of time, making it seem illusory. As Reichenbach notes: 
It is true, Kant would have objected to putting his subjective time on a par with an 
interpretation of time as an illusion. However, the only difference is in emotive 
connotations.
428
 
 This is where we enter into problems for Bulgakov, for whom such ‘emotive 
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connotations’ extended into the religious dimension and were particularly significant.  
Whilst Bulgakov would agree that time is not a primary ontological condition, 
he would, however, argue that eternity, the metaphysical, divine time, is something 
real and an aspect of the ontological absolute. After all, if God resides in eternity, 
then eternity must possess true ontological reality. Furthermore, Bulgakov, in line 
with his broader philosophical project, also suggests that time is built upon 
eternity,429 meaning that events of genuine metaphysical and divine value can take 
place within time: 
Ибо можно ли отрицать реальность времени, когда в исполнившиеся времена и 
сроки воплотился Бог, произошло рождество Христово, протекла земная Его 
жизнь, свершилось Его воскресение и вознесение?
430
  
If such immanent time was only an illusory, a priori concept, this would mean that 
time would possess no ontological value. Then, if we take into account the fact that 
time is supposed to be rooted in eternity, this would mean that the value of eternity 
concurrently is not absolute and is reduced to a function of human cognition. 
Bulgakov would of course reject this. Also, as the above indicates, the rejection of 
the reality of time would mean that the significance of religiously important events 
taking place in time – such as, for example, the coming of Christ – would also be 
undermined. This would also be unacceptable to Bulgakov. 
Nevertheless, Bulgakov also accepts the Kantian thesis when he presents 
time as secondary, as the condition of immanent experience. This idea is qualified by 
the fact that time is infused with genuine value, which comes from eternity. Time is 
thus ‘within’ man, as Kant would suggest, but in distinction to Kant he argues that it 
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is something that was created for man, or is rather his created condition:  
Но из глубины уныния, среди печального молчания, слышится неумолчный шепот, 
робкий и тихий, но вместе с тем уверенный и незаглушимый: ты – вечен и только 
родился для времени, – оно в тебе, а не ты в нем, это ты развертываешь и 
свиваешь его свиток в памяти своего духа...
431
 
So whilst Bulgakov can both challenge and support Kant’s ideas about time, this is 
subject to a certain concession: he admits that time is within man, and in this regard 
can somewhat question the reality of time, but this does not mean, however, that by 
this ontological relation to time man only possesses time in the cognitive sense that 
Kant is suggesting. This is because although time is real through man; through 
man’s action of connecting time in history, man reaches transcendentally to the 
eternal, the divine, to make time real. Furthermore the condition of time is only made 
possible for man due to the created conditions of the world.   
The question of the reality of time is further problematic for Bulgakov, as has 
already been suggested, due to his understanding of the time-history relation. If 
history is to be an ontological process, in the sense that it has real and not illusory 
significance, then the time that occurs within this process must also be by extension 
real or ontological. Furthermore, time, in accordance with this historical thesis, must 
be part of a fundamentally teleological process:  
Бог, силою Своею вызывая мир к бытию, присутствует и во времени, ибо в нем 
протекает процесс теофанический, который есть в то же время и 
теогонический.
432
  
Time is thus part of a historical process. However, Kant lacks such a historicised 
notion of time:  
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The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every determined quantity of time is 
possible only through limitations of one time lying at the foundation. Consequently, the 
original representation, time, must be given as unlimited.
433
 
This understanding violates Bulgakov’s most basic understanding of time and history, 
and these ideas are duly refuted:  
«Трансцендентальное» время Канта, или отвлеченная форма времени, 
неизбежно мыслится как потенциальная бесконечность, не знающая ни начала ни 
конца; поэтому его идея и приводит разум к антиномии, обнаруженной самим же 
Кантом. Напротив, конкретное время, которым и является история, имеет и 
начало, и конец...
434
 
Analysis of the relationship between Kant and Bulgakov regarding the 
problem of time in Svet nevechernii has highlighted how Bulgakov perceives the 
relationship between time and man, and also how the supposed reality of time is 
challenged by some Kantian assumptions which clearly held some weight for 
Bulgakov.  
 
Sophia and Time 
 The final aspect of Bulgakov’s thought dealing with time in Svet nevechernii 
which merits discussion is the question of the relationship between time and Sophia. 
Sophia, as became apparent in Filosofiia khoziaistva, plays an important role in the 
construction of Bulgakov’s thinking about the universal: as Khoruzhii argues, it is the 
central concept through which the immanent condition of the world is infused with 
metaphysical value. He writes: 
Она [софийная связь мира с Богом] должна обеспечивать ценность и смысл мира, 
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а это возможно только одним путем – путем утверждения реальной причастности 
мира Богу как источнику всякого смысла и всякой ценности. Именно это 
утверждение осуществляет софиология Булгакова: ее можно определить как 
метафизическое учение о причастности мира Богу....
435
 
Bulgakov accordingly identifies, in Svet nevechernii, ‘Sophiological time’ (Sofiinoe 
vremia) as a special, unitary or synthesising category of time.  
As we have seen, Sophia is the central unitary point of Bulgakov’s overall 
philosophy. In Svet nevechernii, Sophia similarly functions as a unifying principle for 
time: Sophiological time is perceived to occupy an intermediary position between the 
immanent temporal condition (time) and the metaphysical temporal condition 
(eternity). Bulgakov therefore states:  
Этим средним положением между временем и вечностью, «μεταξύ»,
436
 и 
определяется ее [Софии] своеобразная метафизическая природа в отношении к 
временности и тварности.
437
   
As the Divine Wisdom Sophia pervades the world from the moment of creation, 
presiding in everything both immanently and transcendentally – antinomiously being 
both one and the other. In this intermediary position, Sophia allows for the 
establishment of a metaphysically or divinely driven teleology unfolding across the 
expanse of time. Sophia thus completes a historicised, determinist understanding of 
time, which dictates that time is neither empty nor directionless. Indeed time, being a 
part of the grand unity of things, is instead teleological: 
Так как ей [Софии] принадлежит положительное всеединство, то ею 
обосновывается вся связность бытия, установляющая не механическое 
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чередование, но внутреннее последование событий, иначе говоря, объективное 
время, ибо время не есть голое чередование, вытеснение прошлого настоящим, 
клочкообразная разорванность бытия.
438
 
We thus see the emergence of the concept of Sophiological time: Sophia establishes 
the connection of all life, and therefore the internal connection of all events and time 
beyond mechanical cycle. Time does not remain just objective: it has deeper 
connections. Sophiological time is thus the temporal space which Sophia, and 
mankind insofar as it participates in Sophia, occupies. It is conceived of as a 
synthesis of time, which describes the unifying position Sophia occupies in the 
temporal domain: 
 София содержит в себе живой и реальный синтез времени, в котором уже 
переходятся грани времени (хотя и не временности вообще). Если можно так 
выразиться, софийное время есть единый, сложный и слитный, хотя не 
сверхвременный, однако не надвременный акт: это есть вечное время...
439
 
Sophia therefore transgresses time, although perhaps not the conditions of time 
(vremennost’). Sophiological time is, as a synthesis, unified time: it is also becomes 
‘eternal’ time in which everything holds together above time. Objective time in such a 
way is overcome through Sophiological time.  
Finally, in the same way that Sophia is omnipresent throughout creation in its 
immanent, becoming form, it follows that Sophiological time similarly pervades the 
immanent form of time:  
Не обладая вечностью по своей природе, София может находиться в плоскости 
временности, будучи к ней обращена.
440
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Sophia, then, and Sophiological time, operates as the intellectual mechanism which 
Bulgakov uses to justify his antinomic description of time. Sophia allows for the 
simultaneous binding of eternity and time to take place: through this it allows 
Sophiological light, divine knowledge – however it may be characterised – to filter 
into time and to fill time with eternal, metaphysical significance.  
What emerges then is that Sophia is the philosophical-theological apparatus 
Bulgakov uses to establish a determined, universal understanding of time. Time is 
founded upon eternity, upon the metaphysical or divine temporal basis, and this 
foundation is achieved through the mediation of Sophia. Sophia provides the means 
by which man is able to occupy both immanent and transcendental temporal spaces, 
as Sophia is the embodiment, as it were, of the divine antinomy in which 
transcendence and immanence occur simultaneously. Sophiological time is the 
expression of this in the temporal sphere. Furthermore, this description of Sophia 
and Sophiological time further establishes Bulgakov’s innately historicised 
conception of time, in that it allows the teleological process of the spread of divine, 
metaphysical value throughout time to take place. It allows him to repeat, as above, 
that time ‘is not a bare rotation’, it is, rather, a teleological, and thus historical, 
process. 
 
Conclusions  
 Bulgakov attempts to treat or identify time as an independent philosophical 
concern and he thereby ostensibly separates it from the question of history. This 
seeming distinction has been brought into question, however, as analysis of what 
Bulgakov writes about time in Svet nevechernii (1917) reveals a conceptualisation of 
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time which is fundamentally historicised, not extending beyond the basic thesis 
which states: ‘time, that is, history’. Indeed, patterns of determinist thinking, 
characteristic of Bulgakov’s thought about history, are repeated, as is a need to 
provide some sort of theological-philosophical justification or resolution to the 
condition of time – that is, a form of theodicy of time. Bulgakov’s thinking suggests 
more specifically that immanent time is determined, directed, and dependent upon 
metaphysical time (eternity), and in this way Bulgakov constructs a familiar 
conceptual relation. This continuity further allows for the establishment of a 
historical-teleological trajectory to exist within time as it does in history. In this 
reckoning, Sophia is described as the nexus through which the infusion of 
metaphysical direction and value can take place in the temporal dimension.  
A broader feature of Bulgakov’s thinking has also been restated, namely that 
in the grander scheme of things history is primary and time is secondary. We see, 
from the various angles Bulgakov takes, time being apprehended and transformed 
into something regular and cognisable according to the broader historical categories 
and continuities of his thinking. This primacy of historical over temporal experience – 
expressed in the notion that time is not empty or directionless, but rather is 
potentially Sophiological and historical – establishes a pattern of thinking that places 
Bulgakov at fundamental odds with his contemporary, Berdiaev, who propounds an 
almost opposite thesis. Berdiaev suggests that time is primary and ‘historical time’ is 
nothing but a redundant form of restricted time. It appears that the pressures of 
Bulgakov’s universalist project, deeply influenced by Solovʹev but no doubt in its 
absolutism also influenced by a Marxist and by extension Hegelian legacy, lead him 
inevitably to describe time in restricted terms, as otherwise his broader thesis for the 
world would unravel. The potential chaos of time is regulated by historical structures. 
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This profound difference between Berdiaev and Bulgakov regarding the history-time 
relation will be further explored across Berdiaev’s writings, and we will see how in 
the realm of time and history an existentialist project unavoidably comes into conflict 
with a universalist one. 
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4. Conclusion 
 This exploration of Bulgakov’s thinking has revealed how deep historicising 
tendencies penetrate into his philosophical and religious worldview. He does not 
readily see human experience outside a historical framework. Bulgakov’s cursory 
treatment of time demonstrates his inability to conceive of temporal experience in 
any other way than historical, and further that his attention is held by absolute, 
universal problems. This is very different to Berdiaev, who engaged with the 
individual and looked at time from an existential perspective. Indeed, a broader 
concern with history rather than time itself demonstrates – at least in Bulgakov’s 
case – an intellectual inclination to look at philosophical problems in terms of 
structures and overarching schema rather than in terms of singular experience.  
 This historicising proclivity is accompanied by a determinist inclination. 
Whenever Bulgakov describes the historical dimensions of a problem he also subtly 
imposes limitations which serve to restrict and direct the historical development of 
the given problem. Therefore evil, theodicy, freedom, creativity and the other 
questions which concern Bulgakov are discussed in such a way that their solution is 
framed in terms of necessity and inevitability. Evil is therefore viewed as impotent 
and non-substantial; freedom is real only in its divine aspect; creativity is possible 
only in accordance with God’s plan laid at the beginning of history, and causality 
demonstrates metaphysical rather than immanent patterns. 
 The reasons for this absolutist, determinist historical edifice are open to 
interpretation. Commentary on Bulgakov’s experience of the present, his sense of 
temporality as crisis demonstrates that he perceives in the world around him a 
growing level of crisis and calamity, the genesis of which is multifaceted. His need to 
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enter into dialogue with this sense of crisis possibly led him to find structures in 
which he could neutralise his concerns, structures which provided a greater logic and 
also a lent a comforting sense of providence to the disasters erupting in Russia and 
the world. Beyond this, Bulgakov’s personal intellectual history, in which contrasting 
or opposing worldviews ideas were adopted and then moved on from – most 
obviously Marxism, but also, in varying degrees, Kantianism and Hegelianism – laid 
certain intellectual roots which proved tenacious. Therefore, the determining, 
historicising tendencies of Marx and Hegel, although presented in a reformulation, 
nonetheless continued to influence Bulgakov’s thought. 
 In final summary, Bulgakov as a historical thinker is a complex entity. What 
emerges most clearly, however, is his need for structure and order in history – or, 
moreover, of a completed sense of history itself. In this sense of history as an 
organised, sensible, cognisable whole, Bulgakov certainly found comfort. 
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Chapter 2: Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev  
Time and History  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Berdiaev’s life  
 Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev’s (1874-1948) life bears similarity to the 
tumult of his thought. Born in 1874 into an aristocratic family in Kiev, he refused the 
military service judged appropriate for someone of his birth and embarked on an 
intellectual career.441 His outspoken style led him to be internally exiled by the tsarist 
regime at the end of the nineteenth century, and then to be expelled from Russia by 
the Bolsheviks in 1922 along with his likeminded compatriots. Like his lifelong 
acquaintance Sergei Bulgakov, he lived through the Russian Revolution and Civil 
War, and, after settling in Paris following a spell in Germany, he too would then also 
live through the horrors of the Second World War and Nazi occupation.  
In a similar way to Bulgakov, Berdiaev was – at least at first – a classic thinker 
of the Russian Silver Age. Indeed, as one biographer has recently observed, 
Berdiaev’s movement through various intellectual commonplaces was perhaps more 
a reflection of developments in motion within Russian intellectual society than being 
of his own initiative: 
…Бердяев, как и любой другой мыслитель, не был свободен от сильных влияний 
со стороны других: когда многие увлекались марксизмом – Бердяев тоже вполне 
искренно им увлекался; если Лев Шестов зачитывался Ницше – Бердяев тоже 
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выписывал себе из Германии собрание сочинений немецкого бунтаря; русская 
интеллигенция открывала для себя Ибсена – и Николай Александрович 
публиковал статьи об Ибсене; когда Сергей Булгаков и другие стали переходить к 
идеализму и религии – Бердяев тоже пережил духовный переворот...
442
 
In time, however, Berdiaev would distinguish himself as unique from Bulgakov and 
his contemporaries, on account not only of the content of his thought but also of his 
international acclaim. 
 
Berdiaev’s thought: Methodological considerations 
 Before introducing the substance of Berdiaev’s thinking, there needs to be a 
note made about the methodology that will be used to approach his philosophy as it 
is quite different to the method applied to Bulgakov. Approaching Berdiaev in a 
systematic, analytic fashion is difficult due both to the nature and quantity of his work. 
Quantitatively, where with Bulgakov we were able to analyse only the first half of his 
work – that which was engaged specifically with philosophy – with Berdiaev we need 
to take into account the entire, very large, corpus, as he never strayed from a 
philosophical-religious medium. Qualitatively, Berdiaev wrote profusely and 
frequently without, by his own admission, much in the way of structure or 
methodology:  
Во мне нет того, что называют обдумыванием, дискурсивным, выводным 
мишлением, нет систематической, логической связи мысли […] Анализ – 
сравнительно слабая сторона моей мысли.
443
 
This means that many of his texts substantially repeat the same ideas in different 
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ways. Furthermore, there is also the issue that there is not the clear chronology of 
philosophical development that we see in Bulgakov. A strict diachronic investigation 
of Berdiaev’s thought – especially given the quantity of his work – would therefore 
not be fruitful in the way that it was for Bulgakov. This is particularly true when 
looking at a single theme including, for instance, time. Berdiaev, sometimes 
seemingly arbitrarily, simply elects to discuss time in some texts and not others. 
Sometimes there is a development from an earlier text, sometimes not. In order to 
piece together the whole, a synchronic approach involving citation from a variety of 
texts is favourable. Although chronological developments can be noted, the most 
important aspect of analysis is construction of the whole.  
There is also the matter of Berdiaev’s exposition. As Rozanov commented in 
1916 regarding Berdiaev’s Smysl tvorchestva: 
 Прежде всего – глубокий упрек философской книге: автор высказывает, а не 
доказывает.
444
 
This statement is true for Berdiaev at both the specific, sentence-based level and at 
the broader level of whole texts – his books rarely work in a way whereby they prove 
anything in particular to the reader. Indeed, they just present a viewpoint in its totality, 
without any logical exposition. We, therefore, will decide the important steps in 
Berdiaev’s intellectual journey through an approach which, whilst remaining true to 
his philosophy, will involve some inference and construction. This will mean that 
although trying to stick to a certain selection of texts when dealing with a specific 
problem, texts from quite different chronological periods will be cited in order to draw 
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a complete picture of Berdiaev’s philosophy. 
Having said all this, there is a reasonably coherent philosophical basis evident 
across Berdiaev’s work, and a consistent body of thinking quite coherently informs all 
his writing. However, he appears to be in a constant process of remoulding and 
restating – possibly even reinterpreting – this basic set, even system of ideas that he 
believes to be true and intends to demonstrate. In view of this, despite having a 
comprehensive understanding and knowledge of Berdiaev’s works in their totality, 
there are further reasons why it will not be appropriate to cite from every text, as we 
would see a continued and confusing reiteration of the same ideas. Although an 
effort will be made to classify Berdiaev’s various phases of thinking, these will not 
differ greatly from the authoritative categories delineated by Zen’kovskii445 and later 
expanded upon by Poltoratskii.446  
Broadly speaking, we will be working with the material Berdiaev published in 
the latter half of his life, when he was living in Paris. Texts written in the 1930s and 
1940s will be of special relevance, as his philosophy by this point was perhaps 
slightly better formulated than previously. Central texts include, but are not limited to, 
O naznachenii cheloveka (1931), Ia i mir obʺektov (1934), Opyt eskhatologicheskoi 
metafiziki (written 1941, published 1947) and Samopoznanie (1947). There are some 
central ideas that emerge from earlier works, however, and these works include 
Filosofiia svobody (1911), Smysl istorii (1922) and Novoe srednevekovʹe (1924). 
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Berdiaev’s thought: an overview 
Due to the synchronic rather than diachronic approach we will be taking to 
Berdiaev’s thought, a detailed introduction to his philosophy is necessary before we 
engage with the principal concern of this thesis. The basic themes of Berdiaev’s 
thinking mark him out as distinctively Russian – he engages with the sometimes 
nebulous questions of creativity, freedom, eschatology, time, history, subject-object, 
and the Divine-human relationship. Burt has pointed out that the philosophical depth 
of some of these questions has – at least in the West – been subject to some doubt: 
Problems that vex the “Russian mind,” such as the concepts of truth, freedom, the 
absolute and the ineffable, the nature of experience, the person, are relegated in 
Western philosophy to the subdisciplines of aesthetics and ethics or turned over to the 
tender mercies of “literary theory.”
447
 
It is not, perhaps, completely without justification to wonder whether or not Berdiaev, 
given his fame, has been at least in part responsible for the creation of a negative 
impression of Russian philosophy. In the exposition of his thought he is aphoristic, 
repetitive, and internally inconsistent. He also suffers from an unfortunate 
egocentricity and an at times hubristic self-confidence.448 However, in spite of this, 
there is still much in Berdiaev’s thinking that is of profound importance and he deals 
with questions, albeit in his own way, with great insight. It is this insight that has 
created interest amongst philosophers and theologians. As Lowrie comments: 
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Perhaps a secret of Berdyaev’s ever-widening contribution to the world’s thought was 
his striking of new fire from human minds.
449
 
The themes he writes about should not, therefore, be in any way ‘relegated’. There 
should instead be an effort to re-engage with some of the more challenging and 
problematic areas of his thinking. The following will be an attempt to capture the 
central features of his philosophy. 
 
Existential Focus 
 The centre of Berdiaev’s philosophy deals with the problem of the person,450 
and he seeks to deal with philosophical questions through the lens of human 
existence and experience. As he writes in an early work, Smysl tvorchestva (1916): 
 Антропология или, точнее, антропологическое сознание предшествует не только 
онтологии и космологии, но и гносеологии, и самой философии познания, 
предшествует всякой философии, всякому познанию.
451
 
Given this focus, Berdiaev’s philosophy has been described as both ‘existentialist’452 
and ‘personalist’453 and some commentators call it both.454 Berdiaev similarly used 
both terms. Although the term ‘personalism’ captures the fact that his philosophy sits 
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in a Christian tradition,455 and also that it should not be connected too closely with 
his more distinguished existentialist contemporaries such as Heidegger, Karl Jaspers 
(1883-1969), or even Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), his thinking demonstrates 
closer similarity to this more modern existentialist tradition which interprets the world 
through a person’s immediate experience. Personalism should thus in this context be 
read as a rebranding of existentialism, although evidently their definitions are quite 
similar. 
There is ample material to support this. Tillich, a distinguished contemporary 
of Berdiaev, remarked broadly on the existentialist tradition: 
They [existentialists] consequently take their place with all those who have regarded 
man's "immediate experience" as revealing more completely the nature and traits of 
Reality than man's cognitive experience. The philosophy of "Existence" is hence one 
version of that widespread appeal to immediate experience which has been so marked 
a feature of recent thought.
456
 
Berdiaev fits such a definition of existentialism. Indeed, as an old man looking back 
on his life, he proclaimed himself such: 
Я всегда был экзистенциальным философом, а за это на меня нападали.
457
 
Wernham also concluded that Berdiaev had most in common with the existentialist 
tradition, despite his unorthodox approach: 
There is nevertheless, between the thought of Berdyaev and the existentialists, in 
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addition to a common anthropocentrism, a similarity of categorical framework which 
deserves to be noticed, even although, […] the content which he gives to the common 
terms derives from his own peculiar source.
458
 
Berdiaev can therefore be referred to as an ‘existentialist’ – albeit of a highly 
individual type. 
 
Interior-exterior 
Taking the starting point of the person, Berdiaev investigates his nature, 
foundations and experience, looking variously at human relationships with God, with 
other people, with the world and with oneself. In this investigation he makes a key 
division between ‘interior’ (vnutrennii) and ‘exterior’ (vneshnii): 
Мой внутренний духовный опыт не есть объект. Дух никогда не есть объект, 
существование существующего не есть никогда объект.
459
 
Internal qualities thus relate to the subject, and also to the intuitive, transcendent and 
metaphysical or noumenal, whilst external qualities concern the object, and therefore 
the immanent and the material. As the above suggests, the two are somewhat set 
against one another: the internal spirit is never an external object. In this connection 
mystical thinking – specifically reminiscent of Meister Ekhart and Jakob Boehme, but 
also influenced by Plotinus and early Christian thinking – guided some of Berdiaev’s 
existentialism.  
Across his work Berdiaev searches for ways to demonstrate the primacy of 
the metaphysical or noumenal interior over the phenomenological or material exterior. 
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As Calian comments, Kant probably informed at least part of this connection 
between the noumenal and mystical:  
Thus the intuitive insights of mysticism provided Berdyaev with the contents of the 
spiritual or real world he desired, supported as he already was by the Kantian 
demarcation of the noumenal world philosophically.
460
 
The interior is thus broadly the domain of truth – one is tempted to use the term 
‘authenticity’ to put Berdiaev in line with other existentialists,461 although he does not 
term it this way – whereas the exterior is that of falsehood. 
 
Freedom and Creativity 
As well as separating internal from external, Berdiaev also identifies the 
deepest foundation of human ontology in uncreated freedom. This freedom exists 
alongside a second ontological foundation of divine nature, although uncreated 
freedom plays a more important role in Berdiaev’s ontology. Indeed, it is amongst his 
central ontological assumptions that man is fundamentally free – free from all 
influence, from all pressure, from all determination:  
Нужно выбирать: или примат бытия над свободой, или примат свободы над 
бытием.
462
 
Freedom is a key aspect of the ‘internal’, and the binary nature of the above 
statement suggests how freedom follows a similar opposition: internal-free is set 
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against the external-determined.463 As it is uncreated, freedom is conceptualised as 
absolute, and it is therefore controversially located outside God – it is outside all 
determination, be that divine or human. The power of freedom in Berdiaev’s thought 
has previously been interpreted as quite Nietzschean, as it invests remarkable 
potential in man as freedom’s bearer.464 In Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (1927-28), 
he explains:  
 Свобода не сотворена, потому что она не есть природа, свобода предшествует 
миру, она вкоренена в изначальное ничто. Бог всесилен над бытием, но не над 
ничто, но не над свободой.
465
  
Freedom is thus tied to the original nothing, that which came before being. God 
participates in this freedom, and, in the act of creation, passes it on to man.  
Man’s freedom allows him to create, and in this creative capacity we also see 
the second aspect of man’s ontology, his divine nature: 
Творчество есть дело богоподобной свободы человека, раскрытие в нем образа 
Творца.
466
 
Man’s creativity therefore shows that he possesses freedom, but also that he is 
made by and in the image of God. God wants man through free creativity to 
complete the creation that He began, and man’s ability to do this is testament to 
God’s image within him. However, the word free still remains – man does not have to 
do any of this. Conflict is thus possible between man’s freedom and the divine will, 
as he is free not to do what God wants: 
                                            
463
 Berdiaev usually takes the absence of freedom to mean determinism.  
464
 See N. K. Bonetskaia, ‘Apofeoz tvorchestva (N. Berdiaev i F. Nitsshe)’, Voprosy filosofii, no. 4 
(2009), pp. 85-106. 
465
 N. Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha. Problematika i apologia khristianstva (1927-1928), in 
N.A. Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (Moscow, 1994), pp. 13-228 (p. 112). (Hereafter 
Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha).  
466
 Berdiaev, Smysl tvorchestva, p. 329. 
222 
 
Но и для философствующего разума ясно, что насильственное добро, 
насильственная прикованность к Богу не имела бы никакой ценности, что 
существо, лишенное свободы избрания, свободы отпадения, не было бы 
личностью.
467
 
Man is not coerced into good and is free to fall from God. Therefore although God is 
present in interior freedom, so too is something outside God over which He has no 
control. This freedom to fall allows Berdiaev to arrive at one of his most significant 
concepts, the idea of objectification. 
 
Objectification  
As well as dealing with the nature of the person, Berdiaev attempts to 
apprehend the ‘exterior’, the world that surrounds the person. He addresses this 
chiefly through the concept of objectification:  
Углубление моего философского познания привело меня к идее объективации, 
которую я считаю для себя основной и которую обыкновенно плохо понимают.
468
 
Although Melikh has recently suggested that this concept is an idea borrowed from 
Schopenhauer,469 objectification is Berdiaev’s description of the process whereby the 
originally metaphysical, existential world becomes object or material. The crux of his 
argument is that objectified, exterior reality is not real in the way that existential, 
interior life is real. It is secondary, not primary. He argues that objectification is the 
creation of the subject, that it is a particular condition achieved through human 
agency:  
Объективация же совершается субъектом и обозначает его направленность и его 
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состояние. Нет ничего ошибочнее смешения объективности с реальностью.
470
 
In such a way he seeks to undermine the basis of empirical epistemology, ontology 
and also the general conclusions of positivism which, he finds, are guilty of mistaking 
the objectified world for reality.  
Berdiaev’s conception of the objectified world is negative. He addresses it 
under pejorative epithets such as external, determined or material. He attaches to it 
qualities which he holds to be inimical to freedom. Berdiaev almost suggests an 
antipathy towards the external world, as is recalled in an oft quoted remark from 
Samopoznanie: 
Я не могу помнить первого моего крика, вызванного встречей с чуждым мне 
миром. Но я твердо знаю, что я изначально чувствовал себя попавшим в чуждый 
мне мир, одинаково чувствовал это и в первый день моей жизни и в нынешний ее 
день.
471
 
A significant element of Berdiaev’s notion of the objectified world relates to how he 
understands it to be the result of Original Sin, man’s misuse of his freedom. The 
objectified world is directly connected to man’s fall and his current fallen nature:  
Мир объективации есть мир падший, мир заколдованный, мир явлений, а не 
существующих существ. Объективация есть отчуждение и разобщение.
472
  
Objectification therefore relates to a number of concerns in Berdiaev’s thinking – it 
plays a role in the mystical, existential and Christian aspects of his philosophy. 
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In keeping with the importance of freedom in his thought, Berdiaev’s 
conclusions about objectification are intended to be anti-deterministic: he suggests 
that the interior, the existential ‘spirit’ is not in any way determined by the natural, 
objectified world:  
...дух не детерминирован природным миром и есть прорыв в нем.
473
 
However, with the notion of the objectified, fallen nature of the material world and the 
suggestion of the interior’s independence from it, Berdiaev begins to posit a dualism 
in which the external world, although being a product of metaphysical, internal 
activity, is separate from and set against the original internal world. This tension is a 
source of significant interest for further examination. By placing emphasis on the 
superiority of the existential over the external world, Berdiaev also shows an affinity 
with the idealist philosophical systems of Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer. They all 
in their own way suggested the primacy of the metaphysical over the material or, in 
Berdiaev’s lexicon, the existential and internal over the objectified and external.  
 
Paradox 
 The emergent issue of the more exact relationship between interior and 
exterior, existential and objectified, highlights a key question of paradox. Berdiaev 
was keen to describe his thought as ‘contradictory’ or ‘paradoxical’, and sometimes 
used this notion to cover up methodological or philosophical shortcomings: 
В моей философии есть противоречия, которые вызываются самым ее 
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существом и которые не могут и не должны быть устранены.
474
 
However, an overreliance on the notion of contradiction and paradox does not 
preclude the possibility that Berdiaev also succeeded in describing some genuine 
paradoxes. As initial exploration has suggested, in his thought man occupies two 
worlds which are quite opposed to one another: one is external, the other internal. A 
key issue concerns how far the external and internal can be occupied simultaneously 
and thereby be connected. Examination of this question frequently tends towards 
paradox: the strength with which Berdiaev describes the conditions of both the 
existential and the objectified domains makes any resolution – or even relationship – 
between them seem impossible. This will be particularly evident with the issue of 
time: Berdiaev posits an internal time and an external time, which, despite their 
conflicting properties, are still presented as connected. The consequences of this 
paradoxical relation, detectable in varying intensities, between interior and exterior 
will play out across Berdiaev’s work, and will help guide our analysis. 
 
Jakob Boehme 
 Boehme (1575-1624) deserves special mention when introducing Berdiaev’s 
thought. As he comments: 
Были годы, когда для меня приобрел особое значение Я. Беме, которого я очень 
полюбил, много читал и о котором потом написал несколько этюдов.
475
 
Boehme’s name appears in the majority of Berdiaev’s books, and he frequently cites 
him at length. Indeed, if Berdiaev is normally quite opaque about which thinkers 
influenced him, with Boehme he is uncharacteristically direct. Boehme’s influence 
over Berdiaev was broad and informed many aspects of his Christian mysticism and 
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his ontology.  Boehme’s idea that found particular resonance with Berdiaev was that 
of the Ungrund, which, similarly to Eckhart’s Gottheit, was conceived of as a great 
abyss of nothingness and freedom that existed before being and from which 
everything issues. Of this Ungrund, and its importance to his personal philosophy, 
Berdiaev writes: 
 Противоречивый, страдальческий, огненно-трагический характер мировой жизни 
определяется тем, что до бытия, глубже бытия лежит Ungurnd’ [sic.], бездонность, 
иррациональная тайна, первичная свобода, из бытия невыводимая.
476
  
This Ungrund is the key potential which lies at the root of all things, and it is from this 
that objects are generated, as Berdiaev explains: 
Таким образом, Ungurnd [sic.] есть ничто, безосновное око вечности и, вместе с 
тем, воля, безосновная, бездонная, недетерминированная воля. Но это – ничто, 
которое есть «ein Hunger zum Etwas». Вместе с тем, Ungurnd [sic.] есть свобода. В 
тьме Ungurnd’а [sic.] возгорается огонь, и это есть свобода, – свобода 
меоническая, потенциальная. По Беме, свобода противоположна природе, но 
природе, но природа произошла от свободы. Свобода подобна ничто, но от нее 
происходит что-то. Голод свободы, безосновной воли к чему-то должен быть 
насыщен.
477
 
Boehme’s notion of the Ungrund, then, propagated the dualist tendency in 
Berdiaev’s thought, as it clearly tended towards the internal and away from the 
external. For Berdiaev everything that is grounded in this freedom is of the upper 
order, and everything that it divorced from it – whether or not existing as a result of it 
– is of the lower order. As Korol’kova explains, Boehme’s thinking promoted a 
negative conception of the material, created world:   
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Беме объясняет существование зла с помощью идеи о падении духа в материю, 
самого прекрасного духа – Люцифера. Люцифер – дух природы и телесности…
478
 
This sense of alienation and freedom from the material world helps to explain 
Berdiaev’s proclivity towards dualism: from the pure potential of uncreated freedom 
or the Ungrund things have to fall into the external and material. Boehme therefore 
informed some of the deepest distinctions in Berdiaev’s thought, particularly those 
surrounding internal and external, free and unfree, created and uncreated. 
 
Time and History in Berdiaev’s thinking 
 The theme of time is much more pronounced and explicit in Berdiaev’s 
thought than it had been in Bulgakov’s. He asserts its synchronic pervasiveness in 
his autobiography: 
Победа над смертоносным временем всегда была основным мотивом моей 
жизни.
479
 
His engagement with history is also substantial, and it too plays an important role in 
his philosophy. The titles of many of his books reflect this, suggesting organising 
themes more concerned with temporal and historical problems – including Smysl 
istorii (1922); Novoe srednevekovʹe (1924); Sudʹba cheloveka v sovremennom mire 
(1934); and Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki (1947). A broader body of literature 
thus exists to draw on than was available with Bulgakov.  
As is suggested by the inverted order of time and history in the title of this 
chapter, a key idea we will be advancing is that while Bulgakov argues that history is 
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primary and time secondary, or rather that he conceived of time historically, Berdiaev 
argues the direct opposite – namely that time is primary and history secondary, that 
history is just a form (amongst other forms) of time:  
Но философская проблема истории есть прежде всего проблема времени.480 
Because it is his primary concern, investigation will therefore begin with an account 
of Berdiaev’s philosophy of time, and move on afterwards to his philosophy of history. 
A further point of interest is how, despite their different philosophical orientation, 
Bulgakov and Berdiaev brought many of the same questions into contention 
regarding time and history. Where Bulgakov ‘historicised’ certain problems, these 
same problems – most notably those of freedom and creativity, but, to a lesser 
extent, also evil – were similarly taken on by Berdiaev and ‘temporalised’. The 
different weight they attached to these problems – Bulgakov tended towards a 
greater concern with evil, Berdiaev with freedom and creativity – adds an extra 
dimension to comparison, and further elucidates the contrasting nature of their 
philosophies. 
 
The Structure of Investigation 
 Due to our synchronic approach to Berdiaev, the question of structure is more 
pertinent: there is not the same sense of natural chronology to guide investigation. 
As with Bulgakov, first an initial exploration of Berdiaev’s sense of temporality will 
provide a context in which to situate his conceptual thought about time and history. 
Due to the greater significance of time in his philosophy, analysis of his 
conceptualisation of time will then follow, which constitutes the main section of this 
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chapter. Within this, examination will begin at Berdiaev’s most basic separation of 
time and eternity, where the relationship between external, objectified time – ‘time’ – 
and internal, existential time – ‘eternity’, will be explored. At this stage of 
investigation the relationship between the two will be characterised as more 
simplistically dualistic: although the question of paradox exists, it is not as 
pronounced. The chief chronological development in Berdiaev’s thought on time-
eternity, the positing of three ‘types’ of time in 1939, will then be discussed. 
Discussion here will continue to bear upon the question of dualism, but the third form 
of time posited, ‘existential time’, brings the potential for paradox into greater clarity. 
Following this, analysis will move onto the ‘temporalised’ problems, specifically 
creativity and freedom. These describe in greater detail the more practical interaction 
between internal and external time, and highlight the paradoxical nature of their 
relationship more fully. As with Bulgakov, then, where the ‘historicised’ problems 
demonstrated most clearly his pattern of deterministic thinking, so with Berdiaev 
examination of these ‘temporalised’ problems will demonstrate the dualistic paradox 
that underlies his conceptualisation of time. Following the question of time, there will 
be a smaller investigation of Berdiaev’s conceptualisation of history, the final section 
of this chapter, which will reveal certain elements of this aspect of his thought which 
complement his work on time. 
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2. Temporality 
Стало банальным говорить, что мы живем в эпоху исторического 
кризиса, что кончается целая эпоха и начинается новая, 
еще не имеющая имени. 
Sudʹba cheloveka v sovremennom mire, 1934.
481
 
Temporality as crisis 
 The sense of temporality as crisis was a prevalent theme in Berdiaev’s work 
as it was in Bulgakov’s. This similarity is to be expected: they lived through the same 
period of history and lived in many of the same places at the same times. Much of 
what was said about Bulgakov’s experience of temporality as crisis can therefore be 
applied to Berdiaev, who maintained:  
Мне пришлось жить в эпоху катастрофическую и для моей родины и для всего 
мира.
482
 
A sense of crisis thus informed Berdiaev’s perspective on the world. It will be noted 
later that, specifically in his formulations on the problem of history, crisis perhaps 
took a more formative conceptual role in Berdiaev’s thought than in Bulgakov’s. In 
terms of our exploration of Berdiaev’s experience of time, we do not, however, want 
to repeat what was said about Bulgakov. It is suffice to say that the same historical, 
social, intellectual and religious issues figured significantly in Berdiaev’s perception 
of temporality as crisis. The idea of a Kairos-like moment similarly persists. Two new 
aspects Berdiaev’s perception of temporality as crisis should instead be explored, as 
they demonstrate a diversification on the theme. These are the innovation of an 
epochal appreciation of crisis, and work on the relationship between the machine 
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and time. A series of three texts, Novoe srednevekovʹe (1924), Sudʹba cheloveka v 
sovremennom mire (1934), and Tsarstvo dukha i tsarstvo kesaria (1949), constitute 
a trio of commentaries on the nature and condition of the present, and these will be 
of particular use here. A passage in O naznachenii cheloveka (1931) also offers a 
notably vivid account of Berdiaev’s experience of time. 
 
Intensification of crisis: the ‘epoch’ of crises 
 A prevalent feature of Berdiaev’s thinking in general is his intensity. He was 
predisposed towards hyperbole and this resonates throughout his work. For a man of 
heightened sensitivity, as Berdiaev appeared to have been, 483  living through an 
epoch of cataclysmic upheavals was traumatic, and consequently a sense of crisis 
penetrated deeply into his thinking and his experience of time. Augustyn notes:  
It is hardly surprising that in the face of the catastrophe that affected Russia and 
Europe as a whole […] Berdjaev is prone to use the emphatic style, which was 
generally characteristic of his writing. […] The philosopher uses a very simple image: 
the order, the Cosmos, is endangered by a destructive force, the approaching 
Chaos.
484
 
This meant that whilst Bulgakov sought to rationalise or normalise crisis in a 
deterministic system, Berdiaev sought greater meaning in crisis itself, he allowed it to 
define his experience of the present in a more substantive way. In Sudʹba cheloveka 
v sovremennom mire, discussing the aftermath of the First World War, he writes: 
Захлестнутый хаосом истории, окруженный бушующимими иррациональными 
силами, пораженный историческим фатумом – человек соглашается перейти в 
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сферу нечеловеческого существования, он выталкивается из человеческого 
существования. Война была катастрофическим моментом в обнаружении того 
хаоса, который шевелился под лживой капиталистической цивилизацией.
485
 
The visceral character of this description is striking. Capitalism, it seems from the 
above, has come to create a world in which all is not well, in which chaos overflows 
and destroys mankind. There is a sense that history has long been pregnant with the 
bedlam that has now erupted, that now is the era of the revelation of crisis. This 
sense of an epoch of crisis was hit upon ten years previously, in Novoe 
srednevekovʹe, where Berdiaev had claimed, in a slightly more narrative mode, that 
the current epoch of ‘new history’ is coming to an end, that the ‘day’ is changing into 
‘night’. His reflection on the present in this narrative was developed according to the 
idea that any such epochal shift is by its very nature catastrophic: 
День истории перед сменой ночью всегда кончается великими потрясениями и 
катастрофами, он не уходит мирно.
486
 
Berdiaev therefore perceives his era to have been appointed to be one of crisis. It is 
the end of one period and the beginning of another, and, he believes, in such 
transitory periods crisis will always pervade: 
Молодежь всего мира ищет нового порядка, происходит мировая революция. Но 
не чувствуется радости рождения новой жизни. Тень легла на мир. Начался цикл 
исторических и космических катастроф и обвалов.
487
  
Crisis therefore defines Berdiaev’s experience of the present even more so than it 
does for Bulgakov. Bulgakov certainly posited a sense of temporality as crisis, but, 
through the determinism of his historical thinking was able to find perhaps greater 
comfort in a durable, robust Orthodox faith and a given end to history. Berdiaev, 
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however, found no such happiness, and continued to be disturbed by the chaos and 
collapse that he saw around himself. Crisis thus becomes the defining feature of the 
present for Berdiaev in a more menacing way than it did for Bulgakov. 
 
The advent of the machine and temporality 
 A distinctive aspect of Berdiaev’s sense of temporality as crisis relates to his 
description of a feature of modernity, the advent of the machine. He was very aware 
of how industrial development was reshaping the modern world, and this puts him 
amongst the scores of other Russian thinkers, writers and artists who also engaged 
with this theme.488 As has already been outlined, Berdiaev was sensitive to the 
division between internal and external and their attached epithets. Within this 
framework technological development was perceived as the epitome of 
externalisation and therefore was the source of significant concern. The machine, as 
well as being a great creative triumph of mankind, was seen to be mechanising life, 
and was thus a particularly stark reflection of mankind’s ability to produce exterior, 
inhuman things. Although there is a degree of ambivalence here reminiscent of 
Berman’s claim concerning man’s paradoxical relationship with modernity, 489 
Berdiaev, like Bulgakov, tends to place greater impetus on the negative aspects of 
this development:  
Техника не только свидетельствует о силе и победе человека, не только 
освобождает его, но также ослабляет и порабощает человека, она механизирует 
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человеческую жизнь и накладывает на человек образ и подобие машины.
490
 
Berdiaev understands that the mechanisation of human life, its subjection to the form 
of the machine, implies the loss of freedom. More than this, the advent of the 
machine was also full of symbolism: it was the harbinger of a new reality, a new 
world epoch in which previously unknown powers were rising: 
Но вот техника на вершине своей ставит человека перед совсем иной 
космической действительностью, совсем уже не связанной с землей, она 
переносит его в междупланетные пространства, она окружает человека новыми, 
ранее неведомыми энергиями, действие которых еще не изучено.
491
 
Temporality comes into play due to the fact that in the head-spinning new 
reality of the machine, Berdiaev felt that the movement of life, the tempo of life itself 
had changed: 
Головокружительные успехи техники в XIX и XX веках обозначают самую 
большую революцию в истории человечества, более глубокую, чем все 
революции политические, радикальное изменение всего ритма человеческой 
жизни, отрыв от природного, космического ритма и возникновение нового, 
определяемого машинами ритма.
492
 
The use of ‘rhythm’ emphasises the temporal aspect of the change Berdiaev 
detected in the modern world. Time, he felt, was beginning to move according to 
some new metre. A defining feature of this changed time, this new relationship 
between man and time, was the fact that time was beginning to move faster: 
Машина изменяет отношение человека к времени. Время ускоряется.
493
  
Time is thus speeding up. This adds to the cataclysmic feel of the current epoch: it 
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creates the impression that as time is accelerating, control is being lost and humanity 
is heading faster and faster towards some unknown horizon. His perception of 
technology thus became eschatological: 
Техника имеет свою эсхатологию, обратную христианской, – завоевание мира и 
организацию жизни без Бога и без духовного перерождения человека.
494
 
Machine-time, the time of technology in this way becomes a distinct threat to 
mankind. It threatens to lever apart man from God, to put things out of kilter and 
upset the human-divine balance. It also offers a ‘reverse’ eschatology and sets up 
the possibility for a ‘bad’ end to the world process. This idea will be discussed in 
greater detail later. 
This experience of accelerating, crisis time persists throughout the rest of 
Berdiaev’s life. Tsarstvo dukha i tsarstvo kesaria (published posthumously in 1949) 
continues along the same theme: 
Происходит страшное ускорение времени, быстрота, за которой человек не 
может угнаться. Ни одно мгновение не самоцено, оно есть лишь средство для 
последующего мгновения.
495
 
The idea of a ‘terrible’ quickening of time is marked, and adds significantly to his 
broader sense of temporality as crisis. It also suggests another important theme – 
the destruction of the present for the sake of the future – which will figure in his 
broader conceptualisation of time. 
 
Conclusions 
Berdiaev’s perception of temporality as crisis consists in a heightened and 
epochal sense of crisis, paired with a pronounced sense of temporal acceleration. 
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This perception of temporality as crisis will be manifested across his philosophy, as 
will be seen later when the dual possibilities of the end of history are discussed. For 
Berdiaev, then, time is experienced in a critical mode just as it was for Bulgakov: 
both saw historical, epochal crisis and both found fault in the direction of the modern 
world. Their experience of time was imbued with apocalyptic tension and expectation. 
It remains to be seen how, in accord with the ideas brought up earlier by Koselleck 
and McKeon, this sense of temporality as crisis will be differently employed in 
conceptual thought about time and history. 
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3. Berdiaev’s Philosophy of Time 
Проблему времени я считаю основной проблемой философии, особенно 
философии экзистенциальной. 
Samopoznanie, 1947.
496
 
 
Overview 
 Berdiaev, as an existentialist, had a more overt interest in the problem of time 
than Bulgakov. While Bulgakov’s philosophy was influenced more by structural 
concepts, Berdiaev’s was motivated by reflection on the direct experience of the 
person and this inevitably drew him towards the question of time. Indeed, time has 
assumed pride of place in other existential philosophies. Heidegger, for example, 
states in his ground-breaking Sein und Zeit (1927): 
 Time must be brought to light – and genuinely conceived – as the horizon for all 
understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, 
time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of 
Being…
497
 
Berdiaev’s focus on time demonstrates both his continuities with and deviations from 
the existentialist tradition. As well as positing a similarity to Heidegger, through his 
work on time he was also able to bring his thinking into line with a diverse range of 
other, non-existentialist thinkers, the most significant among them belonging to 
Neoplatonic, Mystic and Christian traditions.  
 Berdiaev’s thinking about time is very broad. Reference to this philosophical 
problem can be found amongst his first and his last works. In Filosofiia svobody 
(1911), his first full book, he notes: 
Грехопадение совершилось предвечно и предмирно, и из него родилось время – 
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дитя греха и данный мир – результат греховности.
498
   
Likewise, in Ekzistentsial’naia dialektika bozhestvennogo i chelovecheskogo, 
published on the eve of his death in 1947, he writes: 
Человек наследует вечность в своей человечности, он призван к жизни в Боге, он 
идет от вечности, через время, к вечности.
499
 
Berdiaev discusses time over a period of almost half a century. Although it would be 
naïve to expect his philosophy of time to fit into a simple schema, it will nonetheless 
be characterised by its wholeness. This work on time will suffer from all the 
shortcomings of his philosophy more broadly. Before moving on to the main analysis, 
some introductory points should to be made. 
 
The comparative element: time and history; history and time 
 Comparison between Berdiaev and Bulgakov relies on their contrasting 
engagement with similar problems: both understand that a relationship exists 
between time and history, but organise the relationship differently. Within this 
discussion, similar problems – creativity, freedom, evil – come into contention but 
have different weight attached to them. As was expounded above, in terms of the 
first of these comparisons, opposed to the history-time primacy suggested by 
Bulgakov, Berdiaev suggests the primacy of time over history. The philosophical 
groundwork that makes this possible needs to be clarified so that the reader can 
understand more clearly the nature of what is a sometimes confusing problem. 
 Primarily, Berdiaev understands history as one of the layers of objectification: 
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it is a condition of the present fallen state of the world and the process whereby we 
move within (and eventually out of) our current condition: 
В истории объективирует человек свое творчество. Дух в истории есть 
объективный дух […] История в своей объективации совершенно равнодушно к 
человеческой личности, он еще более жестока к ней, чем природа, и она никогда 
не признает человеческой личности верховной ценностью, ибо такое признание 
означало бы срыв и конец истории.
500
 
History is therefore essentially an intermediary stage in the grander dynamic of the 
movement from time to eternity (discussed below); it is a part of objectification and 
does not have greater existential meaning than this allows.  
Within the assertion, then, that the question of history is first the question of 
time is the assumption that time is something deeper than history. However, this is 
not to say that history is completely disregarded: in its secondary capacity it is still of 
interest. History’s significance is accepted, as long as this acceptance is qualified by 
the assertion that eternity – the existential, metaphysical aspect of time – stands 
higher: 
Нужно принять историю, принять культуру, принять и этот ужасный, мучительный, 
падший мир. Но не объективации принадлежит последнее слово, последнее 
слово звучит из иного порядка бытия. И мир объектиный угаснет, угаснет в 
вечности, в вечности, обогащенной пережитой трагедией.
501
 
Analysis will therefore reflect this assumption that history is of less consequence 
than time by devoting much more attention to the latter. 
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Chronological developments  
Although chronological development in Berdiaev’s thought is rarely 
pronounced, a shift is evident. Around 1931-34, with texts such as Ia i mir obʺektov 
(1934), Berdiaev began to engage with the problem of time more regularly. Earlier 
work had been more concerned with the problem of history, and although the text 
Smysl istorii (1922) deals with the problem of time, conclusions were in part 
complicated by their entanglement with historical concerns. This is not to say that at 
any point the time-history primacy had been questioned: indeed, in this work he still 
writes: 
Основным вопросом, основной посылкой всякой философии истории является, 
несомненно, вопрос о значении времени, о природе времени, потому что история 
есть процесс во времени, временное совершение, движение во времени.
502
 
However, in line with the sort of distinctions made by Zen’kovskii and Poltoratskii 
referred to above, we can still see how a ‘historiosophic’ phase in Berdiaev’s thought 
wanes after Novoe srednevekovʹe (1924), and how the questions of time and 
eschatology assume greater importance. 
 
Text selection 
 As has already been mentioned, there is a number of key passages on time 
that will be drawn on most heavily. These sometimes develop from a thematic focus 
in a given text, or sometimes Berdiaev conveniently just decided to put a section on 
time in a given work. He also had a habit of ending a book with an eschatological 
chapter, which means relevant material frequently crops up in the terminal pages of 
many of his works. For our purposes the following texts contain passages of 
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particular importance: O naznachenii cheloveka (1931), dealing with issues 
surrounding time and creativity; Ia i mir obʺektov (1934), where we see the first really 
potent engagement with the problem of time, and also the text which Berdiaev 
identifies in Samopoznanie as being his best work on time;503 O rabstve i svobode 
cheloveka (1939), where Berdiaev first properly introduces his idea of the three 
different forms of time; Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki (written 1941, published 
1947), where preceding ideas about time are expanded and the question of time and 
newness is discussed; and also Samopoznanie (1947), where he presents an 
overview of his opinions on time. There is some significant engagement with time in 
Smysl istorii (1922), but much of this thinking is repeated in fuller form in these later 
texts. The relevant aspects of this earlier text will be noted as we move through 
Berdiaev’s philosophy of time.  
 
Influences on Berdiaev’s thought about time 
 In the Introduction to this thesis a number of philosophies of time were 
outlined and those introductions need not be repeated, as comparison can be drawn 
where significant similarity arises. Here we need only note that Plotinus, St. 
Augustine, Eckhart, Bergson and Heidegger have special relevance to Berdiaev’s 
thinking in ways that will be explored in the course of analysis.  
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Time and eternity 
Detailed investigation into Berdiaev’s philosophy of time will begin at the 
simplest level, concerning his basic opposition of time and eternity. This will lay a 
wider framework in which the more nuanced aspects of his thought can sit. As it is 
the most fundamental of Berdiaev’s ideas about time, issues relating to time-eternity 
will crop up in all of Berdiaev’s texts dealing with the problem of time, and all five 
relevant texts will thus be used for citation. After looking first at the ways in which 
Berdiaev conceptualises time and eternity and the nature of their relationship, 
discussion will then move onto cosmogony and eschatology. These concepts 
describe how time began (the passage from eternity to time), and how time will end, 
(the passage from time back to eternity). In such a way it is intended that the 
concepts of time and eternity will be described in their fullness. 
A distinction between time and eternity is maintained throughout Berdiaev’s 
work. However, in 1939 he develops this distinction by positing three ‘types’ of time. 
Here the sense of a divide between external, objectified time and internal, existential 
time becomes more dominant. Eternity is a part of this and is connected to the 
existential aspect of time, but becomes in itself slightly less important. A discussion 
of this development on the three types of time will follow analysis of the more basic 
concepts of time and eternity.  
 
Concepts 
Berdiaev’s first intuition about the nature of time is thus the distinction 
between two basic temporal concepts:  
Все восходит к тайне отношения между временем и вечностью […] Задача, 
стоящая передо мной, в том, чтобы целостная личность вошла в вечность, а не 
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разорванные ее части.
504
 
This distinction goes back to ancient Greek philosophy and demonstrates 
participation in a philosophical tradition that is millennia old. Bulgakov also drew such 
a distinction, meaning that at a fundamental level both perceived a similar temporal 
order. As Bulgakov wrote in Svet nevechernii (1917): 
 Время и вечность соотносительны: время не ощущалось бы в течении своем, не 
суммировалось бы из отдельных разорванных моментов, если бы этого не 
совершал сверхвременый субъект времени.
505
  
As comparison demonstrates – and as we would expect – the unitary force of 
Bulgakov’s philosophy brings time and eternity closer together, whereas they appear 
more opposed in Berdiaev’s dualistic formulation. Berdiaev makes his first proper 
philosophical exploration of the distinction in Smysl istorii (1922), but we will take up 
his discussion from Ia i mir obʺektov (1934). Here he repeats many of the ideas 
presented in Smysl istorii, but in a clearer form which is not complicated by 
simultaneous discussion of history.  
 
Time 
In Berdiaev’s configuration, time belongs to the objectified world and is 
therefore itself objectified. Objectified time reflects all the badness, the lack of unity, 
and the fallen nature of the objectification process that is currently at work: 
Время падшее, время нашего мира есть результат падения, происшедшего 
внутри существования. Падшее время есть продукт объективации, когда все для 
всего стало объектом, внеположным, т.е. все стало разорванным, разобщенным и 
скованным, связанным. Нельзя сказать, что все вещи во времени. Время есть 
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лишь состояние вещей.
506
 
According to the above objectified time, like objectification, is something akin to a 
condition imposed upon the world. It is objective, external, and is also broken apart, 
disjunct and constrained. It is ‘fallen time’, time which has fallen from eternity:  
Время есть парадокс, и понять его возможно только в его двойственности. Время 
не реально, время есть суета, отпадение от вечности.
507
 
Objectified time, like objectification itself, is not real: it does not offer the true 
meaning of existence, and is thus not real or existential. Significantly, time is also a 
‘paradox’ due to its dualistic nature: there is a fallen side to time, and there is an 
original, eternal aspect to time. Although the word ‘paradox’ is somewhat 
incautiously attached here,508  under closer investigation it will be seen how this 
duality of time does indeed resonate with a deeper paradox within Berdiaev’s 
philosophy as a whole.  
These quotations highlight a methodological problem surrounding Berdiaev’s 
use of the word ‘time’: sometimes he uses the word ‘time’ to indicate an external time, 
sometimes (see below) an internal time. Also, as with his identification of the 
‘paradox’ of time, he also sometimes uses the word ‘time’ to describe the 
interrelation of time and eternity as a whole. Caution should therefore be exercised 
when approaching Berdiaev’s use of this word, as, depending on context, it takes on 
different meanings.  
 
Eternity 
If ‘time’ is the time of the objectified, external world, ‘eternity’ is the time of the 
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highest metaphysical existence, the existential and the internal. It is aligned with the 
spirit, rather than the material world: 
Дух хочет вечности. Материя же знает лишь временное. Настоящее достижение 
есть достижение вечности.
509
 
‘Eternity’ is not simply just a theological idea about God’s eternity, 510 it also functions 
as an internal time, opposite to the external time of the objectified realm. Although it 
is not initially phrased quite in this way, it is clear through the sorts of epithet that 
Berdiaev attaches to eternity that it functions as the internal dimension of time. 
Eternity embodies all the internal values that he holds highest – those of freedom, 
creativity and novelty: 
Вечность же не может мыслиться нами, как законченность, завершенность в 
нашем здешнем смысле. Вечность есть вечная новизна, вечный творческий 
экстаз, растворение бытия в божественной свободе.
511
 
He thereby rejects the Platonic notion that eternity is static: rather, it is in constant, 
creative motion. Eternity, in Berdiaev’s reckoning, thus corresponds to all the best 
values in man, whereas objectified time corresponds to the worst, external 
characteristics.  
 
Interrelation 
  As has already emerged, objectified time and eternity fit into a hierarchy in 
which eternity has primacy over objectified time. It is clearly stated in Ia i mir 
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obʺektov (1934):  
Время есть как бы выпадение из вечности, и вместе с тем время находится 
внутри вечности.
512
 
Berdiaev clearly intends to avoid a determinist monism in which objectified time is 
only a form of eternity. In view of this, he explicitly describes objectified time as a 
collapse of eternity, rather than a medium through which eternity operates: 
 Время не есть образ вечности (Платон, Плотин), а распад вечности.
513
 
The argument is not watertight, as it could be argued that a collapse of eternity still 
contains an image of eternity. There is also a suggestion of paradox here that will 
become manifest later. How can objectified time, as something which originated from 
eternity, be wholly fallen from eternity but still maintain some sort of relation to it? 
The conspicuous disassociation with Plato and Plotinus, who held that time was a 
form of eternity, is also notable. Although Berdiaev has little in common with Plato on 
this issue, his convergence with Plotinus is more substantial: both suggested the 
metaphysical responsibility of ‘Spirit’ or man for the creation of time, and both 
postulated the evanescence of time. Berdiaev’s attempt to distance himself from 
Plotinus is at this juncture thus unconvincing.  
  
Internal-external dualism  
As analysis has demonstrated, this distinction between time and eternity takes 
on a more specific meaning for Berdiaev, extending beyond simple Christian 
formulations. It has emerged that connected to these two concepts of time and 
eternity, Berdiaev also intuits a corresponding division between ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ time, or between objectified and non-objectified time. This helps in some 
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way to explain their dualistic and possibly paradoxical relationship: ‘time’ 
corresponds to an external time, ‘eternity’ to an internal time. The notion of an 
internal time is posited in a potentially confusing assertion which he repeats across a 
number of works: 
Время в человеке, а не человек во времени.
514
 
From what we know already about ‘time’ as a product of objectification, objectified 
time should be outside man: it is ‘vnepolozhnyi’ and opposed to him. This objectified 
time is synonymous with the objectified, externalised world: 
Мир объективированный есть мир овремененный. И эта овремененность 
означает также болезнь времени.515 
Such objectified time could not be ‘within’ man: Berdiaev in the first quotation must 
therefore be talking about a different time, an internal time. For the moment, eternity 
fills this role: as has been mentioned, all the internal, existential elements in 
Berdiaev’s thought – creativity, freedom, novelty – exist in eternity. When Berdiaev 
argues that time is ‘within’ man, this thus means that an ‘internal’ time, or eternity is 
within man. In contrast, objectified time is external, and is thus of limited value:   
Мне хотелось, чтобы времени больше не было, не было будущего, а была лишь 
вечность.
516
 
Time as a whole, as an interrelation, thus has a profoundly dual aspect. On the one 
hand it is eternity, it is within man, within it sit creativity, freedom and all the internal 
things he values as existential. On the other, however, it is opposed to man, it is 
external, objectified and it should cease. Whether or not this constitutes paradox 
requires further examination. 
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‘Bad’ and ‘Good’ time in Smysl istorii 
 The opposition of a ‘time’ to an ‘eternity’ was first suggested in Smysl istorii 
(1922). Here, although Berdiaev frequently presented it in terms of a distinction 
between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ time, it is clearly a nascent formulation of the later internal 
time-external time division: 
Это ведет к признанию того, что существует как бы два времени – время дурное и 
время хорошее, время истинное и время не истинное.
517
 
Although it should not be over-emphasised, this demonstrates that even when 
Berdiaev was writing during his so-called ‘historiosophic’ phase, to use Zen’kovskii’s 
and Poltoratskii’s categorisation of Berdiaev’s thought, he still perceived a similar 
basic temporal separation. Smysl istorii emphasises the point that much of what 
Berdiaev intuited, as well as being a distinction between ‘time’ and ‘eternity’, was, 
perhaps more significantly, really a distinction between ‘good’, internal time, and 
‘bad’, external time. An awareness of this deep division between internal and 
external modes of existence therefore cut right through his speculations on the 
nature of time. 
 
The nature of objectified time 
Berdiaev fills more pages discussing the time of this world, objectified time, 
than he does discussing eternity, the internal or existential time. Indeed, eternity is 
often used more as an opposing, symbolic node to objectified time than as a 
substantiated, fully explored concept. Berdiaev is thus – at least in general – more 
concerned with the problem of objectified time, and in so doing uses it to reflect upon 
his concerns related to the objectified world. We may recall the quotation belying his 
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focus on the objectified, and consequently mortal, aspect of time: 
Победа над смертоносным временам всегда была основным мотивом моей 
жизни.
518
 
A fuller exploration of the more exact nature of this objectified time will highlight with 
greater precision why Berdiaev was so opposed to objectified time, and through this 
to objectification more broadly. In so doing it will also clarify further how his temporal 
dualism works. 
 Berdiaev is almost exclusively negative in his description of objectified time, 
and the strength of this consistent negativity is central to the sense of temporal 
dualism he creates. He picks up on a number of distinct features which he finds 
exemplify the injurious nature of objectified time. In Ia i mir obʺektov (1934) he writes:   
Время есть болезнь, болезнь к смерти. И есть смертельная печаль в этой 
болезни, болезни времени.
519
 
This idea that objectified time is a disease is profound: it suggests that time is 
somehow a malformation, something toxic, degenerative to human existence. 
Inherent in the idea of disease is that it is slowly brings about an end to life, that it will 
triumph over existence. Elsewhere he also describes objectified time in terms of 
torment and nightmare: 
Время есть мука и кошмар нашей посюсторонней жизни.
520
 
Both descriptions relate to a sense of the hostility of objectified time to humanity, and 
convey the idea that such time is somehow crippling mankind. 
The nature of this disease of objectified time, Berdiaev elaborates further, 
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consists in the fact that it lacks fullness, specifically the fullness of the present: 
В чем болезнь и смертельная печаль времени? В невозможности пережить 
полноту и радость настоящего как достижения вечности, в невозможности в этом 
моменте настоящего, самом даже полноценном и радостном, освободиться от 
отравы прошлого и будущего, от печали о прошлом и страха будущего.
521
 
In objectified time, the present cannot be experienced without a sense of the past 
and future in pressing upon it. The present cannot be ‘liberated’ from the past and 
future and therefore cannot be experienced in its wholeness. This impetus he places 
upon the importance of the present is a key to his wider understanding of the 
difference between what time should be (internal time) and what time is (objectified 
time): internal time relates to direct experience, the present moment, however 
external, objectified time breaks this up and subjects it to an external flow. This 
recalls significantly the Christian idea of ‘Kairos’: the present, the elected moment, 
should be sought after rather than Chronos, the flow of time. This idea of ‘fullness’ is 
also a rather Russian element in Berdiaev’s thinking, as hugely influential thinkers in 
the Russian tradition such as Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860) and Vladimir Solovʹev 
(1853-1900) had propagated the notion that fullness or wholeness was a central 
theme for philosophy, specifically in the social and religious sphere. 522  Berdiaev 
applies this demand for wholeness to the temporal dimension, claiming that it is 
impossible to feel the fullness of present as a moment of eternity due to the 
poisonous influence of the past and future.  
 As is also revealed by the above quotation, Berdiaev’s perception of the sick, 
diseased state of objectified time relates to the distinctions of past and future in 
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themselves.523 He argues that it is these elements that emphasise the disease of 
objectified time, due to the fact that past and future destroy the wholeness of the 
present, where access to eternity is possible. The condition of past and future thus 
signifies detachment from eternity: 
Прошлое и будущее, разорванные части больного времени, не имеют 
преимущества в отнощении к вечности. Священное находится внутри мгновения, 
приобщенного к вечности, а не в объективированных социальных образованиях 
прошлого и будущего.
524
  
The disease of objectified time, therefore, consists in the way in which the past and 
future destroy the present. In this reckoning past and future do not exist in the way 
the present exists: 
Онтологически нет прошлого, как нет и будущего, а есть лишь вечно творимое 
настоящее.
525
 
By continually dragging upon the present, then, the past and future disturb it. This 
argument about the nature of objectified time had already been made in the earlier 
Smysl istorii (1922), but it is presented in clearer form in the above.526  
This thinking recalls significantly of Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) ideas about 
time, with which Berdiaev was well acquainted.527 Bergson was concerned with the 
establishment of the durée, a multiplicitous, unified duration of time. This sat in 
contrast to the divided time that was produced by the analytical mind: 
Shall we say, then, that duration has unity? Doubtless, a continuity of elements which 
prolong themselves into one another participates in unity as much as in multiplicity; but 
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this moving, changing, coloured, living unity has hardly anything in common with the 
abstract, motionless and empty unity which the concept of pure unity circumscribes.
528
 
Time for Bergson should be whole and in unity, it should not be abstract and divided 
through analysis. Although at this broad level they are similar, such a similarity with 
Bergson should not, however, be overplayed. Berdiaev demonstrated a number of 
key differences to Bergson as well, as Motroshilova contends: 
Бергсон и Хайдеггер, с одной стороны, помогают Бердяеву таким образом 
осмыслить время; с другой стороны, они, по мнению Бердяева, «недостаточно 
видят» двойственность времени.
529
 
Here Motroshilova is referencing a section from Ia i mir obʺektov, in which Berdiaev 
contends that neither Bergson nor Heidegger sufficiently grasp the dual nature or 
paradox of time. Instead he argues that Augustine is closer (although still wide of the 
mark) to comprehending this, as he places greater importance on the role of the 
subject in constructing the wholeness of the present.530 Comparison with Bergson, 
however, is nonetheless still informative. 
A similar category of concern can be identified in another contemporaneous 
philosopher, McTaggart (1866-1925). Perhaps the most important thinker on time in 
the twentieth century – but of whom Berdiaev remained unfortunately ignorant – 
McTaggart wrote about how notions of past, present and future problematise any 
understanding of time. He argued that time, understood on the basis of past, present 
and future, was unreal: 
I believe, however, that this would be a mistake, and that the distinction of past, present 
and future is as essential to time as the distinction of earlier and later, while in a certain 
sense, as we shall see, it may be regarded as more fundamental than the distinction of 
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earlier and later. And it is because the distinctions of past, present and future seem to 
me to be essential for time, that I regard time as unreal.
531
 
Although the way Berdiaev describes time is different, he still evinces a sensitivity 
comparable to McTaggart’s which suggests that the current distinctions of past, 
present and future are somehow problematic.  
For Berdiaev, then, only the present possesses ontological value, but this is 
lost when it is broken up and dragged apart by the past and future: 
Время распадается на прошлое, настоящее и будущее. Но прошлого уже нет, 
будущего еще нет, а настоящее распадается на прошлое и будущее и 
неуловимо.
532
 
Objectified time is thus broken. It makes access to eternity, the realm of internal time, 
through the present impossible, and will eventually bring death to man. In this 
respect it is symptomatic of the ‘externalised’ condition of the objectified world. It is 
hostile to man and determines his existence.  
 
Having clarified the concepts of ‘time’ and ‘eternity’ in Berdiaev’s thinking, 
their interrelation and character, we can now move onto the ways in which they flow 
into each other at their initial and terminal points. 
 
The beginning and the end: cosmogony and eschatology 
 For Berdiaev, as for Bulgakov, a concern with the relationship between time 
and eternity led to thinking about the process whereby the transition from time to 
eternity is made. We do not, however, see this category of problem – or at least this 
problem phrased in such a way – with other modern philosophers for whom time was 
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also important, such as Heidegger, Bergson, or McTaggart. When dealing with this 
problem, Berdiaev in the main keeps in line with the Christian salvation myth which 
describes a fall from eternity to time, and then, after a worldly process, a movement 
back to eternity. By placing it within this Christian narrative structure, Berdiaev 
slightly historicised his concept of time: 
Но, вместе с тем, христиансвто дает смысл времени, истории во времени. 
История во времени есть путь человека к вечности, в ней накапливается 
обогащающий опыт человека. Но совершенно невозможно мыслить ни творения 
мира во времени, ни конца мира во времени. В объективированном времени нет 
ни начала, ни конца, а лишь бесконечная середина. Начало и конец – в 
экзистенциальном времени.
533
  
Within this Christian structure, the notions of beginning and end are seen as 
particularly important. 
 The beginning and end, as the original boundaries of time and eternity, help 
establish the character of the relationship and transition between time and eternity. 
They are approached under the concepts of cosmogony and eschatology. Despite 
their relevance to historical concerns, Berdiaev’s claims regarding the creation and 
end of specifically objectified time are also integral to his conception of the nature of 
time more broadly, as they set the conditions in which the birth and end of objectified 
time are possible. Their discussion therefore belongs to a consideration of his 
philosophy of time, rather than his philosophy of history. Through their exploration 
the character of the time-eternity relationship is further clarified.  
 
Cosmogony 
 Cosmogony, dealing with the creation or beginning of the world, is a 
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significant aspect of a philosophy of Berdiaev’s type, which – perhaps somewhat 
immodestly – aims to give a holistic account of everything. In his thinking there are 
two cosmogonic ‘moments’, two points at which the world as we know it came to be: 
the first depicts the creation of the cosmos and the world, the second the creation of 
the objectified world and time. Following the Christian creation myth, these occupy 
different places in the narrative so are not simultaneous. We need to look into both to 
understand the process which led to objectification and objectified time, as both 
established important conditions for time. 
 
The first cosmogonic moment 
 The first stage of Berdiaev’s cosmogony, the creation of the cosmos and the 
world by God, is actually of greater importance to the later discussion of freedom, 
creativity and time. It is relevant here because it establishes freedom and the 
possibility of fall, which, together, allow the creation of time to take place. As much of 
this has been dealt with in the introduction to this chapter, the most noteworthy point 
to highlight is Berdiaev’s positing of uncreated freedom at the beginning of all things, 
and further his radical suggestion that this uncreated freedom, located outside God, 
existed alongside God (rather than through God) before creation: 
Вначале был Логос. Но вначале была и свобода. Логос был в свободе, и свобода 
была в Логосе. Но таков лишь один из аспектов свободы. Есть другой аспект, в 
котором свобода является совершенно вне-логстной, и происходит столкновение 
Логоса и Свободы.
534
 
Uncreated freedom is of great importance to the existential, internal aspects of 
Berdiaev’s philosophy, as it is through this freedom, pervading through creation from 
the very beginning, that man is able to engage in creativity, and escape the influence 
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of the objectified world. As becomes clear below, the role of this uncreated freedom 
in the creation of objectified time is central. 
  
The second cosmogonic moment 
 The second moment in Berdiaev’s cosmogony comes after the period of 
edenic existence which follows the creation of the world. This next part of the drama, 
in accordance with Christian thought, consists in the fall of man. However, for 
Berdiaev this fall also entails the advent of objectification, and the consequent 
beginning of objectified time. The fall of man, according to him, is possible due to 
man’s freedom and free agency, as is recounted in Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha 
(1927-1928): 
Тьма первоначально сгустилась в высшей точке духовной иерархии, там впервые 
свобода дала отрицательный ответ на Божий зов [...] там творение вступило на 
путь самоутверждения и самозамкнутости, на путь разрыва и ненависти. Человек 
отпал от Бога вместе со всем творением...535 
The image of the initial darkness ‘thickening’ in the highest point of the spiritual 
hierarchy is intended to show how the initial freedom, here described in terms of 
‘darkness’ or ‘gloom’, autonomously took on form and opposed God. Although the 
talk of a ‘spiritual hierarchy’ complicates matters somewhat, this initial darkness is 
posited as independent from God, acting against him through self-affirmation and the 
assertion of independence. The first cosmogonic moment has made this process 
possible through the original investment of freedom in man. Significantly time, in this 
schema, is described as a direct result of the fall: 
Не грехопадение произошло во времени, а время явилось результатом 
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грехопадения.
536
 
Somewhat paradoxically the fall, then, as well as occurring in (objectified) time, also 
created this time; either way, however, objectified time is its direct result. The 
paradoxical elements of this problem will be dealt with in much greater deal when we 
come to discuss the relationship between creativity and time, as it describes the 
same problem. However, at this point Berdiaev clarifies his suggestion that in the 
same way that man is responsible for objectification, he is also responsible for 
objectified time: it is a product of his activity. It is not something created by God, it is 
something solely created by man. It therefore does not share those same 
metaphysical, existential properties that other divine-human capacities – most 
notably freedom and creativity – share. 
 
 Berdiaev’s cosmogony thus sets the conditions which make the birth of time 
possible. The first condition is man’s freedom, located in the darkness or uncreated 
freedom previous to existence. Freedom allows man to answer negatively to God’s 
call and bring about the fall. The second condition is the advent of objectification, the 
externalisation of man and his subjection to the world of objects. Objectified time is 
thus closely tied to the fate of freedom, and, moreover, to the fate of man. It is also 
significant that in the fall man reaches beyond God – to freedom – to create 
objectified time. A question therefore arises – is objectified time totally disconnected 
from God? It could be argued that this is so as uncreated freedom, the most 
important element for this creation of objectified time, is independent by its very 
nature from God. This would then beg the broader question how far is objectification 
itself, as a product of the application of freedom, entirely disconnected from God. 
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Their disconnection propagates further a sense of impassable dualism. 
Objectified time, as a result of man’s fall – his free opposition to God’s will – 
can likewise be considered as opposed to God (and therefore the divine within man). 
This is very different to eternity or internal time which is in communion with the 
metaphysical and divine elements of man. Dualism persists. Berdiaev recognises the 
contradictory nature of this scenario:  
Двойственность времени, его двойственный смысл для человеческого 
существования связан с тем, что время есть результат творческого нового, 
небывшего и вместе с тем оно есть продукт разрыва, утери целостности, забота и 
страх.
537
 
The fall, in its original moment, was new – it was the creation of a new world order by 
man’s use of his freedom. In this respect, objectified time should have internal, 
existential value. However, objectified time is bad, it is the loss of wholeness and the 
product of rupture. Berdiaev therefore again falls back on the notion of duality, in this 
scenario regarding only objectified time, rather than the time-eternity relation: 
objectified time on the one hand is the product of something good and internal – 
freedom, creativity, newness – but results in something bad and external which 
exerts external pressure upon man. This introduction of the theme of creativity 
throws the problem of paradox into sharper relief: how can objectified time be bad, 
external, if it is the product of creativity, which begins in the internal? How can 
internal and external be linked in such a way? This issue will be explored in much 
greater depth later. Sufficient here is to note the cosmogonic structure Berdiaev 
describes, and how in this framework the themes of freedom and creativity have 
become significant in connection to the birth of time.  
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Eschatology 
 Eschatology is central to Berdiaev’s philosophy of time. As mentioned earlier, 
it is connected to the Christian notion of ‘Kairos’, the moment of resolution, where the 
end is elevated and seen to be of particular significance. Calian, referenced earlier, 
in his reasonably successful appraisal of Berdiaev’s work identifies eschatology as 
an organising theme to his philosophy more broadly: 
…this study wishes to bring attention to an untreated aspect of Berdyaev’s 
Weltanschauung which underlies his whole thinking. This untreated aspect is the 
eschatological emphasis found in Berdyaev.
538
 
This reflection is, in our opinion, accurate. Subsequent scholarship has continued to 
identify the centrality of eschatology – Styczynski recently noted: 
In short, it seems that the Russian philosopher [Berdiaev] concentrated on abandoning 
the world of culture and time (his analysis of time, resembling that of Bergson, 
constitutes one of the best parts of his thought), on fulfilling the destiny of man, i.e., 
entering the eschatological dimension of existence, eternity. The predominance of 
mythos over logos, of Jerusalem over Athens, is evident here.
539
 
Eschatology is thus recognised as a key component in Berdiaev’s philosophical 
thinking, not just about time and history, but also concerning a variety of other 
themes such as creativity, freedom, ethics, and culture.  
 
Preoccupation with the end 
Berdiaev was very engaged with the question of the end and all its associated 
problems and paradoxes. This recalls of the ‘futurist’ type of eschatology discussed 
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by McGrath in the introduction to this thesis. 540  Indeed, in Berdiaev’s Opyt 
eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki (1947), he writes:  
Я хочу рассматривать все вопросы в эсхатологическом свете, в свете конца.
541
 
For Berdiaev, the thrust of his eschatology is a focus on the end in itself, which 
brings with it the end of objectified time, and consequently also history. Objectified 
time is not the final destination for man, it is only a midpoint that should give way to 
something else: 
Но совершенно невозможно мыслить ни творения мира во времени, ни конца 
мира во времени. В объективированном времени нет ни начала, ни конца, а лишь 
бесконечная середина.
542
 
Indeed, he goes on: 
Трагедия и мука истории суть прежде всего трагедия и мука времени. История 
имеет смысл только потому, что она кончиться. Смысл истории не может быть 
имманентным, он лежит за пределами истории.
543
 
Indeed, the fact that time (and in the above also history) ends is what gives meaning 
to all the pain that occurs within it.  
Berdiaev’s focus on the eschatological, as with the cosmogonic, also 
contained a paradoxical element. He maintains that whilst the beginning of the end 
must occur in part within objectified time, the completion of the end will take place 
outside it:  
Конец мира и истории не может произойти в будущем, т.е. в нашем времени. И 
вместе с тем, конец мира и истории не может быть лишь потусторонним, 
совершенно по ту сторону истории, он разом и по ту сторону и по эту сторону, он 
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есть противоречие для нашей мысли, которое снимается, но не самой мыслью.
544
 
This is the sort of paradox that Berdiaev was fond of, and demonstrates another of 
his points of contact with the mystical tradition as many mystics – such as Eckhart, 
for example545  – were very fond of this sort of paradox. It also testifies to the 
continuing relevance of the notion of paradox to his thought about time. 
 
Eschatological proximity 
 A salient aspect of Berdiaev’s thinking about the end of time concerns the 
apparent fact that objectified time, in his reckoning, could come to an end at any 
point. The end continually feels close and this creates the sense that objectified time 
is somehow unstable, that it could potentially collapse into an eschatological abyss 
without any forewarning: 
Я всегда философствовал так, как будто наступает конец мира и нет перспективы 
времени.
546
 
This idea is repeated; it seems Berdiaev feels his understanding of the proximity of 
the end is amongst his more unique philosophical characteristics: 
У меня всегда была настоящая болезнь времени. Я всегда предвидел в 
воображении конец и не хотел приспособляться к процессу, который ведет к 
концу, отсюда мое нетерпение.
547
 
Berdiaev’s suggestion of the continuous possibility of the end is something that is 
consistent with the broader themes of his philosophy. It relates to his sense of 
temporality as crisis: the world appears to be over-brimming with crisis, but it is not 
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clear when a final end may come. As the above also suggests, the omnipresent 
possibility of the end is also contingent upon the potential of freedom. His weak 
sense of process points to the fact that true freedom, in Berdiaev’s mind, implies 
freedom from determination by any historical process:  
В мировом и историческом процессе нет необходимости прогресса 
закономерного развития […] Мне всегда казались мало значительными и не очень 
важными сами по себе события на поверхности истории, я вижу в них лишь знаки 
иного.
548
 
This refutation of the notion of progress, and also the questioning of the idea of 
process more broadly, is thus tied up with Berdiaev’s affirmation of man’s 
independence and his belief in the primary importance of man’s inner workings. 
We are thus left to wonder how the end of time, which appears constantly 
possible but is not subject to historical law or determinism, comes about. An 
accusation could certainly be made that Berdiaev, despite identifying the proximity of 
the end, does not offer much in the way of explanation of how it might happen. The 
only real possibility appears to be through creativity, a process in which man 
accesses freedom and moves outside time: 
 И вот задача этики творчества заключается в том, чтобы перспективу жизни 
сделать независимой от рокового хода времени, от будущего, которое вызывает в 
нас ужас и мучит нас. Творческий акт есть выход из времени, он совершается в 
царстве свободы, а не царстве необходимости.
549
 
However the above also does not offer any suggestion as to when eschaton may be 
reached. As is made clear, and as will also be discussed in more depth below, 
creativity is a matter of freedom, not compulsion. Man chooses to create, he is not 
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compelled to create, and he does not create according to any predetermined 
schema, as with Bulgakov. Therefore by suggesting the end will be brought about by 
creativity does not make it any clearer exactly when this will happen. We have now 
transgressed, however, into territory that belongs to, or is perhaps shared with, the 
philosophy of history. There should now be some discussion of the context to 
Berdiaev’s thought about eschatology.  
 
Context to Berdiaev’s eschatology 
 Berdiaev’s eschatological bent of thought chiefly demonstrates his continuity 
with the Russian tradition. Eschatology is a continuous theme amongst Russian 
thinkers – we see it clearly in (amongst many others) Sergei Bulgakov, Vladimir 
Solovʹev, Nikolai Fedorov (1827-1903), Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856), and also 
arguably in many Russian interpretations of Marxism, including not only Lenin and 
Trotski, but also revolutionaries of the older breed such as Nechaev (1847-1882), 
where an obsession with the end clearly bordered on some sort of eschatological or 
millenarian anticipation. 550  However, what distances Berdiaev specifically from 
Bulgakov, Fedorov, Solovʹev and also contemporary revolutionaries was the fact that 
Berdiaev’s concept of eschatology was not based on an earthly eschatological end, 
but one that is located in pure transcendence. He is therefore further from the 
millenarian eschatology, a heaven on earth, which could be construed as being the 
logical product of Bulgakov’s ‘philosophy of economy’, Fedorov’s idea surrounding 
the resurrection of all human souls or Solovʹev’s focus on the universal church.  
This sort of earthly millenarianism, Lössl comments, has since Origen been 
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wrongly associated with the Jewish faith: 
 Tertullian’s example also demonstrates that the belief in the millennium is not inherently 
“Jewish,” as Origen suggests, but that it came to be defined as Jewish in the process of 
being increasingly interpreted in spiritual terms.
551
 
Berdiaev, however, clearly followed Origen’s interpretation, and similarly identified 
the earthly aspirations of Jewish messianism as being distorted and even perverse: 
Еврейский дух XIX и XX века перекликается с древнееврейским духом. В нем есть 
иная, искаженная и извращенная форма мессианизма, есть ожидание иного 
Мессии, после того как истинный Мессия был еврейством отвергнут, есть все та 
же обращенность к будущему, все то же настойчивое и упорное требование, 
чтобы будущее принесло с собою всеразрешающее начало, какую-то 
всеразрешающую правду и справедливость на земле, во имя которой еврейский 
народ готов объявить борьбу всем историческим традициям и святыням, всякой 
исторической преемственности.
552
 
Berdiaev therefore went to lengths to demonstrate that his eschatology was a 
genuine eschatology, that for him the end lay in spirit, transcendence, and the 
metaphysical: it was ‘other-worldly’ (potustoronnii) and not ‘of this world’ 
(posiustoronnii). This means that for him, the rule of objectified time, the rule of 
objectification and the conditions of this world are weak, transitory: 
Эсхатологизм связан был для меня с тем, что все мне казалось хрупким, люди 
угрожаемыми смертью, все в истории преходящим и висящим над бездной. Я в 
личной жизни склонен был ждать катастроф и еще более в исторической жизни 
народов. Я давно предсказывал исторические катастрофы.
553
 
Berdiaev thus took eschatology to mean the end of the objectified world, and, by also 
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positing the continual proximity of the eschatological moment, further suggested that 
the conditions of time and the objectified world were by their very nature weak and 
evanescent. This further propagated his sense of a divide between a genuine, deep, 
internal world and an external, weak, transitory world. 
 
Conclusions: time-eternity  
 The basic structure of Berdiaev’s thinking about time, which surrounds the 
construction of a relationship between time and eternity, has been drawn up. 
Berdiaev, as Bulgakov did, subscribes to the basic ancient Greek-Christian 
distinction between time and eternity, which, as well as providing a strong sense of 
objectified ‘time’ as being purely immanent and ‘eternity’ being purely noumenal and 
existential, also provides a slightly historicised model which plots the movement from 
one to the other and back again. The opening stage of this schema is a cosmogonic 
motion of ‘objectification’, the final act is an eschatological movement from time to 
eternity.  
Berdiaev’s treatment of the concepts of time and eternity tries to balance a 
number of different philosophical interests which extend well beyond the boundaries 
of conventional Christian discourse. On the one hand, he proclaims that there is an 
internal time – eternity – a time which is ‘within’ man. On the other he also describes 
an external, objectified time, one which, whilst being produced from internal time, 
has fallen away from the internal and God and has subsequently lost its internal 
meaning. It is now opposed to and outside man. Together, this suggests a 
disconnection between the realms of time and eternity, and it becomes difficult to 
conceive of how a passage from one to the other is possible as they appear entirely 
separate. Indeed, the attempt to conceive how man occupies both internal and 
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external times becomes problematic without the use of paradox, as the two are quite 
opposed to one another.  
 Berdiaev was intransigent in the face of criticism, and frequently fell back on 
the belief that people ‘misunderstood’ his use of paradoxical concepts: 
Меня очень плохо понимают […] Склонность к парадоксальному и 
противоречивому мышлению вела меня к тому, что иногда враги меня хвалили. 
Плохо понимают характер моего дуализма, ошибочно приписывая ему 
онтологический характер, особенно плохо понимают центральное для меня 
значение объективации и эсхатологические мотивы моей философии. Меня все 
хотят отнести к категориям, в которые я никак вместиться не могу.
554
 
Although he describes ontological dualism as a false charge, it is difficult to conceive 
of any other divide: the realms of internal and external being are quite clearly 
opposed in his philosophy of time. With the specific question time, however, from 
1939 onwards Berdiaev will attempt to formulate better a bridge between time and 
eternity according to the principle of ‘existential time’. This, it seems, is intended to 
make the sense of dualism in his thought about time more surmountable, as with it 
he attempts to formulate more clearly the relationship between objectified and non-
objectified time. 
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Deepening the problem: the three forms of time 
 Until O rabstve i svobode cheloveka (1939), Berdiaev had seemingly satisfied 
himself with the distinction he had made between objectified time – or simply ‘time’ – 
and eternity, a broadly internal, existential form of time. However, for reasons he 
does not explicitly explain, he wanted to expand upon this conceptualisation of time. 
Perhaps he was motivated by a desire to make clearer the means by which a 
transition from objectified time to eternity was possible, or perhaps, more likely, he 
intended to make the temporal conditions behind creativity and its related concerns 
more understandable. Either way, such was the importance of time to his 
philosophical project that Berdiaev clearly needed greater clarification regarding the 
nature of time. 
 The new conclusion he reached on the problem of time relied on a 
development of the existentialist idea that time is within man. Berdiaev expanded this 
solution by suggesting that the nature of time depends on the mode of existence that 
man (or perhaps the world) is engaged with: 
Время есть модус существования и зависит от характера существования. 
Неверно сказать, что происходит движение и изменение, потому что существует 
время; верно сказать, что время существует потому, что происходит движение и 
изменение. Характер изменения порождает характер времени.
555
 
At a basic level, it would be expected to follow that objectified existence would 
correspond to objectified time, and existential, internal existence would correspond 
to existential, internal time. This is borne out. However, it is also little more complex 
than this. Berdiaev identifies three types of time which correspond to three types of 
existence: cosmic (kosmicheskoe), historical (istoricheskoe) and existential 
(ekzistentsial’noe). Although, strictly speaking, they are not all of entirely obvious 
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ontological distinction (‘cosmic’ is not an obvious ontological category), Berdiaev 
clearly intends them to be ontological. Each form of time corresponds to a mode of 
being. In this respect, as we shall see, they are temporal distinctions based on 
ontological conditions.   
 In this distinction of the three types of time, Berdiaev continues to 
demonstrate a superficial similarity to Heidegger, who similarly distinguished 
between three types of time: originary temporality, world-time, and the ordinary 
conception of time. Blattner summarises what he terms as Heidegger’s ‘temporal 
idealism’ as follows: 
 [Heidegger’s] idealism relies upon drawing a further distinction between modes of time, 
between what he calls “world-time” (Weltzeit) and “the ordinary conception of time.” The 
explanatory dependence just mentioned is in fact a chain of dependencies: ordinary 
time (the ticking away of purely quantitative moments) depends on world-time (the 
succession of qualitatively determinate Nows), whose core phenomenon is in turn the 
pragmatic Now (the Now that aims us into the purposive future by relying on the given 
past), which finally in turn depends on originary temporality.
556
 
Although the level of sophistication with which Heidegger conceived of time is vastly 
beyond Berdiaev – almost to the point at which anything other than superficial 
comparison breaks down – what is clear is that there was an existing, recent 
(Heidegger published Sein und Zeit in 1927) existentialist thesis on time that 
distinguished between different modes of time for Dasein, or being. As Volkogonova 
reflected on Berdiaev: 
…Бердяев, как и любой другой мыслитель, не был свободен от сильных влияний 
со стороны других…
557
 
It is not, therefore, unreasonable to think that Berdiaev followed an already 
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established path with this development in his philosophy of time. 
 In our engagement with the three types of time we will draw mainly on O 
rabstve i svobode cheloveka (1939), Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki (1947), and 
Samopoznanie (1947). As with all of Berdiaev’s writing, in these three texts the ideas 
on this theme presented are approximately the same, but quotation from all three is 
necessary because he explores these same ideas from different angles. 
 
Cosmic time 
 The first of the three ontological-temporal distinctions Berdiaev draws is that 
of ‘cosmic’ time. Across the distinction of the three types of time, two are objectified  
and one is non-objectified. Cosmic time is the first of these two objectified types of 
time. It is also the most simple of his conceptualisations. Cosmic time corresponds to 
the natural cycle of the cosmos – it is defined by the rotation of stars, the movement 
of planetary bodies, and the cycles of nature: 
Время космическое символизируется кругом. Оно связано с движением земли 
вокруг солнца, с исчислением дней, месяцев и годов, с календарем и часами. Это 
круговое движение, в котором постоянно происходит возвращение, наступает 
утро и вечер, весна и осень. Это есть время природы, и, как природные существа, 
мы живем в этом времени.
558
 
Berdiaev was keen to attach spatial representation to these conceptualisations of 
time – with cosmic time he chooses to use the circle. This should not be taken to 
mean that for some reason he is trying to assert any sort of primacy to space, as he 
is clear on the fact that he views time to be of much greater significance. Indeed, he 
had already stated in Ia i mir obʺektov: 
 Время для моего существования первичнее пространства, и пространство в моем 
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существовании предполагает время.
559
 
Spatial representation is thus simply an explicative measure.  
 The negative aspect of cosmic time is twofold – it issues from both its 
connection to the natural, external world and also from the fact that there is no 
freedom in cosmic motion. Its connection to the natural, and thus objectified world 
highlights how cosmic time is objectified time: 
Время космическое есть одно из порождений изменений в мире 
объективированно-природном. Космическое время есть время 
объективированное и подлежит математическому счислению, оно подчинено 
числу, дроблению и складыванию. Часы и дни дробятся на минуты и секунды и 
складываются в месяцы и годы.
560
  
As it is determined by an external, cosmic measure, cosmic time is itself objectified. 
Furthermore, everything in cosmic time is determined by endless cycle: it does not 
go anywhere, meaning there is no end and no meaning to cosmic time, as it does 
not exit into eternity. It therefore bears no similarity whatsoever to eternity, the 
internal dimension of time: 
 Космическое и историческое время не походит на вечность.561   
Cosmic time, therefore, is a fundamentally limited dimension of objectification. This 
propagates further the sense of Berdiaev’s antipathy towards the cosmic, natural 
world, as he perceives its time to be inherently bad. 
 Finally, cosmic time, as will be discussed in Section 4 on Berdiaev’s 
philosophy of history, also presents what Berdiaev suggests as the ‘ultimate 
objectification’, the possibility of history ‘gone wrong’. History, he will argue, can 
either empty out into cosmic time and suffer final determination and the 
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extermination of freedom, or into existential time and from there transcend upwards 
to eternity. Although this is a question related to the philosophy of history, it is 
nonetheless instructive to note that the final end points of history are still conceived 
in terms of temporal categories. 
 
Historical time 
 The second of Berdiaev’s conceptualisations of time, historical time, is more 
revealing as to the deeper aspects of his thinking about human life – cosmic time 
had simply demonstrated, as his readers already understood, that he felt alienated 
from the natural world and the cyclical monotony of natural time. Historical time 
describes his perception of a human life or society in time: it is a constant motion 
forwards, an unrelenting drive onwards towards future achievement. More than being 
a description of a simple temporal motion, in historical time there is also a sharp 
judgement being passed on historical life, and on man’s destiny within the historical 
sphere. This in turn opens up the possibility for Berdiaev to criticise some of the 
ideas (already mentioned in Section 2) regarding modernity and a future-orientated 
perception of time.  
Berdiaev’s identification of historical time first reaffirms the priority of time over 
history, an idea oft-repeated throughout his work: 
Но философская проблема истории есть прежде всего проблема времени. 
Обоготворение истории есть обоготворение исторического времени.
562
 
However, it also allows Berdiaev to admit – but also to delimit – the existence of 
linear, forwards, or ‘historical’ motion in human existence: 
 Историческое время порождено движением и изменением иным, чем то, что 
происходит в космическом круговороте. Историческое время символизируется не 
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кругом, а прямой линией, устремленной вперед. Особенность исторического 
времени именно в этой устремленности к грядущему, оно в грядущем ждет 
раскрытия смысла.
563
 
Historical time thus corresponds to man’s ontological condition within history. The 
spatial identifier Berdiaev chooses for historical time is the straight line, striving 
endlessly forward. As was evident from earlier quotation, this movement bears no 
similarity to eternity, meaning that his conceptualisation of historical time is, as with 
cosmic time, also negative. He is consequently overt in his damnation of historical 
time as something objectified that must be overcome: 
И самая борьба против исторического времени, против прельщения и рабства 
истории происходит не в космическом, а в историческом времени.  Историческое 
время больше связано с человеческой активностью, чем время космическое. Но 
личность по-новому ранена и порабощена историческим временем, и она даже 
иногда ищет избавления от плена истории переходом в космический план 
существования.
564
 
This having been said, the possibility of activity (aktivnostʹ) indicates that Berdiaev is 
willing to allow access to something else within historical time other than just cosmic 
cycles. The emergence of newness through such activity will allow an eschatological 
horizon to be opened within historical time. This presents a route out of historical 
time, something that was not discussed with cosmic time. 
 Along with this notion of the possibility of activity in historical time, Berdiaev 
also outlines a degree of overlap between cosmic time and historical time in common 
forms of measurement: 
История, конечно, подчиняется и космическому времени, она знает исчисление по 
                                            
563
 Ibid., p. 156. 
564
 Ibid., p. 156. 
273 
 
годам и столетиям, но она знает и свое историческое время.
565
 
This therefore also allows for the possibility of historical time emptying out into 
cosmic time and final objectification, as similarly the possibility of activity in historical 
time highlights the possibility to overcome historical time and raise it up out of 
objectification – something that will be achieved in existential time. There are thus 
two possible exit points from historical time, pointing in opposite directions: one 
towards existential time and then out into eternity, the other into cosmic time:  
Есть два выхода из исторического времени, в две противоположные стороны – к 
времени космическому и времени экзистенциальному.
566
 
In this way, historical time corresponds to the current human condition, at least in 
Berdiaev’s mind: man is caught somewhere between objectification and 
transcendence, and needs to exit one way or another. 
Berdiaev’s description of historical time also offers an implicit treatise on the 
notion of ‘progress’, something that Bulgakov, as well as a number of other Russian 
philosophers of their period, had been keen to criticise. It will be remembered that 
Bulgakov’s essay, Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa (1902), represented a classic 
engagement with this idea: 
Первая и основная задача, которую ставит себе теория прогресса, состоит в том, 
чтобы показать, что история имеет смысл, и исторический процесс есть не только 
эволюция, но и прогресс. Она доказывает, следовательно, конечное тождество 
причинной закономерности и разумной целесообразности…
567
 
Historical time, the line always struggling forward, offers a certain analogy to this 
concept, a concept Berdiaev is similarly trying to discredit: in his mind historical time, 
or progress, continually moves forward by its own logic, by evolution, and traps man 
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within this movement. Man must, as outlined above, rail against this and try to 
overcome it. Berdiaev thus admits the existence of progress-like movement, but also 
delimits it. By offering a version of progress (historical time) in which progress is 
restricted by the ontological-temporal conditions in which it is located – i.e. by the 
fact that historical time does not move into eternity – he also neuters the theory of 
progress and subjects it to the overarching importance of the metaphysical and 
existential. Historical time – progress – is thereby bounded, awaiting a turn either to 
a cosmic or existential end, neither of which are located within it. 
  
Existential time 
 Existential time constitutes the crux of the philosophy of time Berdiaev 
reaches in 1939, and is amongst the most important of his philosophical innovations. 
Where cosmic and historical time represented the objectified, determined ontological 
conditions of existence, existential time represents the key existential, internal aspect 
of Berdiaev’s philosophy: it demonstrates man’s engagement in freedom and his 
access to the divine. Existential experience, to which existential time corresponds, is 
demonstrative of the deepest qualities of man’s being, as he comments in Opyt 
eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki: 
Для субъекта, как существующего, есть разное время, определяемое его 
состоянием, его направленностью. Наше существование погружено не только в 
действительность, реализовавшуюся в формах объектности, но и в 
действительность потенциальную, более глубокую и широкую. И потому только 
возможно изменение, творчество и новизна.
568
 
Existential time, therefore, corresponds to man’s engagement in potential, where 
things are not objectified. In the same way as eternity was, then, existential time is 
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also connected to creativity, newness, and change, i.e. existential and transcendent 
capacities and qualities. By attributing these same internal elements to existential 
time that had been attributed to eternity, the earlier claim that eternity had functioned 
to symbolise the internal dimension of time is vindicated. Now, however, this role is 
being taken over – or perhaps shared somewhat – by existential time.  
The representation of existential time is not quantifiable by any straightforward 
spatial metaphor, as it corresponds to the existential condition in which access to the 
metaphysical is possible. In this respect existential time is very different to the other 
types of time. Indeed, it does not appear to resemble time in any conventional sense:  
Время экзистенциальное лучше всего может быть символизировано не кругом и 
не линией, а точкой. Это как раз значит, что время экзистенциальное менее всего 
может быть символизировано пространственно. Это время внутреннее, 
неэкстериоризированное в пространстве, не объективированное. Это время мира 
субъективности, а не объективности. Оно не счисляется математически, не 
слагается и не разлагается. Бесконечность экзистенциального времени есть 
бесконечность качественная, а не количественная.
569
 
With this description Berdiaev tries to distinguish the untarnished, non-exterior 
condition of existential time: like Bergson’s durée, it is not subject to mathematical 
enumeration, expansion or division, so we can assume that it does not suffer from 
the disease of time, the division inherent in the broken past, present, and future 
separations. Similarly its ‘infinity’ is qualitative – by which we assume subjective, 
existential – rather than the numeric, quantitative infinity that exists in objectified time. 
Note, however, that he still chooses the word ‘infinity’ (beskonechnost’) rather than 
‘eternity’ (vechnost’) – demonstrating the fact that existential time is still ‘time’ rather 
than eternity. 
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Despite its difference to cosmic and historical time, Berdiaev establishes that 
singular events still take place within existential time, meaning that there exists at 
least a sense of temporal sequence within existential time. Although it certainly bears 
significant similarity, it is thus distinct from the wholly non-successive temporal 
manifold posited by Heidegger in the concept of ‘originary temporality’.570 Indeed, 
Berdiaev argues, choosing to adopt a secondary spatial representation, although 
events of existential time occur in the ‘vertical’ plane, they are still projected along 
the ‘horizontal’ plane of historical and cosmic time. Events that occur on this vertical 
plane can descend or ascend into the horizontal dimension, as is indicated below: 
 Все, что совершается в экзистенциальном времени, совершается по линии 
вертикальной, а не горизонтальной. По линии горизонтальной это лишь точка, в 
которой происходит прорыв из глубины на певерхность. События 
экзистенциального времени представляются линией по горизонтальной плоскости 
вследствие передвижения этих точек, связанных с прорывом из глубины. Это 
есть экстериоризирование того, что не подлежит экстериоризации, объективация 
невыразимого в объекте. Всякий творческий акт совершается во времени 
экзистенциальном и лишь проецируется во времени историческом.
571
 
Through this description of an intersection between the vertical (existential) and 
horizontal (historical/cosmic – i.e. objectified) planes of time, it becomes evident how 
Berdiaev is trying to construct a more coherent temporal framework in which events 
occurring in the metaphysical plane are able to penetrate the objectified, empirical 
plane. Things that take place in the non-objectified vertical, in the depths, coincide 
with the objectified dimensions and are then represented along the plane of the 
horizontal, according to the rules of the horizontal. This representation or projection 
within the horizontal is the objectification or exteriorisation of the event occurring in 
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the vertical.  
However, this brings up two separate issues which still, at basis, make full 
intersection between these dimensions more difficult to conceive. The first of these 
consists in the fact that existential time is not eternity, so it remains difficult to 
conceive of how the coming of eternity, the true end of time, could take place. 
Existential time is rather a temporal channel to eternity, not eternity itself. It is thus 
not truly identical with the upper echelons of the metaphysical. The second problem 
consists in the fact that even if existential time were truly unadulterated 
transcendence, the conditions of objectification, of the ‘horizontal’, as will be 
revealed further, appear so strong that they have the power to warp anything that 
passes over from the vertical, rendering it limited. This means that the existential can 
only remain existential if it stays in the existential: any passage into the object leads 
to fall. The first of these issues will be discussed in the following section, whereas 
the second is of much wider significance, concerning practical interrelation between 
objectified and non-objectified time through creativity. As this brings creativity to the 
forefront, it will be discussed in the later section dealing with the temporalised 
problem of creativity. 
 
Existential time and eternity 
 The most obvious issue surrounding existential time is that, whatever the 
epithets Berdiaev attaches to it, it is nevertheless not fully commensurate with 
eternity. He is explicit on this point: 
Неверно было бы сказать, что экзистенциальное время тождественно вечности, 
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но можно сказать, что оно причастно в некоторых мгновениях вечности.
572
 
Instead, then, existential time participates in eternity at certain moments. It is 
therefore by the logic of the above not a direct channel for eternity straight into the 
temporal. This distinction between existential time and eternity has been missed 
previously in some scholarship. Seaver, for example, one of the first wave of 
European scholars to deal with Berdiaev after his death, overlooks the difference 
when he argues:  
There are two ways out of [historical time]: one is when history turns to nature, and is 
submerged again in cosmic time. This is the term of naturalism. The other way is when 
history passes into the realm of the freedom of the spirit, and is submerged again into 
existential time.
573
 
The aim of eschatology, as has been made clear, is the submergence in eternity, not 
in existential time: the difference is significant, as existential time is a mode of human 
existence, a temporal formation of a human ontological condition – it is not an 
endpoint in the way eternity constitutes an endpoint. It is a channel through which 
‘moments of eternity’ be reached, rather than a destination. 
Although it would be inappropriate to labour this point too far, it is thus of note 
that Berdiaev wants to separate the concept of existential time from eternity, as, in 
this respect, he is actually – if only in this specific scenario – limiting man’s temporal 
reach with regard to God’s. Although with his ideas about freedom and creativity 
Berdiaev is at risk of putting man almost on a level to God, or at least beyond His 
reach, here Berdiaev relegates man’s temporal reach to just moments of eternity 
through existential time – God, we assume, just operates in eternity. If man is called 
to creatively reform the world, and bring about the eschatological end of time and 
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objectification through this, we are left to wonder how far this is possible. Man’s 
access to eternity is restricted by the nature of existential time, which only allows 
momentary participation: the challenge is thus to maximise contact with eternity 
through existential time. 
 
Conclusions: the three forms of time 
 Berdiaev’s extension of his engagement with time and eternity as external and 
internal forms of time is thus achieved through the supposition of cosmic, historical, 
and existential times. Representing different ontological modes of existence, these 
modes reveal how for Berdiaev existence itself, in all its various facets, is deeply 
connected to time. This temporal ‘system’ (although this word should, of course, be 
used with trepidation in Berdiaev’s case) creates a structure in which a movement 
from time to eternity appears more feasible, albeit momentarily. In this framework we 
see how cosmic time is conceived as the lowest of the forms and existential time as 
the highest. Between these historical time corresponds to a sort of middle ground: 
both cosmic and existential time intersect with the historical line of historical time, 
which itself can move towards either the cosmic or existential. Importantly, both 
historical and cosmic times are objectified, ‘horizontal’ forms of time, whilst 
existential time is non-objectified, ‘vertical’ and internal time. Dualism is thus still very 
clearly expressed, indeed, perhaps more clearly expressed, as now due there is a 
clearer opposition posited between ‘existential’ and ‘objectified’ forms of time. 
Eternity here is still an important concept and it is tied in an (albeit slightly ambiguous) 
relation with existential time.   
This thesis on the threefold nature of time has in the past been misunderstood. 
Seaver, for example, suggests: 
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Historical time is an interlude in cosmic time. It has a beginning and will come to an end. 
The occasion for its beginning was the Fall of Man; the Fall of Man was in fact the 
cause of historical time, and this is why it is still man’s curse and enemy.
574
 
Although he is correct that historical time is the product of the fall, it is overlooked 
that cosmic time, too, is ‘objectified time’, and thus is similarly a product of falling. 
Historical time is no ‘interlude’ in cosmic time, both were created together at the 
cosmogonic moment of objectification. Rather, they correspond to two different 
modes of objectified existence. A degree of parity between historical and cosmic 
time needs to be reasserted, as in this way one is able to understand with greater 
clarity how this interpretation of the three types of time is a part of a broader time-
eternity distinction.  
The notion of existential time is central to Berdiaev’s philosophy of time more 
broadly, as it is a better articulated description of what an ‘internal’ time should be. 
Eternity, although being described according to various internal and existential 
epithets (creative, free etc.) did not elaborate this in such clear terms. The positing of 
existential time also brought issues surrounding the practical intersection of internal 
and external forms of time to light, as it was described in some detail how moments 
of existential time are manifested along the horizontal plane of historical time. This, 
however, brings the question of creativity into specific relief, as it emerges that 
creativity is the practical means through which this intersection can take place. It will 
also be revealed how creativity is, quite paradoxically, also responsible for the 
movement of objectified time. This now demands further exploration.  
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The ‘temporalised’ problems: creativity, newness, freedom and evil 
 After looking in detail at the structure and concepts Berdiaev uses in his 
philosophy of time, and then at their development, we can now address the problems 
which become ‘temporalised’ in his thought. These are the problems which, whilst 
not solely related to time, function to put Berdiaev’s deeper assumptions about the 
nature of time into better focus. The most significant of these is creativity: it has been 
touched upon a number of times, and its importance to Berdiaev’s philosophical 
project is manifold. Related to creativity are the problems of newness and freedom, 
which similarly take on temporal significance. The question of the relationship 
between evil and time also appears, but is of lesser importance. These questions 
together show most clearly the paradox of time that has so far been indicated in 
Berdiaev’s philosophy, but not explored further. They reveal a contradictory scenario 
in which on the one hand mankind’s activity, through creative activity and the use of 
freedom, continually creates the flow of objectified time, whilst on the other hand 
they paradoxically describe how objectification and objectified time also determine 
the result of this activity, making it correspond to the flow of objectified time. 
 As already mentioned, it is of interest to the wider scope of this thesis that the 
above ‘temporalised’ problems are almost identical to the problems which Bulgakov 
‘historicised’. However, whilst creativity for Berdiaev is central, for Bulgakov the 
theme of evil is more central to the determinist aspects if his thought, as his 
dominant notion, namely that: 
Мир не может вовсе не удаться...
575
 
implies that evil, which runs counter to the meaning of the world, cannot win. To the 
contrary, Berdiaev, as an anti-determinist, will entertain conditions in which the world 
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can fail, in which evil can triumph. A bias towards different problems, and different 
organisations of the same problems, is thus evident. 
 
Creativity and time 
 
Overview 
 Creativity sits right at the centre of Berdiaev’s thought and is one of the most 
distinctive themes of his philosophy. Contemporaries and scholars have often 
highlighted the importance of this theme in Berdiaev. For example, Rozanov wrote of 
the ‘heroic character’ of all Berdiaev’s works, which ‘call to creativity’,576 and, much 
more recently, Bonetskaia has also stressed the importance of creativity to his 
thought: 
[Для Бердяева] Идея творчества в кругу идей одна из важнейших.
577
 
Creativity is a particularly rich element of Berdiaev’s thinking, and it influences his 
philosophy of time in a number of respects. 
The temporal dimensions of creativity stem first from the wider significance he 
attaches to creativity at a philosophical and theological level. Berdiaev holds that 
when God made man, He created man from nothing. However, in order to make man 
in His image, God invested in man the same capacity to create from nothing: 
 Творчество же есть прорыв из ничего, из небытия, из свободы в бытие и мир. 
Тайна творчества раскрывается в библейско-христианском мифе о творении 
мира Богом. Бог сотворил мир из ничего, т.е. свободно и из свободы. […] И 
человек, сотворенный Творцом и по его образу и подобию, есть также творец и 
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призван к творчеству.
578
 
God now awaits creativity from man. Free creativity is perceived to be man’s 
fulfilment of God’s desire, even His ‘will’: 
Свободное творчество есть ответ твари на великий призыв Творца. И творческий 
подвиг человека есть исполнение сокровенной воли Творца, который и требует 
свободного творческого акта.
579
 
This is not, however, to say that man must create in the way that God desired, as the 
basis of creativity is uncreated freedom, independent from God. Nevertheless, 
creativity takes on a very broad significance in the construction of Berdiaev’s 
philosophical project as a whole. 
 
Differences with Bulgakov on time-creativity  
Given the role of creativity in Bulgakov’s thought on history, there is also a 
significant point of crossover between Berdiaev and Bulgakov on the question of 
creativity and time/history. Indeed Berdiaev, perhaps not without bitterness, notes: 
С. Булгаков в своей книге “Свет невечерний” признал демонический, 
человекобожеский характер моей мысли о творчестве.
580
 
Berdiaev’s emphasis on the great importance and also independence of human 
creativity led Bulgakov, along with other Christian commentators, to feel that 
Berdiaev had promoted blasphemous thinking. Although both thinkers accept the 
real significance of creativity, and similarly the decisive role of creativity to the 
movement of history and time, in their separate conceptions of creativity the 
opposition between an existentialist ‘temporaliser’ and a more determinist 
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‘historiciser’ is distinct. In this opposition Bulgakov, the more determinist thinker, 
focuses on reining in creativity and Berdiaev, the existentialist, concentrates on 
exalting it. 
Bulgakov, it will be remembered, suggests that creativity is like a plan placed 
within man by God, a goal which man pursues in time:  
То, чтó тварь сознает в себе как задачу творчества, вложено в нее Богом, 
другими словами, задача эта предвечно разрешена, но она должна быть 
разрешена во времени.
581
  
This grows into the idea that God gives an historical plan to man which he fulfils 
through creativity, that is to say, creativity functions as a means for establishing a 
determined passage of events in history which man follows through his creative 
activity. Creativity is thus invested with no real independence: it is only a means for a 
preformed plan to be accomplished. Berdiaev, however, holds to the contrary that 
creativity is much more important. In his understanding, it is connected with freedom. 
Although the creative capacity is given by God, creative activity is, as well as being 
free from determination by the material world, also free from God: 
Я признавал, что творческие дары даны человеку Богом, но в творческие акты 
человека приходит элемент свободы, не детерминированный ни миром, ни 
Богом.
582
  
Creativity is therefore a fundamentally anti-deterministic element in Berdiaev’s 
philosophy. This question of creativity thus expresses in clear form some of the 
differences between these two philosophers. 
  
In Berdiaev’s thought key ideas are developed regarding time and creativity in 
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O naznachenii cheloveka (1931), and significant ideas are also introduced in Opyt 
eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki (1947) regarding the question of newness in time. A 
chronological shift is evident as the latter work also takes into account Berdiaev’s 
new ideas regarding the three types of time posited in 1939. Samopoznanie (1947), 
as it has been thus far, will also be a continued point of reference. A degree of 
relative chronological development is thus evident, but, as ever with Berdiaev, it is a 
little opaque.  
 
Objectified time and its relation to creativity 
 Moving on to the specific problem, the key question that needs to be explored 
concerns the relationship between objectified time – external time – and creativity. It 
is significant that in Berdiaev’s estimation creativity is a key internal capacity: it is not 
connected to objectified time, or to the condition of the impending, determined future: 
Для свободного творческого акта не существует детерминированого будущего и 
нет рока. В мгновение, когда совершается свободный творческий акт, нет мысли о 
будущем, нет мысли о неотвратимой смерти, о грядущей муке, есть выход из 
времени и из всякой детерминации.
583
 
Creativity is therefore closely aligned to the internal, existential world and to non-
objectified, internal time: 
Творчество движется не по плоскости в бесконечном времени, а по восходящей 
вверх линии, к вечности.
584
 
Although creativity belongs to the internal world, it will at some point have to engage 
with the external, objectified world. Analysis will proceed by first discussing how 
creativity is, through this engagement, described as responsible for creating the flow 
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of objectified time. This requires a detailed examination of the process of the creative 
act in itself. Differences to Bulgakov will be noted as they arise, as they are 
meaningful. 
 
The creative process: nothing to something 
 Creativity begins, Berdiaev informs us, with man’s reaching into the original, 
‘meonic’ freedom, into nothingness, and bringing forth something: 
Творчество есть переход небытия в бытие через акт свободы.
585
 
All creativity, Berdiaev therefore argues, is by its very nature creativity from nothing: 
Творчество по самому существу есть творчество из ничего. Ничто стало тем-то, 
небытие стало бытием.
586
 
Importantly, in any creative plan or conception man’s undetermined, original freedom 
comes into play:  
Во всяком творческом замысле есть элемент первичной свободы человека, ничем 
не детерминированной, бездонной, свободы не от Бога идущей, а к Богу 
идущей.
587
 
Therefore, although it is implied that this freedom is ‘moving towards God’, the 
assertion that the creative idea or design does not come just from God is more 
important: it means mankind’s creativity is not directed by God. 
This establishes a clear difference to Bulgakov: Bulgakov suggested that 
divine creativity was from nothing, but human creativity was from the divine basis, 
from the divine something: 
Тварное творчество, которое является актуальным выражением тварной свободы, 
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есть не творчество из ничего, но творчество в ничто из божественного 
что.
588
  
Berdiaev is clear: a root element of creative activity is man’s access to nothingness, 
that which is free from everything, even God. Bulgakov is equally clear: man, 
although creating ‘into nothingness’ does this from divine substance: man does not 
create from nothing in the way Berdiaev suggests. 
 
The created product: newness 
 The root of creativity lies in nothing. The product, however, is something. 
Indeed, creativity is an activity that is inherently goal-orientated: it brings forth a 
creative product. In Berdiaev’s conception, the defining characteristic of things that 
have been created is the fact that they did not exist beforehand. This means that in 
the creative process something wholly new, something that never existed within the 
world, is brought forth: 
Творчество есть всегда прирост, прибавление, создание нового, небывшего в 
мире.
589
 
Newness, therefore, is the fundamental characteristic of things that are the product 
of creativity.  
 Conversely, Bulgakov argued that such newness from human creativity was 
not possible: 
 Человеческое творчество не содержит поэтому в себе ничего метафизически 
нового, оно лишь воспроизводит и воссоздает из имеющихся, созданных уже 
элементов...
590
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A difference between the two therefore persists: Berdiaev recognised man’s ability to 
create newness, Bulgakov did not. 
 
The creative motion: newness-change-time 
 The emergence of newness creates change: there is now a new situation in 
which something has come to exist through the creative process. This suggestion 
that creativity creates change is crucial, as it is from here that change becomes 
responsible for ‘movement’, and, by means of this, for objectified time, as Berdiaev 
comments in Ia i mir obʺektov (1934): 
В действительности не изменение есть продукт времени, а время есть продукт 
изменения. Время есть потому, что активность, творчество, переход от небытия к 
бытию, но эта активность и творчество разорванные, не целостные, не в 
вечности.
591
 
The assertion, then, that creativity creates objectified time because it creates 
movement and change is central. In the above formulation the result – time – is 
broken, because the creative activity which is responsible for it is itself somehow 
broken. Therefore creativity creates objectified time, not existential or internal time. 
The idea that creativity gives birth to objectified time is repeated once it has 
been made. In Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki, the formula is reasserted in an 
alternative wording. Here it is argued that newness and coterminous ‘movement’ are 
responsible for the existence of objectified time: 
Но время не есть форма, в которую вкладывается мировой процесс и которая и 
сообщает миру движение. Время есть потому, что есть движение и новизна.
592
  
This recalls the Absolutism-Relativism debate discussed in the introduction to this 
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thesis: according to the above, then, Berdiaev would fall in the relativistic camp – 
time is not absolute, but is instead dependent on events and change. The solution, 
then, that objectified time is the result of creativity is advanced quite explicitly: it is 
posited as contingent upon newness, change, and motion, the results of creativity. 
Without creativity, without change or movement there would be no objectified time.  
 Strikingly, Bulgakov comes to the same broader conclusion about the time-
creativity relation, albeit by the almost opposite philosophical chain of argument. He 
argues: 
Возможность истории, исторических процессов, а в том числе хозяйства (и 
знания), основана на этой способности к новому творчеству, идущему дальше 
простого воспроизведения или повторения старого...
593
  
According to both philosophers, then, objectified time, or time-as-history for Bulgakov, 
are only possible due to creative activity and its resultant newness. Difference only 
arises, as has already been suggested, due to their differing perceptions of how this 
creative activity takes place.  
 
Activity or being 
 It is relevant to note here that creative ‘activity’ is now being used to connect 
time and man in the same way as ‘being’ was used to connect them earlier. With the 
different ‘types’ of time, Berdiaev had argued that time was dependent on the mode 
of being the person was engaged with. Creativity, though, is activity: it requires 
man’s activity. In this way it is something different to being. However, having said 
this, time appears no less dependent on activity here than it did on being earlier. 
Berdiaev is therefore further complicating his description of the relationship between 
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man and time. As well as bearing some innate ontological connection to man’s mode 
of being, it also has a more active connection in which man’s activity, the way he 
directs his creative energy, determines time. This, perhaps, reflects more broadly on 
Berdiaev’s understanding of man’s various modes of being – they are the result, one 
way or another, of some effort or activity on the part of man. This would suggest that 
man lives in the historical, cosmic, or existential domain as a result of the orientation 
and use of his creative freedom. 
 
 Despite beginning outside objectified time, then, creativity is, according to the 
above, responsible for establishing the movement of objectified time. Although 
Berdiaev does not explicitly word it this way himself, in our analysis it is clear that 
this is so. Creativity is thus simultaneously connected very closely to both external 
and internal forms of time.  
 
The other side of the paradox: the independent role of objectified time 
As well as suggesting that the source of objectified time is in creativity, an 
alternative idea also emerges. This suggests that the force of objectification and 
objectified time demands that creativity corresponds to its laws. In this way creativity 
would not be responsible for the movement of time, but, rather, creativity would have 
to obey the laws of objectified time, meaning that time would appear to be flowing 
and working independently of creative activity.  
As Berdiaev notes, despite its eschatological horizon (dealt with later), the 
creative act cannot just remain as an idea, it must incarnate something and thereby 
take on form: 
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Всякий творческий акт, моральный, социальный, художественный, 
познавательный есть акт наступления конца мира, взлет в иной, новый план 
существования. Но творящий должен воплощать для мира и для людей свои 
образы иного, свой экстаз, свой огонь, свой трансцензус, свое приобщение к иной 
жизни. И он принужден это делать по законам этого мира.
594
  
When incarnating his ideas, then, the creator must correspond, work according to 
the laws of the external world, which include the laws of objectified time. Rather than 
creative activity establishing the flow of objectified time, then, it now appears that 
objectification, existing independently from the internal, creative domain, opposes 
and determines the results of creative activity. It therefore appears that as soon as 
the internal ‘ecstasy’, ‘flame’, or ‘transcendence’ touches the external domain they 
are immediately forced into line with the rules of the external. The laws of the 
external world appear insurmountable, and the sense of a particularly impassable 
dualism ensues.  
 
The fallen nature of the creative act 
 A central tenet of Berdiaev’s thought about creativity thus consists in his belief 
that all the products of creativity are fallen. By this he means that the end result of 
creativity never delivers the creative ‘flight’ or transcendence present in the original 
creative intention. This takes on specific temporal consequences: although the 
creative act takes place (or perhaps begins) outside time, creative products appear 
within time. Creative activity in the final analysis thus fails to transcend time: 
Творческий акт происходит вне времени. Во времени лишь продукты творчества, 
лишь объективизация. Продукты творчества не могут удовлетворять творца.
595
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Fall occurs due to the necessity for the creator to deal with the objectified world. The 
products of creative acts consequently appear in time: rather than creating the 
movement of time, they instead are described as falling into it and, it is implied, as 
obeying its rules. Even more significantly, this interaction is described in terms of the 
‘resistance’ creativity meets from objectification:  
Первичный творческий акт есть взлет вверх, к иному миру. Но он встречает 
затруднение, сопротивление в материи этого мира, в ее бесформленности, 
массивности, тяжести, в дурной бесконечности, окружающей со всех сторон 
творца.
596
 
It should be noted that the notion of ‘bad infinity’ (originally a Hegelian idea) is in fact 
here also a description of objectified time. The notion that ‘resistance’ and ‘difficulty’ 
is met upon contact with the objectified world is particularly pertinent: it suggests that 
objectification, and objectified time as a part of objectification, are working against 
the internal flight of the creative impulse. Therefore creative products must ‘settle in 
(objectified) time’, despite the original inspiration of the creative impulse: 
Продукты творческого акта оседают во времени. Но сам творческий акт, 
творческий взлет приобщается к вечности.
597
  
The results of creative acts, this suggests, will therefore correspond to the objectified 
time in which they settle. 
It is a further point of note that in Berdiaev’s thinking contact with the 
objectified dimension cannot be avoided: as creativity is orientated towards the world, 
as it is triggered by a desire to change the world, it cannot just remain in the internal 
and satisfy itself there. It needs to issue outwards, the creator demands departure 
from himself: 
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Но во всяком случае творящий не может остаться в себе, он должен выйти из 
себя. Этот выход обычно называют воплощением, которому придают 
объективный характер по преимуществу.
598
 
This issuing out of itself, this embodiment of the creative impulse is, however, the 
moment of failure. From a Hegelian perspective, Berdiaev accepts both sides of an 
opposition – objectified and internal – but is not willing to allow their sublimation and 
resolution. The objectified world is thus always encountered when a creative act 
takes place: 
Творческий акт человека нуждается в материи, он не может обойтись без 
мировой реальности, он совершается не в пустоте, не в безвоздушном 
пространстве.
599
 
Creative activity cannot entirely work on the ‘from nothing’ principle, as it cannot exist 
without the reality of the material world. Curiously, then, it is creativity’s need to 
incarnate itself in an object, to create something, that proves to be the cause of its 
downfall. Here, perhaps, Bulgakov would be able to suggest a Christological solution 
to the problem which Berdiaev does not reach: Bulgakov would suggest that Christ 
had demonstrated the perfectibility of matter, the assuaging of its previous sinful 
condition, making possible its transfiguration into something holding divine value. 
This would offer a way out, making the possibility of a perfect creative product real, 
but Berdiaev does not describe it as an option.  
 From this second perspective, then, objectified time conditions the results of 
the creative act, rather than simply existing as a consequence of them. This presents 
a similarity to the Absolutist position in the Absolute-Relative debate: objectified time 
appears dominant, untouched by events but instead forcing events to correspond to 
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its inexorable flow. There is thus a clear, well formulated paradox: how can 
objectified time be the product of creative activity whilst at the same time being 
responsible for determining the product of this activity? Expressed in terms of the 
broader paradox we have been exploring prior to this section, the question of 
creativity demonstrates how external time is on the one hand secondary to internal 
time, it is at once a product of this internal time and flows from it, but, on the other 
hand, is paradoxically completely opposed to this internal time, and is described in 
strong enough terms to be able to condition this internal time and subject it to its 
laws. 
 
 The eschatological character of creativity 
 The question of the eschatological character of creative activity can now be 
discussed, as it throws further light on the complex relationship between time and 
creativity. Creativity, itself initially linked to internal time, has a paradoxical 
connection to objectified time: this has been established. However, according to its 
eschatological character, creativity is also portrayed as aiming beyond objectified 
time – it is presented as potentially transcendent to it, a channel into non-objectified 
time. It is therefore connected to the end and the final passage to the higher 
dimension. Berdiaev is quite explicit on this point: 
И творчество несет в себе эсхатологический элемент. Оно есть конец этого мира, 
начало нового мира.
600
 
Through creativity Berdiaev invests great responsibility in man: he is to create – and 
thereby end – the world alongside God. Calian thus notes accurately the significance 
of eschatology to Berdiaev’s thought on creativity:  
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The creative act points to an eschatological context, to an End dimension not yet 
realised, where it will be successfully completed and realised. Hence the significance of 
eschatology to Berdyaev’s notion of creativity.
601
 
The possibility, however, of this ‘successfully completed’ creative act is, as 
discussion has brought to light, quite problematic – perhaps impossible. 
Creative acts are eschatological because they are directed towards the end, 
which entails escape from objectification. They aim beyond specifically objectified 
time where the constant pressure of the future causes fear and harm: 
И вот задача этики творчества заключается в том, чтобы перспективу жизни 
сделать независимой от рокового хода времени, от будущего, которое вызывает в 
нас ужас и мучит нас. Творческий акт есть выход из времени, он совершается в 
царстве свободы, а не в царстве необходимости.
602
  
Creativity is thus geared towards escaping the rule of this time, and will be 
completed in freedom where time does not rule. This, therefore, is the key 
eschatological horizon of creativity: it is aimed outside objectified time. 
Looking at the first aspect of the paradox discussed above, the question 
arises as to how creativity on the one hand seems to create objectified time and on 
the other is directed outside it. If time – in whatever form – is the product of creativity, 
then in trying to escape time, is creativity not attempting to escape its own products? 
It could be suggested that the creative eschatological impetus is driven towards 
escaping the conditions in which creativity is fallen, escaping the conditions in which 
creative activity continues to create time. However, this does not remove the 
situation in which creative activity is in conflict with its own product: although it tries 
to escape objectified time, it continues to create this same time. If we consider the 
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second half of the paradox, the solution would also be similarly problematic: if 
objectified time were totally independent from internal time and internal creativity, 
then what hope would there be for a creative eschatological overcoming of 
objectified time, if such objectified time always changes the products of creativity, 
and makes them objectified? Moreover, what need would there even be to overcome 
such time if it were independent?    
Berdiaev perhaps understands this, and often discusses the ‘dual nature’ of 
time: 
И вот перед нами раскрывается двойственная природа времени. Время есть и 
источник надежды, и источник ужаса и муки. Обaяние будущего связано с тем, 
что будущее может быть изменено и в какой-то степени зависит от нас.603 
Although we continue to hope that we can change the future (presumably through 
creativity), the existence of the future in itself is what needs to be changed. The only 
exit from this strange condition appears to be the complete avoidance of the 
objectified realm of time. If time were removed, if creativity did not have to engage in 
objectified time then perhaps it is conceivable that some existence outside time in 
the metaphysical dimension would be possible:  
И если бы вся жизнь человеческая могла превратиться в сплошной творческий 
акт, то времени больше не будет, не будет и будущего, как части времени.
604
 
However, Berdiaev does not suggest that he wants to disregard the objectified world 
entirely: he does not overlook the fact that man has an empirical life or the fact that 
creativity has a product, not just a direction. Solution does not therefore lie in the 
veneration of pure potential, however attractive Berdiaev may sometimes find this 
idea.  
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The impetus for eschatological creativity 
There is also the question of the specific impetus for eschatologically-
orientated creativity, as this complicates the relationship between internal creativity 
and the external world further. Here a distinction needs to be drawn between 
impetus and source: impetus describes the trigger for a given creative action 
whereas source relates to the basis which makes creativity possible, and where the 
creative capacity issues from. Although we know that the source of creativity is 
internal, it has not yet been made sufficiently clear what it is that specifically triggers 
a creative action. One would assume that since creativity’s source is internal, and 
since creativity is at first a free, internal desire, its impetus would also be somehow 
internal. However, Berdiaev actually grounds the eschatological impetus of creative 
activity back in the external dimension. He holds that the fulfilment of the 
eschatological aim does not consist in immediate transcendence of the world, but 
rather the world’s transfiguration: 
Я же исповедую активно-творческий эсхатологизм, который призывает к 
преображению мира.
605
  
Man is dissatisfied with the world and therefore desires to change it. The impetus for 
creative eschatology thus lies in a negative reflection on the objectified world. Man 
sees the condition of the world and desires its end: 
Творчество в своем первоисточнике связано с недовольством этим миром, оно 
есть конец этого мира, хочет конца этого мира в своем первоначальном порыве и 
есть начало иного мира. Поэтому творчество эсхатологично.
606
 
A key element of the eschatological character of creativity therefore is a special 
human engagement with the world. This desire to change the external world, 
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however, always seems to lead to the downfall of the creative impulse: as soon as it 
is subjected to the conditions of objectification, fall inexorably ensues. This 
demonstrates, in a circular way, how creative eschatology is intertwined with the 
external world in both its product and impetus: the impetus of the creative act derives 
from a response to the creative product, which then leads to the creation of another, 
similar product, which leads to the same reaction, and so the process seems to go 
on ad infinitum.  
 
Eschatological creativity as unstable 
 One of the even more opaque, but nonetheless interesting, comments that 
Berdiaev makes concerns his understanding of the connection between the 
instability of being and creativity: 
Для философии творчества основным является сознание, что человек не 
находится в законченной и стабилизированной системе бытия, и только потому 
возможен и понятен творческий акт человека.
607
  
The world condition, as Berdiaev understands it, is not stabilised, and it is this lack of 
stability that makes the creative act both cognisable and possible. This immediately 
suggests the importance of the notion of temporality as crisis: for Berdiaev, the 
unstable, or, perhaps, ‘crisis’ state of the world and time is what makes the 
‘philosophy of creativity’ – i.e. a defining aspect of his broader philosophy – 
understandable. What is particularly noticeable is how he does not offer any 
discussion of what a transfigured, or completed, resolved or ‘stabilised’ world might 
look like: crisis and instability, therefore, penetrate deep into his worldview, and, 
despite his focus on eschatology, he does not prophesy an end of this condition.  
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Does objectified time overcome creativity? 
A broader question emerges: is Berdiaev’s philosophy of creativity, by merit of 
the power attributed to objectified time and the objectified world, fundamentally 
pessimistic? Should we, rather than talking of Calian’s ‘Philosophy of Hope’, instead 
be discussing the opposite? There is much that could be put forward to support this 
idea, although it is misleading when taken too far: to do so would detract from the 
point that his philosophy is dualistic and paradoxical – neither side appears to 
overcome the other. However, there is still an element of pessimism related to 
creativity: Berdiaev describes a situation in which the conditions of the objectified 
world, amongst them time, bring down creativity and doom it to failure. He therefore 
identifies the continual failures of creative activity, due to the fact that it never 
succeeds in realising its intention: 
Творческий акт в своей первоначальной чистоте направлен на новую жизнь, 
новое бытие, новое небо и новую землю, на преображение мира. Но в условиях 
падшего мира он отяжелевает, притягивается вниз, подчиняется необходимому 
заказу, он создает не новую жизнь, а культурные продукты большего или 
меньшего совершенства.
608
 
Looking at the relationship between time and creativity, what does this say about the 
possibility of escape from objectified time? As we know, the creative product is 
temporal, not eternal: the result is not transcendence. Although it is not a total failure, 
as products are produced, something does issue from the creative flight – one could 
speculate that the total, abject failure of creative activity would be the failure to 
produce anything whatsoever – however, these are only pale reflections of the 
original creative flame. This situation makes the conceptualisation of a successful 
eschatological end distinctly problematic. 
                                            
608
 Ibid., p. 248. 
300 
 
Berdiaev is not unaware of the problem, although in the main only disregards 
such criticism: 
Но хотелось бы предотвратить ложное понимание моей мысли. Я совсем не 
отрицаю смысла продуктов творчества в этом мире. Это есть путь человека, 
человек должен пройти через творчество культуры и цивилизации. Но это есть 
творчество символическое, дающее лишь знаки реального преображения. 
Реалистическое творчество было бы преображением мира, концом этого мира, 
возникновением нового неба и новой земли.
609
  
Instead, however, he falls back on a symbolist aesthetic, claiming that we see only 
‘signs’ of real transfiguration, thereby demonstrating that he remains a Silver Age 
thinker, in this sense, to the end. Indeed, he also remains caught up in the 
consequences of the paradox that seems to encroach into all areas of his work. He 
is at a halfway house, as it were, admitting the partial intersection of the domains of 
time and eternity – there are ‘signs’ of the latter existing in the former – but is unable 
to describe how the full transfer from one to the other can successfully take place. 
 
Tragedy 
 The time-creativity-objectification relation is thus valuable in that it describes 
the possibility of eternity and internal time interacting with objectified time. Berdiaev 
understands the difficulties that arise from his philosophy, and, therefore, when 
discussing the relationship between objectified time, eternity and creativity he is 
inclined to use the term ‘tragedy’ to describe their interrelation. He argues: 
Все продукты творчества могут быть временны и тленны, но сам творческий 
огонь есть огонь вечности, в котором должно было бы сгореть все временное. В 
этом трагедия творчества. Он хочет вечности и вечного, а создает временное, 
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создает культуру во времени, в истории.
610
 
However, he still admits that the attempt to reach the eternal fails: despite desiring 
the eternal, creativity creates only the temporal. This represents the fall of the 
original creative movement into the objective world. It is hard to see exactly how 
Berdiaev expects to move beyond this problem that, in terms of its aim of 
transcending objectified time, creativity is set a seemingly Sisyphean task: despite 
continuing labour, it does not really achieve anything.  
The reference to ‘signs’ of the eternal is not the only such instance of this type 
of thinking, and elsewhere, for example, he writes about the glimmering of the 
noumenon in the phenomenon: 
Творчество нуменально по своему первоисточнику, но оно обнаруживает себя в 
мире феноменальном. Продукт творчества принадлежит к феноменам, но в них 
просвечивает и нуменальное, в них есть вечное.
611
 
However, this should be contrasted with the more frequent reflections he makes on 
the tragic failures of creative activity, on the conspicuous lack of full realisation. 
Consider, for example: 
 Творческое горение, творческий взлет всегда направлены на создание новой 
жизни, нового бытия, но в результате получаются охлажденные продукты 
культуры, культурные ценности, книги, картины, учреждения, добрые дела.
612
 
Творческий акт устремлен к бесконечному, форма же творческого продукта 
всегда кончена.
613
  
Но я изначально сознал глубокую трагедию человеческого творчества и его 
роковую неудачу в условиях мира.
614
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These quotations, taken from across the three texts we have been looking at, are 
sufficiently expressive to demonstrate that Berdiaev primarily sees the tragedy of 
creativity in the object world. Given what has been highlighted by the discussion of 
the relationship between internal and external time in their connection through 
creativity, this is to be expected: the paradox Berdiaev describes thus appears 
unsolvable. 
 
Preliminary conclusions: creativity and time  
 Exploration of the issue of creativity therefore clarifies further some of the 
general issues that surround the question of time in Berdiaev’s work. In particular it 
highlights with greater accuracy the paradox that exists in the interrelation between 
non-objectified, internal time and objectified, external time: it demonstrates that a 
connection between the two exists, but, in view of their strong opposition can only be 
conceived paradoxically. Both are described in terms of their potential to surmount 
the other: the flow of internal time, through creativity, in one instance seems to 
create the somehow corresponding flow of external time, and in another this external 
flow of time appears to condition the product of this creative process. The elucidating 
role of creativity here is similar to the role it played in Bulgakov’s thought, as, by 
looking at the problem of creativity and history in the latter’s philosophy, the 
multifaceted nature of the determinist assumptions he held became more evident. 
Clearly, for both thinkers, creativity plays an important role in the structuring of 
thought about time. 
 In terms of the broader goals of Berdiaev’s thinking, this paradox brings with it 
certain difficulties. By describing the failure of the creative act, he points towards the 
apparent impossibility of both the full movement of non-objectified time into 
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objectified time (the opening stage of the creative process) and also the apparent 
impossibility of the full contrary movement (the eschatological horizon of creativity). 
All he describes is the potential for ‘signs’ or indications – that is, imperfect 
reflections. The fleeting moment of connection between internal and external does 
not provide a satisfactory result either way. Although Berdiaev might, in line with his 
broader ideas surrounding the importance of the ‘moment’, argue that in this context 
man should seek to ‘exit into the moment’ and depart this way, this does not seem to 
be a tangible alternative due to the impossibility of full crossover. As creativity is so 
central to his philosophy, it begins to appear that man is trapped within Berdiaev’s 
paradox: if creativity does not open a way out of objectified time, how is man to 
escape? 
 
Freedom and time 
 The next of the problems related to time that will be considered is that of 
freedom. Berdiaev has been considered by many the ‘philosopher of freedom’, and 
he accepted willingly this grand title: 
Меня называют философом свободы [...] И я, действительно, превыше всего 
возлюбил свободу. Я изошел от свободы, она моя родительница. Свобода для 
меня первичное бытие.
615
 
It was perhaps Berdiaev’s insistence on the pervasive importance of freedom that 
won him the admiration of such a variety of readers – many found the radical 
assertion of freedom both tempting and engaging. As Lowrie, in unapologetically 
eulogistic terms, puts it: 
If Berdyaev was a knight, he was a rebel knight, and his insistence on his own freedom 
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was more than a passive refusal to accept authority or discipline; it usually meant an 
attack upon “whatever powers there be.”
616
 
Beyond the more hagiographic engagements with Berdiaev, there is more serious 
work on Berdiaev’s philosophy of freedom. Recently Gęścińska and Lepez captured 
the scope of Berdiaev’s thought on freedom, on how it tied in with his (then very 
popular) critique of communism, and thereby made him an increasingly well-known 
figure: 
Freedom is indeed the recurrent theme of Berdjaev’s thought. Berdjaev is a great 
advocate of freedom, true freedom, which is especially reflected in (a) his rejection of 
the concept of negative liberty, (b) his emphasis on the importance of autonomy for, or 
the internal foundation of, morality, (c) his critique of communism and totalitarianism 
that deprive man of his freedom, and (d) his critique of the ‘‘dictate of the masses’’ in 
democracy.
617
 
As Gęścińska and Lepez elaborate, Berdiaev’s espousal of freedom is thus more 
complex than just a rebellious rejection of political, social and religious orthodoxy, it 
also had a significant intellectual dimension and was built into the foundations of his 
philosophy. 
 The relationship between freedom and time brings up some significant issues. 
However, it is does not feature as dominantly as the time-creativity relation, and so 
will be dealt with more briefly. Indeed, rather, the idea of freedom was integrated into 
work on creativity – many of the issues which arise with freedom have thus already 
been addressed. There are also, however, some independent issues: freedom plays 
an important non-determinist role in Berdiaev’s philosophy of time, as it works 
against linear, progress-like movement. It also brings up the question of the 
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relationship between nonbeing and time, and of God’s potential for control over 
objectified time. It should, however, be noted that Berdiaev rarely directly connects 
freedom and time. In view of this, then, we are exploring the consequences his 
philosophy of freedom brings for his philosophy of time. 
 
Freedom and creativity 
 As was established previously, creativity is central to the possibility of time: it, 
from a certain perspective, allows time to move by creating newness. Although we 
do not want to repeat these conclusions with the word ‘freedom’ in the place of 
‘creativity’, there can still be an analogous assertion that if creativity makes time 
possible, then likewise freedom makes time possible, because creativity is not 
possible without freedom. Indeed, in a rephrasing of the theological idea that God 
awaits creativity from man, in Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (1927-8) Berdiaev arrives 
at the formulation: 
Бог ждет от меня акта свободы, свободного творчества.
618
 
He is able to do this due to the fact that genuine creativity presupposes man’s 
participation in genuine, other-worldly freedom, as he writes in his seminal Smysl 
tvorchestva (1916): 
 Творчество неотрывно от свободы. Лишь свободный творит. Из необходимости 
рождается лишь эволюция; творчество рождается из свободы. Когда мы говорим 
на нашем несовершенном человеческом языке о творчестве из ничего, то мы 
говорим о творчестве из свободы.
619
 
Considering earlier conclusions, we can suggest then that if objectified time is 
created by newness then this creation is likewise dependent on the existence of 
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freedom. Similarly, if creativity is conversely subjected to objectified time, then 
freedom is in the same way subjected to objectified time. As before, the relationship 
between time and freedom will posit the same paradox: is freedom responsible for 
the existence of objectified, external time, or is it subjected to external time? Again, 
the paradoxical solution can be suggested that both statements are true. 
 
Time and nonbeing 
 If time moves due to freedom, time also exists due to the existence of 
nothingness or nonbeing (as with Bulgakov the distinction is a little indistinct). When 
discussing the initial, uncreated freedom man draws on to create, Berdiaev 
establishes a close similarity between freedom and nonbeing: 
В недрах потенции, которая не есть бытие, и которую мы апофатически 
принуждены называть небытием, заложена та первичная, до-бытийственная 
свобода, без которой не может быть творчества нового, небывшего.
620
 
Although in the above it seems that pre-ontological freedom ‘lies’ in nonbeing, 
suggesting a difference between the two, there is in fact an emergent blurring of the 
division between freedom and nonbeing. Indeed Berdiaev continues in a way that 
suggests an identity between them: 
Можно апофатически сказать, что нумен есть небытие, потому что нумен есть 
свобода. Бытие же есть детерминация, бытие не есть свобода.
621
 
Freedom and nonbeing, if they are not coterminous, become very closely related. 
Understanding the significance of nonbeing to creativity and consequently its role in 
the development of the world, Berdiaev is led the somewhat Hegelian proclamation 
that the ‘dialectic of world development’ is possible only due the existence of 
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nonbeing: 
Становление, диалектика мирового развития возможны лишь потому, что есть 
небытие. Если допустить лишь бытие, то накакого развития не будет. Новизна в 
становлении возникает из недр небытия.
622
 
In such a way, then, when Berdiaev claims that objectified time depends on creativity, 
he is also suggesting that it depends on freedom and nonbeing. These things, 
although all engaging in the same process, are not identical: creativity relates more 
to activity; freedom and nonbeing to being. They are all requisite, however, for the 
movement of time. This therefore corresponds to the point made earlier that 
objectified time relates both to human activity and human modes of being. 
Berdiaev’s perspective on nonbeing also suggests the positive potential of 
nonbeing, as it is not constrained or determined and is drawn upon in creative 
activity. This is very different to Bulgakov, who perceived negative value in nonbeing, 
and who also argued that man did not have access to nonbeing. Again, then, the 
potentially chaotic nonbeing is restricted in Bulgakov’s thinking where it is given freer 
rein in Berdiaev’s. Given the significance of nonbeing to the temporal processes of 
both philosophers, it becomes ever clearer how Berdiaev’s conception of time was 
fundamentally broader, freer and less determined than Bulgakov’s.  
 
Preliminary conclusions: freedom and time 
 Berdiaev’s thinking about freedom, although not always conspicuous in its 
connection with thinking about time, therefore set conditions that influenced his 
temporal philosophy. The first of these was that the existence of freedom essentially 
allowed objectified time to occur due to the importance of freedom in the creative 
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process. Similarly freedom, in its close connection with nonbeing, establishes a tie 
between objectified time and nonbeing, as the existence of nonbeing also makes 
creativity possible. More deeply, perhaps, Berdiaev’s work on freedom demonstrates 
a broader tendency in his philosophy. It reveals a type of thinking inclined towards 
deep, binary divisions between created-uncreated, free-unfree, and internal-external. 
These divisions also manifested themselves the strong distinction being drawn 
between non-objectified time and objectified time. Freedom should thus be viewed 
from this perspective, and be understood to relate to the ‘internal’ rather than the 
‘external’: as a part of the former, it will sit in paradoxical connection with the latter. In 
terms of a comparison with Bulgakov, much that was said about creativity can apply 
here. Bulgakov puts less impetus on freedom as he does not advocate primordial 
freedom: his view of the historical process is determined and therefore freedom fits 
in as a part of that determinism. Berdiaev, however, through his interpretation of 
freedom aims to make time less determined. Although there has been less to say 
about freedom than about creativity in Berdiaev’s philosophy of time it can still be 
suggested that freedom, as a crucial element in creativity, is of more profound 
importance to Berdiaev’s philosophy that it was for Bulgakov’s. Instead, Bulgakov’s 
restriction of freedom became more important. 
 
Evil and time 
 The final problem that takes on temporal significance for Berdiaev is that of 
evil. Much of the discussion above has indirectly touched upon the problem of evil, 
chiefly due to the possibility that for Berdiaev objectified time could be, or represent, 
evil: Original Sin created objectification, thus objectified time could be, or could be 
evidence of, evil. In Berdiaev’s reckoning the possibility of evil lies in the potential of 
genuine freedom: freedom, which is also nothing, is external to God’s influence and 
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is compelled neither towards good nor evil. Such potential, connected to nonbeing, 
thus contains the possibility for evil: 
Ибо всякое восстание против Бога есть возврат к небытию, принявшему форму 
ложного фантасмагорического бытия, победа ничто над божественным светом.  И 
тогда только ничто, которое не есть зло, превращается в зло.
623
 
Nothing, whilst not being evil, has the potential to become evil, just in the way it has 
the potential to be good: it is independent from coercion. Indeed, the absence of the 
freedom to evil, and to protest against God, the absence of the possibility to turn the 
nichto into evil would be deterministic, which would go against the principle of 
freedom that is present throughout Berdiaev’s philosophy:  
Человек, лишенный свободы зла, был бы автоматом добра.
624
 
The possibility of evil, as will be discussed in greater depth in section 4, allows for a 
final eschatological turn towards cosmic rather than existential time, a ‘bad end’ to 
the historical process. This is a question related to the problem of history. However, 
generally speaking, Berdiaev’s sense of theodicy is more straightforward and also 
less dominant than Bulgakov’s, meaning that the significance of objectified time’s 
potential ‘evil’ character is not so significant. It still, however, merits discussion. 
 
Is objectified time evil? 
 The principal question regarding evil and objectified time is thus the character 
of this form of time in Berdiaev’s reckoning. Establishing the more evil character of 
objectified time helps identify the dualistic character of Berdiaev’s temporal 
philosophy more broadly: ‘evil’ objectified time could potentially be set against ‘good’, 
non-objectified time. To a certain extent this potential good-evil dualism is picked up 
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upon by Berdiaev himself, who notes in Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki:  
Не только для опознания и объяснения факта существования зла, но для 
возможности самого существования мира и человека, необходимо допустить 
дуалистический момент.
625
 
However, as ever with Berdiaev, this clear opposition, whilst at some points 
detectable, is also made more complex by the paradox which underpins his thought 
more generally. He therefore continues to write:  
Но этот дуалистический момент нужно мыслить диалектически, его нельзя 
превратить в дуалистическую онтологию, которая столь же ошибочно, как и 
онтология монистическая.
626
 
Although objectified time may well to a certain extent be ‘evil’, it would also be 
caught up in a complex dialectical relationship in which evil (objectified time) would 
pass into good (non-objectified time) and good back into evil. Paradoxically, then, 
non-objectified time should have some sort of connection to ‘good’, internal time.  
Before this is explored further, however, there needs to be some mention of 
Berdiaev’s conception of the nature of evil. He makes a direct association between 
the object and evil, as is explained in O rabstve i svobode cheloveka (1939): 
Объект всегда злой, добрым может быть лишь субъект.
627
   
Indeed, this sort of deeply negative reflection on the objectified world has prevailed 
throughout Berdiaev’s work. He notes in Smysl tvorchestva (1916): 
Дух человеческий – в плену. Плен этот я называю «миром», мировой данностью, 
необходимостью.
628
 
A salient characteristic of evil is therefore is object quality, and this is accompanied 
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by various deterministic and necessitating attributes. One would assume, therefore, 
that anything of an ‘objectified’ character would correspond to such an evil character. 
 Looking at Berdiaev’s description of objectified time, he frequently ascribes to 
it a deterministic, coercive and therefore potentially evil character, but also 
conversely he also regularly tries to break this principle of the necessity of objectified 
time, tries to break it down and root it back within the internal. Hence the old 
quandary: it is unlikely that it will ever be described as purely ‘evil’, due to the 
paradox that describes its connection with the interior world. On the one hand 
objectified time is a disease, it is fallen from eternity, it is the temporal framework 
externally imposed upon man in which death is unavoidable and in which the human 
organism breaks apart, whilst on the other hand time is the almost the tool of man, it 
adopts his modes of experience, he controls it, and it is therefore connected to his 
interior:  
Время есть падшесть в судьбе мира. Но неверно было бы сказать, что только 
падшесть. Время есть также продукт движения, активности, творчества, но 
ущербленных и притянутых вниз.
629
 
However, as with creativity, despite the fact that objectified time is rooted within man 
he still wants to escape it, his creative desire orientates him beyond such time, 
towards an escape from decaying and disintegrating into the merciless current of the 
future. A definitive judgement cannot be passed: it is thus quite ambiguous whether 
or not objectified time is evil. Although there is perhaps more material to suggest that 
it is more evil than it is good, the fact that Berdiaev wants to connect objectified time 
to the subject, to give it at least the potential to be good, cannot just be disregarded. 
 This is again quite different to Bulgakov for whom, as with the questions of 
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creativity and freedom, evil was a much more controlled problem: it was constricted 
by a well formulated, deterministic theodicy. Berdiaev, however, by linking freedom 
to the nichto beyond God’s reach gave a greater freedom to evil, meaning that the 
evil aspects of time allow it to run free of any divine coercion. For Bulgakov evil was 
limited in the same way as the rest of existence was, meaning that it was understood 
in a more Hegelian sense, where it was perceived as an unfortunate consequence of 
an inexorable process moving towards the realisation of the Kingdom of God. 
Consequently, evil appears to be of lesser importance in Berdiaev’s work as it is tied 
to the broader theme of the internal-external dualism: it is not such an immediate 
problem, so Berdiaev does not concern himself with it in the same way. 
   
Conclusions: the temporalised problems 
 The problems of creativity and freedom are therefore of much greater 
consequence to Berdiaev’s philosophy of time than the problem of evil, which just 
reflects the dualistic tendency which flows through this thinking. However, together 
they highlight with much greater precision the deep paradox that runs through 
Berdiaev’s thought about time, concerning the relationship between internal and 
external forms of time. Significantly, these same problems also revealed the more 
deterministic characteristics of Bulgakov’s thought about history: for him, however, 
evil was the most important, as was suggested in his notion that evil cannot win in 
the world. Although creativity and freedom also figured in this thinking, they, like evil 
in Berdiaev’s thought, were of lesser consequence. Despite dealing with these 
issues in different ways, then, they were all of continued concern for both 
philosophers, and their description had considerable impact on the way in which they 
would describe time and time-as-history. Indeed, the ways in which they differently 
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engaged with these problems perhaps helps explain some of the reasons why they 
tended to opposite solutions of the time-history/history-time relation in the first place. 
More broadly, Berdiaev revealed a temporal dimension to these issues as 
they helped explain how time, in its dual forms, was experienced directly by the 
person. Given his general mystical focus, as ‘internal’ capacities he sought to give 
creativity, freedom and also the potential for evil free reign. He also sought, however, 
to highlight how these capacities were restricted by the external dimension. 
Conversely Bulgakov, as an inherently more structural thinker, chose to limit the 
scope of these capacities: man was free to an extent, man created under guidance, 
and man was unable to do evil that might overturn God. Seeing as he did an 
inevitable end to history, brought about through Sophiological activity directed 
towards the establishment of the kingdom of God, he looked at these problems 
through the lens of achieving this goal across the course of history, rather than 
engaging with them as immediate problems of the present. Berdiaev was concerned 
with man’s abilities as they came from within, and thus looked at time as a field for 
this activity. Bulgakov was more modest in his appraisal of mankind, and sought to 
impose limits upon these capacities and wanted to put them within a structure where 
they received greater meaning from above.  
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Conclusions: Berdiaev’s philosophy of time 
  
 Berdiaev’s engagement with the problem of time presents a many-sided 
reflection on an issue that cut right to the heart of his thinking. His work on pure time 
– i.e. time as time, rather than as history – is evidently much broader than 
Bulgakov’s, who when speaking only about time was nowhere near as expansive. 
Central to the comparison between the two was the different ways in which the 
organisation of their respective philosophies naturally presented the problem of time, 
and also the different points at which time manifested itself in their work. For 
Berdiaev, more so than for Bulgakov, time was an obvious, troubling question: 
Проблема времени есть основная проблема человеческого существования.630 
While still understanding the relevance of time, Bulgakov was able to instead 
approach it through the prism of history. Indeed, as Bulgakov demanded a greater 
sense of structure than Berdiaev, he was perhaps naturally inclined to give primacy 
to history over time, as history for him offered a clearer framework in which the 
troubles of the present would eventually solve themselves. Time perhaps did not 
provide such a sense of security.  
Conversely, Berdiaev ascribed primacy to time over history. This can be seen 
as a result of the existentialist character of much of his thinking: when looking at the 
immediate conditions of man’s existence, his life in the world, he found time, and the 
conditions that time imposes upon man a prevalent feature of his existence and 
experience. He was thus more interested in time because it is an immediate problem: 
he did not look at it in a structural fashion, but was driven to discover what he 
perceived to be the ‘truth’ of human life through its exploration. For Berdiaev, 
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structures and systems did not offer the deeper meaning to life. 
However, as has been established, much of Berdiaev’s reflection upon the 
nature of time was caught up in a paradox which underpins his philosophy more 
broadly. His conceptualisation of time is profoundly dualistic: on the one hand he 
intuits an internal, existential time, an ‘eternity’ which belongs to the mystical domain 
of interior, untrammelled experience whereas on the other he finds an external, 
‘objectified’ time, one which is hostile to the internal and existential. The first, 
reminiscent of Bergson’s notion of the durée or Heidegger’s originary temporality is 
undivided, full and sits at the core of man’s internal being, whereas the second is 
broken apart and split into the merciless, endless procession of past and future. 
Despite this opposition a paradoxical connection between these two types of time is 
also posited. This is achieved through a variety a philosophical means – it is 
identified in work specifically dealing with time – but is clarified in particular by his 
work on creativity and time. Creativity describes how human activity, beginning in 
internal, existential time but manifesting itself in external, objectified time connects 
together the two different temporal domains, which are revealed to be in a 
paradoxical state of mutual connection and repulsion. Berdiaev therefore 
successfully maintains a dual perspective on time in which paradox features 
prominently: he understands that time is connected to hope, potential, and the 
internal, but also that it is externalised, cruel, and that it brings about the continual, 
impending pressure of human mortality.  
This dualistic and paradoxical perspective on time is the result of the unique 
mixture of Christian mystic and philosophical ideas that Berdiaev takes on. Whilst 
there is a large amount of interexchange between these various types of thinking in 
his thought, it can be seen how mystical thinking, combined with a deep existentialist 
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proclivity, propagated the notion of opposition between such categories as internal-
external and uncreated-created. Likewise, an antipathy towards positivism and an 
interest in Kant focused his mind on the object-subject divide, and, ensuing from this 
and also from a concern with the determinism of German idealists such as Hegel, 
Berdiaev also drew a divide between free and determined. Drawing these various 
strands of thought together, Berdiaev’s philosophy of time thus identifies a time in 
which all the ‘good’ sides of these divisions (internal, subjective, uncreated, free and 
so on) sit and another in which all the ‘bad’ sides (external, object, created, 
determined etc.) sit. They resist one another but also connect to one another, as 
they are, after all, both still temporal.  
 This paradox within Berdiaev’s philosophy of time allows for reflection on a 
broader issue that could be raised regarding one of his dominant philosophical 
concepts, that of objectification. Considering the relationship between internal and 
external forms of time highlights questions surrounding the more exact nature of the 
relationship between objectification, the external, object would, and man’s internal, 
existential and divine life. How is it possible, one is led to wonder, that man, in the 
beginning, was able to take his internal life and externalise it? How does this external 
world then relate to the internal world? After all, at one level the external world is set 
against man, it determines him and resists his ambitions, but it is nonetheless still 
originally the product of his originally internal, free activity. Furthermore, in view of 
the primacy of freedom in Berdiaev’s thinking, how free, then, is the objectified world 
from God’s divine influence? Can it comprehensively fall away from the internal in 
some great, all-encompassing catastrophe? Due to the importance Berdiaev places 
on the paradox of the relationship between internal and external, it is very difficult to 
provide any answer or solution to these problems other than by reaching towards 
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further paradox.  
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4. Berdiaev’s Philosophy of History 
 
Я проникнут темой истории, я читал много книг по истории, но я всегда 
испытывал нравственное страдание при чтении 
исторических книг, до того история представлялась мне 
преступной. 
Samopoznanie, 1947.
631
 
 
Introduction and definition 
 
 The emphasis Berdiaev placed upon time by no means meant that he 
relegated the problem of history to the background of his philosophy. Indeed, he 
wrote significantly about history: it plays a vibrant, distinct role in his thinking and he 
has much to say on the subject. Noticeably Berdiaev’s philosophy of history has 
garnered more attention than his philosophy of time. A larger number of scholars 
have written about history in Berdiaev’s work and it has generally been accepted as 
a central theme in his philosophy:  
Из сказанного ясно, сколь важна для Бердяева философия истории. По сути дела 
– это основная арена мировой драмы.
632
 
Research into Berdiaev’s philosophy of history has been conducted both in recent 
scholarship and by the generation of Berdiaev scholars who were active in the years 
after his death.633 Perhaps they were more drawn to examine Berdiaev’s work on 
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history because history is considered a particularly ‘Russian’ theme – Courten, for 
example, is of the view that: 
…it became the task of the philosopher and the intellectual in Russia to gain insight into 
the course of history, and to determine which place Russia had in it.
634
 
As this indicates, an inclination to think about history also allows discussion to lead 
towards debate of Russian history: philosophers – and then also critics – of a Russo-
centric perspective wanting to enter into discussion of Russian destiny find fertile soil 
in the question of history, and are thus often drawn to write about it. Berdiaev’s work 
on history, and many of the reflections of Russian commentators upon it, follow this 
tendency. Berdiaev was keenly aware of Russian experience, of the Russian people 
and of a Russian ‘mission’ in the context of history: 
Русский народ из всех народов мира наиболее всечеловеческий, вселенский по 
своему духу, это принадлежит строению его национального духа. И призванием 
русского народа должно быть дело мирового объединения, образование единого 
христианского духовного космоса.
635
  
However, this sort of messianic nationalism is not the focal point of this study and is 
hence of lesser interest.636 It will have little effect upon his broader conceptualisation 
of history or on his work about history as it is related to time. 
 In analysis of Berdiaev’s philosophy of history we will be looking at a number 
of texts, as history appears in a number of contexts. These include the earlier texts 
Smysl istorii (1922) and Novoe srednevekovʹe (1924), along with the milestones of 
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his later intellectual development, O naznachenii cheloveka (1931), Opyt 
eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki (1941) and Samopoznanie (1947). Also Sudʹba 
cheloveka v sovremennom mire (1934), although mainly relating to temporality (as 
was discussed in section 2), has some relevant material. Although there is some 
difference between these texts, there is a similarity in terms of the consistency of 
underlying themes that inform Berdiaev’s historical contemplation. The main 
difference that arises relates to his increasingly negative stance towards history as 
he gets older.  
 
Defining ‘philosophy of history’ in Berdiaev’s thinking 
 Particular attention needs to be paid to clarifying how exactly a philosophy of 
history is approached in Berdiaev’s thought. Primarily it needs to be asserted that, as 
with Bulgakov, it is being used in terms of conceptualisation of history: this refers to 
the ‘speculative’ tradition, outlined in the introduction to this thesis, of considering the 
nature of history, and the movement and structure (or lack of structure) of history as 
a whole. Philosophy of history is not used in the ‘analytic’ sense, in which there is a 
systematic historical investigation of specific events which are then subjected to the 
terms of a broader, detailed philosophy of history. Philosophies of the latter sort 
pertain to thinking of a more critical, rigorous type which is harder to find in the 
Russian tradition of the early twentieth century. Although at times Berdiaev tries to 
evaluate events in the light of a perceived broader historical movement, it becomes 
evident that other than a quite sparse narrative (which all but disappears around 
1924 after Novoe srednevekovʹe) and a vague Christian notion of a historical 
schema he does not view history in this systematic sense. He is therefore more 
historiosophic than he is historiographic in his approach to history. 
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In terms of a more specific definition of Berdiaev’s philosophy of history, this 
will be prefaced by an understanding of the position of history as a substrate of time. 
In view of this, our analysis of Berdiaev’s philosophy of history will ultimately enrich 
our understanding of his philosophy of time, and clarify further his supposition of the 
primacy of time over history. Firstly, then, it is necessary to remain aware of the fact 
time still has primacy over history, and that history is comprised of time, and in such 
a way is a temporal space in which historical events unfold. History follows the basic 
narrative of the ‘temporal process’:  
А это ведет к признанию того, что самый временной процесс, который есть 
мировой исторический процесс, совершающийся в нашем времени, зачинается в 
вечности, что в вечности зачинается то движение, которое совершается в нашей 
мировой действительности.
637
 
This narrative will constitute the basis of his philosophy of history. Much of the work 
already done on Berdiaev’s later understanding of ‘historical time’ need not be 
repeated: it is already known that history is understood as horizontal progress in a 
forwards direction, how it is ultimately limited and how it is not an end within itself, 
but how it is also subject to overlapping with cosmic and interjection from existential 
time. We will instead be looking at the aspects of Berdiaev’s writing about history 
that have not yet been covered, at the other ways in which he characterises the 
movement and structure of history. The focus of this investigation will be the 
discovery that the modes of historical movement Berdiaev describes ultimately 
contribute to a sense of uncertainty and anti-linearity which, in the context of other 
philosophies of history is highly unusual, and, in comparison with Bulgakov, is very 
different. 
Definition of ‘philosophy of history’ is also important because taken in itself the 
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term is potentially extremely broad. As Poltoratskii accurately points out: 
Проблематичность философии истории связана с выяснением ее метода, задач, 
материала и границ. С ней не только соприкасаются, но нередко и 
перекрещиваются история в многообразных ее течениях, социология, социальная 
философия, философия культуры, психология народов, политическая 
философия и публицистика.
638
 
This is especially true with Berdiaev, as so much of what he writes about history is 
not strictly speaking part of a ‘philosophy’ of history – it frequently moves into being 
straightforward history itself, and from there on into social commentary, intellectual 
criticism and political discussion. Indeed, Gottlieb remarks: 
…[Berdiaev’s] philosophy of history makes it clear that, in his response to the revolution, 
he aspires not merely to a polemic against the revolution but to an overall integrated 
religious/philosophical vision of human existence on both the universal and individual 
levels.
639
 
Taking into account the grand ambitions of Berdiaev’s philosophy of history, we need 
to be sure that we remove the elements which for this study would be superfluous, 
as otherwise there will be a risk of moving into territory that, whilst no doubt revealing 
to Berdiaev’s thought, would in this case be irrelevant.  
 Our investigation will centre upon the claim that Berdiaev describes a 
philosophy of history which is quite unconventional: while for many thinkers history is 
a linear process, for Berdiaev it is non-linear and uncertain. This is ultimately a 
reflection of the fact that an understanding of time underpins his philosophy of history. 
Also, the prevalence of the idea of uncreated, un-coerced freedom, and of a focus on 
eschatology further informs this unusual conceptualisation of history and historical 
development. 
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The difference between historical narrative and philosophy of history 
Relevant to concerns surrounding the definition of Berdiaev’s philosophy of 
history is the issue that Berdiaev also had a particular inclination to write histories, or 
narratives on a variety of phenomena. The linearity he describes in these narratives 
could be seen to undermine the non-linearity which will be argued belongs to his 
philosophy of history. Berdiaev narrates accounts of a whole host of issues, which 
are variously political, intellectual, religious, social and economic. In these accounts 
he rarely cites other sources, but rather just presents an assumed historical 
knowledge.640  At first glance it appears he may be talking about something which 
ostensibly falls under the rubric of the philosophy of history. However, what is rather 
being offered is his interpretation of prosaic history – i.e. a description of the 
development of a particular social grouping or intellectual movement. The terms of 
these narratives rarely correlate with his philosophical ideas about the nature of 
history. The two can thus be considered separately. 
What will therefore be argued is that Berdiaev’s philosophy of history is 
actually quite different to his writing of history: where his writing of history is quite 
linear, his philosophy of history is much less linear and more confused, more 
paradoxical. Philosophy of history thus reflects on how he understands history in a 
deeper, more holistic sense, whereas writing history is an attempt to construct a 
narrative of a particular event or part of history. There rarely seems to be much 
overlapping between the two: his philosophy of history does not inform his writing of 
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history. At the only point at where they significantly overlap, in Novoe srednevekovʹe 
(1924), linearity breaks down. Interestingly, the qualitative difference between 
Berdiaev’s philosophy of history and his writing of history could be compared to the 
difference between his essays dedicated to the discussion of other writers (which are 
frequently quite cogent) and his exposition of his personal philosophy.641  Perhaps 
when he has an external reference point – i.e. ideas that are not of his personal 
genesis – he is able to write more clearly. 
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History as uncertain 
 Two defining features have been hypothesised for Berdiaev’s philosophy of 
history: uncertainty and non-linearity. Historical ‘uncertainty’ relates to the fact that, 
due to the nature of his own philosophy, Berdiaev is unable to provide the sense of 
certainty that Bulgakov, for example, could provide when talking about the process 
and end of history. Walicki has recently contended that: 
Berdjaev and Bulgakov […] awaited a health-restoring spiritual revolution and allotted 
Russia a special role in Christianity’s transformation of the world...
642
 
Although it is true that both awaited it, there is sufficient evidence to say that 
Berdiaev was racked by the concern that this spiritual revolution may never come. 
Indeed, through the logic of his own philosophy, which placed great emphasis upon 
freedom and also upon the freedom to evil, Berdiaev was compelled to accept the 
possibility of a bad end to history. Although a belief in the end of history itself is not 
challenged, we do not see the same confidence in the outcome of the historical 
process that many other Russian philosophers – in this case particularly Bulgakov – 
possessed. There is therefore a fundamental uncertainty in Berdiaev’s philosophy of 
history that, when combined with its non-linear quality, makes for a sense of history 
that is quite different to many of the other historical modes of thinking that we have 
come across – for example, Hegel, Marx, and also much Christian thought, including 
the Church fathers. However, unlike other philosophers such as Bergson and 
Heidegger, with whom Berdiaev had significant similarity, he still wanted to discuss 
history at length.  
 This uncertainty regarding history reflects a different engagement with the 
sense of temporality-as-crisis than was seen with Bulgakov. Where Bulgakov saw 
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crisis, he attempted to rationalise this crisis and understand it through a broader, 
providential historical narrative in which everything made sense according to a pre-
determined meaning. Berdiaev, however, was perhaps more ambivalent in the face 
of this crisis: it shook his confidence in the world around him and he was led to 
wonder if the darkness of his time may overcome all. Uncertainty therefore became a 
prevalent theme in his conceptualisation of history. 
 
Existentialism and Nietzsche 
 A key dimension of this uncertainty is rooted in Berdiaev’s existentialism. Just 
as with time, man is deeply significant to his understanding of how history moves – 
man’s activity shapes history, man reveals his destiny in history and man will one 
day end history. Man and history are inseparable: 
Нельзя выделить человека из истории, нельзя взять его абстрактно, и нельзя 
выделить историю из человека, нельзя историю рассматривать вне человека и 
нечеловечески.
643
 
History will thus be ‘within’ man, just as time (from one perspective) was:  
Человек есть в высочайшей степени историческое существо. Человек находится 
в историческом, и историческое находится в человеке. Между человеком и 
«историческим» существует такое глубокое, такое таинственное в своей 
первооснове сращение, такая конкретная взаимность, что разрыв их 
невозможен.
644
 
All that we know about Berdiaev’s ontology and his understanding of man is thus 
relevant to his understanding of history, and in order to understand how he 
conceptualises history, the idea that history is a reflection of man’s development 
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must be appreciated. As before, Berdiaev’s existentialism is tied to the Christian 
creation myth, so much of his conceptualisation of history is also meant to follow the 
Christian narrative. One would assume that this provides a degree of certainty, but it 
does not.  
Uncertainty is rooted in Berdiaev’s assertion of man’s freedom: man is free to 
do as he wants, and, as history is indivisible from man, history becomes what man 
chooses to make it. Here we return back to the question of creativity, which, as it did 
with time, assumes an important role in the historical process:  
Наступит эпоха, новый исторический эон, когда эсхатологический смысл 
творчества будет окончательно выявлен. Проблема творчества упирается в 
проблему смысла истории.
645
 
Through creativity, then, man is free to direct himself towards whatever he chooses 
in history. As he is free, as he bears the likeness to God, he is able to create in such 
a way as he sees fit, and by this he can lead history in whichever direction he 
chooses. 
There is thus a significant typological comparison to draw between 
Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of history presented in Also Sprach Zarathustra (1885) 
and Berdiaev’s. Zarathustra claims: 
Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman – a rope over an abyss. A 
dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a 
dangerous shuddering and staying-still.
646
 
Although the end of history is different – Nietzsche sees it in the advent of the 
Superman, Berdiaev in the Kingdom of God – the confluence of their thinking is 
marked. Both place man at the centre, both see history as specifically man’s great 
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endeavour:  
Весь мировой процесс стоит под знаком Человека...
647
 
Similarly, both describe the process as uncertain. History, Zarathustra proclaims, is 
fraught with ‘danger’: it is a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous wayfaring and a 
dangerous staying-still. Berdiaev’s focus on freedom similarly propagates this 
uncertainty. Man’s participation in uncreated freedom means that history is 
fundamentally uncertain:  
Свобода заключает в себе такое темное иррациональное начало, которое не дает 
никакой внутренней гарантии, что свет победит тьму, что божественно заданная 
тема будет разрешена, что дан будет ответ на заданную Богом тему о свободной 
любви.
648
 
Creativity is also tied to history, and this makes history all the more uncertain and 
unstable as it is free to be used towards bad ends. The significance attached to free 
creativity as man’s god-like ability is also quite profoundly Nietzschean, as 
Bonetskaia has recently noted.649 History could end well or end badly, at any point. 
Berdiaev’s insistence on man’s freedom in history to choose between good and evil 
earned him some disrepute in his own day – Karsarvin, commenting in 1923 in 
Sovremennye zapiski on Berdiaev’s Smysl istorii, notes:   
Тема истории – автор прав – есть тема свободы. Но свобода вовсе не есть 
свобода выбора между дорбым и злом, и без выяснения понятия свободы 
метафизика истории невозможна.
650
 
Karsavin therefore felt that Berdiaev’s concept of freedom was not sufficiently 
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clarified: most likely, he would have wanted to have seen freedom guided towards 
good, rather than, as with Berdiaev, it sitting in a void between good and evil. More 
broadly, then, we see then that this first moment of Berdiaev’s uncertainty when 
faced with history is an expansion of his broader uncertainty as to which way man 
will choose to direct his freedom. This brings up the issue of eschatology and 
uncertainty. 
 
The bifurcation of the eschatological horizon  
 Conventionally, eschatology relates to the end of history and/or time, the point 
at which history ends and where whatever lies beyond history is realised. The 
eschatological horizon thus refers to the orientation towards that point, the ‘eschaton’, 
at which eschatology occurs. If we look at many Russian eschatologies we see this 
eschatological horizon normally conceived in a single way. Fedorov, for example, 
sees the end of history in the resurrection of all dead generations. Solovʹev saw it in 
the unification of the Church and the coming of the Kingdom of God. Bulgakov saw 
the eschatological horizon being reached by the sophiological process of economy 
and the endowing of sophiological wisdom to world. Berdiaev, however, did not 
subscribe to a single eschatological end. His eschatological vision was bifurcated, 
removing the certainty of what the eschatological completion of history would consist 
in. 
 This bifurcation of the eschatological horizon in Berdiaev’s philosophy is 
expressed in a number of ways, but these different descriptions all relate to one 
division: either history can end in final objectification, or history can end in 
transcendence and movement into the metaphysical. In his later work, a key aspect 
of his conceptualisation of this event relates to the final temporal mode that human 
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life adopts:   
История происходит в своем историческом времени, но она не может ни в нем 
остаться, ни в нем кончиться. История выходит или во время космическое, это 
утверждает натурализм и он соглашается на окончательную объективацию 
человеческого существования, человек оказывается лишь подчиненной частью 
мирового природного целого, или во время экзистенциальное, и это означает 
выход из царства объективации в духовный план.
651
 
It is interesting to note in passing that, whilst for many the end of history is 
considered also in terms of an end of time, Berdiaev still sees the continuation of 
temporal existence after history has come to an end. History can thus end in one of 
two ways, one good, one bad. He posits this dual possibility on a number of separate 
occasions. In O naznachenii cheloveka (1931) he discusses the issue in more 
Hegelian terms, looking at the way in which ‘consciousness’ can deal with its present 
lack of unity in the objectified world: 
Первоначальная подсознательная, стихийная цельность невозможна уже после 
возгорания сознания и прохождения через раздвоение сознания. После этого 
возможно или движение вверх, в рай сверхсознания, или разложение и падение в 
адские состояния, сохраняющие клочья сознания.
652
  
So here, albeit in discussion of a quite different manner of philosophical problem, 
Berdiaev is still reiterates the possibility of ‘disintegration and fall into hellish 
conditions’. This dual eschatological possibility stalks his thinking about the end, and 
it brings with it a feeling of the insecurity of history, of the fact that there is no 
indication as to which of the two outcomes will come about. 
 This bifurcation of the eschatological horizon is possible again due to 
Berdiaev’s insistence on freedom. Man must be free to sin just as he must be free to 
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do good. This is established from the early stages of his philosophy, in Filosofiia 
svobody (1912): 
Свобода греха, поистине, есть величайшая тайна, рационально непостижимая, но 
близкая каждому существу, каждым глубоко испытанная и пережитая. Но и для 
философствующего разума ясно, что насильственное добро, насильственная 
прикованность к Богу не имела бы никакой ценности, что существо, лишенное 
свободы избрания, свободы отпадения, не было бы личностью.
653
 
In the same passage he goes on to explain how despite the fact that God may well 
have a plan for us, may well have put an idea for us to complete within ourselves, we 
are nonetheless free to pervert that idea: 
В плане творения нет насилия ни над одним существом, каждому дано 
осуществить свою личность, идею, заложенную в Боге, или загубить, осуществить 
карикатуру, подделку.
654
 
The bifurcation of the eschatological horizon thus is a product of man’s freedom to 
direct his will towards evil or towards good: final objectification is thus as equally 
possible as is final transcendence. These two eschatological horizons, quite 
opposed to one another, constitute the defining quality of Berdiaev’s uncertainty 
about history: it can go either way, as there is nothing that can coerce man in a given 
direction. Objectification, slavery and necessity, whilst being opposed to freedom 
and God’s plan, can thus be the ultimate product of freedom, as he comments in one 
of his last works: 
Зло бессмысленно, и оно имеет высший смысл. Также свобода противоположна 
необходимости и рабству, и она может перерождаться в необходимость и 
рабство, переходить в свою противоположность.
655
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History and the internal-external paradox 
 The paradox of the internal-external relationship we had been discussing 
earlier also manifests itself in Berdiaev’s thought about history, and this develops an 
uncertainty about history of a different species. Berdiaev appears to offer contrary 
suggestions as to whether or not history is internal or external, and consequently 
how it should be understood. In its connection with objectified time, history is 
understood as a product of objectification. Man is enslaved by history, it is imposed 
upon him:  
Человек не только принимает тяготу истории, не только ведет с ней борьбу и 
осуществляет свою судьбу, но он имеет тенденцию обоготворять историю, 
сакрализировать происходящие в ней процессы […] Человек готов поклониться 
исторической необходимости, историческому року и в нем увидеть действие 
Божества.
656
 
However, in Smysl istorii – and at many other moments – Berdiaev is also willing to 
attach positive, internal value to history. Here he addresses what he calls incorrect, 
frequently deterministic understandings of history: 
Прежде всего, я хотел бы указать на то, что существует ложное и очень 
распростаненное в современном сознании отношение к историческому процессу, 
которое делает его мертвым и внутренне невоспринимаемым.
657
   
Although broadly negative about history, we see then at moments Berdiaev wants to 
suggest that history can be interpreted from the internal. He does not just see history 
as something imposed upon man but also as something that comes from within man, 
shows his communion with the metaphysical and eternal and thereby reveals his 
eventual passage beyond objectification: 
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Если история не есть лишь внешний феномен, если она имеет какой-то 
абсолютный смысл и связь с абсолютной жизнью, если в ней есть подлинно 
онтологическое, то это значит, что она должна зачинаться и совершаться в 
недрах Абсолютного, т.е. в тех недрах бытия, с которыми соприкасается, в своей 
последней глубине, духовная жизнь и духовный опыт.
658
 
We therefore see the re-emergence of the similar paradox: history has both an 
internal and an external aspect. From the first perspective, history is something full of 
value and internal potential, from the second history is objectified and hostile to man 
and his internal life. Paradoxically, both of these sides of history exist simultaneously 
– history is both interior and exterior, phenomenological and noumenal. This 
paradoxical, dual character of history serves to further propagate the sense of 
uncertainty – evident here more in terms of confusion – regarding Berdiaev’s 
apprehension of history, as it cannot be solved either way.   
 
History as tragedy 
 A prevailing notion throughout Berdiaev’s work is a sense of the ‘tragedy’ of 
history, of its inevitable failure, of the fact that all that comes to pass in history is 
fallen. It is difficult to equate this sort of pessimism with the optimistic belief in the 
coming Kingdom of God. Again, then, we are presented with a deep uncertainty, 
which links back to this bifurcation of eschatology: if everything in history fails, it 
seems unlikely that a final transcendental movement out of history will take place. 
This idea of ‘tragedy’ appears throughout Berdiaev’s work, but it is clearly articulated 
in Sudʹba cheloveka v sovremennom mire (1934). Here we read of the fact that 
history is a tragic conflict within the human condition, something that it has never 
been able to overcome: 
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История же есть трагическое столкновение между личным и сверх-личным и до-
личным. История никогда не разрешает конфликта между личностью и 
обществом, личностью и культурой, личностью и массой, между качеством и 
количеством.
659
 
The tragic quality of history is linked to the conditions of the objectified world – in this 
quotation Berdiaev outlines how history cannot resolve the difference between 
individual and society, the problem that in the current world everyone is divided, 
objectified and unable to escape this condition. This notion of the tragedy of history 
is also closely connected to the tragedy of creativity: everything that is intended to 
bring an end to the world through creativity fails, and so too, therefore, does history:  
 История имеет смысл, признание смысла истории принадлежит христианству. Но 
история вместе с тем есть неудача человека, неудача культуры, крушение всех 
человеческих замыслов.
660
 
Berdiaev intends to demonstrate that through the assertion of the failure of history, it 
follows that there must be something after history which will resolve the problems 
that history itself is unable to solve: 
Несоизмеримость между историей и личной человеческой судьбой и есть 
трагедия истории, трагедия бесысходная в пределах истории, требующая ее 
конца.
661
 
This conclusion is, however, problematic, and it leads away from the existentialist 
claim that history is man’s destiny, man’s work: if what is going on within history 
cannot be resolved within the boundaries of history, surely history becomes 
somewhat meaningless and divorced from man? Again, then, we return to the 
paradox which underpins Berdiaev’s philosophy more broadly. How are we to 
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connect what is going on within history (i.e. in the ‘external’ realm) to what goes on 
beyond history’s boundaries (i.e. the purely ‘internal’, existential realm)? How will the 
resolution of history take place? The notion of the tragic fate of history places 
emphasis on the external coercion that takes place within history, and this opposes 
the notion that history is within man, that man resolves it in the internal domain, 
beyond the reach of the external pressure of history.  
 
 Uncertainty therefore assumes two prevailing characteristics in Berdiaev’s 
philosophy of history: one relates to the dual possibility of history’s end, the other to 
the confusion which ensues from the paradox that history is both internal and 
external. This has been demonstrated across a number of texts: on the one hand, 
history appears opposed to man, it works against him, it is a failure and a reflection 
of all that is fallen in the world, but on the other hand it is man’s path to the 
transcendental, to the eschatological end of this world and the coming of the 
Kingdom of God. These differing perspectives are difficult to align with one another, 
and describe well the broader paradox of his thought. 
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History as non-linear 
 As well as being uncertain, history in Berdiaev’s conceptualisation was also 
non-linear. This non-linearity establishes again Berdiaev’s great difference to 
Bulgakov in his conceptualisation of history: Bulgakov’s description of the historical 
process was deeply linear, it had a clear rhythm and was moving in a certain 
direction. However, for Berdiaev history was ‘volcanic’, it erupted in crises whereby 
things suddenly changed:   
Почва истории – вулканична, и из нее возможны вулканические извержения.
662
 
In this volcanic quality, it is further evident how Berdiaev’s original experience of time, 
the sense of temporality as crisis, manifests itself in a conceptualisation of history in 
which crisis-type movement – sudden movements and changes – becomes an 
important mode of historical development. Berdiaev sees in the crises of his time 
something analogous to the nature of history itself. Bulgakov had conversely tried to 
rationalise crisis, had tried to diminish its importance and subject it to a providential, 
linear development.  
Non-linearity takes on a variety of forms. Primarily it relates to the way in 
which Berdiaev describes the process of history – he argues against the necessity of 
cause and effect, against the idea that a linear principle could guide human 
development. In this respect anti-linearity in history was a facet of his general 
opposition to the objectified world in which external forces were perceived to reign. 
However, non-linearity also relates to his description of the relationship between 
memory and history and his attempt to root the entirety of history within the subject. 
In Novoe srednevekovʹe, Berdiaev also writes in a more ‘analytic’ mode about history, 
but still continues to posit a strong sense of non-linearity 
                                            
662
 Berdiaev, Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki, p. 148. 
337 
 
Anti-process and anti-evolution theory 
 The most pronounced non-linear aspect of Berdiaev’s conceptualisation of 
history consists in his overt rejection of the notion of a linear historical process. He is 
insistent on this rejection throughout his philosophical career.  In 1922 he claims: 
В истории нет по прямой линии совершающегося прогресса добра, прогресса 
совершенства, в силу которого грядущее поколение стоит выше поколения 
предшествующего…
663
 
Likewise, in 1947: 
Для понимание моей мысли важно подчеркнуть, что мне чужда идея прямого, 
сплошного, непрерывного развития.
664
 
His need to insist on the absence of consistent development is the result of some of 
the most fundamental aspects of his thinking. The most significant of this is creativity. 
Creativity, the basic motivating force of both time and history, is grounded in 
absolute freedom, in freedom from cause and effect and therefore freedom from 
coercion. Creativity does not follow consistent developmental patterns as it is freely 
chosen:  
Я вообще антиэволюционист в том смысле, что признаю прерывность, связанную 
с вторжением в мировой процесс свободы, и отрицаю непрерывность как 
выражение детерминизма.
665
 
Beyond creativity, quite simply the nature of Berdiaev’s philosophy itself militated 
against such linear thinking. By his own admission, he was not a systematic thinker: 
Тут обнаруживается также моя сравнительно слабая способность к 
систематичекому развитию мысли. Я мыслю и пишу афористически и стараюсь 
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находить формулировки для своих интуиций.
666
 
This non-systematic, non-linear conceptualisation of history is thus a product of the 
basic qualities of his philosophy.  
 A desire to transcend process was also looked at in terms of being anti-
evolutionary, and in such a way it could be used to combat atheistic 
conceptualisations of the historical process. Through this not only Darwin, but also 
the general positivist notion of progress, could also be challenged. Again, this anti-
evolutionism is repeated throughout Berdiaev’s life, so quotation can be drawn from 
any number of texts: 
Эволюция не только не есть творчество, она противоположна творчеству. В 
эволюции ничто новое не создается, а лишь старое перемещается. Эволюция 
есть необходимость, творчество же есть свобода.
667
 
By equating evolution with necessity, and thereby objectification, Berdiaev limits 
evolution to the immanent realm. In evolution Berdiaev sees no possibility for 
creativity or creative movement – evolutionism, or thinking that relates the world 
process only to the immanent world, is thus discarded: 
В эволюции, как ее понимает натуралистичекий эволюционизм, по-настоящему 
новизна возникнуть не может, так как нет творческого акта, всего восходящего к 
свободе и прерывающего каузальную связь.
668
  
The idea of creativity is thus one of the central concepts Berdiaev deploys to identify 
developmental patterns which transcend the logic of linear, evolutionary 
development.  He therefore returns to the point that was reached with the philosophy 
of time, that time, and in this case history or ‘world development’, moves only as a 
consequence of creativity, which is itself possible only due to the existence of 
                                            
666
 Ibid., p. 244. 
667
 Berdiaev, O naznachenii cheloveka, p. 117. 
668
 Ibid., p. 142. 
339 
 
newness and nonbeing: 
Становление, диалектика мирового развития возможны лишь потому, что есть 
небытие. Если допустить лишь бытие, то накакого развития не будет. Новизна в 
становлении возникает из недр небытия.
669
 
Berdiaev’s conceptualisation of history is thus thoroughly non-linear as a 
consequence of the nature of the historical process. This does not follow the pattern 
of determinism, it does not move forward in a direct line towards perfection, but 
follows the free will of creativity, it bounds forward in volcanic upheavals and in 
moments of creative passion: 
Закона необходимого исторического прогресса нет, это противоречит свободе 
человека и предполагает ложную объективную телеологию.
670
 
 
Memory as non-linear 
 One of Berdiaev’s more curious ideas relates to his understanding of memory 
– or sometimes anamnesis671 (pripominanie) – and history. This is mainly dealt with 
in Smysl istorii (1922), but also appears briefly in O naznachenii cheloveka (1931), Ia 
i mir obʺektov (1934) and Samopoznanie (1947). Memory, Berdiaev argues, is a 
means by which man discovers that the entirety of history – everything that has 
happened within history – is contained within himself. In this respect it is amongst his 
most overt attempts to subject history to the existentialist frame of his philosophy: 
Каждый человек по своей внутренней природе есть некий великий мир – 
микрокосм, в котором отражается и пребывает весь реальный мир и все великие 
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исторические эпохи...
672
 
This suggestion that every historical epoch is exists within man means that when we 
want to write or think about a particular historical period or event, we need to find 
those historical periods or events within ourselves: 
…человек должен в самом себе познать историю, постигнуть ее, раскрыть, напр., 
глубочайшие пласты эллинского мира, чтобы поистине постигнуть историю 
Греции, историк должен раскрыть в себе глубинные пласты мира 
древнееврейского, чтобы постигнуть эту историю.
673
 
This seemingly absurd suggestion must be understood in the context of Berdiaev’s 
shifting antipathy towards the external world, towards the objectified world. All 
experience, all history, if it is to contain genuine value must exist at some extent 
within the individual. Like many thinkers of a mystical bent, Berdiaev valued that 
which is within. This thesis on memory should also thus be understood in the context 
of Berdiaev’s mystical striving to find intuitive yet metaphysical meaning in history as 
a whole. It also bears some significant resemblance to St. Augustine’s idea that 
through memory man is able keep the historical ‘alive’ in the present, and prevent 
time from falling apart. 
 It can be contested that the idea of memory and history is non-linear for the 
quite obvious reason that the suggestion that all history exists within man, that man 
can commune somehow with others’ past experience, completely breaks down the 
conventional impression of history as a process whereby the present is lived and 
then the past becomes past – i.e. non-accessible as direct experience. Through 
positing the ability of man to engage in any aspect of the past Berdiaev not only 
breaks down the pattern of the cycle of generations but also contests the basic idea 
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of the past as past, the movement of future, present, past. As Seaver summarises:  
Remembrance, therefore, is the link that connects the existential present with the 
existential past. By means of it the past lives in the present.
674
 
History loses its sense of being something that has gone but instead becomes a 
compilation of universal experience or knowledge that man can engage with as and 
when he chooses, with disregard for temporal or historical processes: 
Итак, можно сказать, что в этом микрокосме заключены все исторические эпохи 
прошлого и этого человек не может в себе задавить пластами времени и 
ближайшей исторической жизни; это может быть прикрыто, но никогда не может 
быть окончательно задавлено.
675
 
This thesis on memory or anamnesis is thus non-linear and strikingly unusual. It 
contributes significantly to the generally non-linear character of history that Berdiaev 
describes across his philosophy. We can now finally look at the point at which this 
non-linear conceptualisation of history intruded into his writing about the modern 
world. 
 
The concept of the ‘new middle-ages’ 
 Berdiaev’s essay Novoe srednevekovʹe (1924) earned him a great deal of 
fame in Europe. This was no doubt because in this text he presented a Russian 
interpretation of the revolution that followed neither conventional left-wing nor 
commonplace pro-imperial émigré readings of the event.676 The idea of the ‘new 
middle ages’ had, however, been hit upon before the text itself – it appears in 
nascent form in Smysl istorii (1922). The concept of the ‘new middle ages’ is actually 
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as much related to Berdiaev’s experience of time – his sense of temporality as crisis 
– as it is to a philosophy of history. It was born from his reflection on the character of 
his own times, which sees the end of the current epoch – which he terms ‘new 
history’ – and the beginning of a new one, the ‘new middle ages’: 
Нам суждено жить в историческое время смены эпох. Старый мир новой истории 
[…] кончается и разлагается, и нарождается неведомый еще новый мир.
677
 
The idea of the ‘new middle ages’ is thus in part a speculation on current affairs, as 
well as a type of history, and will also contain elements of philosophical reflection on 
the nature of history. There is a greater sense of consecutive development and 
linearity than we have been describing elsewhere – however, a fundamental sense 
of historical non-linearity still underpins the narrative. Non-linearity consists in the 
fact that despite looking to describe historical movement forwards, Berdiaev actually 
envisions historical development in terms of a turning backwards, or something 
similar to Zarathrustra’s notion of a ‘looking back’. This is made possible by the 
assumption that elements of the past can be repeated.  
Novoe srednevekovʹe depends on the construction of a historical narrative, 
spanning the movement from the original, or old middle ages, through the ‘new 
history’, and then on to the ‘new middle ages’. During the old middle ages, Berdiaev 
argues, there was a particular inclination towards the spiritual, to searching for God 
and to interpreting divine mysteries: 
Но знаем также, что Средние века были эпохой религиозной по преимуществу, 
были охвачены тоской по небу, которая делала народы одержимыми священным 
безумием, что вся культура средневековья направлена на трансцендентное и 
потустороннее, что в эти века было великое напряжение мысли в схоластике и 
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мистике для решения последних вопросов бытия...
678
   
The character or condition of this epoch was central to Berdiaev’s interpretation of it. 
After the old middle ages came ‘new history’, in which people became more and 
more externalised, consumed variously by industrial progress, individualism, 
imperialism and the wars between classes. Discussion of the ‘new history’ thus also 
provided a vehicle for criticism of the current epoch, and again focused on its human 
character: 
Нам предстоит несомненный факт: в новой истории, гордой своим прогрессом, 
центр тяжести жизни перемещается из духовной сферы в материальную, из 
внутренней во внешнюю жизнь, общество становится все менее религиозным.
679
 
Following the horrors of ‘new history’, Berdiaev interprets a new epoch, the ‘new 
middle ages’, where he perceives a return to the old spirit of the middle ages, in 
which people again want to find religious meaning and inner, intuitive value in the 
world: 
Мы опять вступаем в атмосферу чудесного, столь чуждую новой истории, опять 
возможны станут белая и черная магии. Опять возможны станут страстные споры 
о таинах божественной жизни. Мы переходим от душевного периода к духовному 
периоду.
680
 
The ‘new middle ages’ thus becomes a device through which the ontological centre 
of mankind is corrected, realigned back to the internal away from the external. 
This narrative is non-linear due to the way in which it describes a return to 
certain points in the past. This is qualified, however, by the suggestion that there is 
not some sort of complete return to or restoration of by-gone epochs: 
...нужно окончательно установить, что никаких возвратов и реставраций старых 
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эпох никогда не было и быть не может. Когда мы говорим о переходе от новой 
истории к средневековью, то это есть образный спосов выражения. Переход 
возможен лишь к новому, а не старому средневековью.
681
 
However, he argues that there is a certain element of the ‘eternal’ in a given 
historical epoch, and that this can be restored in a new epoch. This is where linearity 
breaks down as past events can be returned to or relived, so long as they have an 
‘eternal’ character: 
К слишком временному и тленному в прошлом нельзя вернуться, но можно 
вернуться к вечному в прошлом.
682
  
So whilst the objectified elements of the past cannot be restored, the metaphysical or 
eternal parts of it can be: and in such a way we see how non-linearity can come to 
define elements of the historical process. It issues from a philosophical assumption 
about the nature of history that certain past things can be restored due to their 
‘eternal’ (or metaphysical, internal etc.) character. 
 In the concept of the ‘new middle ages’ strict historical consecutiveness is 
thus absent. This sort of non-consecutive development was also described in Smysl 
istorii. Here he similarly describes different ‘epochs’ of human development, but also 
describes how they are not to be taken consecutively, that one can move between 
them: 
 В исторической судьбе человечества можно установить четыре эпохи, четыре 
состояния: варварство, культура, цивилизация и религиозное преображение. Эти 
четыре состояние нельзя брать исключительно во временной 
последовательности; они могут сосуществовать, это – разные направленности 
человеческого духа.
683
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This then is quite revealing: by describing these epochs as different ‘orientations’ of 
the human spirit, we perhaps come closer to what it is Berdiaev is trying to capture 
through the concept of the ‘new middle ages’, and how this is anything but a simple 
description of a linear historical development. Furthermore, he also contends that 
this human development is contingent only upon the direction of human freedom: 
Многое зависит от нашей свободы, от творческих человеческих усилий. Потому-
то возможны два пути. Я предчувствую нарастание сил зла в будущем, но хотел 
определить возможные положительные черты будущего общества.
684
 
History thus again becomes non-linear, it becomes dependent upon the will of the 
subject, defined by his freedom. The concept of the ‘new middle ages’, although 
perhaps in quite an opaque form, is another reflection of this. It recalls Berdiaev’s 
thesis on memory or anamnesis, in which there are elements of the past which can 
be drawn out and re-experienced in the present. 
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Conclusion: Berdiaev’s philosophy of history  
 Berdiaev’s philosophy of history has been discussed from a specific angle. 
What has been attempted is to capture how he conceptualised history, how he 
reflected on the nature of history – how it moved, where it was heading. This has 
been done by distancing Berdiaev’s actual writing of history from his philosophical 
reflection on history, as the two are, other than in the case of Novoe srednevekovʹe, 
quite distinct. Two prevailing features of this philosophy of history have been 
identified: uncertainty and non-linearity, and together they make for a highly 
individual and unusual conceptualisation of history. 
 It was mentioned at the outset of this section that Berdiaev’s philosophy of 
history is prefaced by his understanding of time’s primacy over history. This has 
remained true, and discussion of history alone – without reference to time – has 
been relatively sparse. The uncertainty that is detected in Berdiaev’s thinking about 
history – evident in two different forms – is deeply reminiscent of the uncertainty that 
cuts through his philosophy of time: it is consistently argued that both time and 
history are paradoxically both inside and outside man. The non-linearity of 
Berdiaev’s description of history demonstrates the paradox and uncertainty that lie 
behind it: he does not want history to be subject to external rules or laws of 
development, but also admits that these external rules do come into play. Non-
linearity similarly maintains a sense of the freedom of history from determinism.  
In terms of comparison with Bulgakov what is most interesting is how clearly 
the two thinkers oppose each other on such a panoply of issues. First of all there is 
the way in which their experience of temporality as crisis translates into a philosophy 
of history: Bulgakov seeks regularity whereas Berdiaev embraces non-linearity and, 
even, crisis itself. Bulgakov is driven to imbue history with reason, logic, and 
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certainty, whilst Berdiaev finds the meaning of history in the absence of such 
coercive concepts. Both believe ardently in the end of history, and hope for the 
coming of the Kingdom of God, but where Bulgakov finds the meaning of history 
demands the necessity of the Kingdom of God, Berdiaev finds the meaning of history 
demands the possibility of failure – freedom must be absolute if it is to mean 
anything. Berdiaev thus prophesises the possibility of a bad end to history whereas 
Bulgakov claims that the divine plan cannot fail.  Between them, they offer a quite 
remarkably binary opposition on the same problem, engaging in the same questions, 
the same themes, wanting the same thing, but coming to almost opposite 
conclusions. 
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5. Conclusion 
 It is difficult to come down on either side of the fence when attempting to 
assess the broad success or failure of Berdiaev’s philosophy as a whole, let alone on 
a specific issue such as his philosophies of time and history. Perhaps an attempt to 
do so in itself is not particularly constructive. One conclusion to draw is how 
classically Russian Berdiaev’s philosophy is: it is caught between so many 
competing bodies of thought, trying to synthesise and adapt to everything whilst at 
the same time offering something new, something profound, and gets caught up in 
the enormity of the task. Dobieszewski, describing the Russian tradition – but he 
could well be describing Berdiaev – notes that: 
Consequently, one may say quite justifiably that Russian philosophy is a relatively 
autonomous philosophical universe which simultaneously reflects its own entirety, 
similarly (in form, of course, not in content) to such past schools of thought as Greek 
and Jewish philosophy, Patristics, French Enlightenment philosophy or classical 
German philosophy.
685
 
This investigation has certainly testified to the importance of all of the above – save 
perhaps French Enlightenment philosophy – in the construction of Berdiaev’s 
thought about time. 
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Conclusion 
Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdiaev 
 
The pattern of similarities and differences between Bulgakov and Berdiaev is, 
in certain respects, to be expected. In terms of experience and intellectual 
background they are from very similar stock. Although originally Berdiaev was from 
an aristocratic background and Bulgakov from more humble beginnings, in their 
formative years between 1900-1922 they moved in many of the same circles and 
shared many friends and acquaintances. In terms of their thought about time and 
history, both had the same ultimate goal in mind: an eschatological end and a 
movement beyond the current world condition. What was different was how they 
envisioned getting to this point. Berdiaev viewed the end more in terms of time, 
Bulgakov more in terms of history: both, however, were keenly aware of the 
relevance of temporal experience in itself, as, after all, history is still a passage 
through time. Time, or time conceptualised as history, therefore played a significant 
part in both of their philosophies, as it described the way in which the coming of God 
would be achieved.  
Neither Bulgakov or Berdiaev could accept that idea that time just was, that it 
merely existed as a fact of life to be dealt with. Something like Einstein’s Theory of 
Relativity, for example, would satisfy neither: it would only touch on the ‘surface’ of 
the problem, and, to borrow Bulgakov’s terminology, would not reach into the 
‘depths’. Therefore, it becomes clear how for both a sense of history and time 
reflected a desire to find meaning in the world around them. This can also be tied to 
the notion of temporality as crisis: in a world of uncertainty and calamity, notions of 
eventual resolution give hope that crisis can be overcome. Both philosophers bear 
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this idea out, although the way in which they understood the means of achieving this 
end as very different: crisis perhaps pervades more deeply into the construction of 
Berdiaev’s philosophy, whereas Bulgakov responds more strongly against crisis, 
placing greater emphasis on the orderly nature of historical and temporal processes. 
 A further dimension of the comparison between Bulgakov and Berdiaev is 
how it has brought into focus the significance of a similar set of problems in both 
philosophers’ work. These problems – those of creativity, freedom, necessity and evil 
– have highlighted some of the broader assumptions which informed and developed 
their contrasting philosophies of time and history. With Bulgakov, his continual focus 
on providing a theodicy and a resolution of evil, along with his restriction of human 
creativity and freedom, allowed for his construction of a determinist pattern of 
thinking about history and a corresponding philosophy of time, in which the ‘good’, 
divine and metaphysical dimension applied pressure on the material dimension. 
Likewise, for Berdiaev, his discussion of the problems of creativity and freedom, and 
to a lesser extent evil, demonstrated with greater clarity the paradoxical nature of his 
understanding of time: they reveal how, when discussing the ‘objectified’ and 
‘existential’ domains of time, his descriptions of the relationship between the 
metaphysical and material inexorably tend towards paradox. 
 Both philosophers testify to the significance of the problem of time, and history 
as a problem related to time – rather than just being a problem in itself – in Russian 
philosophy. At the same time, their thinking on these questions demonstrates 
engagement with a philosophical tradition which extends back to Plato, and which 
continues to be relevant today. They can justifiably take their place in this tradition. 
Yet it is noticeable is how classically Russian this engagement is, drawing on such a 
broad range of philosophies and ideas. This reflects not only Bulgakov’s and 
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Berdiaev’s great erudition but also their connection to the intellectual mainstream; 
they were not estranged or disconnected from the European tradition but 
demonstrate an active engagement with and innovative interpretation of many 
bodies of thought. 
 
 This thesis has sought to adopt a comparative and thematic approach and to 
explore lines of research which could be developed further, in the Russian Silver Age 
and beyond. The theme of time, both an ancient and modern problem, has provided 
a new avenue through which to investigate two thinkers’ philosophies. There is no 
reason why there cannot be further discussion of time in Russian philosophy, or, 
indeed, further discussion of the question of history, whether through such major and 
very different figures as, for example, Fedorov, Frank or Bakhtin, or through lesser 
known Silver Age philosophers, such as Ern, whose messianic philosophy has much 
to say about time, history and temporality as crisis. Indeed, an attempt to write a 
broader account of the theme of time and history across Silver Age thought could 
elucidate the larger relevance of this theme to Russian thought as a whole, and also 
demonstrate further how Russian thought plays its part in the European intellectual 
and cultural tradition.   
  
352 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary (Berdiaev and Bulgakov) 
 
Berdiaev, N. A, ‘Tipy religioznoi mysli v Rossii: Vozrozhdenie pravoslaviia’, Russkaia 
mysl’, (1916), in Evlampiev, I. I. (ed.), S.N. Bulgakov: Pro et Contra. Lichnost’ i 
tvorchestvo Bulgakova v otsenke russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei. Antologiia, vol. 
1 (St Petersburg, 2003), pp. 748-81. 
 
Smysl tvorchestva. Opyt opravdanii cheloveka (1916), in N. A. Berdiaev, 
Filosofiia svobody. Smysl tvorchestva (Moscow, 1989), pp. 251-580. 
 
Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo (Prague, 1923). 
 
Novoe srednevekov’e. Razmyshlenie o sud’be Rossii i Evropy (1924) 
in Berdiaev, N.       A., Smysl istorii. Novoe srednevekov’e (Moskva, 2002), pp. 219-
310. 
 
Konstantin Leontʹev. Ocherk iz istorii russkoi religioznoi mysli (Paris, 
1926). 
 
Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha. Problematika i apologia khristianstva 
(1927-1928), in N.A. Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (Moscow, 1994), pp. 13-
228. 
 
O naznachenii cheloveka. Opyt paradoksal’noi etiki (1931), in N. A. 
Berdiaev, O naznachenii cheloveka. Opyt paradoksal’noi etiki (Moscow, 1993) pp. 
19-252. 
 
Ia i mir obʺektov. Opyt filosofii odinochestva i obshcheniia (1934), in 
N.A. Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (Moscow, 1994), pp. 230-316. 
 
Sudʹba cheloveka v sovremennom mire. K ponimaniiu nashei epokhi 
(1934), in N.A. Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (Moscow, 1994), pp. 317-62. 
 
Dukh i real’nost’. Osnovy bogochelovecheskoi dukhovnosti (1937), in 
N.A. Berdiaev, Filosofiia svobodnogo dukha (Moscow, 1994), pp. 363-461. 
 
‘Vladimir Solov’ev i my’ (1937), in Burlaka, D. K., (ed.), Vl. Solov’ev: pro 
et contra. Lichnost’ i tvorchestva Vladimira Solov’eva v otsenke russkikh myslitelei i 
issledovatelei, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 176-81.  
 
O rabstve i svobode cheloveka (Opyt personalisticheskoi filosofii) 
(1939), in N.A. Berdiaev, Tsarstvo dukha i tsarstvo kesaria (Moskva, 1995), pp. 3-
162. 
 
Opyt eskhatologicheskoi metafiziki. (Tvorchestvo i obʺektivatsiia) (Paris, 
1947). 
 
353 
 
Ekzistentsial’naia dialektika bozhestvennogo i chelovecheskogo (1947), 
in N. A.  Berdiaev, O naznachenii cheloveka. Opyt paradoksal’noi etiki (Moscow, 
1993) pp. 253-357.  
 
Samopoznanie. Opyt filosofskoi avtobiografii, in Nikolai Berdiaev, 
Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1 (Paris, 1949-1983). 
 
Tsarstvo dukha i tsarstvo kesaria (1949), in N. A. Berdiaev, Tsarstvo 
dukha i tsarstvo kesaria (Moscow, 1995), pp. 287-356. 
 
Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma (Paris, 1955). 
 
Bulgakov, S. N., Ot marksizma. Stat’i i retsenzii, 1895-1903 (Moscow, 2006). 
 
              Dva grada. Issledovaniia o prirode obshchestvennykh idealov (St 
Petersburg, 1997). 
 
              Filosofiia khoziaistva (Moscow, 1990). 
 
 Svet nevechernii. Sozertsaniia i umozreniia (Moscow, 1994). 
 
 ‘Na piru bogov’, in Iz glubiny. Sbornik statei o russkoi revoliutsii 
(Moscow, 1990), pp. 90-144. 
 
 
Primary (other) 
 
Aristotle, Aristotle's Physics: Books 3 and 4, Translated by Edward Hussey (Oxford 
1983). 
 
Bakhtin, M. M., Avtor i geroi. K filosofskim osnovam gumanitarnykh nauk (St. 
Petersburg, 2000). 
  
        ‘Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel’, in Bakhtin, M. M., 
The Dialogic Imagination, Translated by Caryl Emerson and Micheal Holquist (Austin, 
1981), pp. 84-258. 
 
 
Bergson, H., An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T.E. Hulme (London, 1913). 
 
Berkeley, G., The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1843), in George 
Pitcher, Berkeley (London, 1977). 
 
Chaadaev, P. Ia., Sochineniia (Moscow, 1989). 
 
Danilevskii, N. Ia., Rossia i Evropa. Vzgliad na kul’turnye i politicheskie otnosheniia 
slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu (St. Petersburg, 1995). 
 
Dostoevskii, F. M., Idiot. Roman v chetyrekh chastyakh. Chasti tret’ia i chetvertaia 
(Moscow, 1971). 
354 
 
 
Gertsen, A. I., Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1946), 
 
Hegel, G. W. F., Lectures on the Philosophy of History, translated from the third 
German edition by J. Sibree (London, 1857). 
 
 Phenomenology of Spirit, Translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1977). 
 
Heidegger, M., Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Oxford, 1995). 
 
Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford, 2000). 
 
James, W., The Dilemma of Determinism (1884). 
 
Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason: A revised and expanded translation based on 
Meiklejohn, edited by Vasilis Politis (London, 1993). 
 
Karsavin, L. P., ‘N. A. Berdiaev. “Smysl istorii. Opyt filosofii chelovecheskoi sudʹby.” 
“Konets Renessansa. (K sovremennomu krizisu kul’tury)”’, (1923), in Ermichev, A. A. 
[ed.], N.A. Berdiaev: pro et contra. Antologiia, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1994), pp. 327-
30. 
 
Lenin, V. I., Materializm i empiriokrititsizm, in Lenin, V. I., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 
5th edition, vol. 18 (Moscow, 1961), pp. 7-384. 
 
Leont’ev, K. Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo. Filosofskaia i politicheskaia publitsistika 
(Moscow, 1996). 
 
       Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem v dvenadtsati tomakh, vol. 7, book 2 
(St. Petersburg, 2006). 
 
Marx, K., Engels, F., The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition (London, 1998). 
 
 The German Ideology (1844), in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: 
Selected Writings (Oxford, 2000), pp. 175-211. 
 
McTaggart, J. E. ‘The Unreality of Time’, (1908), in L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.) The 
Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. The Reality and Language of 
Time, vol. 1 (Abingdon, 2008), pp. 21-35. 
 
Mesiter Eckhart, ‘Sermon XII, Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt, animam autem 
occidere non possunt’ (1300-1327), in James M. Clark, Meister Eckhart: An 
Introduction to the Study of his Works with an Anthology of his Sermons (Edinburgh, 
1957), pp. 182-84. 
      
    ‘Sermon 20: Qui audit me non confundetur’ (1300-1327), in Clark, J. 
M., Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Study of his Works with an Anthology of 
his Sermons (Edinburgh, 1957), pp. 223-27. 
 
355 
 
Newton, Sir I., The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1729), in H.G. 
Alexander, H. G. [ed.], The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence: Together with Extracts 
from Newton’s Principia and Opticks (Manchester, 1956), pp. 143-71. 
 
Nietzsche, F. W., Thus Spoke Zarathrustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, 
Translated by R. J. Hollingdale (London, 2003). 
 
Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis, 2000). 
 
Plotinus, Enneads, Translated by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1966-1988). 
 
Reichenbach, H., The Direction of Time (Berkeley,1956). 
 
Rozanov, V. V., ‘Novaia religiozno-filosofskaia kontseptsiia. Nikolai Berdiaev “Smysl 
tvorchestva. Opyt opravdaniia cheloveka”, in Ermichev, A. A. (ed.), N.A. Berdiaev: 
pro et contra. Antologiia, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1994), pp. 261-269. 
 
Saint Augustine, Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick (Oxford, 1992). 
 
Tillich, P., The Interpretation of History (New York, 1936). 
 
Tolstoi, L.N., ‘Smert’ Ivan Il’icha’, Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 12 (Moscow 1964), pp. 
57-115. 
 
Schelling, F. W. J., Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Second Edition, 1803. 
Translated by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Camrbidge, 1988) 
 
Shestov, L., ‘Umozrenie i Apokalipsis’ (1927), in Burlaka, D. K., (ed.), Vl. Solov’ev: 
pro et contra. Lichnost’ i tvorchestva Vladimira Solov’eva v otsenke russkikh 
myslitelei i issledovatelei, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 467-530 
 
Voronov, E., 'Sergei Bulgakov. Ot marksizma k idealizmu’, (1904), in Bulgakov, S. N., 
Ot marksizma k idealizmu. Stat’i i retsenzii, 1895-1903 (Moscow, 2006), pp. 815-16. 
 
The King James Bible (Edinburgh, 1855). 
 
 
  
356 
 
Secondary 
 
Afanas’eva, Z.G., ‘Razvitie V. I. Leninym marksistskoi teorii klassovoi bor’by v kontse 
XIX veka i kritika “legal’nogo marksizma”’, in Vasetskii, G. S., et al. (eds.) Ocherki po 
istorii filosofii v Rossi. Vtoraia polovina XIX i nachalo XX veka (Moscow, 1960), pp. 
177-200. 
 
Augustyn, L., ‘Utopia and history. Some remarks about Nikolai Berdjaev’s struggle 
with history’, Studies in East European Thought, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010), pp. 71-79. 
 
Bardi, J. S., The Calculus Wars: Newton, Leibniz, and the Greatest Mathematical 
Clash of All Time (New York, 2006). 
 
Barr, J., Biblical Words for Time (London, 1962). 
 
Bazhov, S. I., Filosofiia istorii N. Ia. Danilevskogo (Moscow, 1997). 
 
Beer, D., Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal 
Modernity, 1880-1930 (Cornell, 2008), p.33. 
 
Berman, M., All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York, 
1982). 
 
Blackledge, P., ‘Leon Trotsky’s Contribution to the Marxist Theory of History’, 
Studies in East European Thought, vol. 58, no. 1 (March 2006), pp. 1-31. 
 
Blank, K., ‘The Rabbit and The Duck: Antinomic unity in Dostoevskij, the Russian 
religious tradition, and Mikhail Bakhtin’, Studies in East European Thought, vol. 59 
no. 1 (June 2007), pp. 21-37. 
 
Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism (Cambridge, 1999). 
 
Bochkarev, N. I., ‘Nekotorye voprosy kritiki V. I. Leninym ideologii burzhuaznogo 
liberalizma v Rossii (1907-1914 gg.)’, in Vasetskii, G. S., et al. (eds) Ocherki po 
istorii filosofii v Rossi. Vtoraia polovina XIX i nachalo XX veka (Moscow, 1960), pp. 
201-23. 
 
Bonetskaia, N. K., ‘Apofeoz tvorchestva (N. Berdiaev i F. Nitsshe)’, Voprosy filosofii 
(2009), No.4, pp. 85-106. 
 
Bonner Richardson, D., Berdyaev’s Philosophy of History: An Existential Theory of 
Social Creativity and Eschatology (The Hague, 1968).  
 
Butterfield, J. (ed.), The Arguments of Time (Oxford, 2006). 
 
Burns, R. M, ‘On Philosophizing about History’, in Burns, R. M., Rayment-Pickard, H. 
(eds), Philosophies of History: From Enlightenment to Postmodernity (Oxford, 2000), 
pp. 1-29. 
357 
 
 
Burt, P. V., ‘Russian Philosophy without Apology’, in Vysheslavtsev, B. P., The 
Eternal in Russian Philosophy, translated by Penelope V. Burt (Grand Rapids, 2002), 
pp. vii-xi. 
 
Calian, C. S.  Berdyaev’s Philosophy of Hope: A Contribution to Marxist-Christian 
Dialogue (Leiden, 1968). 
 
Callahan, J. F., Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge (Harvard), 
1948). 
 
Chamberlain, L., Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the Philosophy Steamer and 
the Exile of the Intelligentsia (New York, 2006). 
 
Clark, J. M., Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Study of his Works with an 
Anthology of his Sermons (Edinburgh, 1957). 
 
Clarke, O. F., Introduction to Berdyaev (London, 1950). 
 
Clowes, E. W., Fiction’s Overcoat: Russian Literary Culture and the Question of 
Philosophy (New York, 2004). 
 
Copleston, F. C., Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev (Notre 
Dame, 1986) 
 
               Russian Religious Philosophy: Selected Aspects (Tunbridge Wells, 
1988). 
 
Courten, M. de, History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment of 
Vladimir Solovʹev’s Views on History and his Social Commitment (Bern, 2004). 
 
Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9 (1998, London). 
 
Crone, A. L., Eros and Creativity in Russian Religious Renewal: The Philosophers 
and the Freudians (Leiden, 2010). 
 
Davy, M.-M., Nicolas Berdyaev: Man of the Eighth Day, translated by Leonora 
Siepman (London, 1967). 
 
Disalle, R., Understanding Space-Time: The Philosophical Development of Physics 
from Newton to Einstein (Cambridge, 2006). 
 
Dobieszewski, J., ‘Neoplatonic tendencies in Russian philosophy’, Studies in East 
European Thought, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010), pp. 3-10. 
 
Dobrokhotov, A. L.  ‘Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev’, in Dobrokhotov, A. L., et al., 
Russkie filosofy. Konets XIX – seredina XX veka (Moscow, 1993), pp. 48-55. 
 
Duncan, P., Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After 
(London, 2000). 
358 
 
 
Dvoretskaia, E. V., ‘Stanovlenie “my” v zapadnoi i russkoi personalisticheskoi filosofii: 
Levinas i Berdiaev’, in Anan’eva, E. M., et al., Russkaia i evropeiskaia filosofiia: puti 
skhozhdeniia. Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii (St. Petersburg, 1999), pp. 93-98. 
 
Evgrafov, V. E., et al. (eds), Istoriia filosofii v SSSR, 5 Vols (Moscow, 1968-88). 
 
Evlampiev, I. I. , ‘Religioznyi idealizm s. n. bulgakova: “za” i “protiv”’, in Evlampiev, I.I. 
(ed.), S.N. Bulgakov: Pro et Contra. Lichnost’ i tvorchestvo Bulgakova v otsenke 
russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei. Antologiia. vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 2003), pp. 7-59. 
 
Evtuhov, C., The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian 
Religious Philosophy  (Ithaca, 1997). 
 
         ‘Introduction’, in Sergei Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy: The World as 
Household, trans. C. Evtuhov (New Haven, 2000), pp. 1-32. 
 
Evtukhov, E., ‘O snoskakh Bulgakova (ideinyi kontekst “Filosofii khoziaistva”)’, in 
Vasil’eva, M. A., Kozyrev, A. P. (eds), S. N. Bulgakov. Religiozno-filosofskii put’ 
(Moscow, 2003), pp. 140-54. 
 
Fink, H., Bergson and Russian Modernism, 1900-1930 (Evanston, 1990). 
 
Fudel’, S. I., Ob O. Pavle Florenskom, (Paris, 1988). 
 
Futch, M. J., Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space (Boston, 2008). 
 
Garaeva, G. F., Sofiinyi idealizm kak istoriko-filosofskii fenomen (Moscow, 2000). 
 
Gavrilyuk, P. L., ‘Universal Salvation in the Eschatology of Sergius Bulgakov’, 
Journal of Theological Studies, NS, vol. 57, no. 1 (2006), pp. 110-32. 
 
Gerson, L. P., Plotinus (London, 1994). 
 
Gęścińska, A. A., Lepez, S., ‘Freedom as praxis: a comparative analysis of August 
Cieszkowski and Nikolaj Berdjaev’, Studies in East European Thought, vol. 62, no. 1 
(2010), pp. 109-23. 
 
Goodman, L. E., Avicenna (London, 1992). 
 
Gonzalez, J., ‘In pursuit of a historical tradition: N. A. Rozhkov’s scientific laws of 
history’, Studies in East European Thought, vol. 59, no. 4 (October 2007), pp. 309-46. 
 
Gottlieb, C., Dilemmas of Reaction in Leninist Russia: The Christian Response to the 
Revolution in the Works of N.A. Berdyaev 1917-1924 (Odense, 2003). 
 
Gray, C., The Russian Experiment in Art, 1863-1922, Revised edition (London, 
1986). 
 
Grayling, A. C., Berkeley: The Central Arguments (La Salle, 1986). 
359 
 
 
Haimson, L., The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism (London, 1955). 
 
Halfin, I., From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness and Salvation in 
Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh, 2000). 
 
Hamburg, G. M., Poole, R. A., A History of Russian Philosophy (Cambridge, 2010). 
 
Hamilton, P., Historicism (London, 1996). 
 
Hawking, S. W., A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (London, 
1988). 
 
Helm, P., Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, Second Edition (Oxford, 2010). 
 
Holquist, M., Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World (London, 1990). 
 
Hook, S., From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, 
Morningside Edition (New York, 1994). 
 
Iakovets, U. V., ‘Paradoks S.N. Bulgakova: Otritsanie istoricheskikh zakonov i 
predskazanii – ili dar predvideniia?’ in Osipova, U. M., Kul’kova, V. M., Zotovoi, E. S. 
(eds), Preodolenie Vremeni. Po materialam mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, 
posviashchennoi tvorcheskomu naslediiu S.N. Bulgakova (Moscow, 1998), pp. 33-41. 
 
Jenkins, K., Re-thinking History (London, 1991). 
 
Kamenskii, Z. A., Zhukov, V. A., Kant i Filosofiia v Rossii (Moscow, 1994). 
 
Kennedy, J. B., Space, Time and Einstein: An Introduction (Chesham, 2003). 
 
Khoruzhii, S. S., Mirosozertsanie florenskogo (Tomsk, 1999). 
 
              ‘Sofiia – Kosmos – materiia: ustoi filosofskoi mysli ottsa Sergiia 
Bulgakova’, in I. I. Evlampiev, (ed.), S.N. Bulgakov: pro et contra. Lichnost’ i 
tvorchestvo Bulgakova v otsenke russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei. Antologiia, vol. 
1 (St Petersburg, 2003), pp. 818-53. 
 
Knuuttila, S., ‘Time and creation in Augustine’, in Stump, E., Kretzmann, N. (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 103-115. 
 
Kornblatt, J. D., ‘Eschatology and Hope in Silver Age Thought’, in Hamburg, G. M., 
Poole, R. A., A History of Russia Philosophy 1830-1930: Faith, Reason, and the 
Defense of Human Dignity (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 285-301. 
 
Korol’kova, E. A., ‘Ia. Beme i russkaia sofiologicheskaia mysl’’, in Ananʹeva, E. M., et 
al., Russkaia i evropeiskaia filosofiia: puti skhozhdeniia. Materialy nauchnoi 
konferentsii (St. Petersburg, 1999), pp. 9-11. 
 
360 
 
Koselleck, R., Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. K. Tribe 
(New York, 2004). 
 
Krasicki, J., ‘‘‘The tragedy’’ of German philosophy. Remarks on reception of German 
philosophy in the Russian religious thought (of S. Bulgakov and others)’, Studies in 
East European Thought, vol. 62, no. 1 (February 2010), pp. 63-70. 
 
Kuvakin, V. A., Kritika ekzistentsializma Berdiaeva (Moscow, 1976). 
 
Lampert, E., Nicolas Berdyaev and the new Middle Ages (London, 1945). 
 
Le Poidevin, R., MacBeath, M. (eds), The Philosophy of Time (Oxford, 1993). 
 
Leskov, L.V., ‘Sofiinost’ filosofii khoziaistva Bulgakova: sinergeticheskaia 
interpretatsiia’, in Trubnitsyna, T. G., Nedzvetskaia N. P., (eds), Dva Bulgakova. 
Raznye sudby, vol. 1 (Moscow, 2002), pp. 71-82. 
 
Loemker, L. E., ‘Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion’, The Personalist Forum, 
vol. 9, no. 1 (1993), pp. 19-33. 
 
Losskii, N. O., Istoriia russkoi filosofii (Moscow, 1994). 
 
Lössl, J., ‘“Apocalypse? No.” – The Power of Millennialism and its Transformation in 
Late Antique Christianity’, in Cain, A., Lenski, N., (eds), The Power of Religion in 
Late Antiquity (Farnham, 2009), pp. 31-44. 
 
Louth, A., ‘Sergii Bulgakov and the Task of Theology’, Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. 
74 (2009), pp. 243-257. 
 
Lowrie, D. A., Rebellious Prophet: A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev (London, 1960). 
 
MacMaster, R. E., Danlivesky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher (Cambridge 
(Harvard), 1967). 
 
Martin, G., Past Futures: The Impossible Necessity of History (Toronto, 2004). 
 
Majumdar, D., Plotinus on the Appearance of Time and the World of Sense: A 
Pantomime (Aldershot, 2007). 
 
Magee, B., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford, 1983 [Revised 1997]). 
 
Malinov, A. V., ‘Istoriia filosofii kak filosofiia istorii’, in Zamaleev, A. F. (ed.), Russkaia 
Filosofiia. Novye issledovaniia i materialy. Problemy metodologii i metodiki (Sankt-
Peterburg, 2001), pp. 191-195. 
 
            Filosofiia istorii v Rossii XVIII veka (St. Petersburg, 2003). 
 
McGrath, A. E., Christian Theology: An Introduction, Second Edition (Malden, 1998). 
 
361 
 
McKeon, R., “Time and Temporality”, Philosophy East and West, vol. 24, no. 2 (April 
1974), pp. 123-28. 
 
Meerson, M. A., ‘Sergei Bulgakov’s Philosophy of Personality,’ in Kornblatt, J. D., 
Gustafson, R. F. (eds), Russian Religious Thought (Wisconsin, 1996), pp. 139-53. 
 
Melikh, Iu. B., ‘Sushchee lichnosti i lichnostnost’ edinosushchego. K voprosu o 
spornosti personalizma u L.P Karsavina i N.A. Berdiaeva’, Voprosy filosofii, no. 8 
(2008), pp. 145-57. 
 
Monakhinia, E., ‘Professor protoierei sergii bulgakov (1871-1944)’, in Bulgakov, S., 
Dva grada. Issledovaniia o prirode obshchestvennykh idealov (St Petersburg, 1997), 
pp. 353-414. 
 
Motroshilova, N. V.  Mysliteli Rossii i filosofiia zapada. V. Solovʹev, N. Berdiaev, S. 
Frank, L. Shestov (Moscow, 2006). 
 
Neuhouser, F., Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, 1990). 
 
Nichols OP, A., ‘Wisdom from Above? The Sophiology of Father Sergius Bulgakov’ 
New Blackfriars, vol. 85, issue 1000 (2004), pp. 598-613. 
 
Oaklander, N., (ed.) The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, 4 vols 
(Abingdon, 2008). 
 
Offord, D., The Russian revolutionary Movement in the 1880s (Cambridge, 1986). 
 
Peachey, G., Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World (London, 2007). 
 
Pearson, K. A., Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time 
of Life (London, 2002). 
 
Pitcher, G., Berkeley (London, 1977). 
 
Polovinkin, S. M., ‘P. A. Florenskii: Logos protiv Khaosa’ in D. K. Burlaka, P. A. 
Florenskii: Pro et contra. Lichnost’ i tvorchestvo Pavla Florenskogo v otsenke russkix 
myslitelei i issledovatelei (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 625-648. 
 
Poltoratzky, N. P., ‘Nikolay Berdyayev’s Interpretation of Russia’s Historical Mission’, 
The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 45, no. 104 (1967),  pp. 193-206. 
 
Poltoratskii, N. P., Berdiaev i Rossiia. Filosofiia istorii Rossii u N. A. Berdiaeva (New 
York, 1967). 
 
Poole, R.A., Problems of Idealism: Essays in Russian Social Philosophy (New 
Haven, 2003). 
 
Popov, S. I., ‘Bor’ba V. I. Lenina protiv neokantianskoi revizii marksistskoi filosofii i 
znachenie etoi bor’boi dlia sovremennosti’, in Vasetskii, G. S., et al. (eds) Ocherki po 
362 
 
istorii filosofii v Rossi. Vtoraia polovina XIX i nachalo XX veka (Moscow, 1960), pp. 
224-49. 
 
Popper, K. R., The Poverty of Historicism (London, 1957). 
 
Pustarnakov, V. F., ‘O zamysle knigi, xode raboty nad nei i nekotorykh itogakh 
issledovaniia’, in Pustarnakov, V. F. (ed.), Filosofiia Shellinga v Rossii (St. 
Petersburg, 1998), pp. 3-12. 
 
Pyman, A., Pavel Floresnky: A Quiet Genius. The Tragic and Extraordinary Life of 
Russia’s Unknown Da Vinci (London, 2010). 
 
Read, C., Religion, Revolution and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900-1912 (London, 
1979). 
 
Remes, P., Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the ‘We’ (Cambridge, 2007). 
 
Ricoeur, P., History and Truth, Translated by Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, 1965). 
 
Roberts, D. D., Nothing but History: Reconstruction and Extremity after Metaphysics 
(Berkeley, 1995). 
 
Rodnianskaia, I. B., ‘Bulgakov v spore s marksistkoi filosofiei istorii: ottalkivaniia I 
pritiazheniia’, in Evlampiev, I. I.  (ed.), S. N. Bulgakov: Pro et Contra. Lichnost’ i 
tvorchestvo Bulgakova v otsenke russkikh myslitelei i issledovatelei. Antologiia, vol. 
1 (St Petersburg, 2003), pp. 885-901. 
 
Sapronov, P. A., Russkaia Filosofiia. Opyt tipologicheskoi xarakteristiki (St. 
Petersburg, 2000). 
 
Saul Morson, G., Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (New Haven, 1994). 
 
Seaver, G., Nicolas Berdyaev: An introduction to his Thought (London, 1950). 
 
Sergeev, M., Sophiology in Russian Orthodoxy: Solovʹev, Bulgakov, Losskii and 
Berdiaev (New York, 2006). 
 
Slaate, H. A., Time, Existence and Destiny: Nicholas Berdyaev’s Philosophy of Time 
(New York, 1988) 
 
Sorabji, R., Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages (New York, 1986). 
 
Steinberg, M., Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 
1910-1925 (Ithaca, 2002). 
 
Styczński, M., ‘Sergei Hessen, Neo-Kantian: Dedicated to Professor Andrzej Walicki’, 
Studies in East European Thought, vol. 56, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 55-71. 
 
363 
 
 ‘Berdjaev: authentic existence or a negative sociology’, Studies in East 
European Thought, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010), pp. 81-91. 
 
Stöckl, K., ‘Modernity and its Critique in 20th century Russian Orthodox Thought’, 
Studies in East European Thought, vol. 58, no. 4 (December 2006), pp. 243-269. 
 
Stump, E., Kretzmann, N., ‘Eternity’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 78, no. 8 (1981), 
pp. 429-53. 
 
Tihanov, G., ‘Continuities in the Soviet Period’, in William Leatherbarrow and Derek 
Offord (eds), A History of Russian Thought (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 311-39. 
 
Tillich, P., ‘Existential Philosophy’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 5 (1944), No. 
1, pp. 44-70. 
 
Vaganova, N. A., Sofiologiia protoiereia Sergiia Bulgakova (Moscow, 2010). 
 
Valliere, P., ‘Sophiology as the dialogue of Orthodoxy with Modern Civilisation’, in 
Kornblatt, J. D., Gustafson, R. F. (eds), Russian Religious Thought (Wisconsin, 
1996), pp. 176-92. 
 
Modern Russian Theology, Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox 
Theology in a New Key (Edinburgh, 2000). 
 
Vizgin, V. P., ‘Nikolai Berdiaev i Gabriel’ Marsel’: k fenomenu vstrechi’, Voprosy 
filosofii, no. 3 (2010), pp.110-118 
 
Volkogonova, O., Berdiaev (Moscow, 2010). 
 
Wachtel, A. B., An Obsession with History: Russian Writers Confront the Past 
(Stanford, 1994). 
 
Walicki, A., The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in 
Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought, Translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka 
(Oxford, 1975). 
 
A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism, 
Translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford, 1979). 
 
‘Milestones and Russian intellectual history’, Studies in East European 
Thought, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010), pp. 101-07. 
 
Waterfield, R., ‘Introduction’, in Plato, Republic, Translated by Robin Waterfield 
(Oxford, 1993), pp.xi-lxii. 
 
Wernham, J. C. S., Two Russian Thinkers: An Essay in Berdyaev and Shestov 
(Toronto, 1968). 
 
364 
 
White, H., Tropics of Discourse: Essay in Cultural Criticism (London, 1978). 
 
Usachev, A. V., ‘Funktsii poniatia Nichto v knige S. Bulgakova “Svet nevechernii”’ in 
Trubnitsyna, T. G., Nedzvetskaia N. P., (eds),  Dva Bulgakova. Raznye sudby, vol. 1 
(Moscow, 2002) pp. 197-213.  
 
Zen’kovskii, V. V., Istoriia russkoi filosofii, vol. 2, part 2, (Leningrad, 1991). 
 
